A U.S. Foreign Policy That Needs Realism And Pragmatism

By Robert Kagan
This opinion was published in The Washington Post on 29/04/2011 

A number of articles over the past few months have reported that inside the Obama administration, camps of alleged “idealists” and alleged “pragmatists” have been dueling over how to respond to the revolutionary upheaval in the Arab world. According to these accounts, the “pragmatists” worry about American interests and have therefore been cautious about moving away from the long-standing dictatorships in the region. Thus the New York Times explained that, in Egypt, “diplomats at the State Department” favored standing by then-President Hosni Mubarak because they viewed “the Egyptian crisis through the lens of American strategic interests in the region.” 

The assumption is that the “idealists” don’t care as much about American interests. They just want the United States to live up to its principles and get on the right side of history — no matter what the strategic costs. 

This, of course, is nonsense. For one thing, nations, like individuals, rarely act purely on principle or purely out of self-interest. Nor can national interests be so neatly defined. Access to oil is an interest, but so is the promotion of certain principles, including democracy. The pragmatic Dean Acheson, then secretary of state, never doubted that promoting democracy in Europe after World War II was profoundly in America’s interest.

In his fine book, “Ideals and Self-Interest in America’s Foreign Relations,” the late Robert Osgood made a powerful case for the realist approach to international affairs. But he emphasized that idealism had always been “an indispensable spur to reason” in the making of foreign policy. As an example, he noted that those who had argued for a strict focus only on America’s self-interest prior to World War II and had recommended staying out of the war proved “the most blind to the real requirements of American self-interest.” The “idealists,” on the other hand, who were most alarmed by the threat of fascism to Western liberal society, immediately saw the necessity of coming to the defense of the democracies in Europe, on whose survival American security depended. 

The question today is: What constitutes pragmatism in today’s Middle East? Was sticking with Mubarak a pragmatic, realistic option? By the time the Obama administration got around to supporting Mubarak’s departure — after two years of “pragmatically” supporting him — he was already finished. His refusal to make even modest political reforms doomed him, and in the end it was the Egyptian people, not the United States, who pushed him out. Did the “pragmatists” want us to try to help Mubarak stay in power even as great numbers of his people took to the streets, and even as his own military refused to carry out his orders? Would that have served American strategic interests?

We tried that approach before. In the late 1970s, the Carter administration stood by the shah of Iran until the bitter end. That policy did not prevent, and may have aided, the course of radical revolution in Iran and the triumph of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini— a strategic setback for the United States that dwarfs anything that has happened since in the Middle East.

The “idealists” who argued for Mubarak’s departure in February were just as concerned about America’s strategic interests as those who opposed it. Their pragmatic judgment was that clinging to a failing dictatorship as it struggled brutally to remain in power could only radicalize otherwise moderate Egyptians. They calculated that it was better to prepare for the inevitable next phase of Egypt’s political evolution than to try futilely to stop it.

This applies throughout the region. It is not pragmatic to cling to the status quo in a revolutionary era. The “pragmatists” worry about the risks of easing dictators from power and fear what may come after. They are right to worry. But we should not underestimate the risks of placing American power behind the dictatorships in their struggle with an aroused people. Recent polls show many Egyptians do not like the United States, but given our complicity in their long repression, it is not surprising. Nor should we be shocked to learn that the people of a new Egypt tend to oppose any policy they associate with the Mubarak dictatorship, including peace with Israel. 

We are also paying another price. The Muslim Brotherhood is the strongest political force in Egypt today because Mubarak crushed the moderate, secular opposition. And we let him. 

So as we look today at the other revolutionary crises — in Bahrain and Yemen, as well as in Syria and Saudi Arabia — let us not fall into the trap of thinking that the apparently “pragmatic” course is really the safest. It is time again to let our reason be guided by our ideals.

Robert Kagan, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes a monthly column for The Post.

