Why Did Protests In Algeria Fail To Gain Momentum?

By Lahcen Achy 
This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 31/03/2011

Protests in Algeria erupted at the same time as in Tunisia. Like Tunisia, Algeria witnessed several self-immolations of unemployed youth. It also faces similar socio-economic conditions to Egypt and Tunisia--including high levels of unemployment, particularly among youth; widespread corruption and a large bureaucracy; and a lack of transparency.Unlike elsewhere in the region, however, social unrest in Algeria did not spread throughout the country. Demonstrators were vastly outnumbered by the police. Protests failed to gain momentum, as they did in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and, to a large extent, Yemen.

One explanation for this difference lies in Algeria's rich oil and gas resources, which gave the regime more resources to address the public's dissatisfaction without resorting to violence. The government has allocated more money for food subsidies, awarded pay increases to court clerks and municipal civil servants, and helped young entrepreneurs by offering them interest-free loans to establish their businesses, granting them a three-year tax exemption, and likely reserving a quota of local public contracts for them. The president also promised cash transfers and furniture for poor families in 14 isolated regions. And the government lifted the state of emergency after 19 years.

Economic aid packages, however, are only part of the reason why Algerians have shown little enthusiasm for radical changes in the country. Five other factors also seem to be at play.

First, the public does not share a common set of grievances. Calls for national protests mobilized only about 2,000 demonstrators. Instead, concerns tend to be specific to particular groups. Associations of petroleum workers, public health employees, telecommunications professionals, fire fighters, religious preachers, municipal civil servants, and the unemployed protested separately to defend their own economic and social interests. Protests by graduate students opposing university reform since mid February, and an open-ended strike by physicians in public hospitals, were able to mobilize more people compared to anti-regime protests.

Second, the opposition appears divided and constrained by regulations that restrict the right to demonstrate. Independent trade unions, human rights organizations, opposition parties, and youth associations established an ad-hoc coalition in January--the National Coordination for Democratic Change (CNCD in French)--to push for change through peaceful protests. The coalition favors weekly organized protests instead of the kind of spontaneous daily demonstrations that proved so effective in Egypt and Tunisia. Internal disagreements within the CNCD have already emerged between human rights organizations and trade unions on the one hand, and political parties on the other. The bone of contention is on maintaining demonstrations every Saturday in Algiers despite their ban by the regime and the inability of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and the Socialist Forces Front to mobilize people on common grounds.

Third, protestors have faced a strong security apparatus. Algeria has expanded its security forces in recent years, from 50,000 police officers in the mid-1990s to about 170,000 officers now. Officers are both well-paid--they earn 65 percent more than average public civil servant (U.S. $470 compared to U.S. $280 per month)--and enjoy good career prospects, making it unlikely they would turn against the government. Their tactic of dividing protesters into small groups also prevents any sense of power that would come from mass mobilization. The police in Algeria relied on anti-riot trucks and have not so far, unlike in most other countries in the region, fired on crowds.

Fourth, the military in Algeria is more integrated into the country's political sphere than in Tunisia or Egypt--making any potential resignation by the president irrelevant for regime change. The People's National Army counts approximately 140,000 active members and 100,000 reservists, and has always played a leading role in the country's affairs. All of Algeria's presidents have been supported by the army. The emergency law that was lifted earlier this month after being in force for two decades only strengthened the military's authority. In addition, many general officers manage the largest public-sector companies, giving them privileged access to strategic sectors in the economy.

Fifth, the specter of the civil war in the 1990s is still very fresh in people's minds. Fears of another period of violence and insecurity keep Algerians from seeking a radical change despite their economic and social grievances. The civil war, which took place in the nineties led to between 100,000 and 120,000 deaths, with most families losing at least one member. Although in September 1999, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) announced the end of its attacks and Algerians approved massively a National Reconciliation initiative, sporadic violence continues to erupt in the country threatening peace and stability.

These factors do not mean Algeria won't experience regime change at some point. The upheaval in the region could still lead to unexpected effects. But the widespread calls for change that so forcefully brought down leaders in Tunisia and Egypt are largely absent in Algeria now. In spite of the sporadic demonstrations and of the calls for change from prominent intellectuals and political figures, a unifying movement that transcends societal divisions is yet to be seen in Algeria.

Lahcen Achy is a resident scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut who specializes in the political economy of the Middle East.

