Saudi Arabia's Missteps Into Bahrain

By Ray Takeyh
This commentary was published by The Council On Foreign Relations on 15/03/2011

On March 14, 2011, Saudi Arabia launched its own "Brezhnev Doctrine," exercising the right to militarily intervene to prop up an unpopular governing order. In the process, the Saudis have demonstrated how little they understand their own region and their own country. Saudi rulers have made a major mistake in casting the crisis in Bahrain as a sectarian conflict in which Iran's Shia proxies are battling a benign Sunni ruling class for sake of Persian aggrandizement. The rebelling in Bahrain, as indeed throughout the region, is about a disenfranchised and impoverished majority seeking political representation and economic justice. The proper path for Bahrain's al-Khalifa dynasty is to renegotiate its national compact and appreciate that as the Middle East finally joins the twenty-first century it has limited options beyond a constitutional monarchy.

The aging Saudi rulers nurturing their own misconceptions and conspiracies are hopelessly behind the curve as the Arab Spring gradually suffuses the entire Middle East. The yearning for democratic reforms and economic equality cannot be repressed through police tactics in Riyadh or forceful intervention in Manama. It would be wise for Washington to have a frank and unpleasant conversation with its ally of long-standing. Too often the lure of Saudi oil wealth has caused successive American administrations to placate their truculence. The old Arab bargain whereby the state exchanges material rewards for political quiescence is no longer relevant. If the Saudi monarchy and its Sunni subsidiaries want to survive the turbulent politics of the new Middle East, they will have to opt for political modernization as opposed to offers of bribes mixed with threats of violence.

The Iranian angle is as interesting as it is intriguing. The Islamic Republic is itself beset by a democratic uprising that it has tried to contain at the risk of its own illegitimacy. The Saudi move this week could not have come at a better time for the guardians of Iran's theocracy. Tehran will likely continue its unequivocal condemnations and portray itself as champion of democracy without actually practicing it at home. By highlighting the deficiencies of the Arab political order and Washington's seeming passivity, the clerical state can try to capture the region's political imagination irrespective of its own tarnished reputation. But don't expect any regional show of force by the Iranian regime. Tehran understands that it benefits the most by limiting itself to rhetorical attacks as opposed to a direct military intervention that could allow the Saudis to portray their power play as part of the effort to contain Iran.

U.S. policymakers must grasp that the crisis in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Middle East is not about Iran and should not be seen through the prism of U.S.-Iran confrontation. The sooner Washington emancipates itself from such flawed perceptions, the sooner it will be in position to craft a new, stable regional order.

Humanitarian Intervention In Libya?

By Adil E. Shamoo
This commentary was published in Foreign Policy In Focus on 16/03/2011

Unlike the despots in Egypt and Tunisia, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi is resisting the popular revolutions sweeping the Arab world. As of this writing, the pro-democracy rebels successfully control Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, and most of the eastern part of the country. Gaddafi still controls most of the military, revolutionary committees, and foreign mercenaries. More importantly, Gaddafi controls the capital city of Tripoli with a population of 2.5 million out of a total population of 6.5 million. Gaddafi is attacking the rebels, taking back Zawiya, Ras Lanof, and pushing forward east to take more rebel areas.

Those beating the war drums claim that since Obama asked Gaddafi to step down, the United States will lose credibility if it does not act to hasten Gaddafi’s removal. Worse, the Libyan leader, if he retains control, may launch "a mass murder of innocents," argues Geoffrey Robinson of the UN's justice council. With the lives of many Libyans at stake, pressure is building for the United States to lead a humanitarian intervention to support the rebels and topple Gaddafi. Proponents argue that conditions on the ground create an open-and-shut case for such intervention.

The shouting sounds familiar. Many of the players that called for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 are echoing the same group think. Last time around, the president of the United States and his administration led the cry for the invasion of Iraq. This time, the administration has stated that, although exploring a full range of options, it has not put enforcing a no-fly zone on the table just now.

Humanitarian intervention is a controversial tactic. The international community should consider such a course of action in Libya only after a thorough assessment of means and ends.