The Future Of Al-Nahda In Tunisia

By Rajaa Basly
This commentary was published in The Daily Star on 29/04/2011

Among the many results of the “Tunisian Revolution for Dignity and Freedom,” as Tunisians have taken to calling it, has been the legalization of previously banned political parties.

Arguably the most influential party in Tunisia’s new political scene is Al-Nahda (Renaissance), which was previously not allowed to function legally due to its Islamist nature and was subject to strong repression in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Its founder Rashid Ghannouchi returned from exile in London on Jan. 30, shortly after former President Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali’s departure, in order to reconfigure the party for political participation on a level playing field.

The revolution cast aside previous laws, and Al-Nahda was officially legalized by decree of the interim government on March 1, despite the fact that Article 8 of the Constitution (which is due to be rewritten) prohibits political parties based on religion. From 1992 to 2011, Al-Nahda was almost completely absent from Tunisia, and played no part in the overthrow of the authoritarian regime that had stifled any serious opposition to the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD). The removal of the RCD left a political vacuum in a country with a young, underemployed population.

Although this would seem to be a field ripe for Al-Nahda recruitment, many Tunisians are cautious about the Islamist party. The youth who led the revolution have never known anything but single-party dictatorship under Ben Ali, and were not exposed to the ideas of Al-Nahda. The Tunisian middle class is wary of Al-Nahda, which has been accused of extremism and terrorism, in particular following the incidents in the early 1990s, when Al-Nahda activists attacked an RCD office in a Tunis neighborhood, killing one civilian, and threw acid in the faces of certain individuals. The shock of these incidents still resonates today, and Ghannouchi has recently admitted that party members committed mistakes in the past, though he stressed that those were individual acts not authorized by the party leadership.

Al-Nahda entered the new era with a flexible political discourse, seeking to turn over a new page and provide reassurance that it is committed to the values of democracy, human rights, non-violence and the personal status code, which bans polygamy and provides for gender equality. The daily Le Temps reported on Feb. 6 that Ghannouchi stated that the personal status code is derived from Shariah (Islamic law), polygamy has been determined to be illegal, the hijab (headscarf) is a personal choice, and stoning and amputation cannot be carried out as punishments. There are some indicators, however, that Al-Nahda’s stance is not so clear, including a Feb. 17 interview in which Al-Nahda spokesman Hamadi Jebali denied having aims to implement Shariah law on one hand then went on to confirm the party’s adherence to it during the same conversation.

Al-Nahda has joined the Committee for the Protection of the Revolution formed in response to ongoing protests, which draws together at least 28 separate organizations including the General Union of Tunisian Workers and leftist movements. This dynamic coalition has strengthened the hand of protesters who forced the resignation of two Cabinets viewed as too closely affiliated with the Ben Ali regime.

Al-Nahda also criticized the government formed by Beji Caid Essebsi on Feb. 27 in response to persistent protests. Ghannouchi in particular has traded barbs with Essebsi, who held a number of prominent positions in the Ben Ali era. Ghannouchi described the 84-year-old Essebsi as having been dusted off and brought out of the archives, and Essebsi on the day of his inauguration retorted that the 70-year-old Ghannouchi was also from the archives, just a different box. Al-Nahda has chosen to side with the crowds against the remnants of the former regime, the makeup of the troubled government, its lackluster performance, and its reluctance to make bold decisions keeping pace with the momentum of the popular revolution.

In this context, the formation of the democratic transformation committees has been a topic of much debate. Three committees were formed initially of nonpartisan specialists: the Political Reform Committee, the Fact-Finding Committee for Excesses and Violations during Recent Events (although no timeframe is set for “recent events”), and the Fact-Finding Committee for Cases of Embezzlement and Corruption. Tunisia’s political elite has been particularly interested in the work of the Political Reform Committee because of its role in formulating the transitional laws, including the electoral code.

The Islamists officially requested a presence on the Political Reform Committee, which other groups within the Committee for the Protection of the Revolution demanded should be given executive powers. The government acquiesced and in a Feb. 18 decree renamed it the Higher Authority for the Achievement of the Revolution Objectives, Political Reform and Transition to Democracy, and added representatives from political parties such as Al-Nahda and civil society organizations, as well as other prominent figures.

