Amid The Arab Spring, Obama’s Dilemma Over Saudi Arabia

By Martin Indyk
This commentary was published in The Washington Post on 07/04/2011

There’s a crisis in U.S. policy in the Middle East — and it’s not about Libya. For weeks the Obama administration has been preoccupied with averting a humanitarian catastrophe in North Africa. But on the other side of the region, in the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula, a matter of vital, strategic importance awaits the urgent attention of policymakers.

Over there, the ailing 87-year-old king of Saudi Arabia probably isn’t getting much sleep. Abdullah, this Sunni monarch of monarchs, custodian of the holy mosques of Mecca and Medina, can see the flames of instability and turmoil licking at all his borders. In the south, Yemen is imploding, to the advantage of his al-Qaeda enemies. In the east, Bahrain’s Shiite majority has been in such a state of revolt that Abdullah has already sent armed forces to prevent Iran from establishing a “cat’s paw” on the Sunni Arab side of the Persian Gulf. In the north, Abdullah sees Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government as nothing more than a front for the hated Persians. In the west, a Palestinian majority is demanding that the Hashemite king of Jordan become a constitutional monarch. Meanwhile, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, that other Sunni pillar of regional stability, has already been overthrown.

Historically, in times of trouble, Saudi kings have depended on American presidents to guarantee their external security. But at this moment of crisis, Abdullah views President Obama as a threat to his internal security. He fears that in the event of a widespread revolt, Obama will demand that he leave office, just as he did to Mubarak, that other longtime friend of the United States. Consequently, Abdullah is reportedly making arrangements for Pakistani troops to enter his kingdom should the need to suppress popular demonstrations arise.

This presents the Obama administration with a particularly thorny dilemma. Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest oil producer and the only one with sufficient excess production capacity to moderate rises in the price of oil. Instability in Saudi Arabia could produce panic in the oil markets and an oil shock that could put an end to America’s economic recovery (and the president’s hopes for reelection). This would argue for granting an “exception” to Saudi Arabia from the Obama administration’s trumpeting of universal rights. Indeed, the soft criticism of Bahrain’s Saudi-dictated suppression of its people suggests that this has already become U.S. policy.

Yet helping the Saudi king effectively erect a wall against the political tsunami sweeping across the Arab world is not a long-term solution. If there’s one thing that we can now predict with some confidence, it’s that no Arab authoritarian regime can remain immune from the demands of its people for political freedom and accountable government. To be sure, $100 billion in subventions from the palace and the promise of 60,000 jobs can help postpone, for a time, the demands of unemployed Saudi youths. But political freedom, transmitted across borders via cable TV and the Internet, has proved to be a seductive idea. In the end, it will not be assuaged by economic bribes or police-state suppression.

And the Saudi system is fragile. Power is concentrated in the hands of the king and his brothers, who are old and ailing. The Saud family’s legitimacy depends in significant part on its pact with a fundamentalist Wahhabi clergy that is deeply opposed to basic political reforms, such as equal rights for women. The deep structural tensions generated by a 21st-century Westernized elite existing within a 15th-century Saudi social structure have been papered over for decades by oil wealth. If this strange social contract begins to fray, it might tear completely. And over in the eastern quarter, adjacent to Bahrain, where most of Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves are located, sits a restive Shiite minority who have been treated as second-class citizens for decades.

Even if the Obama administration were understandably inclined to leave well enough alone, it cannot afford to do so for other reasons. The Saudis are attempting to erect the wall beyond their borders not only by suppressing the revolt in Bahrain but also by insisting that Jordan’s king not pursue the reform agenda he has promised his people. In effect, Abdullah intends to carve out an exception for all the kings and sheiks — Sunni to a man — in Saudi Arabia’s neighborhood. It might work for a time. But should this dam break, it could generate a sectarian Sunni-Shiite, Arab-Iranian conflict on one side and an Arab-Israeli conflict on the other. It could spell the end of Pax Americana in the Middle East.

