Kurdish Self Determination: The Good And The Better

By Amir Taheri
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 31/12/2010
 
A recent remark by Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani that the issue of "self determination" remains on the table has come as a gift to those who have always claimed that partition is the best solution for Iraq. Over the past seven years we have seen dozens of seminars, mostly held in the United States, on how best to carve Iraq up. Meanwhile, books and articles on the subject amount to a sizeable library.

 
The election of Barack Obama as President of the United States encouraged the partitionists. Obama himself had no particular position because, as in other issues, he wanted to have as much wiggle room as possible. However, his vice president Joseph Biden, who had passionately argued in favour of the war in Iraq, had promoted partition for years before his new position forced him to either shut up or equivocate.
 
Inside Iraq, however, the idea has never been raised in the context of a public debate. The reason for this is that Arabs, who account for almost 80 per cent of Iraq's population, have had no desire to raise it while the Kurds, during the reign of successive despots in Baghdad, did not dare even hint at it.
 
Now that Iraq is an open society there is no reason why the issue of Kurdish self-determination should not be raised.
 
Barzani is wise not to want to brush the issue under the carpet. After all, when the southern Sudanese are allowed self-determination and at a time that the Kosovars are buildng a state of their own, no Kurdish leader worth his salt could pretend that the issue does not exist.

But what does self-determination actually mean?
 
If one takes self-determination to mean the right to choose one's government through free and fair elections, the Iraqi Kurds already enjoy that right. As head of the autonomous Kurdish government in Erbil, Barzani himself is a living testimony to this fact.
 
However, many of those who speak of self-determination mean something else: the right to break away from Iraq and form an independent state in the provinces where ethnic Kurds form a majority of the population.
 
And, who might benefit from such a development?
 
Before the Khomeinist revolution, the safe assumption was that Iran would not wish the Kurds of Iraq to have a state of their own.
 
The reason was that Tehran feared that such a development could attract its own Kurdish minority to secession.
 
Today, the picture is different. The Khomeinist regime, or at least the part of it that is still dominant, sees the world through a pan-Shi'ite prism. Its long-term strategy is to assume the leadership of united Shi'ite communities across existing frontiers and then use this as a platform for claiming the leadership of Islam as a whole in an as yet ill-defined "final confrontation" with the "Infidel" Western powers.
 
That strategy would benefit from the break-up of Iraq. For the past four years Tehran has been promoting the so-called " federal" agenda for Iraq in the hope of creating a client republic in the eight central and southern provinces of Iraq where Shi'ites form a majority of the population.

The break up scenario would also make sure that a carved up Iraq would not be able to challenge Tehran's ambitions for regional hegemony. A united Iraq with a population of 30 million plus huge potential wealth thanks to oil reserves and water resources would be in a good position to counter-balance Iran.
 
Moreover, Iraq is the second largest Shi'ite majority country after Iran. In time, Najaf could re-emerge as the main centre of Shi'ite scholarship and religious guidance, making it harder for the Khomeinists to pursue their pan-Sh'ite dreams. Even today, there is evidence that Grand Ayatollah Ali-Muhammad Sistani, who is based in Najaf, is emerging as the most popular Shi'ite marja'a or "source of emulation" in Iran.
 
Turkey's position may have also changed. Until the liberation of Iraq, the popular view was that Turkey did not want an independent Kurdish state for fear that such a development might push its own ethnic Kurds towards secession. Between 1981 and 2003, Turkey also enjoyed the carte blanche issued by Saddam Hussein for military incursions in northern Iraq. That enabled the Turks to pursue Kurdish rebels deep inside Iraqi territory with the consent of the despot in Baghdad. As long as a despot was in power in Baghdad, a united Iraq suited Turkish interests. A democratic Iraq, however, is unlikely to tolerate foreign military incursions into its territory for long. It would be hard for Turkey to provoke a war situation with its only democratic neighbour in the Middle East without provoking adverse reaction from the international community.
 