Arab Ownership of the Revolution

Libyan rebels early on claimed pride in their efforts to oust Gaddafi and didn’t want foreign intervention, reported NPR’s Lourdes Garcia-Navarro. President Obama’s remarks at a March 3 press conference recognized this sensitivity about foreign intervention: “One of the extraordinary successes of Egypt was the full ownership that the Egyptian people felt for that transformation. That has served the Egyptian people well. It serves U.S. interests well. We did not see anti-American sentiment arising out of that movement in Egypt precisely because they felt that we hadn’t tried to engineer or impose a particular outcome, but rather they owned it.”

By the end of the first week of the Libyan revolution, and although Libyan rebels had not requested any help, conservatives and neoconservatives began answering the nonexistent call for military intervention and deriding the administration for not doing enough. As the Gaddafi regime became more aggressive toward the rebels and casualties mounted, some Libyan rebels debated whether to call for limited Western military intervention under UN auspices. Their initial desire for help with airstrikes against Gaddafi forces reflected their impatience and desperation.

For decades, the Arab League represented despotic regimes. But now the Arab League, with prodding from the Libyan opposition’s Interim Transitional National Council, has asked the UN to impose a no-fly zone only through a Security Council decision. The lessons of outside unilateral intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan—and non-UN-imposed no-fly zones--are too strong to ignore. U.S. military leaders have also expressed the reluctance of the United States and NATO to get involved right now. They are supporting the Arab League’s no-fly zone recommendation, but it stopped short of endorsement.

In countries like Libya, just as in Iraq, outside calls for humanitarian military intervention in a country with significant oil reserves are met with suspicion. As New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof wrote, “after Iraq, we just don’t have a realistic option of invading another Arab country with oil.” Intervention will bring the ire of the Arab street and celebrations from al-Qaeda.

Assessing the Moral Conditions

Humanitarian intervention has come to mean the use, or the threat of use, of military intervention in the affairs of another country for the sake of stopping a humanitarian disaster and protecting the people in that country from violations of human rights. For some, like Harvard law professor Ryan Goodman, linking the term humanitarian to military intervention is contrary to international law and done for the purpose of justifying a preemptive military invasion of another country. For the UN's Geoffrey Robertson, "there is now a narrowly proscribed international law right for states to render assistance to innocent civilians battling for their lives."

Four questions must be considered before recommending military intervention based on humanitarian considerations.

First, when would such a military intervention in Libya be morally justifiable?  Is it when Gaddafi kills hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands, or more? Military intervention will also result in many deaths, of Gaddafi supporters, rebels, and the intervening soldiers. All human lives are of equal worth in their humanity. As Mahatma Gandhi queried in Non-Violence in Peace and War, “What difference does it make to the dead, the orphans and the homeless, whether the mad destruction is wrought under the name of totalitarianism or the holy name of liberty or democracy?” If the answer is we must always act, then why did proposals to intervene in similar cases throughout the world--such as in Rwanda, Ivory Coast, and the Congo-- not merit the same serious consideration?

Second, who should carry it out the intervention? UN intervention in past international crises has met with mixed results, yet is the only organization that represents a global consensus. The UN should explore several avenues including: a peaceful removal of Gaddafi and guarantee of safe passage to exile; a guarantee of safety to his soldiers without retribution; a UN-sponsored election; recognition and enforcement of a UN-administered ceasefire. The UN can mobilize other international bodies to erode Gaddafi’s authority if the situation continues to deteriorate. The International Criminal Court (ICC) could be asked to investigate Gaddafi’s alleged crimes against humanity.

Neither the Western powers nor NATO enjoys full credibility among the Arab people, who believe that Western and U.S. policies in the Middle East lack moral consistency. For example, amid massive anti-government demonstrations in Bahrain, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates urged that government to expedite reforms during his announced visit. Yet immediately after he left, Saudi Arabia sent a thousand troops to prop up the regime, as if the United States gave the Saudis the green light to intervene.

Any unilateral military intervention by the United States or NATO alone will be characterized as Western imperialism and a grab for Arab oil. If the Gaddafi regime continues its slaughter and the UN refuses to intervene militarily, the United States or NATO could possibly intervene militarily if and only if they pledge no covert or overt manipulation of an election or engineering of a new Libyan government. While skeptical that such a pledge could be trusted--for the sake of saving so many lives--it is an option on the table.

Third, how should a humanitarian intervention be carried out? If the rebel leaders are credible and represent a large and diverse segment of Libyan society, they will need assistance to determine the type, scope, and means of the military intervention. After the request is made, the rebel leaders and the military interventionists must agree on answers to all of these questions prior to commencing the intervention. In order to create conditions that are as humane as possible, the planners should concentrate on operations that create the fewest casualties for all sides. The UN should also be prepared to negotiate a peaceful outcome as long as the primary demands are met.