For all of these reasons, President Obama urgently needs to negotiate a new compact with King Abdullah. He has to find a way to convince him that defining a road map that leads to constitutional monarchies in his neighborhood, and eventually in Saudi Arabia, is the only effective way to secure his kingdom and the interests of his subjects. Abdullah has been willing to undertake important reforms in the past. But if the king is to be persuaded to embark on this road again, he will need to know that the president will provide a secure safety net of support, rather than undermine him. And he will need to know that the United States will not make a deal with his Iranian enemies at Saudi expense.

Such a compact would be difficult to negotiate in the best of times. It cannot even be broached in current circumstances unless the basic trust between the president and the king can be reestablished. With a budget crisis at home and turmoil in the Middle East, it’s understandable that Obama has had little time for the personal engagement with potentates that does not come naturally to him. But it’s not just Abdullah’s survival that is at stake. A revolt in Saudi Arabia could sink his presidency.

The writer is vice president and director of the Brookings Institution’s foreign policy program and convener of the U.S.-Islamic World Forum, which meets in Washington next week.

Intervention Lite Isn't Working In Libya

By Michael Glackin
This commentary was published in The Daily Star on 08/04/2011  

Wanted: Accommodation for a soon-to-be-retired dictator. Will live in a tent, but must provide enough room for female bodyguards and occasional pop concerts by international superstars such as Beyonce and Mariah Carey.

Laugh if you will, but the idea of allowing Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi to spend his dotage in exile is becoming increasingly attractive to the British government, amid the realization that, despite two weeks of coalition airstrikes, the war to oust him has now reached a stalemate. At last month’s London conference on Libya, British Foreign Secretary William Hague insisted that the government was “not engaged in looking for somewhere for [Gadhafi] to go”; but then he quickly added, “that doesn’t exclude others from doing so.”

Unfortunately, a week remains a long time in politics and the failure of the West’s military operation, at least in its current form, to topple Gadhafi appears to have emboldened the Libyan leader. Last month Mohammad Ismail, a confidante of Gadhafi’s son Seif al-Islam, offered the West a way out by proposing Seif as leader while his father headed to his Elba in either the Libyan desert or Sudan. But this week, Abdelati Laabidi, Gadhafi’s deputy foreign minister, was busy touting the idea that Gadhafi himself should lead Libya’s transition to democracy, in return for a cease-fire.

All this comes at the same time as it has emerged that NATO’s bombing campaign is running short of aircraft, following America’s withdrawal of its fighter planes earlier this week. So as Libya settles into a de facto division between the rebel-held east and Gadhafi-held west, what else is the coalition doing to secure Gadhafi’s removal?

Talk at the London conference of arming rebels is a non-starter. It is being raised as a feeble alternative to deploying coalition troops, something the United Kingdom and the United States in particular are desperate to avoid. First, it is doubtful that the largely untrained rebels could operate the sophisticated weaponry they require to take on Gadhafi’s military might; and second, fears persist, particularly in Washington, that such weapons could fall into the wrong hands.

Indeed both the U.K. and the U.S. have now dispatched teams of diplomats to Benghazi in a bid to “better understand” who the rebels are, amid fears that many are allied to Al-Qaeda. The Foreign Office remains tight-lipped. But insiders say the primary focus of the British government now is to prevent Gadhafi from regaining control of any more of Libya by continuing the airstrikes, while at the same time encouraging members of the regime to abandon their leader.

This brings us neatly to the many conspiracy theories surrounding the arrival in the U.K. of Libya’s former foreign minister, Moussa Koussa. Initially some believed he had brought a secret message from Gadhafi, hard on the heels of Ismail’s secret visit. Another interpretation was that he believed the regime is doomed and that facing British justice would be preferable to facing rebel justice.