Thus today, as neo-Ottomans in Turkey pursue dreams of empire, Ankara may be tilting towards a new position that favours the break up of Iraq. After all, the Ottoman Empire was made possible by the fact that the Arabs were divided into countless mini emirates or had no states of their own. A mini-Kurdish state in northern Iraq would have no choice but kowtow to Ankara even if that meant continued Turkish military incursion into its territory.
 
Syria may also favour the break-up of Iraq. Such a development would make Syria the most populous Arab state in the strategic region between Egypt and Iran and thus a more important player. A united and democratic Iraq, on the other hand, would be a daily challenge to a Syria dominated by a despotic elite in a client situation vis-a-vis the Khomeinist regime in Tehran.

Part of the Jordanian ruling elite would also be favourable to a beak-up of Iraq. A smaller Iraq would make tiny Jordan look bigger while old dynastic claims to ruelrship in Baghdad are revived.

One other regional player, Israel, has always been favoruable to the dismembering of Iraq. Many in Israel's leadership believe that Iraq is the only Arab country large and, potentially, wealthy enough to pose an "existential threat" to the Jewish state. They argue that a smaller Iraq would be less likely to harbour dreams of leading the Arabs in a new major war against Israel.
 
But what if all partitionists are mistaken in their various calculations?
 
The first big losers could be Iraq's own Kurds. They would not only have to bear the huge cost of building a new state but would also continue to pay for its maintenance and defense in a hostile region. Several studies show that a citizens of a mini Kurdish state in Iraq would end up much poorer than they are today. Landlocked and cut off from the bulk of Iraq's huge oil wealth, the Kurds might find "self determination" not such a good deal after all. Even in Europe, the partitions that we have witnessed recently have often ended up to the detriment of the secessionists. The Slovaks are now 40 percent poorer than when they were part of a united Czechoslovakia. With the possible exception of Slovenia, all the seven states that have emerged from the break-up of Yugoslavia are relatively poorer. There is no reason why Iraqi Kurds would do any better.
 
That would not be the only cause for concern. The areas that would presumably form the new mini state include a number of ethnic groups that do not regard themselves as Kurds. The new state would have to either suppress those minorities by force or accept their demand for the creation of micro-states in accordance with the most radical interpretations of the Treaty of Lausanne.
 
The regional powers that favour the partition of Iraq would also end up as losers. All those states include within their frontiers a wide variety of ethnic minorities, including Kurds, who might be interested in their own versions of "self determination". History shows hat when the contours of one state are put in doubt the frontiers of all states within this region are open to change. Most of the states surrounding Iraq have treated it either as a nuisance or an actual threat. And in the case of some, Kuwait and Iran for example, they have not been wrong. However, new Iraq will not be what it was under the mad dictators of the period between 1958 and 2003.

 
In 1989, French President Francois Mitterrand and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher were opposed to the re-emergence of a united Germany. Their fear was based on the memories of the Weimar Republic and the Nazi Reich. Today, united Germany is the principal guarantor of stability in Europe and the continents ultimate economic insurance. The lesson is that fears of the past should not block the hopes of the future.
 
Barzani should press his analysis to its logical conclusion and formally put the issue of "self determination" on the agenda for national debate. Unless one is wrong, a majority of Iraqi Kurds are attached to Iraq provided they are allowed to enjoy a wide measure of autonomy within a pluralist system. Since 1991 Iraqi Kurds have succeeded in developing an original system of autonomy that maintains their links with Iraq without putting their fate in the hands of those in power in Baghdad. Both Barzani and his ally-cum-rival Jalal Talabani deserve credit for an outcome that seems to satisfy a majority of Kurds in Iraq. As far as Iraqi Kurds are concerned, their current status is good enough, and there is no reason to upset it in the name of something better. Often, better could become an enemy of the good

Lebanon: The Year That Wasn't

This editorial was published in The Daily Star on 31/12/2010
 
As Lebanon bids farewell to 2010, it also bids a bittersweet goodbye to the hope that some 500 items on the Cabinet’s agenda – and on the agenda of the Lebanese people – would receive the attention they deserve.