Although Al-Nahda has succeeded in establishing itself within the coalition pushing to consolidate the revolution, it is still challenged by internal rifts and competition from other Islamists. Disputes surfaced as the younger generation of Al-Nahda members forced founding member Abd al-Fattah Morou from the leadership body in light of demands that Al-Nahda be more self-critical regarding the violence it committed in the 1991 Bab Souieka incident. Morou is now openly criticizing Al-Nahda and planning to form an independent party. In addition, the official composition of Al-Nahda’s executive bureau has seen significant changes, including Rashid Ghannouchi’s announcement from London that he was stepping aside from active leadership in favor of spokesman Hamadi Jebali.

Fragmentation is a real threat for Al-Nahda; some 50 political parties have been legalized, some of which are openly Islamist in orientation and thus are potential competitors for Al-Nahda’s traditional constituency. Al-Nahda is also faced with unexpected emergence of a Salafist youth movement, particularly Hizb al-Tahrir, which was denied legal status by the government after it openly proclaimed its primary objective to be forming an Islamic Caliphate and abolishing political parties. This growth of fundamentalist Salafism puts Al-Nahda in an awkward position, and may force it to reposition itself after the Salafists have led demonstrations chanting bigoted and anti-Semitic slogans, and attacked liquor stores and unveiled women.

The question of the relationship between religion and state remains one of the core unresolved issues, and Al-Nahda may have to clarify its stance on the state’s secularism in the future. It has categorically rejected the separation of religion and state, but is now presenting itself as the equivalent of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, which operates in the framework of a constitutionally secular state. Tunisian identity and Article 1 of the Constitution, which says that the religion of Tunisia is Islam, are sure to be hotly contested up through the legislative elections scheduled for July 24, when the Second Republic’s overall political and ideological direction will become clearer.

For the first time in Tunisia’s history, licensed Islamist parties will take part in elections, bringing a new dynamic into political life. Tunisians will have to balance between modernism and traditionalism so as not to fall into extremism on either end.

Rajaa Basly is secretary-general of Génération Tunisie Libre. This commentary, translated from the Arabic by Paul Wulfsberg, is reprinted with permission from the Arab Reform Bulletin. It can be accessed online at: www.carnegieendowment.org/arb, © 2011, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

European Foreign Policy After Libya

By Vaira Vike-Freiberga and Antonio Vitorino

This commentary was published in The Jordan Times on 29/04/2011

 

If an encouraging message is to be found in the creation of an international coalition to protect Libya’s civilian population, it is that Europe still counts for something on the world stage. The galvanizing leadership of France and the United Kingdom was vital in assembling an alliance of support that included the Arab League and the United States, and in overcoming the divisions that often plague Europe’s attempts to punch its weight on the world stage (Germany, we are looking at you).

The intervention in Libya also represents a confluence of several longer-term trends. The first annual European Foreign Policy Scorecard, just published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), identifies these trends in its analysis of 80 foreign-policy issues. Taken together, these trends suggest that, despite an inward-looking stance in 2010, Europe is finding what it takes to count as a foreign-policy actor.

First, the Franco-British push for intervention is the latest example of European foreign policy by a small number of very active member states. Getting agreement over anything is difficult for a European Union of 27 members. Getting a workable agreement once leadership has been shown is a lot easier.

Indeed, as the ECFR’s Scorecard shows, a small core of leading countries has been vital for the multilateral approach to issues such as Iranian proliferation (led by the EU-3 of Germany, Britain, and France), and getting international climate-change talks back on track at Cancún, following the debacle at the Copenhagen summit in 2009.

Second, European leaders did not feel the need to wait for the US. Today’s world, with its rising global powers (such as India, Brazil and China) and rising regional powers (such as Turkey and Mexico), is increasingly post-American. Especially after sobering experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the former hyperpower is now first among equals. France and Britain pressed for intervention in Libya, and only then did the US fall into line. And once the intervention began, US President Barack Obama was happy to let the Europeans (and then NATO) take the leading role.

