Assad's Toxic Assets

By Bilal Y. Saab, Chen Kane, and Leonard Spector

The battle of Homs is over and Syrian forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad have taken control of the besieged city. Yet despite what they viewed as a "tactical defeat," Syria's armed rebels, who are operating under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) -- a group of defected soldiers from the Syrian military -- vowed to continue the fight until the Syrian regime is toppled.

The balance of power tilts heavily in favor of the Syrian forces and, barring unforeseen circumstances, will likely remain so for months to come. But there is an increasing possibility that the governments of Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait could provide financial, military, and logistical assistance to the FSA in the not so distant future, bolstering its overall strength. Yet public statements by senior Qatari and Saudi officials expressing their governments' desire to arm the FSA notwithstanding, there is no evidence yet of substantial amounts of money or weapons being transferred to the rebels.

Should regional governments and Western powers commit to turning the FSA into an organized and well-armed military force that is capable of both defending its members and launching offensive attacks against Syrian forces, Assad's ability to crack down on the opposition will likely be degraded. But there is also the risk that such a strategy could not only fail but also have unintended consequences for the Syrian people and the region. Indeed, while a stronger FSA could put a dent in the repression campaign of the Syrian government (especially if the rebels receive anti-tank weaponry, improvised explosive devices, and modern communications equipment necessary for effective command and control), further militarization of the Syrian uprising is also likely to deepen and intensify domestic conflict, possibly causing a full-blown civil war. Facing what could be a more potent foe, the Syrian government will show no restraint in its application of military force, seeking to crush all forms of armed resistance once and for all. In the event that Syria slides into full-blown civil war, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon will bear the brunt of the spillover. Specifically, these countries will have to absorb hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the violence inside Syria (hundreds, if not thousands, have already arrived in Turkey and Lebanon), an outcome, which could cause heavy economic burdens and much societal stress for the host countries. Increasing sectarian bloodshed in Syria will also encourage al Qaeda and other radical Islamist actors to expand their involvement inside the country for the purpose of saving their Sunni co-religionists and establishing a base of operations in the region.

In this potential -- and highly probable -- scenario of widespread chaos in Syria, regional and international security concerns abound. High on a list of security worries for Washington and other Western capitals is the fate of the Syrian government's stockpiles of chemical and potentially other mass destruction weapons. There are sharp disagreements among analysts and policymakers in the United States over what to do in Syria to stop the bloodshed. Some, including Senator John McCain, are calling for air strikes against government assets. Others such as Senator Lindsay Graham prefer arming the rebels. And another group favors efforts to establish a more effective diplomatic approach with Russia and China. However, all government agencies inside the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama concur on the critical need to keep a close eye on Syria's chemical arsenal and other strategic weapons. "We're watching this. We're watching it carefully," said U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman, describing the State Department's efforts to monitor the safety and security of the Syrian government's chemical arsenal. At the Pentagon, Defense Department spokesman George Little stated that the U.S. military "remains concerned" about Syria's deadliest weapons, but considers them secure for now. At the White House, National Security Council spokesman Tommy Vietor noted that "Syria is a country of significant proliferation concern, so we monitor its chemical weapons activities very closely." At a February 14 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, mentioned that the United States was keeping a close eye on defections and the command structure of the Syrian army "to make sure they [the chemical weapons] are still under control of the regime." Three days later, in a letter sent to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Senators Susan Collins, Kirsten Gillibrand, and Jeanne Shaheen urged the Obama administration to clarify U.S. plans for securing or neutralizing Assad's chemical arsenal.