Learning How To Topple A Tyrant

By William J. Dobson
This commentary was published in The Washington Post on 31/03/2011 

Last week I wrote a post asking whether the dramatic events sweeping across the Arab world might herald the beginning of a new democratic wave. If that is the case, I argued, the central element propelling this wave — which is moving incredibly fast — would be what are called “demonstration effects” — in essence, groups in one country witnessing events in another and then trying to replicate the results. So, for example, Egyptians watch events in Tunisia, and seeing their success, are emboldened to rise up against their own dictator. It is almost a domino theory for democracy promotion.

An underpinning of this argument is that the groups in one country are learning from the groups in another. When I traveled to Egypt a year ago, I met with members of the April 6th Movement, one of the youth groups which is believed to have played a key role in deposing Mubarak. In my conversations with them — and with other youth groups in other authoritarian countries — I often was told how these young activists were studying the example of Otpor, the Serbian youth group that toppled Slobodan Milosevic in 2000.

So let me show you just one example of this learning by youth groups across borders. The members of Otpor often thought about their struggle against Milosevic and his regime as a battle of brands. In their brand war, they created a sophisticated communication strategy aimed at getting Serbs to reconsider the man who was ruling their country. Here is a short commercial that Otpor created targeting Milosevic.

Now, here is a recent ad posted by a Sudanese youth group called Girifna that aims to end Omar al-Bashir’s dictatorial rule.

Do you think democratic youth groups in one country are studying the methods of those in another country? You bet.

 This morning I spoke with Srdja Popovic, one of the former leaders of Otpor. He originally had no idea that the young people in Girifna had made an ad that so closely replicated Otpor’s from more than a decade ago. A friend of his pointed it out. But neither was Popovic entirely surprised that it happened. “Things have become so much faster and cheaper, even in the last 10 years. We had to pay for pamphlets and stickers and what-have-you. The drop in the cost in labor time alone is huge,” says Popovic. “Now you create a Facebook page in 30 seconds and it costs you 15 cents for the Internet connection. These forces conquer state media.”

So, why are the revolutions in the Arab world moving so fast? Technology is part of the answer. But so is the speed with which young people can learn from each other. And they are clearly students of revolution.

Has The Arab League Become A League Of Peoples Rather Than A League Of Regimes?

By Hamid Alkifaey
This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 30/03/2011

The Arab League’s recent decision to request the intervention of the UN Security Council to protect the Libyan people from their own government is an important decision that constitutes an historical precedent and a qualitative transformation in this pan-Arab league established in the middle of the forties to serve Arab regimes, rather than Arab people. This decision has transformed the League into a modern institution that monitors the performance of the ruling regimes and their treatment of their people and is concerned with human rights, putting the interests of the people above the interests of the regimes, even if this necessitates calling upon the international community to intervene militarily to correct the situation. This brave decision has encouraged western countries to move to protect Libyan civilians who are bravely saying no to dictatorship, injustice and vanity, yes to freedom, dignity and democracy, and who have been making massive sacrifices to this end. The UN decision regarding Libya is in itself an historic decision that will eventually lead to the toppling of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, a leader who has surpassed all world leaders in many ways, the most prominent of which being the length of time he has been in power.

Most notable in the international position towards Libya is French eagerness and enthusiasm to get rid of the Gaddafi regime. France was a pioneer in receiving the Libyan opposition at the highest levels and in recognising the Libyan Interim National Council as the sole representative of the Libyan people. French planes began sorties over Libyan air space within hours of the passing of UN Resolution 1973. This French position is in contrast to Paris’s position to the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, as France never showed any enthusiasm for change there. On the contrary, it implicitly supported Bin Ali when in power. As for the regime of Saddam Hussein, French opposition to issuing a UN resolution authorising the use of military force in Iraq in 2003 was instrumental in preventing the US, UK and the countries which supported them, from getting UN authorisation for military intervention. France later tried to improve its relations with Iraq and the French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner paid several visits. Included in his visits was the village of ‘Abu Hawen’, the home village of Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi, who is a French citizen himself. France also sent an Arabic-speaking ambassador to Iraq who has been very active in promoting his country. However, all this did not stop France from opposing the removal of Iraq from the UN Charter 7 sanctions when the UN voted on Iraq on 15th December 2010. The reason for the French opposition was that UN Oil-for-Food Fund refused to pay some bills presented by French companies because the bills, according to the UN Fund, were not properly issued. It’s not known whether Iraqi officials had discussed this French position with French officials during their meetings with them, but what is known is that the French position regarding post-dictatorship Iraq remained negative, despite its attempts to benefit economically, and its position in the UN last December is the best proof of that.