Third, in a post-American world, those who took the lead on intervention were aware of the need to act multilaterally. A coalition of the willing that intervenes in an Arab country cannot be composed only of European powers and the US. Agreement from the Arab League was vital, as was securing a vote in the United Nations Security Council.

The climate-change talks and Iranian proliferation are other examples of Europe acting constructively in a multilateral way. Some EU members are better at this than others - Sweden, for instance, punches above its weight, whereas others undermine this approach by going it alone.

Fourth, Germany will not always want to play ball. Its abstention on Security Council Resolution 1973 - placing it in the same camp as the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) - was a sign that its foreign policy is now influenced more by trade concerns than by European solidarity. Like many European countries, the ECFR’s Scorecard observed that Germany’s efforts to deal with the economic crisis left little room for foreign affairs. Instead, its foreign policy was dominated by economic interests.

But German reticence did not paralyse Europe. The Scorecard did identify European division as a prime reason for Europe’s failings on the world stage - for example, in its relations with Turkey and China. But the lesson of the Libyan intervention is that division can be overcome if the will exists. Europe is not a monolith, but in many areas it can still act coherently, even without complete agreement. Whether the outlier is Germany or another EU member state, division need not be fatal.

Of course, none of this means that the international intervention in Libya will succeed; the situation in Libya is far too complicated to predict the outcome. What it does mean, however, is that Europe is finding a way to work when it comes to foreign policy.

As the ECFR’s Scorecard suggests, Europe is still failing in many areas, with its worst performance recorded in its relations with its immediate neighbourhood (notably Turkey) and in defending values such as human rights. But there are strong grounds for optimism. Although Europe spent last year preoccupied with the financial crisis, the EU’s Lisbon Treaty began to provide the institutional foundations needed to underpin an effective EU-based foreign policy.

The European External Action Service (which serves as the EU’s foreign ministry and diplomatic corps) is a work in progress, and the divisions between member states have affected High Representative Catherine Ashton’s ability to speak for Europe on Libya. But, as these institutions mature, a more coherent EU foreign policy should emerge. Given the need for Europe’s leadership and commitment to multilateralism in a post-American world - now catalysed by the crises just to its south - European foreign policy must grow up fast.

Vaira Vike-Freiberga is a former president of Latvia. Antonio Vitorino is a former Portuguese EU Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs. ©Project Syndicate, 2011. www.project-syndicate.or

The New Pan-Arabism

Patrick Seale writes: This incipient solidarity is a union of peoples, rather than a union of leaders for their own geopolitical ambitions
This commentary was published in The Gulf News on 29/04/2011

Although much blood has been spilled — in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and elsewhere — fresh blood has, at the same time, been infused into a senile and decaying political system.Let us dream for a moment. Although the future is uncertain and danger still lurks at every street corner, Arab society could be experiencing an inspiring moment of renewal. Spreading with contagious euphoria across the Middle East, popular uprisings are providing the Arabs with an immense opportunity, such as occurs rarely, perhaps only in every three or four generations. The opportunity must not be squandered.

Right across the region, the young and the not so young are united in long-stifled aspirations. Formulating the same demands for political freedom, economic opportunity and, above all, dignity, they call out to each other across national boundaries, copying each other, drawing encouragement from each other's experience. The Arab peoples are responding to each other as never before.

Satellite television and internet communications have undoubtedly succeeded in creating a sense of community, informing Arab societies about each other, ventilating common problems, linking Maghreb to Mashreq. Social networks such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter have also played a role in bringing the Arabs together. Had it not been for such new inventions, the spark lit in Tunisia by the self-immolation of a young street vendor might not have set fire to the combustible, pent-up grievances of Egypt, which in turn inspired revolts in Libya, Yemen, Syria and elsewhere.