Lebanon’s politicians have been busy warning the public daily that civil strife and unrest could break out with the issuing of an indictment by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in the 2005 killing of Rafik Hariri.

Unrest related to events in The Hague is a possibility. But so is the outbreak of unrest that springs from the failure to address people’s needs and grievances.

The daily business of government is not a luxury. When the government fails to act on the poor situation of electricity, water supplies, sanitation, road safety, infrastructure, or the economy, to name just a few items, resentment and despair grow to dangerous proportions.

If a given community feels it’s getting short-changed by the government, while other parts of the country “get their share,” tension over seemingly trivial things like a broken power line or unfinished road works can easily become a mini-sectarian war. It doesn’t take grand statements from the Hague to push the country to the brink.

It is no cliché to state that poverty, like the Cabinet’s paralysis, affects all sects. The political stalemate is eating away at the reputation of the government, and of the political system itself. If left untreated, it will eventually have a negative impact on investors and the business community, and lead to a drying up of political support from abroad. A government mired in such an impasse will find itself less and less capable of earning others’ respect, or securing their much-needed cooperation.

Lebanon has in the past lurched from one year to the next, suffering from an acute lack of planning and political vision. But 2010 will be remembered as the year of the infamous 500-item Cabinet agenda, which brings to mind the way the government allows garbage dumps to grow to frighteningly large sizes, until a bout of bad weather brings collapse, with disastrous consequences.

Lebanon has entered the Guinness Book of World Records of late, for its giant plates of tabbouleh and hummus, but the pile of accumulated policy paralysis also deserves mention in a record-book somewhere.

Elsewhere, countries will be entering the new decade by making huge efforts to provide better lives for their citizens. In Lebanon, the political class lives in denial, subsists on grandiose rhetoric, and waits for solutions from the outside world. But no solution will be durable unless Lebanese shoulder their portion of responsibility in 2011, acting with courage, creativity and inspiration. Otherwise, another lost year awaits.

62 Years On, Peace Is Not Impossible

By Rami G. Khouri

This commentary was published in The Jordan Times on 31/12/2010

Where are we, then, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, at the close of the 62nd year after the seminal act of the conflict in 1947-48?

That was when Zionist Jews achieved statehood in the new state of Israel, and indigenous Palestinian Arabs found themselves refugees outside their land, or second-class citizens living in security zones inside the new state that Jews had created for Jews.

We are in a very bad situation with no easy solution, but only hard choices that must be made if generations to come will be spared more wasteful wars. The situation is very difficult, but not irresoluble, as was succinctly captured in recent weeks in statements by the Israeli foreign minister and the Palestinian chief negotiator.

The Palestinian, Saeb Erekat, in a commentary in the Guardian newspaper earlier this month, reminded us that the heart of the conflict for the Palestinians was their refugeehood and exile - partly due to the usual chaos of war, mostly due to deliberate Zionist ethnic cleansing to clear the way for the Jewish state. Neither time nor facts on the ground would render the refugees’ rights moot, he said, emphasising that “Palestinian displacement continues to this day through the revocation of residency cards, ?and confiscation, home demolitions and evictions. At the same time, Israel has barred Palestinians displaced between 1947 and 1949, and again in 1967, from returning to their homes or receiving restitution for their lost property”.

The Jewish-majority Zionist Israeli state would have been impossible without the mass expulsion of Palestinians, he explained, “given that Palestinians constituted a majority in every district of historic Palestine prior to 1948 and also owned over 90 per cent of the landة. This period of dispossession, known to Palestinians as Al Nakba or ‘the catastrophe’, is the seminal Palestinian experience and source of our collective identity”.

The Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, meanwhile, noted in his year-end remarks to Israeli diplomats that a peace agreement with the Palestinians was impossible to achieve under the current circumstances, and the best that could be hoped for were long-term interim agreements on security and economic matters - an offer the Palestinians reject routinely.