Although principles do influence international decisions, interests remain the most important catalyst when some countries decide on important policies. Because France had close economic ties with Saddam Hussein’s regime, it tried hard to protect that (client) regime despite its knowledge of the numerous and heinous crimes committed against the Iraqi people, crimes which far exceeded those committed by the Libyan regime against its people. In the seventies of last century, France helped Saddam Hussein build a nuclear reactor (destroyed by Israel on 7th June 1981), and it ‘lent’ him fighter jets capable of carrying Exocet missiles during its war with Iran in the eighties; it even handed over Iraqi opponents of the regime who were residing in France, to Iraqi authorities to face their fate, which was well known to all.

The United Nations, the Arab League and most countries of the world remained silent on the subject of the indiscriminate and barbaric suppression of Iraqis by Saddam Hussein’s regime in 1991. Iraqi opposition never received anything but snubs from many countries and organisations. I remember I gave speeches at fringe meetings at the British Labour Party Conferences in 2002 and 2003 at the invitation of organisations affiliated to the party. I explained in those speeches the suffering of the Iraqi people and how the international community and the Arab countries were totally ignoring this suffering. The representative of the Arab League, Ambassador Ali Muhsin Hamid, among many other Arab and foreign officials, was present in one of those meetings. I seized the opportunity to remind the audience of the ethical responsibility of the international community over the killings, suppression and crackdown on the opposition that were taking place in Iraq at the hands of the Iraqi regime, and the economic sanctions at the hands of the international community. I criticised the position of the Arab League and said it was silent and had not taken any action in all these years against the wars and acts of genocide against the Iraqi people. It neither condemned nor opposed those criminal acts. After I ended my speech, the Arab league ambassador, Ali Muhsin Hamid, stood up and requested that I to sit next to him and I did. He began telling me about the Arab League saying that the Iraqi people were right to ask for help especially when they were exposed to such catastrophes. He said the Arabs did know about the plight of Iraqis and their suffering, but ‘You Iraqis must know what the function of the Arab League is before you blame it. The League represents Arab regimes and therefore it cannot stand against any of them’! Ambassador Hamid was very sympathetic to the Iraqi people but he emphasised that protecting Arab peoples from their governments was not one of the tasks of the Arab League.

Now, however, it seems that the function of the Arab League must have changed. The latest qualitative transformation in its position deserves study in order to find out if it is a real transformation or a passing position. However, in either case, it is a unique and courageous position that deserves encouragement and appreciation. The Arab political map has changed dramatically over the last eight years. Three important dictatorial regimes which were influential in Arab decision, Saddam Hussein, Bin Ali and Husni Mubark’s’ have been toppled. A fourth one is struggling in vein to stay in power, but its end is imminent. The fall of these three regimes, and the imminent fall of a fourth one and perhaps a fifth, has left an impact on existing regimes which have begun to take into account human rights issues and the opinion of the international community. In addition, the technological advances and world-wide spread of media and communication have contributed to enhancing the role of peoples and weakening totalitarian regimes. Alongside the importance and uniqueness of the Arab League’s decision to support the Libyan people against their government, the UN resolution 1973 to impose a flight ban over Libya and legalise military action against forces loyal to Colonel Gaddafi, which Arab countries will participate in, is also another qualitative and unique decision which will change the balance of power in the region. It will force Arab regimes to respect their peoples. The world will no longer allow a despot to use military power to suppress his people and deprive them of their basic freedoms. These freedoms have now become sacred and no one can violate them. The world has changed forever and the Arab world needs to move along with it.

Syria And The Opportunity Of Reform

By Tariq Alhomayed
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 31/03/2011 

The Syrian President's speech, delivered before the parliament in Damascus, suggests that the Syrian government has decided to confront its internal crisis with severe security measures, instead of a package of reforms, particularly since the Syrian President considers what is happening to be a plot.
 
The Syrian President says that what is happening in his country comes against the backdrop of the "fashion" trend of revolutions taking place in the region. It is important to note Damascus previously considered what happened in Egypt, and elsewhere, to be the voice of the people expressing their dissatisfaction with their rulers' conduct…It is true that President al-Assad said in his speech that reform is a necessity, but yesterday he provided no reformative declarations, which indicates, based on reports a few days ago, that there is a dispute in Damascus, behind closed doors, about how to deal with the unprecedented demonstrations that have erupted in several Syrian cities. It has been said that there are those calling for greater reform, and others calling for more force to deal with the demonstrators. Of course, there is evidence to suggest that this is true, and this does not come from the media or satellite television, which was criticized at length by the Syrian President during his speech, but the issue is far simpler than that.
 