But something more profound is at work. As autocracies are brought down, the region seems to be experiencing a new pan-Arab moment. More genuine than that promoted in the past by individual leaders such as Jamal Abdul Nasser or his rivals in the Baath party, this incipient pan-Arabism is a union of peoples, rather than a union of leaders for their own geopolitical ambitions. Political pan-Arabism was a failure. Will popular pan-Arabism be more successful? Will Arab solidarity be more than an empty slogan? 

The last time something of this nature happened was a century ago when the Ottoman Empire was defeated in the First World War. After four centuries of Ottoman rule, some Arabs saw in the empire's collapse an opportunity for a national awakening. Demands were formulated for freedom, self-determination and unity. But the nascent Arab nationalism of the time was brutally crushed — by the imperial ambitions of Britain and France; by the quest for statehood of the Zionist movement, which flourished under British protection; and also, it must be said, by Arab rivalries, which remain to this day a source of weakness and paralysis. 

Today's revolution is primarily against internal rather than external colonists. The post-revolutionary period is bound to be chaotic. There will be instability, fierce infighting while new political parties are formed and new forces take shape, even attempts here and there at counter-revolution. Faced with popular uprisings, those Arab rulers still in place will inevitably look to their defences. But they should not miss the import of what is happening. They should embrace the new trend rather than fight it. It seems to me, and no doubt to many other observers, that three developments are necessary at this historic moment if the Arab Revolution is to succeed.

Curse of sectarianism

The first is that those Arab monarchies which have so far been spared popular uprisings must themselves introduce and implement far-reaching reforms. Ruling families need to open their ranks to ordinary citizens; representative institutions need to be created; shura councils or parliaments must be given real responsibility; accountability insisted upon; corruption curbed; arbitrary arrests and police brutality ended. In a word, power must be shared and the people's energies harnessed for the common good.

A second development will be even more difficult to bring about, but is perhaps even more important. Sectarianism is the curse of Arab societies. What does it matter if an Arab man or woman is a Sunni or a Shiite, an Alawi, an Ismaili or a Druze, a Christian or a Muslim? Political and religious authorities across the region should make a resolute attempt to consign sectarian differences and conflicts to history. What alone matters is that Arabs — whether male or female, rich or poor, and whatever their backgrounds or religious beliefs — should feel and behave as Arab citizens. It is surely time to launch an ‘Arab Union' based on common citizenship to match the European Union, which the Europeans managed to create over the past half-century. 

A third necessary development is a recognition that oil wealth belongs not just to a few privileged Arabs but to all of them. It must be shared across the region. Generosity is, after all, the greatest of Arab virtues. The oil-poor countries will need help from their richer brothers. Solidarity is meaningless if it is not backed with cash. 

Just as Western Europe pumped billions into the poorer parts of Eastern Europe after the Soviet collapse, so the oil-rich Arabs must urgently come to the aid of their poorer neighbours. With oil prices at near-record levels, it is a scandal that the great majority of Arabs still scrape a living on two dollars a day or less.

Youth unemployment is the number one problem of the Arab world. In country after country it has been the real motor of the revolution. A great bank or fund needs to be set up which, by tapping into Arab sovereign wealth funds, would be dedicated to creating jobs across the region. Countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Syria and others, need massive aid, well-directed and managed, if the democratic movement is not to collapse in disillusion and despair.

If it does, no one will be spared.

Patrick Seale is a commentator and author of several books on Middle East affairs.

'Enemies' Of Convenience

By Ahmed al-Jarallah
This commentary was published in The Arab Times on 29/04/2011 

The dictatorial regimes seem to be reading from the same book, so they always fail in exams. The justification of the Syrian leader for the military raid on Dera’a City and the killing of its defenseless people is similar to that of Muammar Gaddafi when he attacked and cordoned off the Libyan cities in which the protesters took to the streets to demand  freedom. The blood of the innocent flowed until the whole world denounced the act and intervened to protect the citizens in Libya. 

The Syrian regime invented an enemy and named it the ‘Salafist Group,’ claiming that nearby and faraway countries fully support the group in its plan to establish an Islamic emirate in the cities where the massacres were and are still being committed by its forces against the unarmed protesters who are only demanding for freedom. 