Because the West is so urgently trying to engineer an end to the war that allows them to avoid dispatching soldiers, not surprisingly there is little talk from the government of Gadhafi being hauled in front of the International Court of Justice, as this might hinder a negotiated outcome. Although the government insists that Koussa was not offered immunity from prosecution, it is hardly likely that a man with his background would have headed to the U.K. if he expected to pay for his past misdeeds. It is worth noting that Washington quietly removed Koussa Monday from its list of Libyan officials subjected to financial sanctions. Moreover, if the threat of legal proceedings in the West was left hanging over Koussa, it would hardly help the British policy of encouraging other regime figures to abandon Gadhafi.

Indeed speaking before Parliament earlier this week, Hague stated that those Libyans who deserted Gadhafi and came to the U.K. would be “treated with respect.” And despite the fact that Koussa spent two decades running Libya’s foreign intelligence service, the government has been careful to downplay claims that he was a key figure in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1988.

That said, Koussa may well face a court case brought by victims of Irish Republican Army bombings in the U.K., in which Libyan-supplied Semtex explosives were used. Court documents filed in the U.S. three years ago claim that Koussa oversaw the supply of Semtex to the IRA during its bombing campaign in the U.K. during the 1980s and 1990s. Lawyers representing the victims may well seek an arrest warrant for the Libyan, similar to the warrant that British magistrates issued for the former Israeli foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, and which forced her to cancel a trip to London in 2009.

Will Gadhafi, Koussa, and other Libyan officials eventually end up in court? Or will Gadhafi head off into the sunset to enjoy a happy exile with his family and friends? The multitude of possible outcomes stems from the coalition’s reluctance to follow through on the logic of its decision to remove Gadhafi from power. Intervention lite is not working. It is time for the West to show that it has the courage of its convictions by ending this war and Gadhafi’s tyranny.

Michael Glackin, a former managing editor of THE DAILY STAR, is a writer in London.

No Democracy Without Parties

By Ahmad Y. Majdoubeh

This commentary was published in The Jordan Times on 08/04/2011

 

Most of us who think and care about the future of the Arab world have come to the conclusion, after witnessing decades of failed experiments with all kinds of ideologies, approaches and hero worship, believe that it will not have a chance without democracy.

The crucial question, however, is how to bring democracy about?

As reflected in events that are daily unfolding in the Arab world, most Arab regimes have done either little or nothing whatsoever to build or foster democracy. Some, in fact, spent decades oppressing and abusing their people, or living lavishly and selfishly. So at the level of Arab regimes, the overall picture is grim in this respect.

As for institutions in the Arab world, the picture is almost equally grim. None of them has made any noticeable inroad into fostering of democracy. The family is largely dictatorial, and so are the school and the university. Parents either dictate to their children or let them have their way - and none of this is democratic. The vast majority of school teachers oppresses pupils with rote learning, and very few university professors engage students, in their largely professor-centred lectures, in any meaningful discussion or dialogue.

There are some attempts by some NGOs, but most NGOs in the Arab world are lost between a West they worship or hate and an Arab society they love or despise.

The Arab press and the media are equally bad, if not worse. Not only are they, in the words of Plato, an “imitation of an imitation” (for example, an imitation of Al Jazeera which is an imitation of CNN), but they are vulgar, sensationalist and assassins of character. Above all, they have no character or belonging, and they contribute little or none to a true democratic culture.

This is what comes to mind when one thinks about the future of the Arab world.

Yes, several regimes in the Arab world are archaic and mediaeval, and they must go - they and their inept media. But what will happen after they go - like in Egypt right now?

There is hope in the new generation, some say. Look at most of those who remained steadfast in the Tahrir Square. They have the commitment, the language, the right perspective - and even the vision, some would insist. But they do not have the venue or the mechanism, I say.

If one is to be optimistic, one could say: well, we start building democracy now, then we start making these venues and mechanisms. Fine. But the matter is not so simple.

First of all, one is afraid of the vacuum created by the regime, both when it is present and after it is gone. Who is to lead the democratic process? Who is to build these venues and mechanisms - and the culture behind them? Most probably the vacuum will be filled either by foxy remnants of the old regime or by ominous, reactionary parties, which are worse than the defunct regimes.