Three days ago, Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa, through the official news agency (SANA), announced that President al-Assad would deliver an important speech during the next two days, to reassure everyone. This caused expectations to rise dramatically, amongst the Syrian people first and foremost, but also amongst observers abroad, for what is happening in Syria will certainly have implications for many issues in the region, whether positive or negative. However, the President's speech did not include any indications of reform, but only mere promises to study the "reformative" decisions which were announced last week.
 
As expected, immediately after the President's speech, demonstrations took place in Latakia, yet these were dispersed with bullets, and there was news of serious injuries. Damascus today has now entered something of a grey area. The failure to adopt genuine reforms has made solutions even more difficult, in light of the continuing protests, and confrontations in Syrian cities. Delaying reformative decisions will be costly, as it only wastes time. Similarly, the security confrontations will have serious repercussions on Syria as a whole, both internally and externally, and this is a dangerous matter. Accordingly, the coming days will tell us a lot: will the Syrian masses cease their demonstrations, after it has become clear that they will be confronted by force? Or will they intensify their efforts there, and raise the ceiling of demands? Certainly, it is difficult to say anything for sure at the moment; however it is clear that Damascus missed the opportunity to announce the radical reforms the Syrians are waiting for, and this was a grave error. Reform, first and foremost, is a genuine need for Syria, and even if it was enacted now, under pressure, it would not make the state look opportunistic, as the Syrian President claimed.

Syria: A Lost Opportunity

The president's address consisted almost entirely of generalities, offered no new measures and made no specific promises

This editorial was published in The Guardian on 31/03/2011

Has President Bashar al-Assad missed his moment? He has certainly succeeded in disappointing the expectations raised by predictions, some of them apparently leaked by his own government, that he would make a historic speech this week charting a new path of reform for his country. Instead, after nearly two weeks of protests and violence in Syrian cities, he appeared yesterday before parliament to deliver an address which consisted almost entirely of generalities, offered no new measures and made no specific promises. Historic it was not.

His main purpose seemed to be to demonstrate that he would not allow himself to be pushed into panicky action by street protests, an impression reinforced by the orchestration of excessive displays of support by members of parliament and by the crowds waiting outside. The approach was to claim for his regime kinship with the popular movements that have brought political change across the Arab world, and to point to a long-standing reform programme in Syria as evidence that his government welcomed the new importance of the Arab street.

Reform in Syria had been under way for years, he said, but had been delayed by the urgent need to respond to threats from abroad, and to strengthen the Syrian economy. The troubles in Deraa and Latakia had been fomented by foreigners, even if meddling by outsiders was not their only cause. The security forces had been told to avoid bloodshed, the deaths were regrettable, and there would be investigations. This vague commitment aside, Syrians are left contemplating proposals they already knew about, some of which have indeed been in the legislative pipeline for years, and which were dusted off once again late last week.

These plans, which include the possible lifting of emergency rule, a political parties law, a media law, and measures against corruption, are hardly to be rejected in principle. But Syrians have long experience of political and constitutional rearrangements that leave the substance of power in the hands of one party and one family and its associates, of anti-corruption campaigns which inexplicably fail to target the main offenders, and of media relaxations which at best move the line of control a few millimetres.

Assad has some advantages. He is closer to the protesters in age, his foreign policies bring him some support, and the regime does offer some protection to minorities, Kurds excepted. But, if he wants to be seen as part of the solution and not as part of the problem, he will soon have to offer the detailed, convincing measures he signally failed to produce yesterday.

Assad: The Arab Spring Stops Here

While Syria's protesters demand freedom, President has stark message for his people

By Robert Fisk
This commentary was published in The Independent on 31/03/2011

He was not a humble President. He did not give way. There were hints, of course – an end to emergency legislation, "reforms" – but when he spoke yesterday, trying to calm a crisis that has seen more than 60 people killed in a fortnight and threatens his very office, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria did not give the impression of a man on the run.

Was it Libya that gave him the "oomph" to go on, the encouragement to stand up and say that "reform is not a seasonable issue" – an accurate translation of his belief that Syria does not have to conform to the Middle East revolution? Either way, the Baath party is going to fight on. Assad remains the President of Syria. No change.