The regime thought these flimsy excuses are enough to convince the whole world that it is not responsible for the crimes in Dera’a, Duma, Baniyas, Jabala and other cities in Syria. The blood of hundreds of people, the thousands of injured protesters who are in agony, and many others whose means of livelihood have been threatened are not important to the regime. 

Yes, it is not important that the people have freedom to protest against any wrongdoing and complain about corruption, repression and humiliation. The regime does not care if the people live in fear; if their tongues are tied and they are not allowed to think freely. What matters most for the regime is to remain as it is, so it can continue raising the slogan of resistance, cover up corruption and implement the instructions of Iran. 

However, people have been asking, “What resistance, confrontation and foiling of Western, American and Israeli conspiracies the regime is talking about? Who are the targets of the alleged conspiracies when its own people have revolted against it to demand their basic rights like freedom of expression, security and curbing arbitrary arrests? Are the hundreds of thousands of people protesting across the country also conspiring against the so-called ‘resistance regime’? Do other nations provide these people with weapons and financial support to weaken the regime?”        

Brutality and the killing of people can no longer stop protesters from demanding their rights because they have overcome their fears. The Syrian regime must learn from the events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and come to terms with the reality that it is not immune from the uprising.  It should listen to the people and stop justifying the massacres carried out by its forces.

Yes, some Arab nations are not comfortable with the Syrian foreign policy that opened the door wide for the Persians and gave Lebanon to Iran.  Lebanon shares the feelings of the Syrian citizens.  It has never sent weapons or money to protesters, contrary to the claims of the official media in Syria.

The Syrian regime has had enough opportunity to heed the demands of the people to prevent killings, or at least lessen the casualties.  It should have fixed the damage caused by its internal and foreign policies. It would have remained in power if it has implemented reforms and allowed its people to choose their leaders. Instead of taking these steps, the regime resorted to barbaric and bloody repression, which has turned the table completely against it and exposed its destructive schemes.

Nevertheless, it is still not too late to make amends and all Syrians have agreed on this. The world has started listening to the cries of these people and it is now finding ways to protect them from the brutality of the security forces.  Will the Syrian regime realize this fact before it is too late? 

It will be pointless to run to the political sycophants in Lebanon, because they have mastered the art of crying foul to mislead the people, but they will be the first to turn against you once they see signs of weakness. They will be the first to applaud your successor. They have started singing another song, since the beginning of the Hezbollah project to put Lebanon in the Iranian political prison. The first sign was the action of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who has opted to remain in his hiding place. These people are like rats; they jump off the ship immediately after realizing that it is sinking.             
 

Either The Inferno Or Hell... A Medal For Each Martyr

By Zuheir Kseibati

This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 28/04/2011

 

The Arab League rebelled – nay, rose once again - against the governments shooting at the people who are demanding freedom and democracy, instead of rewarding them with salutes and reform. The League discovered, tens of years late, that there is a “serious crisis between the people and the governments in the Arab world.” No one had detected it before the capitals started drowning in blood mires and before the youth were led toward war, and the guillotine of the confrontation with the “extremists”… or the street that still “loves the president.”

The League is rebelling in a “tsunami” of rage, after decades during which it merely mirrored the will, loyalties, disputes and public and hidden conflicts of the governments. In the meantime, the societies were completely absent from the scene of events, with their youth, women and elderly. The League faithfully conveyed the state of turmoil in the region, as well as its wars over the border and the existence, while even when two brothers among the member states fought, it tried to avoid Israel’s mockery and settled for showing patience and upholding silence while wagering on the time factor.

Today, the League does not resemble itself, and whoever reads the recent statements in which it eluded any responsibility in the killings and the oppression, would think it was an organization that did not belong to the region and did not host on its seats ministers or envoys from the countries of the revolutions, the uprisings and the blood mires still expanding among the cities, villages and deserts. And while the Baghdad Arab summit seems to be one of the likely victims of the powerful winds of change – at a time when the question is “who’s next?” – the League appears to be going through a caretaking stage until the selection of a successor to Secretary General Amr Moussa. Hence, based on this, some governments are saying that it is siding with the rebels and with disobedience to secure reforms, without which the Arab world has been living for tens of years.