Senior Israeli officials have recently offered other ideas as well, notably the notion that Jews who left, fled or were driven out of Arab countries in and around 1948 had to be considered in any peace agreement - meaning that approximately equal numbers of Jews and Arabs changed places in the region and therefore there is nothing to negotiate.

The Palestinians, Erekat suggests, need a combination of “return and restitution” as the remedy of choice that has a strong international precedent, such as in Bosnia. He adds that “Israel’s recognition of Palestinian refugee rights and its agreement to provide reparation and meaningful refugee choice in the exercise of these rights will not change the reality in the Middle East overnight, nor will it lead to an existential crisis for Israel. What it will certainly do is mark the beginning of a new reality?that will no longer be rooted in repression, denial of rights, and discrimination. In other words, it will lead to a lasting peace”.

The many attempts in the past 62 years have failed to achieve a comprehensive, lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians because they have consistently avoided coming to grips with the core issues that most matter to the two people. The Palestinian chief negotiator is making an important statement when he says publicly that “reparation and meaningful refugee choice” in the exercise of the rights of “return and restitution”, provides an opening for serious and honest Israelis to explore a middle groun? on which to reconcile the national rights and claims of both sides.

When I was discussing this with an American Jewish friend at Harvard University the other day, he used a phrase that struck me as capturing the essence of what Israelis and Zionists seek from any permanent peace agreement - Palestinian and Arab “acceptance of the legitimacy of the idea of Israel as a safe haven for Jews”.

Yes, this is a hard conflict to resolve, but hard is not impossible. Israelis must come to grips with a “meaningful refugee choice on return and restitution” for Palestinian refugees everywhere, while Palestinians and Arabs must acknowledge that the state of Israel they say they are prepared to live with is a legitimate home and haven for Jews everywhere.

The details and specifics of an agreement will be much easier to work out once these core principles are first acknowledged and then formally accepted in a legally binding agreement. If anyone plans to start the New Year exploring for ways to advance the stalled Arab-Israeli peace process, this is probably as good a starting point as any.

Two-State Solution Vital To Israel’s Own Interests

By Joschka Fischer in Berlin This commentary was published in the Gulf Times on 31/12/2010