These statements and others by senior U.S. officials indicate that the Obama administration is cognizant of the possibility that the Syrian government's stockpiles of chemical weapons might get lost or used against civilians or U.S. and Israeli interests should things fall apart in Syria and the regime lose its grip on power. A CNN report mentioned that the U.S. military has calculated it could take more than 75,000 ground troops to secure Syria's chemical weapons facilities and production sites, which are estimated at 50 spread across the country (not to mention several storage sites and research centers). In addition to using satellites and other monitoring equipment to watch the suspected chemical weapons sites, Washington is also conducting talks with Syria's neighbors (specifically Jordan) about the need to cooperate on border security to prevent smuggling of sensitive materials. Israel is also worried about proliferation and its security and the country's military has recently held a unique exercise -- dubbed "Dark Cloud" -- aimed at preparing the country for potential biological, chemical, and radioactive attacks. While Israel's Defense Ministry holds its "Orange Flame" exercise simulating a biological attack on an annual basis, "Dark Cloud" was the first time the Israeli defense establishment and emergency services simulated a radioactive "dirty bomb" attack, though the exercise was planned before the Syrian uprising's start. 

Syria is not a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international agreement that outlaws the production, possession, and use of chemical weapons and requires states that join the treaty to destroy their stockpiles. Therefore, precise information on the nature and quantity of its suspected chemical agents is lacking. The Syrian government claims that it does not have a chemical weapons program, only research sites for medical civilian use. However, the CIA and other foreign intelligence agencies estimate that the country has a chemical weapons program dating from the early 1980s that is one of the largest and most developed in the world. Syria is also suspected of having a biological weapons program, but it is believed to be far less sophisticated than its chemical program. Thanks to assistance and knowledge obtained from the Soviet Union (and later Russia), Egypt, West Germany, France, Iran, North Korea, and possibly other countries over a period of 20 years, Syria was able to acquire an offensive chemical weapons capability that continues to serve as the regime's strategic deterrent against Israel's assumed nuclear capability and, perhaps more important, as an insurance policy against potential domestic threats. Syria allegedly has large quantities of mustard gas and sarin, which the regime has integrated over the years into its vast repertoire of missiles, rockets, artillery shells, and airdropped munitions. Mustard gas is a blistering -- though not necessarily fatal -- agent that was used extensively in World War I and reportedly during the 1980 through 1988 Iran-Iraq War. Sarin, which is lethal if inhaled even in very small quantities, is the nerve agent that killed 13 people and sickened about 1,000 during a terrorist attack on the Tokyo subway system in 1995 by the Japanese cult of Aum Shinrikyo. In addition to mustard gas and sarin, Syria may also be in possession of VX, a deadly nerve agent that resists breaking down in the environment. In short, Syria's chemical weapons program is thought to be massive and diverse and can be used in combat operations and delivered through various means.

With the Syrian army's takeover of Homs, armed resistance against regime forces seems to have considerably abated. Homs was a crucial battle for both sides because the city was the epicenter of the uprising. The rebels' defeat in Homs was a huge morale and strategic setback to their mission. As things currently stand, the FSA, which is now on the defensive, does not hold any substantial piece of land. "We are exhausted and depressed," one fighter said. "We don't have enough weapons to defend ourselves." In this current strategic environment, the fate of Syria's chemical weapons program seems secure and under the control of regime forces. However, realities on the ground can quickly change especially if regional and international powers decide to arm, train, and fund the FSA or even intervene militarily in support of the rebels. Should that happen and chaos gradually sweeps the country, six scenarios regarding the future of Assad's chemical assets can be identified:

1. Deliberate use by the regime against civilians, rebels, Israel, or U.S. interests in the region: Lieutenant Abduleselam Abdulrezzak, a defector from the Syrian armed forces who reportedly worked in chemical labs has claimed that the Syrian military used chemical weapons against civilians in the Baba Amr area of Homs. The Russian Foreign Ministry strongly denied that the Syrian army used nerve gas in Homs allegedly under the supervision of Russian specialists. While nothing should be ruled out given the regime's mass atrocities so far, Abdulrezzak's and others' testimony have not been independently confirmed or verified, and may be propaganda against the regime. However, it is possible that the regime could use chemical weapons against its domestic opponents in the future (there are unconfirmed reports that the Syrian army used chemical weapons against the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in 1982), but only under narrow circumstances -- i.e., when facing overwhelming opposition and in a last bid for survival. The prevailing assumption is that such a strategy by Assad and his cronies is extremely risky and self-defeating. Surely Assad must know that the moment he uses these outlawed, mass destruction weapons NATO jets will come bombing his palace. That may be true and external military intervention should theoretically deter Assad from attacking his own people with chemical weapons, but what is unclear still is how Assad will weigh the costs and benefits of such a momentous decision, especially at a time when he may be facing an existential threat at home. He might calculate that he has a better chance of surviving a NATO onslaught than, for instance, a growing rebellion in Damascus. Furthermore, there is a sectarian dimension to his potential calculation. As leader of the Alawite sect, Assad may see himself as the guardian of his communal group. Should he sense that the end is near he and his entourage could have a strong incentive to use extraordinary means to defend themselves and prevent the extinction of their clan. Another factor that is unclear is the extent to which such a critical decision is taken by one man - Assad -- or by a coterie of senior figures in the Assad regime. Would cooler heads prevail among the Syrian generals? Or would Bashar and his brother Maher, commander of the Republican Guard, decide to escalate to the point of no return?

2. Unauthorized use by radical generals or army units under fire: The regime's deployment of its finest army and special forces units (who are all Alawi and loyal to Assad) to places like Hama, Homs, Latakia, and al-Safirah (a village which is approximately 12.5 miles southeast of the city of Aleppo) to guard the chemical weapons production facilities is indicative of Assad's precautionary measures and his acute awareness of the game-changing effect of these assets. Should armed rebellion flare up again in areas that host chemical weapons facilities (Latakia and al-Safirah have been quiet so far) and munitions storage sites including Dumayr (25 miles northeast of Damascus), Khan Abu Shamat (36 miles east of Damascus), and Al Furqlus (in Homs) and government forces find themselves facing overwhelming opposition, the generals on the ground could decide, without Assad's authorization, to use chemical weapons against their opponents. They could also be tempted to act preemptively, "using them before losing them." Strict orders by Assad are likely to be given to all units on the ground regarding the terms of use of "special weapons," but control may prove to be elusive in the fog of war and lack of discipline, compounded by extreme fears of revenge by the enemy, could reign supreme.

3. Transfer to other countries or sub-state actors: Should Assad start to feel that his grip on power is weakening he could decide to transfer some of his country's chemical agents to his allies, such as Iran and Hezbollah. This would be an extremely risky course of action (Assad must know that any transfer of mass destruction weapons is perceived as a red line by Israel and the United States) and might precipitate external military intervention, but one possible incentive for Assad could be to bolster his allies' deterrence capabilities against their adversaries, out of a sense of solidarity or firm belief in the trilateral strategic alliance. Another scenario in which Assad could be encouraged to transfer chemical weapons to his allies is a coup against his rule. Sensing that he is about to be toppled and thus lose control of the chemical arsenal, Assad could order whatever remaining units loyal to him to salvage and smuggle as much chemical agent as possible to Iran and Hezbollah, assuming either party will be willing to receive such sensitive materials.

4. Loss of control to terrorist groups: In the heat of intense battle and under circumstances of regime weakening as well as deepening and expanding involvement of terrorist elements on the Syrian battlefield, there is a possibility that chemical agents could fall under the control of al Qaeda. That there are 50 of these sites makes it even more likely. Al Qaeda has a strong presence in Yemen (al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) and Algeria (al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), a still significant following in Iraq (al Qaeda in Iraq), and several cells in Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon's northern region. Despite testimony by U.S. military officials, there is no incontrovertible evidence of al Qaeda operating inside Syria as of now. Al Qaeda leaders have shown a strong interest over the years in acquiring weapons of mass destruction and it would be foolish not to assume that its cadres will have laser-like focus on the chemical weapons facilities and munitions storages that are scattered across the country.