The Arab League is renewing its youth 66 years following its birth, and it cannot be accused of being an agent for having “collaborated” with the street and the demands of the youth and the poor. However, while it can detect the problems following the long period of hibernation, it is too weak to prevent a leader from killing his citizens with canons, or convince him to make up for the sins of the regime by liquidating the past instead of the bloody liquidation of scores with the youth of change.

It might be said that the Arab League is making up for its impotence and fighting through statements, while the West is using force to defend the civilians, the rebels and its interests. This is now happening in Libya where the fighting is not about to end despite the internationalization of the crisis. In the meantime, the internationalization card is used to confront Syria, but is not deterring the bloodshed. Did French President Nicolas Sarkozy not say that there can be no interference in Syria without a Security Council resolution, while London is alluding to the elimination of any obstacles facing such a resolution if the “violent oppression” is not halted?

Between the hell of oppression and the inferno of the internationalization wars, each individual killed is a martyr who is promised a medal and free education for his children!

Chavez talked about the “insanity” of the West in Libya, seeing how he must remain loyal to his friend. As for Putin, he has not yet figured out the paradigm of Washington and its European allies – especially France and Britain – and why they believe they had the right to execute the Colonel. “Should we bomb all locations” around the world? British Defense Secretary Liam Fox responded when asked about the “duplicity” in dealing with Libya and Syria: “We cannot do everything at the same time.” Certainly he did not say that once he completed the mission in Libya he will turn toward another location, but the European eagerness to detect any sign pointing to an American intervention enhances the doubts regarding the internationalization of human rights in the Arab world, either through soft diplomacy or the fist of NATO. The other alternative would be the hell of the confrontations on the domestic arena.

This is the scenario which took Turkey by surprise – at the level of its neighbor - thus translating its discontent toward the slowness of reform in Syria by hosting a conference for the oppositionists in Istanbul. Who said that Erdogan was not also seeking the renewal of the youth of Turkey’s regional role?

The time has not yet come for the border fires to erupt, while the internationalization race is at its peak and the security’s grip is busy producing a medal for each Arab martyr.

Official: The Arab Revolt Makes Tehran Nervous

By Amir Taheri
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 29/04/2011

For three decades Khomeinist rulers in Tehran have dreamed of change in the Middle East. Now that change is really happening in much of the region, Tehran is watching with growing nervousness. 

That the Khomeinist regime should have dreamt of change is no surprise.
 
Thirty years ago, Iran under Walayat al-Faqih or rule by a mullah looked out of place in the Middle East. Indeed, with the exception of Tibet's government in exile under Dalai Lama, the Khomeinist set-up did not resemble any regime in the world. Like the Bolshevik regime of Russia in 1917, it had to either become like others or make all others like itself.
 
For a decade, under Khomeini himself, the regime tried to make the rest of region like itself by "exporting revolution".
 
The results were meagre. Tehran managed to influence part of the Shi'ite community in Lebanon and create a branch of Hezbollah in that country. Tehran also succeeded in turning Syria into a client state without, however, persuading the Baathist regime to adopt Walayat al-Faqih.
 
In the decade that followed, under President Hashemi Rafsanjani, the regime tried to become like others, especially in the economic field. The strategy produced a class of new rich with extensive business contacts with the outside world, including the Gulf region.
 
In the final analysis, however, that strategy, too, failed.
 
Under President Muhammad Khatami, the regime tried a new version of that strategy, this time emphasising the political domain.
 
Known as the "Davos Strategy", named after the Swiss village where Khatami spent time courting Western political and business leaders during the World Economic Forum, it focused on public relations. That included pseudo-intellectual speeches in Western universities and clubs, peppered with quotations from Hobbes, Locke and de Tocqueville.
 