Second, what worries one most is the absence of mainstream parties. Democracy is built on the idea of parties - and I insist here on the word “mainstream” because many of the parties that exist in the Arab world right now are either subversive or corrupt.

There is no democracy without vibrant, strong parties. Democracy is not about electing the person we like or trust. Democracy is about party building. And building parties will take time. A party is not about people getting together, writing down their names on party lists and espousing a few slogans. Nor is it about a gathering in a square or in front of a government building. A party is a culture, the result of thorough upbringing and education. It is about clear, sincere and educated positions on specific issues.

And this takes time. Which is exactly my point here. If we, in the Arab world, want to build viable democracies, we have to prioritise the establishment of parties - real, enlightened parties that belong to both the people and the country. And if we aim to do that, we have to be patient, as a lot of planning, hard work and focus are needed.

Al Assad's Only Option Is Reform

Marwan Al Kabalan writes: For the sake of Syria and Syrians, promises made must be translated into action without delay
This commentary was published in The Gulf News on 08/04/2011

In a famous interview with the New York Times in December 2003, Syrian President Bashar Al Assad summarised the key challenges to his reform project. In response to criticisms about the slow pace of reform, he rejected the argument of old guard versus new.

Instead, he put the blame on what he called ‘Syrian mentality' and the lack of trained cadre to carry out the necessary reform. "There are some obstacles related to the mentality… You have people who are old and people who are young who have this mentality", Al Assad argued. As for the lack of a skilled bureaucracy, he said: "The major problem that I am facing as somebody who is responsible in this country is the cadre; the efficient, trained people to do the reform particularly the administrative reform."

More than seven years after that famous interview, Syria seems to still be looking for the right cadre to fill in key ministerial posts in the new government, which has been entrusted with solving the problems that have led to unprecedented social unrest in recent weeks. A closer look however shows that Syria's problem may have nothing to do with ‘mentality' or the lack of efficient bureaucracy to steer the desired reform. It is, rather, the legacy of a distorted one party system, which is dominated by shadowy institutions and extrajudicial procedures.

Like many other Third World countries, Syria has two power structures: the official powerless one and the real one. In the official one there are all the institutions of a modern state, such as the cabinet, parliament, the ruling party and the bureaucracy. In the real one there is a small number of top brass making all key decisions behind closed doors. The influence of these people, who are often accountable to no one, is a huge problem for reform in Syria.

Three options

When Al Assad succeeded his father president Hafez Al Assad in July 2000, he found the economy and the political system mired in problems and decadence. He faced a classic dilemma: on the one hand, he needed to liberalise the economy and reform the political system in order to survive. On the other hand, he wanted to keep the pillars of his regime intact. Hence, he had three options with risks and gains in mind. The first was to initiate a profound transformation, addressing the economic and political problems of the country in a true and innovative manner. The benefits of this option were gaining a badly needed legitimacy and rally the Syrian people around him.

The risks were to antagonise the barons of the old regime who would certainly strike back against anyone daring to strip them of their privileges. The second option was to make minor changes and maintain the status quo. The risks here were losing the support of the people while keeping the barons happy. The third option was a variation between the two, that is, to introduce some reforms on the economic front while keeping the political system closed. At the time, the third option seemed appealing; but proved to be very costly later. People started to question the president's commitment to reform and his ability to deliver the promises he made in his inaugural speech.

Today, the president finds himself faced with almost the same dilemma but under more pressing conditions. Change in Syria is round the corner and most Syrians believe that it is coming sooner or later.

The majority wants it incremental, peaceful and under no circumstance, would prefer foreign interference in the internal affairs of their country. Should the president opt for genuine reform he needs to know that his power rests with the people who would certainly come to his support in case of a conflict with the barons. Yet, the support of the people should not be taken for granted; some steps are needed in order to regain their trust.