End Game

Too many interventions have occurred in the past decade without identification of reasonable outcomes. The UN, while respecting the Libyan revolutionaries' goals, can demand a commitment to democratic values through free and fair elections within a specified time period. The UN can play its role by supporting the groundwork for these elections and providing international observers.

Humanitarian intervention, if any, should be carried out by the UN under the strict conditions outlined above and only for the sole purpose of ameliorating a potential humanitarian disaster. For now, the UN and other nations can immediately offer humanitarian assistance by providing food, shelter, and medicine to refugees. The American people should insist on spreading our Jeffersonian ideals of freedom and democracy to the Arab people peacefully through offerings of educational, technological, and economic development.

But the American people should say no to the use of humanitarian intervention as a cover for U.S. hegemony.

Adil E. Shamoo, is a senior analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus, and writes on ethics and public policy. He is a professor at University of Maryland School of Medicine. He can be reached at ashamoo@umaryland.edu.

The Blood Money Deal To Release CIA Contractor Raymond Davis

By David Ignatius
This commentary was published in The Washington Post on 16/03/2011

CIA contractor Raymond Davis was released from a Pakistani prison today, thanks to the Muslim ritual known as “blood money.” Next, Pakistan and America will try to clear away some of the bitterness aroused by the case and establish a better relationship based, as President Obama likes to say, on “mutual interest and mutual respect.”

The CIA and its Pakistani counterpart, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, are planning to do just that. A Pakistani says the goal is “new rules of engagement.” A U.S. official says they will discuss “the contours of the relationship.” For both sides, it represents an attempt to rebuild trust after weeks of bitter accustations following the Jan. 27 arrest of Davis for killing two Pakistanis in Lahore.

In Pakistan’s tribal culture, “blood money” payments are seen as a face-saving way of resolving bloody disputes. I described the blood money approach in a March 2 column , after interviews on Feb. 28 with U.S. and Pakistani officials.

This deal had four principal architects: Hussein Haqqani, Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington, who shared the “blood money” idea with Sen. John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Kerry then traveled to Pakistan, where me met with President Asif Ali Zardari, with the leaders of the Punjab government that was holding Davis, and with top officials of the ISI. Haqqani also visited CIA Director Leon Panetta the evening of Feb. 28 to share the “blood money” idea with him, according to a U.S. official. The final details were worked out by Panetta and ISI Director-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha.

U.S. and Pakistani sources said the process that led to Davis’s release Wednesday included a series of steps: First, the U.S. agreed to pay compensation to the families of the two Pakistanis Davis killed on Jan. 27. A Pakistani lawyer quoted by the Associated Press said the total payments amounted to $2.3 million. Another Pakistani source told me the payments were less than $1 million for each family. According to a U.S. official, the actual negotiations were conducted by Pakistanis, but the U.S. has agreed to pay the bill.

After the families reached the private financial agreement and formally forgave Davis, the settlement was recognized by the trial court in Punjab, which could then dismiss the murder charges under what is described as a standard process in Pakistani murder cases. With the murder charges dismissed, the Punjabi court resolved lesser charges against Davis, and he was freed.

An important aspect of the settlement, for the U.S., was that the principal of diplomatic immunity was never formally challenged in Pakistani courts. The Pakistani High Court refused to rule on the question and the trial court didn’t make a finding, either. That was crucial for the U.S., which feared that a legal challenge to its claim of immunity for Davis would expose hundreds of other undercover agents around the world who rely on the legal protection of their formal status as “diplomats.”

The final piece of the settlement may be the most complicated. Pakistani officials say discussions will begin soon with the CIA about the “rules of engagement” in Pakistan. “If it’s a CIA operation, the ISI needs to know,” explained one Pakistani official. The CIA has a roughly similar policy of “declaring” its personnel and operations with some other countries with which it has close intelligence ties, such as Britain, France, Israel and Jordan.

A U.S. official confirmed that the CIA is planning to discuss the “contours” of the relationship, but he said there was no formal “quid pro quo.” This official explained that the CIA “is always willing to discuss Pakistani concerns and work them through.”

Libya Is A Problem From Hell

Why isn't Obama listening to Samantha Power's advice when it comes to intervention in Libya?