Two years have passed since Barack Obama was elected president of the United States. Much to his credit - and in contrast to his immediate predecessor - Obama tried, from his first day in office, to work towards a resolution of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Two years on, are good intentions the best that Obama’s new policy has to offer? After all, nothing of value has in fact resulted from them. Even worse, given that Obama’s effort to enforce a permanent moratorium on new settlement construction in the West Bank has failed, is that direct negotiations between the conflicting parties have run aground. Good intentions count for little in life - and for less in politics. What matters, first and foremost, are results. President George W Bush believed that he needed to take account of only one half of America’s dual role in the Middle East, namely the alliance with Israel. He had no time for the second US role, that of pivotal peace mediator between Israelis and Palestinians, during his entire eight-year presidency. All his initiatives were intended only to pacify the international public. We all know where that led. From the start, Obama wanted to do things differently, pursuing an active Middle East policy. But the results so far are not very different from those under Bush. In both cases, standstill triumphed over progress. Given this, and both sides’ intransigence, many would withdraw and try to forget the conflict altogether. But it isn’t as simple as that, because a continuation of the conflict (which is what “forgetting about it” would boil down to) would not only prolong what is a tragedy for both Palestinians and Israelis, but would also be too dangerous for the region. Most ominously, the window of opportunity for a two-state solution could close for good, because realities on the ground will no longer allow it. For Israelis, this would mean permanent occupation of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and thus reckoning with an Arab majority, which would erode the foundations of their state - democracy and the rule of law - and thus its legitimacy. Such a development is the greatest threat that Israel faces in the medium term, which makes a two-state solution vital to its own interests. Of course, from Israeli leaders’ perspective, the status quo, with its absence of terror and missile strikes, is anything but negative. But it won’t last. Moreover, the country’s strategic situation is deteriorating with each passing year, because the global redistribution of power and influence from the West to the East can only weaken Israel’s position. For the Palestinians, the situation is oppressive, and for Gaza it is an outright humanitarian disaster. They are internally divided between Fatah and Hamas, under Israeli occupation in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, isolated from the outside world in Gaza, hopeless in the region’s refugee camps, and rebuffed by their Arab neighbours. In these circumstances, the loss of a two-state perspective would be a recipe for further indignities and deepening misery. But, if Israelis and Palestinians share a vital interest in a two-state solution, they have very different interests, and therefore mean very different things when referring to the same issues. For Israel, security is the top priority; for Palestinians, what matters most is an end to Israeli occupation. Israel cannot afford a second Gaza in the West Bank and East Jerusalem; for the Palestinians, a state with an ongoing Israeli military presence would be worthless. Perhaps Obama’s central error was that an important but minor matter - stopping new settlements - was given central significance. An indefinite building freeze would lead to the immediate end of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s coalition government in Jerusalem, without giving Israel or Netanyahu anything tangible in return. It should have been clear that Netanyahu would not extend the freeze. The crucial question that the US must ask both Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is whether they would be willing - here and now - to negotiate in earnest about the final status. If so, a way out of the seemingly irresolvable conflict between Israeli security and Palestinian statehood would open. The formula could run as follows: a comprehensive agreement about the final status now (taking into account all open questions, including East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine); implementation of the agreement in pre-defined steps over a longer period of time; and monitoring of the process via a mechanism based on the presence on the ground of a third party (led by the US).This would give Palestinians a guarantee of their state’s borders, its capital, and the Israeli occupation’s pre-defined endpoint. They could use the time, with international help, to build up effective state institutions, address economic development, and heal the rift between West Bank and Gaza. On this new and permanent basis, they may find a solution for the Palestinian refugees and advance the cause of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Israel would have a guarantee that its security would not be endangered by a final-status agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state, and that its withdrawal from the Palestinian territories would be gradual, over several years, and monitored on the ground by a third party. The country would then have clear, internationally recognised borders, enabling it to end permanently the conflict with its Arab neighbours. While the situation in the Middle East currently looks hopeless, a new attempt that focuses on the essential points, not on minor ones, deserves support. The alternative is the loss of the two-state solution and the perpetuation of a terrible - and terribly perilous - conflict. - Project Syndicate/Institute of Human Sciences Joschka Fischer, Germany’s foreign minister and vice-chancellor from 1998 to 2005, was a leader in the German Green Party for almost 20 years

This Week In The Middle East

Can Tunisian protesters end the 'Arab malaise'? Will Egypt ever catch the people traffickers? 

By Brian Whitaker

This commentary was published in The Guardian on 30/12/2010

Demonstrators clash with Tunisian security force members on December 27, 2010 in Tunis centre. Photograph: Fethi Belaid/AFP/Getty Images

Morocco And The Terrorist Threat

By Mohammad El-Ashab

This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 30/12/2010

When technology and violence come together, this simply leads to the formation of a cell of a kind officially described as “cyberterrorist” in Morocco. And although the advanced communication media revolution was meant to be at the service of civil society, as it shortens distances between worlds and brings closer the branches of knowledge and the features of civilized interaction between nations, what has been termed cybercrime today keeps sleepless all the societies that have been scorched by the transcontinental fire of terrorism.

Ever since civilian airplanes turned into missiles that raided the twin towers of the World Trade center in New York and destroyed them on that blood-drenched September 11, it seems that the scientific and technological inventions produced by the human mind in order to bring comfort, prosperity and fraternity have been swayed away from their humane purposes and used to suppress the mind and to spread terror and division.