These steps include establishing the rule of law, end the state of emergency, in effect since 1963, release all political prisoners, grant political freedom, including the freedom of expression and the press and allow exiled Syrians to come back home. Since the recent unrest broke out couple of weeks ago, several government officials have assured that reform is on the way. For the best interest of Syria and Syrians, these promises must be translated into action without any further delay.

Dr Marwan Al Kabalan is Lecturer in Media and International Relations at Damascus University.

Arab President Speaks Too Late

By Ali Ahmed al-Baghli
This commentary was published in The Arab Times on 98/04/2011

ARAB leaders have been flattering themselves in a nauseating way, up to the point of hypocrisy. Only Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi, in spite of his madness and aloofness, is downright frank. I was surprised at the way Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir condemned former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak when the latter’s regime collapsed, and how he launched a scathing attack against Gaddafi who will fall soon by God’s grace.

In his last visit to Qatar, Al-Bashir declared his support for the Libyan revolution against Gaddafi, while addressing the Sudanese community. He expressed concern over the spread of weapons, claiming “there are weapon arsenals in Libya, which outnumber those of the Soviet Union!” He alleged that Gaddafi supplied weapons to the Darfur Movement. He also pointed out the Libyan revolutionists thought Gaddafi employed Sudanese mercenaries, but they were actually from the Darfur Movement, some of whom have been arrested and the people of Libya now understand everything.

At the same gathering, Al-Bashir praised the current relations between Egypt and Sudan, asserting his country has been greatly benefiting from the change. He also praised the Egyptian foreign minister, saying “if we were asked to choose a foreign minister for Egypt, we would never pick anyone other than Nabel Al-Arabi.” He alleged that former Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu-Gaiz sent an official letter to his Libyan counterpart Moussa Koussa, urging him to cooperate in challenging decisions of the Doha talks on Darfur.

Al-Bashir described the Egyptian State Security Department as a criminal, asserting the Alexandria church bombing led to the collapse of the regime. He claimed the department tortured a Salafist to force him into admit responsibility for the bombing but he died. He said the mere mention of the name of former Egyptian Interior Minister Habib Al-Adely used to terrify ordinary people but he is now in detention. “God Almighty takes His time but He does not ignore the plight of His people.”

We have to say to Al-Bashir: Yes, you are right, but are you and your regime not guilty of the atrocious acts you claimed the Egyptian officials have committed? Haven’t you been committing the same for ages against the people of Sudan, who have been suffering for a long time? Did you not conspire against the people and regimes of other nations the same way that Mubarak and Gaddafi have done against you? Why didn’t we hear the truth from you when those people were in power, so that we would have at least felt that our rulers share our opinions on the corruption and tyrannical acts of other leaders?

Between Rabat And Tehran

By Mohammad El-Ashab

This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 07/08/2011

 

When Morocco took the step of severing diplomatic relations with Iran, over two years ago, it seemed as if it was singing its own tune outside the chorus. It was content to keep its stance a bilateral matter, not trying to gather support for its decision, which was based on field observation, not on bias towards those who oppose the Iranian regime, who are many and on the rise.

At the time, Rabat based its action on the fact that its diplomats in Tehran were under suspicion, with regard to the stance on refusing Iranian interference in Bahrain, although many international actors had taken the same stance. And whether bringing up this incident was merely a pretext or the real origin of the crisis, Morocco has since then stopped discussing the existence of a plan to draw its citizens to embrace the Shiite faith. One might also say that the same applies to other Maghreb and African countries that have adopted Sunni Islam as their faith, without failing to acknowledge other sects.

The features of a Moroccan-Iranian conflict did not start appearing now. Indeed, during the Islamic Summit of 1982 in Casablanca, the late King Hassan II made an appearance on television, holding in his hand a publication he said followers of the regime of the mullahs in Iran had distributed in Morocco in order to disrupt the Islamic Summit. This was followed by a wave of arrests aimed at extremist Islamist activists.