By Jamie M. Fly
This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 16/03/2011

As Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi's forces advance toward Benghazi, Barack Obama's administration continues to dither in its response to Libya's crisis. Although the U.S. president insists that all options are on the table, his administration has failed to outline a plan that could conceivably help the Libyan rebels oust Qaddafi and end the bloodshed. The weak American response pales in comparison with countries such as France -- which has recognized Libya's revolutionary council as the country's legitimate government and has contemplated airstrikes -- and even the Arab League, which endorsed a no-fly zone over the weekend.

Meanwhile, some in the foreign-policy establishment have marshaled a number of arguments for U.S. inaction. Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass argued in the Wall Street Journal, for example, that U.S. interests in Libya were "less than vital" and made the case that a no-fly zone would be ineffective at halting Qaddafi's forces. Writing in the Washington Post, retired Gen. Wesley Clark stated that "violence in Libya is not significant in comparison" with recent civil wars in Africa and fighting in Darfur, and that there is "no clear basis for action." And early in the conflict, when reports of regime violence against civilians were at their peak, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen claimed, "We've ... not been able to confirm that any of the Libyan aircraft have fired on their own people."

These arguments are not new. They have been brought forth time and again when the United States and the international community debated whether to intervene in order to halt state-sponsored attacks on civilians. What's more, one of the most eloquent rebuttals to these recurring claims for nonintervention was penned by none other than an official currently serving in the Obama administration. Senior National Security Council official Samantha Power, in her 2002 Pulitzer Prize-winning book A Problem from Hell, identified several reasons behind the United States' repeated failure to prevent genocide.

The first reason for U.S. inaction to prevent the mass killing of civilians is supposed lack of knowledge. In many cases, Power notes:

The most common response is, "We didn't know." This is not true. To be sure, the information emanating from countries victimized by genocide was imperfect. Embassy personnel were withdrawn, intelligence assets on the ground were scarce, editors were typically reluctant to assign their reporters to places where neither U.S. interests nor American readers were engaged, and journalists who attempted to report the atrocities were limited in their mobility. As a result, refugee claims were difficult to confirm and body counts notoriously hard to establish. Because genocide is usually veiled under the cover of war, some U.S. officials at first had genuine difficulty distinguishing deliberate atrocities against civilians from conventional conflict.

Despite these difficulties, it is clear that the violence being deployed by the Libyan regime is indiscriminate and not solely directed at the poorly armed rebels. Qaddafi expressed his intention early in the conflict to "cleanse Libya house by house," and as government forces attempt to retake towns controlled by the rebels, reports of shelling of civilian areas and firing on civilian and humanitarian vehicles have increased. Refugees fleeing the initial outbreak of violence described a brutal scene of bodies hanging from electricity poles and militia trucks loaded with the dead.

As Power wrote about previous U.S. responses to genocide, "U.S. officials who 'did not know' or 'did not fully appreciate' chose not to." It might be convenient to avert our eyes or write off such reports as exaggerated opposition claims, but there are enough examples of such accounts that the human toll in Libya is undeniable.

Skeptics of intervention also argue that the United States cannot have much of an impact without a sizable U.S. military commitment -- a commitment that is then dismissed as imprudent.

U.S. ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder raised this point last week, saying, "Even if [a no-fly zone] were to be established, [it] isn't really going to impact what is happening there today." Haass also made this case in his Wall Street Journal op-ed, claiming that if a no-fly zone is not enough, the United States would then need military personnel on the ground, which would be a drastic and unwise escalation of U.S. involvement. Similarly, Defense Secretary Robert Gates told lawmakers that the implementation of a no-fly zone "begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses," essentially an act of war.

It is not clear that the Pentagon's qualms about a no-fly zone are drawn from a serious assessment of the resource requirements or just a general lack of interest in intervening in Libya. The fact that European allies such as Britain and France, whose militaries lack the size and advanced capabilities of the U.S. armed forces, have seemed much more willing to intervene seems to indicate that it is the Pentagon's traditional noninterventionist tendencies --- rather than resources -- that lie behind its reluctance to get involved.

Gates's unwillingness to lead on this point is a troubling sign about a possible re-emergence in the Pentagon of the so-called Powell doctrine, which held that any involvement required overwhelming force, needed broad international support, and a clear exit strategy.