Nicknamed "A Smile Under A Turban", Khatami for a while charmed some naïve souls.
However, that strategy, too, failed because a leopard does not change by painting is spots.
 
By the time, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had become president, it must have been clear to rulers in Tehran that no nation would be foolish enough to copy Walayat al-Faqih.
 
That was why Ahmadinejad tried to move the ball in a different court by focusing on the Israel-Palestine issue.
 
His calculation was based on the assumption that the issue was top of the list of priorities for Muslims, especially Arabs, throughout the world.
 
To that end, Ahmadinejad adopted an incendiary rhetoric to inject the classical Khomeinist discourse with a stronger dose of anti-Israel and anti-American themes.
 
Well, that strategy, too, has failed.
 
The Arab Uprising was, and is, about people rejecting brutal and corrupt military-security regimes imposed by coups d'etat and maintained by repression. It is not about religion and even less about Israel-Palestine. Nor is there much sign of anti-American sentiments, quite the contrary.
 
No one knows how the current tsunami may reshape the political landscape.
 
But one thing is certain: no one is trying to adopt the Khomeinist model.
 
Tehran strategists are not quite sure what is happening in the Middle East. Nevertheless, it is clear that, all in all, they are pessimistic about the outcome of the current turn in the region's political kaleidoscope.
 
After 9/11, the mullahs feared that change in Afghanistan and Iraq might be extended to Iran. President George W Bush's so-called "Freedom Agenda" for the Greater Middle East clearly included Iran.
 
Now we know that change in the Middle East need not come either from "export of revolution" by Iran or military invasion by the United States.
 
This why Tehran is nervous. Ten days ago, Esfandiar Masha'i, the key strategist in Ahmadinejad's administration, warned against "starry-eyed assessments of the events" in Arab countries affected.
 
"We must not assume that the change will necessarily be in our interest," he said.
 
Newspapers controlled by the "Supreme Guide" Ali Khamenei attacked Masha'i for "trying to create the impression that the Arab Uprising is not profoundly Islamic."
 
However, the Islamic Majlis, Iran's fake parliament, has just published a lengthy analysis that echoes Masha'i's alleged "pessimism."
 
It says that Libya will end up under a new government backed by the United States. Nevertheless, the Majlis rejects the idea of backing Muammar Gaddafi to prevent the US from scoring a strategic gain.
 
The analysis also admits that Egypt and Tunisia will end up under new pro-Western regimes backed by their respective armies. The most that Tehran could hope for is to restore diplomatic ties with Tunis and Cairo. But even that "does not look likely at present."
 
The Majlis analysis insists that the Islamic Republic should deploy "strategic support" for President Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria to crush the popular revolt.
 
In that context, the analysis adds, the role of Hezbollah in Lebanon is "of special importance". The "spread of revolt to Syrian cities" a threat to "the interests of the Islamic Republic".
 
The analysis recommends hat Hezbollah units be used to affect the outcome of the current tensions, especially in Bahrain and Yemen through "asymmetric warfare."
 
The Majlis report calls for using Hezbollah to "strengthen our zone of influence in Lebanon".
The analysis also recommends the use of "clandestine operations" against Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
 
Another move recommended by the analysis is to "extend and deepen relations" with Qatar as a means of dividing the Gulf states. With the fall of the Syrian regime now a possibility, the analysis recommends "strengthening relations with Nuri Al-Maliki's government" in Iraq.
 
All in all, however, the analysis, predicts that Iran's relations with the Gulf states, except Qatar, may be severed at some point in the future.
 
The Majlis report also predicts a popular revolt in neighbouring Azerbaijan and recommends that "contingency plans be drawn to face any eventuality."
 
An prising in the former Soviet republic may quickly spread to Iran's Azerbaijani provinces that account for almost 15 per cent of the total population.
 
The Islamic Republic looks like a man who, all his life, has dreamt of a big do in which he would be the heart of the party but, when the party comes in the end, he has the door shut in his face.