5. Rebel attacks on sites: Unable to seize all chemical production facilities and munitions storage sites, rebels might opt to target some of them in an effort to deny government forces the ability to use chemical weapons at a particular location. But to cause considerable damage to the facilities, the rebels must have heavy weapons and artillery, which they currently lack. Even if they acquire heavy weapons in the future that can damage fortified buildings, this would still be an extremely risky strategy because air contamination would be an issue for both sides (unless the rebels receive gas masks and protective gear). Furthermore, the moment the rebels decide to escalate and hit chemical sites, government forces might retaliate with force and use planes to deliver chemical agents by air.

6. Rebel seizure of sites: Should the rebels seize some of the sites, safeguarding them from terrorist elements and government forces will be a huge challenge. It is one thing to seize a facility, yet quite another to protect it. Government forces can destroy a seized chemical weapons facility either by hitting it with a missile or rocket or bombing it by air, caring less about the contamination effects. What could deter government forces from launching an attack against a chemical weapons facility is the additional seizure by rebels of a missile base (establishing some form of balance of terror). Homs, Hama, Dair al Zour, al-Safirah, and Aleppo all host missile facilities, for example. Some of these facilities have missiles that are suspected to already contain chemical warheads, although it is uncertain which ones.

It is impossible to assess with any degree of precision the likelihood of these scenarios. Given the regional dimension of the Syrian crisis and its interconnectedness with several other strategic concerns related to the Middle East as a whole (including the problem of Iran's nuclear program), the multidimensional challenge the United States faces in Syria could unfold in some very unpredictable ways. Yet none of these scenarios is so extreme or improbable that it does not merit careful consideration. Indeed, in this fluid environment and uncharted territory, everything is possible. This is a case that is rather unique in the history of the world (Libya is not even close given that late Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi gave up his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs and destroyed most of them before his regime collapsed). The Obama administration is doing the right thing by exercising caution on Syria, by talking to its allies about the myriad of security threats surrounding the crisis, by creating an international coalition to deal with the problem, and by closely monitoring any unusual activity on Syrian territory. Some additional measures can be taken to prevent worst-case scenarios. For example, an offer of immunity should be extended to members of the Syrian military who can protect the chemical sites until the cessation of hostilities and the arrival of international inspectors. Also, a strict warning should be issued to Assad's government against the use or transfer of WMD under any circumstances (if this has not been done already through private channels). In parallel, an announcement by the Obama administration should be made that any use of such weapons during the conflict will be treated as a crime against humanity in addition to any the Syrian government may have already committed). None of these measures are guaranteed to succeed in deterring Assad from escalating, but should be done nevertheless to apply pressure on the Syrian president and influence his and his supporters' cost-benefit calculations.

The goal of securing and controlling WMD in Syria, despite its critical importance, cannot be decoupled from the challenge of overall U.S. policy toward Syria. In other words, the safety and control of Assad's chemical assets neither define nor drive U.S. policy toward Syria. Assad's chemical assets may be extensive and deadly and they pose a threat to Syrians and regional and international security, but that does not make U.S. options for Syria -- be it military intervention or military assistance to the rebels -- any less difficult, costly, or risky. In fact, military intervention, if mishandled or if it spirals out of control, might make the goal of securing and controlling these nasty weapons harder to achieve. The same goes for a strategy that seeks to arm the rebels or establish safe havens and humanitarian corridors across the country's borders. It is no wonder that President Obama and his top military brass are extremely hesitant to use kinetic force or send weapons into Syria. The country is a chemical powder keg ready to explode.

-This article was published in Foreign Policy on 13/03/2012
-Bilal Y. Saab is Visiting Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Chen Kane is Senior Research Associate at CNS, and Leonard Spector is Deputy Director of CNS. CNS's Javier Serrat provided research assistance

The Iceman Leadeth

The cool diplomacy of Barack Obama

BY DAVID ROTHKOPF

                                                    British Prime Minister David Cameron with US President Barack Obama

After British Prime Minister David Cameron, who visits Washington this week for consultations at the White House, and U.S. President Barack Obama ultimately leave office, it is unlikely you'll find the two of them vacationing together. While the Tory PM and his American counterpart have developed a comfortable working relationship that is actually somewhat warmer than many had predicted given the political distance between the two, these guys aren't pals. But Cameron shouldn't dwell on it. Obama doesn't have a lot of pals among the members of the world's leadership club.