When Colin Powell, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stressed this approach in an effort to forestall intervention in Bosnia by Bill Clinton's administration, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright famously asked Powell, "What are you saving this superb military for, Colin, if we can't use it?" Similarly, reluctance at the Pentagon was one of the primary reasons that George W. Bush's administration did not intervene militarily in response to the genocide in Darfur. The Obama White House appears to be the latest victim of this time-tested Pentagon tactic.

This goes to Power's most important lesson from her survey of the U.S. response to genocide: It all comes down to will. "The real reason the United States did not do what it could and should have done to stop genocide was not a lack of knowledge or influence but a lack of will," she wrote. "Simply put, American leaders did not act because they did not want to. They believed that genocide was wrong, but they were not prepared to invest the military, financial, diplomatic, or domestic political capital needed to stop it."

If American policymakers want to make a difference, they can. But hope for a quick and bloodless resolution to the Libya conflict is no substitute for a realistic appraisal of the stakes of this crisis. As Qaddafi's forces regain the initiative, the humanitarian costs of inaction grow.

Power is not the only Obama administration official to make the case for U.S. humanitarian intervention. The late Richard Holbrooke, writing in To End a War, his account of the peace talks that ended the Bosnian conflict, presciently warned:

There will be other Bosnias in our lives -- areas where early outside involvement can be decisive, and American leadership will be required. The world's richest nation, one that presumes to great moral authority, cannot simply make worthy appeals to conscience and call on others to carry the burden. The world will look to Washington for more than rhetoric the next time we face a challenge to peace.

However, the Libyan people and the world are getting exactly what Holbrooke feared -- rhetoric about the need for Qaddafi to leave and mixed signals about U.S. resolve in guaranteeing that this happens.

Beyond the moral cost to U.S. foreign policy, a victory by Qaddafi will send a stark message to other autocrats in the Middle East and around the world. The people of Tunisia and Egypt freed themselves from repressive rulers with minimal violence and loss of life. If Qaddafi manages to cling to power through widespread violence and military force, this so-called "Arab Spring" may become very bloody indeed.

It is not too late. Obama should listen to those inside his administration and in the international community who believe that the United States should act to prevent further bloodshed. If he does not, Libya will become the latest in a long list of cases in which the United States, once again, ends up on the wrong side of history.

Jamie M. Fly is executive director of the Foreign Policy Initiative. During U.S. President George W. Bush's administration, he served at the National Security Council and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Patriarch Ra'i's Greatest Challenge

This editorial was published in The Daily Star on 16/03/2011

 

A glance at the resume of Lebanon’s new Maronite patriarch reveals a supreme adeptness for matters both spiritual and legal. A university professor and long-serving Pontifical Council member, Bishop Beshara Rai must now find space for a hardhat next to his mortarboard and miter. Bridges need building. 

Rai assumes the post of patriarch with the country in the grip of several testing quandaries. The political deadlock, which has entered its third month, will require all his evident ability as diplomatic negotiator – overly cozy with no faction yet ready for dialogue with all.

A schism among Lebanese Christians persists. Split politically and at seemingly intractable loggerheads, Rai has taken on the unenviable task of persuading respective Christian leaders that the sect will either heal together, or disintegrate separately. The chasm in Christian political priorities has, over recent years, led to a decrease in the sect’s influence and an increase in the emigration of bright young congregations, who flee Lebanon at an alarming annual rate. Rai’s skills as communicator will need to be at their sharpest in persuading leaders that being Lebanese and Christian is more important to the collective than the fickle force of outside states.

The link between all Lebanese sects needs tightening. Irrespective of religion, national unity is a dogma all politicians claim to follow. Rai must endeavor to close gaps between various sects, as persuader more than pedagogue, as has always been the patriarch’s role. The doors of the patriarchate have historically remained open to all faiths and the new head of Christian Maronites must know now is the time to keep them ajar.

Praise must be given to Rai’s predecessor, Nasrallah Butros Sfeir, who, even while still in possession of all faculties, decided at 91 that he should pass the baton to a more youthful candidate. His years of service and his tireless efforts to achieve Lebanon’s independence must never be forgotten.

With his election Tuesday, Rai has risen to a post that is more than solely religious; the Maronite patriarch speaks for all Lebanon. The country that Pope John Paul II once labelled “a message” of coexistence cannot lapse further into factionalism and disunity. If Lebanon is to remain a beacon for freedom, democracy and independence throughout the region, Rai will play a significant role. The tasks are not easy. They are necessary. 