Well, of course, we shall see. Muammar Gaddafi of Libya is not a wise example to follow in time of need. Friday is another day, the traditional day of memorial and trial and questioning. If he can get through tomorrow without further killing in Deraa and Latakia, Assad may make it. He is young, his wife – wrongly derided by those who hate Syria – is a great asset to him, and his rule has banished the worst excesses of his father, Hafez. But – and it is a big "but" – torture does continue, the iniquities of the mukhabarat security services continue, freedom in Syria is as hard to find as an oasis in the desert, and the Syrian parliament remains, in the words of Al Jazeera's analyst Marwan Beshara, "a circus of support".

Yet there are more "buts" in Syria. It is a hard, tough country, without the avenues to free speech which were available in Egypt, to be sure, but a centre of Arab nationalism. Not for nothing do Syrians shout Um al Arabiya Wahida ("mother of one Arab nation"). Not for nothing do Syrians remember that they and they alone opposed the Sykes-Picot agreement that divided the region between France and Britain in 1916 with force of arms, their horse-riding army mowed down by French tanks at the battle of Maysaloon, their king given the monarchy of Iraq as a consolation prize by Winston Churchill.

This does not justify Bashar's autocratic rule. But it says something about it. Syrians do not obey the rules. Syrians do not follow the other Arabs like sheep. They fought harder than any others for a Palestinian-Israeli peace – which Assad described as "stagnant" yesterday, the unrest a "test for the nation" rather than a test for the President. In truth, the Hauran region – Deraa is in the Hauran, the scene of a fearsome series of government killings last week – has always been rebellious, even under French rule. But can Bashar al-Assad hold his country together?

He has managed, with a minority Alawite power (for which read Shia), to bring the Sunni Muslim majority of Syria into the economic establishment. Indeed, the Sunnis are the economy of Syria, a powerful elite who have no interest in unrest, disunity or foreign plots. It was odd that Assad talked about foreign "conspiracies" yesterday. It's an old adage that does him no credit; foreign "conspiracies" have always been discovered when dictators feel unsafe. Yet Damascus has been attacked by Israeli agents and Saddamist agents and Turkish right-wing agents over the past 40 years. It has a resonance, this talk of the moamarer – the "plot" – which makes Syrians into patriots rather than freedom fighters.

Of course, there is a lot wrong with Syria – and Bashar al-Assad may have pushed his luck yesterday, failing to announce the "reforms" and freedoms that Syrians expected of him. Instead of "God, Syria and Bashar", it was "God, Syria and my People" – but was that enough? He would not make reforms under pressure – "reforms", by the way, means democracy – but he surely is under pressure when government snipers have shot down the innocent in the streets of Syria's cities. He may not be in a mood for concessions. But is Syria not in need of these?

Its economy floats near bankruptcy – it was judged by the Swedish diplomatic corps to be unaffected by the West's economic catastrophe on the grounds that it did not really exist – and its Kurdish minority in the north are in a state of semi-revolt. But Assad has two friends who give him power: the Hizbollah in Lebanon and the Islamic Republic of Iran. If the Israelis need peace in Lebanon, they need Assad, and if Assad wants to maintain his regional power, he needs Iran. Syria is the Arab gate through which Iran can walk. Iran is the Muslim gate through which Assad – and remember, he is an Alawite and therefore a Shia – can walk.

It is all too easy for Madame Clinton to berate Syria for killing its own people – a phrase she does not, of course, use for Bahrain – but the Americans need Syria to extract their last troops from Iraq. It is also easy to turn Syria's problems into sectarianism. Nikolaos Van Dam, a brilliant Dutch diplomat, wrote a fine book emphasising that the struggle for power in Syria lay with the Alawites and that this minority effectively governed the country.

Yet Syria has always remained a unitary state, and it has complied with the West's demands for security co-operation – until the Americans came across the border into Syria and shot up a Syrian security agent's house. So compliant has it been that the US actually sent a poor Canadian to Damascus – "renditioned", in the popular phrase – to be atrociously tortured and kept in a sewer until the Americans realised he was innocent and sheepishly allowed him to return to Toronto.

These, needless, to say, are not issues which are going to be discussed on the television news shows or by the US Secretary of State – who is so concerned about the innocents of Libya that her air force is bombing Gaddafi but is so little concerned about the innocents of Syria that her air force will definitely not be bombing Syria.