It was no use for Morocco to request from the Shah of Iran, who resided in Marrakesh, that he leave the country, in order to enable it to host an Islamic Summit that Iran would attend. Indeed, the confrontation between the two countries grew more acute, at both the religious and political levels, and only the idea of establishing dialogue between Muslim sects within the perspective of the Islamic Awakening University could quell the excesses. Yet Hassan II was not angry for anything more than being upset at some of the Arab criticism that he had received on the background of his ratification of a military treaty with the United States that allows US forces to use Moroccan bases in the case of a threat to the Gulf region.

This took place in the early 1980s, and Morocco, which had established a strategic alliance with the Gulf states, remained apprehensive and would constantly be warning against Iran’s ambitions. Moreover, the good offices it exerted in order to launch dialogue between Iran and the UAE over withdrawal from the three Emirati islands failed to achieve any progress.

Much water has flowed under the bridge since, but caution and the lack of trust have affected the course of relations between Rabat and Tehran. And to this day, neither of the two sides has taken any initiative to contain the crisis. Indeed, it seemed as if Morocco had painlessly pulled out a tooth, while Iran became preoccupied with its immediate neighborhood, looking for loopholes that would serve to fulfill its dreams. Yet the region of North Africa which Iran had placed, from Cairo to Nouakchott, at the forefront of parallel concerns, was itself no longer prone to sectarian spread, being much more preoccupied with sorting out internal matters.

Certainly the changes the region has witnessed will make it likely to terminate practices that have led to the appearance of foreign ambitions with sectarian tendencies. Indeed, and in spite of the geographical distance, it did not fall outside of the agenda of exporting the Iranian revolution. This was helped by the fact that Islamist movements in the region were some of the most fervent, as in Algeria’s experience, and by the appearance of combatant factions in Libya, Mauritania and Morocco under different names. But the situation is in the process of becoming quite different, if not at the level of normalization with movements that can find in themselves the ability to become integrated, then by consecrating the choice of democracy as a framework for competition and for the struggle of ideas and programs.

The problem is that Iran, which criticizes what it considers to be repression of the protests of the Arab street, especially when it comes to protesters affiliated with the Shiite faith, itself opposes the right to protest in order to make heard the voices of domestic opposition in Iran, should rather ensure a normal form of coexistence for the followers of all religious faiths.

Historically, the North African region has been known to always to react to the events taking place in the Levant, especially when it comes to upholding the doctrine and defending the sovereignty and integrity of nations. And the effective severing of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Iran only asserts the reality of this timeless connection. Indeed, had the matter been the result of political disagreements, it could have been contained with a lesser extent of restraint. But having delved deep into the religious dimension, it has become imbued with more dangerous perspectives.

The Middle East And Its Myths

By Amir Taheri
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 08/04/2011

Ever since the Middle East emerged as a geopolitical term in the 1940s it has nurtured myths that have perturbed the analysis of events in the region.
 
One myth is that there could be no war without Egypt.
 
The past half a century shows a different picture.
 
The eight-year Iran and Iraq war did not involve Egypt. Nor was Egypt engaged in the war over Western Sahara. The wars to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait and then to topple Saddam Hussein had no Egyptian input. More recently the mini-wars between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon occurred without Egypt.
 
And all that, not to mention the civil war in Yemen and Algeria and that Turkey's 30 years of war against the PKK.
 
One might also mention 32 years of war in Afghanistan.
 
The above myth has a sister.
 
It is that there could be no peace in the Middle East without Syria.
 
Yet, we have seen Egypt and Jordan make peace with Israel without Syria. We have also seen the Palestine Liberation Oganisation becoming engaging Israel in a peace process. The Pax-Americana in Afghanistan and Iraq after the fall of the Taliban in Kabul and the Ba'athists in Baghdad have nothing to do with Syria.
 
The two myths have cousins.
 
One is that Syria is the arrowhead of resistance against Israel.
 
Facts reveal a different picture. Since 1967 no one has attacked Israel from Syrian territory. One reason Yasser Arafat broke with Damascus was that Damascus would not allow any operations from Syria.
 