Obama doesn't dream up clever nicknames for his international buddies, as George W. Bush did. The PM will never be "the Cameronator" or "Mr. Horses and Hounds" in this White House. Nor should he expect the kind of late-night phone calls from Bubba that were a hallmark of the Bill Clinton era and made the Clinton-Blair relationship such a close partnership. And the kind of soul-mate, connected-at-the-heart-by-a-Laffer-curve, mind-meld of the Reagan-Thatcher years is out of the question.

At issue is whether Obama's cool is an impediment -- or an asset. Although he is, to use a term favored by my daughters' kindergarten teachers, "slow to warm," he is also famously even-keeled in the face of pressure or difficult circumstances. He hasn't much liked the lecturing and condescension of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but he manages his emotions well and, I'm told, it is only after the pedantic, arrogant Israeli prime minister leaves the room that Obama feels free to express his emotions to some of his very small circle of close colleagues. ("No drama" caricatures aside, Obama has certainly shown his inner circle that behind the scenes he is frequently capable of losing his temper and, more frequently, of sharply communicating his displeasure with staffers who frustrate him with lack of preparation or an inclination to try to draw him into their petty agency politics.)

Interestingly, it looks like the Republican Party is going to present him with an opponent who is just as chill. As one senior Democratic Party observer put it, "2012 could be the year of the icebox vs. the refrigerator." Mitt Romney is no hot-blooded back-slapper either. According to an article in this past Saturday's New York Times, Romney had chilly relations with the Massachusetts legislature that parallel those of Obama with Capitol Hill. Neither man has particularly warm relations even with the leaders of his own party.

Obama, of course, has one strength that has thus far eluded Romney. He can turn on the heat and stir up the passion with crowds. In this he is like a lot of great actors, somewhat remote in their personal lives but capable of incandescence on the stage or screen. The contrast between the rock star Obama of the 2008 campaign and the cooler, behind-the-scenes real man was a bit confusing to global leaders during the first two years of the administration. Although clearly a brilliant guy and always very well briefed, he was difficult to connect with, some complained, and in some cases, so businesslike that he seemed brusque, leading to concerns about what this entailed for U.S. relations. From Cameron to Germany's Angela Merkel to Latin American leaders who interacted with him at the first Summit of the Americas he attended, there were doubts and even unhappiness. One now out-of-office Latin American head of state lamented the loss of the easy connection he had with Bush. When Time's Fareed Zakaria recently asked Obama about his closest international relationships, the example he offered of Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan seemed to many observers to be a reach, further proof of Obama's remoteness. And most recently, here at Foreign Policy, GOP gurus Karl Rove and Ed Gillespie suggested that the president's "cold and aloof" character made Obama vulnerable to Republican attacks, charging that his lack of closeness with Afghanistan's Hamid Karzai and Iraq's Nouri al-Maliki had somehow undercut U.S. relationships with those countries (neglecting to consider whether in fact it was Karzai's corruption and obduracy and Maliki's drift toward strongman status and, for that matter, Iran that might have posed bigger problems for these relationships).

But gradually, people have come to see Obama more for his actions than his sometimes too-businesslike demeanor. He has shown courage in his decisions to go after Osama bin Laden and Muammar al-Qaddafi. He has shown tenacity in his pursuit of a negotiated solution in Iran and his patience with the slow progress in Libya. He has shown vision in his pivot from the Middle East to Asia. He has shown flexibility in his ability to reassess policies from Iraq to Afghanistan to global financial markets. He has shown a willingness to roll up his sleeves and get involved, whether during climate talks or tough discussions with the Israelis. What's more, gradually, he has built constructive working relationships founded on a clear sense of professionalism and candor, be it with Cameron, Sarkozy, Brazil's Dilma Rousseff, or, in fact, Erdogan.