Syria needs to be renewed. It does need an end to emergency laws, a free media and a fair judiciary and the release of political prisoners and – herewith let it be said – an end to meddling in Lebanon. That figure of 60 dead, a Human Rights Watch estimate, may in fact be much higher. Tomorrow, President Bashar al-Assad will supposedly tell us his future for Syria. It better be good.

A White House Divided On Syria

By Michael Singh
This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 30/03/2011

More so than the conflicts in Tunisia, Libya, and Bahrain, and perhaps even more than the fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, the recent violence in Syria has posed a challenge to the Obama administration's strategy in the Middle East.  The conflicting impulses within the administration can be seen in recent statements made by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; days ago, she described Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as a "reformer"; in London on March 29, she issued a "strong condemnation of the Syrian government's brutal repression of demonstrators."  Which view of Assad prevails, and how the United States responds to events in Syria, will go a long way toward determining how deeply US.. policy in the Middle East is altered by the recent turmoil there.

One of the key departures President Obama made from his predecessor's policy in the Middle East was in his approach toward Syria. Rather than continuing to heap pressure on the Syrian regime, the Obama Administration returned to the policy of engaging Syria practiced by past administrations.  The reasons behind this shift were manifold: the pressure policy was perceived as not working and engagement with hostile regimes broadly was seen as holding diplomatic promise.

Perhaps most importantly, however, Syria was seen as key to making progress in Israeli-Palestinian peace.  Damascus not only hosted the headquarters of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and therefore in theory held leverage over these groups, but its own negotiations with Israel were essential to achieving the "comprehensive peace" that the administration sought. 

After two years, this approach to Syria has borne no fruit.  Syria has not increased its compliance with the IAEA investigation into its clandestine nuclear activities, decreased its cooperation with Iran and Hizballah, or reduced its interference in Lebanon or increased its cooperation with the Hariri Tribunal.  On the domestic front, far from being a reformer, Assad oversees a regime rated worse for political rights than was Hosni Mubarak's Egypt.  And there has been no progress on the Syrian-Israeli track, nor has Syria played a role in the frozen Israeli-Palestinian talks (though granted, those talks have faltered for reasons quite independent of Syrian policies).

But the current US policy toward Syria has not only been unsuccessful in its outcomes -- it was flawed in its conception.  US interests and values demand that we support freedom and sovereignty for Palestinians; those same values, however, preclude us from trading the liberty of the Syrian and Lebanese people for Palestinian statehood.  Likewise, there is little reason to believe that Bashar al-Assad is truly interested in a Syrian-Israeli peace; Syria's state of war with Israel provides his justification for permanent "emergency laws," and the relations with Iran and Hizballah which he would need to sacrifice to make a deal profit his regime greatly.  We may foresee a peace dividend, but Assad uses a different accounting.

There are signs that some within the Obama administration recognize the need to change course on Syria.  An unnamed U.S. official told the New York Times on March 26 that "Whatever credibility the [Syrian] government had, they shot it today -- literally....it's definitely in our interest to pursue an agreement, but you can't do it with a government that has no credibility with its population."  Some will argue that the problem is not Assad, but his father's "old guard" which surrounds him.  But Assad's own statements and policies belie such wishful thinking.

Courting Assad in pursuit of regional goals while neglecting what happens inside Syria is not realpolitik; it may satisfy the politik by smoothing bilateral relations, but it falls short on the real by underemphasizing the impact of political and economic stagnation in the region for US interests. A more creative, less one-dimensional, and more promising approach is needed, which should include reinvigorated economic and political pressure using sanctions and support for Syrian democracy activists.  The Assad regime is economically vulnerable -- it lacks its neighbors' natural resources, and there are signs that previous rounds of economic pressure were beginning to stress the regime.  It is also politically vulnerable, with a restive population, the urge for reform sweeping the region, and the loss of a Western ally in France, whose foreign minister Alain Juppe recently signaled a major change in French policy toward Syria.  In his speech Monday night regarding Libya, President Obama said that "wherever people long to be free, they will find a friend in the United States."  He can follow through on this pledge by galvanizing an international coalition to exert pressure on the Assad regime.

One can't help but see shades of St. Paul in the Obama Administration's struggle to decide on its approach toward Assad.  It was on the road to Damascus that Paul saw the light and changed his ways; perhaps it will be on the diplomatic road to Damascus that President Obama realizes the need to reorient US policy toward Syria and the region beyond.