However, ever since the suicide attacks in Casablanca in 2003, no terrorist cell has been successful in executing its plans, under the effect of the preemptive strikes which have achieved a record number of networks dismantled, some of them still in the planning phase and others on the verge of execution. Nevertheless, talk of using car bombs represents a precedent of copying methods that have been used in areas of high tension, increasing conflict and security breakdown. And between announcing the dismantling of terrorist cells that focused on recruiting volunteers to join the resistance in Iraq, strengthening the presence of Al-Qaeda in the coastal region south of the Sahara, Afghanistan and Somalia, or threatening Western interests in North Africa, the recognition that the methods used by these terrorist cells have evolved seems noteworthy – least of it being that most of the terrorist cells being prosecuted were using manual methods for building explosives and suicide-bombing equipment.

What reinforces such a belief is that it is not in the interest of Morocco, which wagers on tourism and the appearances of stability to attract foreign investments, to undermine this trend, if it wants to obtain dangerous information regarding the possibility of it being the target of attacks, or to get its hands on scenarios that reach carrying out terrorist attacks in inflamed areas. Yet its sensitivity regarding what is going on in the coastal stretch south of the Sahara seems more worrying, having increased in the absence of indicative regional coordination, in view of the repercussions of disputes over the Western Sahara issue.

It appears that the rift caused by this issue is on its way to affecting numerous other issues, most prominently that of dealing with the growth of the phenomenon of terrorism. And inasmuch as Morocco calls on the United States and France in particular to grant the security challenges on the coast the utmost concern, in light of the increase in kidnappings of foreign nationals, the countries neighboring the coastal region have focused their efforts on causing these disputes, the most prominent feature of this being not reaching an agreement over holding a security conference bringing together Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries, in addition to the US and the countries of the African coast, in order to formulate new mechanisms in the war on terror, one that would attract the attention and resolve of many towards it.

While Morocco is exposed to being targeted from several countries, according to the statements of volunteers in internet technology terrorist cells, this implicitly suggests coordinating efforts further, as it alone cannot confront plans the details of which are being developed beyond its borders. This is apart from the fact that the branches of such a terrorist cell would be directly linked to the “Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb”, because it is the closest to the area under threat, in addition to the fact that it represents the key to all the doors leading to high-tension zones in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen and the coast. And perhaps behind all of this lies its desire to proclaim that the need for regional coordination exceeds any political disagreement that stops at the obstacle of disputes.

Some misplaced rivalries will not be useful to resolve any issue or contain any problem. Yet when terrorism strikes with its full force, it does not distinguish between friend and foe – it is fierce as fire, destroying everything in its path.

And in the coastal region south of the Sahara, in order not to be exposed to further blazing spreads, the efforts of Arab, Islamic and African countries to agree over a bare minimum of consensus have failed, even while the issue regards imminent threats. Such a predicament is nearly more dangerous than any war left to chance, although choosing the timing, defining the goals and gathering efforts are irreplaceable elements in waging any battle.

Sudan: The Imperfect Islamic Republic

By Osman Mirghani
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 30/12/2010
 
Whether it was part of a plan or a mere coincidence, the timing and manner in which Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir announced the plan to declare Sudan an Islamic state has aroused a lot of controversy that will last for a long time. For al-Bashir linked the referendum over the future of southern Sudan to the implementation of Islamic Shariaa law [in the north]. He also commented on the Sudanese girl who was filmed being brutally whipped in an open area by laughing police officers who were apparently enjoying this scene of torture and her cries of pain. This is something that is, of course, nothing to do with the tolerant nature of Islam, and the concept of justice, and the prerequisites for implementing Islamic Shariaa law. However how can we blame these police officers if the regime itself is using Islamic Shariaa law as a bargaining chip in its political maneuvering, and is justifying actions that in fact harm the people of Sudan, and their tolerant and kind nature, as well as [harming] Islamic tolerance, distorting the religion's deeply held principle of justice?
 