The new patriarch’s main asset before entering Bkirki was his ability to speak the truth. His priority while inside is to persuade Lebanon’s estranged politicians to heed it.

Israel Continues To Stir Trouble As Storms Brew Around It

By Hasan Abu Nimah

This commentary was published in The Jordan Times on 16/03/2011

 

The political upheaval in the Arab world has so far claimed some significant victims. The heavily fortified regimes in Tunis and Cairo have already fallen. Muammar Qadhafi’s regime in Libya and Ali Abdullah Saleh’s in Yemen are waging desperate wars against their peoples in the hope that a miracle may save them, but their long-term survival under current circumstances looks extremely unlikely.

The other Arab countries have either to embark on a daring and genuine programme of reform (a few are already trying to do that with varying degrees of authenticity) to meet their people’s demands, or they may have to confront internal rebellions as well.

This formula however hardly applies to one country that exists right in the heart of the Arab world, but which is not an Arab country. That, of course, is Israel.

The fall of Hosni Mubarak’s regime has deprived Israel of a vital strategic asset. Even if no other major political changes in the region were to follow, the Israeli loss is already grave. Does Israel therefore realise that it has to also weigh its options? Will Israel realise that a flimsy layer of fake “stability” imposed on top of mountains of injustice, oppression, occupation, continued aggression and humiliation will not lead to real peace, real security and normal conditions?

Will Israel embark on a radical reform of its policies, and attitudes as well? Or will the “embattled” entity see the collapse of the convenient status quo as an opportunity for louder cries for help, now that the region is embroiled in deeper turmoil and that Israel’s security could be further exposed? Israel has been clearly alarmed by the changes so far, and must be deeply concerned about how much of a political “damage” the current storm will precipitate.

The status quo that lasted in the region for many decades was seen by most Arabs as political stagnation, submission to the will of foreign powers, absence of democracy, utter disregard of ruthless dictators for their people’s rights, corruption, humiliation and defeat.

For Israel and its Western supporters, by contrast, this has been a period of “stability” where strong “allies” such as the two regimes that have already fallen, worked closely with their Western patrons to “fight terrorism” and “curb Islamist extremism” (which is also a code for any and all resistance to Israeli occupation and aggression).

Actually the status quo was carefully designed by world powers with full official Arab acquiescence not only to provide Israel with protection from any possible threat, but also to shield continued Israeli aggression and violations of international law from any accountability or punitive action. Under this cover, Israel could ignore every peace initiative over many years, including the over-generous Arab Peace Initiative, in order to continue its brutal colonisation of Arab lands.

While many Israeli commentators and leaders have lamented the loss of Mubarak and acknowledged the role he played for Israel, and his role as a wedge preventing any unified Arab front to confront Israeli aggression, we should remember that Mubarak’s negative influence spread well beyond Egypt. His regime’s policies effectively controlled the Arab League and the Arab Follow-Up Committee, the body to which Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas often scrambled for cover whenever he needed to succumb even more to Israeli and American pressure.

The status quo that served Israel so well is over, but Israel shows no signs of recognising the need to change its ways. It is resorting to its old ways of opportunistically fishing in troubled waters.

While world attention is focused on the catastrophe in Japan, Israel used the excuse of a brutal murder of a settler family in Itamar colony (no suspects have yet been found in the crime) to announce an additional 500 settler houses on occupied Palestinian land.

Itamar, according to Aluf Benn who writes for the Israeli daily Haaretz, is “the mother of all isolated settlements, on a ridge over Nablus, its radical inhabitants infamous for their violent relations with their Palestinian neighbours”, and “no spot is more emblematic of the conflict and friction in the territories than Itamar” (March 13).

If indeed this gruesome attack does prove to be the work of Palestinians, Israel seems incapable of understanding that its own violence, colonisation, and subjugation and humiliation of millions of people will lead inevitably to counter-violence, even if it is rare - unlike systematic and routine Israeli violence.

Israeli leaders are stubbornly repeating past blunders. The crime is blamed on the Palestinian victims of occupation as usual. Even the complicit Palestinian Authority, whose security forces are mainly built to protect Israelis and which is often praised for doing that successfully, has not been spared the accusation of direct responsibility and incitement. The Israelis exploit the blood of their people to dig deeper and to consolidate further their illegal usurpation of Palestinian rights.