Visitors to northern Israel are surprised by the lack of military muscle in the Golan Heights while a heavy Israeli military presence is maintained along the ceasefire line with Lebanon. Clearly, Israelis expect no attacks from Syria while they regard "terrorist operations" from Lebanon as a constant threat.
 
Israelis describe the ceasefire line with Syria as their "most secure border". Today, many Israeli commentators express concern about possible regime change in Syria. In a recent article, the daily Haaretz warned that the fall of Assads could be a threat to Israel.
 
Another cousin-myth is that the Syrian regime belongs to the "anti-Imperialist" left.
 
But does it?
 
The coup led by Hafiz al-Assad, then Commander of the air force, in 1970 was a move by the right wing of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party against the left led by Salah Jadid.
 
As a young officer, Assad had joined the Ba'ath which, at the time, was modelled on European extreme-right movements such as the Fascist Party in pre-war Italy. Ba'ath's chief theoretician, and one of its founders, Michel Aflaq was a classical fascist. It was when the Arab Socialist Party of Akram Haurani merged with the Ba'ath that the new party acquired a leftist allure. Even after the fusion, the original Ba'athists retained their rightist profile.
 
In 1970, Tehran, under the Shah, and Washington, under President Richard Nixon, regarded Assad's coup as a setback for the Soviet Union.
 
Assad underlined Syria's change of direction by refusing assistance to Palestinians in Jordan during the Black September massacres.
 
With the leftist wing of the Syrian regime eliminated, the Shah's government moved to normalise relations with Damascus. One measure was the lifting of the ban on travel by journalists to Syria. That enabled me to go to Damascus for an interview with Assad. The result was published under the headline "Syria's Liberal Hour".
 
An hour with Assad had left the impression that Syria was moving away from the leftist policies espoused by President Nureddin al-Atasi, Premier Yussef al-Zuayyen and "sorngman" Jadid.
 
Relations warmed up soon and Iran started propping up the Assad regime with cut-price oil and an annual aid package totalling $150 million. In 1975 during the Islamic Summit, I was present at a meeting between President Assad and Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Ali Khalatbari. Assad, who talked endlessly, harped on the theme of
 
" two threats to both of us: religious extremists and misguided Communists."
 
It was an amazing experience. I have seldom seen such a dramatic difference between what a political leader says in private and what he utters in public.
 
I comforted myself by arguing that Assad was a "realist" practising a balancing act. He had to maintain the domination of his minority in the name of "resistance" to please the majority while adopting a radical rhetoric to outflank the left. What was important was that he had stopped supporting anti-Iranian terrorists and kicked anti-Shah exiles out of Syria.
 
Under Assad, Syria became the only Arab military regime not to sign a military pact with Moscow. It also broke talks, began in 1968, about mooring rights for the Soviet navy in Syrian ports. In contrast, Iraq invited the Soviet Navy to Um al-Kasar, its only port on the Gulf.
 
Assad burnished his anti-left credentials in other ways, including the destruction of the left in Syria. By 1973 Syrian leftist parties had disappeared in all but name. Some he bought, others he forced into compliance, and still others he pushed into exile.
 
He crushed the left in Lebanon by dismantling some and silencing others. In some cases, such as that of the leading figure of the Lebanese left Kamal Jumblatt, the Druze leader, assassination was the method used.
 
Whenever the US needed help, Assad was there. As Henry Kissinger shows in his memoirs, Assad's intervention in Lebanon came with a nod from Washington with the aim of flushing out the PLO and wiping out Nasserist and other anti-American armed groups. In 1990, Syria was in the forefront of the US-led coalition in the first Gulf War.
 
Assad was rewarded by becoming the only Arab military ruler to have one-on-one summits with US presidents from Nixon to Bill Clinton. George W Bush ended that tradition by rejecting Assad's demand for a meeting.
 
No region is free of political myths and ours is no exception. And as old myths fade, new ones take their place.
 
The current popular uprising in Syria signals the end of the myths spun around it since 1970. That might foster a better understanding of the past and a clearer vision of the future.