Al-Bashir said that if the south chooses secession in the referendum that is scheduled to take place on 9 January 2011 he will amend the Sudanese constitution so that "there will be no time to speak of diversity of culture and ethnicity…Shariaa [Islamic law] and Islam will be the main source for the constitution, Islam the official religion, and Arabic the official language." Is Islamic Shariaa law, therefore, a bargaining chip in the referendum issue? More importantly, has all the previous talk about Islamic Shariaa law been nothing more than one act in the political theatre that has been ongoing since the Sudanese regime first tricked its way into power through force of arms in 1989? What about those who were tortured, whipped, and even executed, in accordance with Islamic Shariaa law – or at least as the people have been repeatedly told – since 1990 until the present time?
 
There is no doubt that the south will choose to secede because the policies of the regime have made this a foregone conclusion, and those in power in Khartoum are more aware than anybody else that the referendum will result in secession. This is because the government not only failed in making unity an attractive proposition [to the south] over the past five years, since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the Southern People's Liberation Movement [SPLM], but has greatly contributed to pushing the southerners to secede since it raised the slogan of "jihad" during the Sudanese Civil War in the 1990s. Al-Bashir's latest speech has only served to further convince the southern Sudanese to choose secessions, for it reveals that those in power in Khartoum considers any talk about diversity of culture and ethnicity to be "devious", even if this completely contradicts the reality on the ground in Sudan, and puts the future of the country in jeopardy. Diversity in Sudan is an issue that is not just related to the south, but extends from the north to the south, and the east to the west. Even when we were students at primary school [in Sudan], we would sing nationalistic songs praising the ethnic and cultural diversity of this country that is made up of one million square miles, however the size and population of this country will be greatly reduced soon due to the policies of isolating and marginalizing [the south], and exploiting religion for political goals.

 
In this same speech in which al-Bashir decreed the country's constitution and future in just a few improvised words, he also commented on the case of the Sudanese girl who whipped in public in a language that challenges the view of many Sudanese, especially as Islam in Sudan has always been distinguished by its tolerance, which is something that is inherent in this religion, as well as in the natural disposition of the Sudanese people. Al-Bashir called on those who objected to the brutal whipping of this girl to "perform ablutions, pray to God, and return to Islam." He added that "punishment in Islamic Shariaa law includes whipping, amputation, and death, and we will not be flexible with regards to the ordinances of Allah and the Islamic Shariaa." However these words contradict what he previously said with regards to the amending of the constitution depending on whether or not the southerners choose to secede. So, will the regime compromise over Islam and the implementation of Islamic Shariaa law depending upon whether the south chooses to secede or not? Were they flexible over Islamic Shariaa law when they froze its implementation for years? There has been a shift in the regime's position, from utilizing the slogan of the "Islamic Revolution – providing safe haven to extremist Islamists from everywhere, offering training camps to Osama Bin Laden and his followers, and providing assistance to those behind the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa – to the regime changing tack, submitting to foreign pressure, and kicking out its unwelcome guests, and even moving to cooperating with US and French intelligence…so how will the regime explain this [if it becomes an Islamic state]? Nobody knows, however the practice of "Taqiyaa" [concealing one's faith during dangerous circumstances] remains one that those in the regime have been committed to since they first came to power through a coup against the [previous] democratic regime, which they themselves were members of. They placed some of the previous regime's leaders in jail with the aim of concealing the true identity of their regime, and hushing up the role played by the National Islamic Front.
 
The talk that is being repeated these days about the constitution being amended and Sudan being declared an "Islamic" state seems to be nothing more than the regime attempting to hide behind the Islamic Shariaa law in order to avoid responsibility for dividing the country. They are attempting to draw everybody's attention away from the referendum and the forthcoming secession of the south, and the dangerous consequences that this will have, including the implications this will have on the war in Darfur, and the other developments that will result in the situation being more dangerous than many people imagine. There are also some parties within the regime that hope for, and even actively worked to ensure, the secession of the south, so that they will be solely in power in the north and can therefore revive their project to establish an Islamic state there, even if this state is not as large [as the previous unified state], and has a convulsive political approach that is contrary to the nature of the people it rules, and does not follow the tolerance of Islam, and its concept of just rule.