And instead of trying to salvage the situation by making bold attempts to resuscitate a lifeless peace process, Israel is raising the barriers even higher.

Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak said last week that Israel may demand an extra $20 billion in US military aid, on top of the $30 billion already promised over a decade, so that Israel can cope with the changes. But it is not clear if the cash-strapped United States will be enthusiastic this time. Barak claimed that qualitative military aid to Israel is essential, as a strong Israel can become a stabiliser in such a turbulent region.

Israel continues to deny that it has been largely responsible not only for decades of continued Middle East instability and wars, but for exacerbating world crises as well.

It would have been too unlikely to expect Israel to act in a manner that would pave the way for a meaningful peace settlement. What would have been reasonable for a start would have been to refrain from further provocations and land colonisation. Other constructive measures such as relaxing the harsh occupation measures and lifting the Gaza siege before Egypt does would also create a better climate. But Israel is never satisfied with the status quo, it always has to find a way to make things worse.

Iraq's Ship Sinking Fast

Mayada Al Askari wrtes: Al Maliki remains engrossed with consolidating his political might while corruption runs deep and the people clamour for basic services

This commentary was published in The Gulf News on 16/03/2011

It has no doubt crossed the minds of both the Iraqi and US administrations that some form of change has to take place in Iraq before the ship hits rock bottom.

It has been a year since the March 2010 elections in Iraq when hopes for change were high. The elected government, however, has turned out to be a complete disappointment. Services are non-existent, poverty is rampant and corruption is on the rise.

This is the state of affairs at a time when statements are made about Iraq having the second largest oil reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia with most of the oil still waiting to be explored. On the ground, there is nothing to show for this ‘wealth'.

Political blocs are aware that things could take a dangerous turn if the government does not remedy the situation quickly.

That is why Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki was summoned by parliament last week and questioned about how he intended to deal with the protests erupting all over Iraq.

The Al Maliki government itself took a very long time to form. If it were not for the Kurdish Erbil initiative in bringing everyone on board to form a national partnership government, Iraq would still be without a government. Even a year on, Iraq is without a minister of defence. The ministers of interior and national security were approved only a week ago!

The country is simmering with anger while Al Maliki and his bloc are playing politics on a two way street. On the one hand, Al Maliki is assuming all the authority, and on the other, he is pressing all the other blocs' representatives to come up with solutions related to corruption and ill-management, a task which he alone controls.

Regulatory authorities, the central bank and other vital bodies, which are supposed to hold the prime minister and his government accountable for its deeds (or misdeeds if you please) are all under Al Maliki, which seems very odd in a democracy which has come after 35 years of blood, sweat and tears.

There are also stories of Iraqi prisoners telling human rights' groups about the existence of secret jails — something that runs against Iraq's Constitution.
Subverting the law

Members of Iraqi Parliament no longer have the power to propose legislation. Instead, all new laws have to be proposed by the cabinet or the country's president and then passed on to parliament for a vote.

Michael Corbin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq, has told a Washington think-tank that Iraqis are not protesting for regime change, but against poor services and corruption. They want the government to respond to their needs.

In fact this is what sets Iraq's demonstrations apart from protests in other Arab countries. This Iraqi government was elected democratically, but it needs to change its course in many areas.
Muqtada Al Sadr, who has returned to Iraq from Iran after a three-year absence, has spoken freely about the poor governance. He has given the government a 180-day ultimatum to start getting its act together.

The unified Sadrist leadership is the reason Al Maliki responded to public discontent by giving his cabinet 100 days to come up with ways to improve services and cut corruption.

Jason Gluck, a rule of law adviser at the US Institute of Peace and an adviser to the Iraqi Parliament in 2007 stated recently that the developments in Iraq have provoked real concern across the Iraqi political spectrum, and the responsibility now rests largely with parliament to check the prime minister's powers.

The ability of the diverse political parties in parliament to effectively do so will be a critical test of Iraq's budding democracy. So will Al Maliki's willingness to reform his ways and start acting responsibly towards the people's needs by ridding the government of much detested corruption.

The stakes are high and corruption runs deep. And given the performance of his last term in government, Al Maliki will need much more than 100 days to eradicate corruption and provide better services to the people, apart from focusing on ruling the country democratically.