Furthermore, the president has done what many wise leaders do and surrounded himself with top officials who complement his strengths -- deepening relationships, working them behind the scenes, offering warmth and an attentive ear where he can't or doesn't have the time to do so. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has masterfully and tirelessly shouldered much of the burden in this regard, but so too have Vice President Joe Biden, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, and the administration's two secretaries of defense, Bob Gates and Leon Panetta. Collectively and quietly, they have changed the character of America's relationships with the world. The warmth Bush showed for his friends was always undercut by the alienation produced by his us-or-them policy stances (though it must be acknowledged that Gates, together with Condi Rice and Steve Hadley, made valiant and increasingly effective efforts to undo the damage of Bush's first term). What Obama has done is not just restored America's reputation with the tenor of his rhetoric and the substance of his speeches, but he has also turned his seeming aloofness into an American strength.

We've seen it before: For every Bill Clinton or Teddy Roosevelt, the United States has also had effective and even great presidents of considerable reserve, starting with the country's first one. Indeed, drawing on the sang-froid Obama has shown in approving covert, high-risk missions like the one that took out bin Laden, it is increasingly possible to see his remoteness as many of his top military leaders have, not so much as a defect or quirk but rather as the kind of calm, self-possessed "right stuff" of a Chuck Yeager. The reality is that the United States doesn't need a back-slapping president who is chums with other heads of state. In fact, in a world buffeted by crises and fraught with complexity, having a top guy who is unflappable and effective seems to be working considerably better than Americans' recent experience with having one who is a jovial, likeable frat boy oblivious to the havoc he wrought wherever his deeply held convictions took him.

-This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 12/03/2012
-David Rothkopf, CEO and editor at large of Foreign Policy, is author of Power, Inc.: The Epic Rivalry Between Big Business and Government -- and the Reckoning That Lies Ahead

U.S. Inconsistencies Give The Assads Room To Manoeuvre

By Hassan Hassan

On Friday, senior US intelligence officials reportedly said that the embattled Syrian president, Bashar Al Assad, could survive the one-year-old revolt against his dictatorial rule. Mr Al Assad, according to this anonymous account leaked to McClatchy Newspapers, "commands a formidable army that is unlikely to turn on him, an inner circle that has stayed loyal and an elite class that still supports his rule".

These statements, made only a few days after the defection of high-ranking officials and officers, call into question US policy towards the continuing bloodshed.

It is undeniable that Mr Al Assad bears full responsibility for the continuing massacres, and that Russia is his accomplice because it supplies the regime with weapons while at the same time opposing the arming of military defectors. But the US reluctance and inconsistency have only emboldened Mr Al Assad.

The US has a responsibility, as a self-proclaimed defender of human rights and democracy, to do what it can to stop the barbaric clampdown in Syria. In the context of the Arab uprisings, people across the region have had the courage to face brutal regimes to demand change. But they have done so partly because they know the world is watching and that regimes cannot act with impunity anymore. And by the "world", fairly or unfairly, people typically mean the United States.

In Syria, the Baathist regime will continue to wreak havoc as long as it knows it can get away with it - plain and simple. The US has a responsibility to send an unequivocal warning to Mr Al Assad. But, so far, it has failed to do so.

Shadi Hamid, director of research at the Brookings Doha Center, has rightly pointed out that diplomacy cannot work without a threat of military force: "A credible threat does not mean it must be acted upon," Mr Hamid wrote on The Economist website, "but it does mean the international community must be ready to follow through on its threat, if necessary and if a particular set of conditions are met".

At this stage, such a threat may be pointless as long as Mr Al Assad knows it will not be acted upon. Syrian's foreign minister, Walid Al Moallem, has said: "I assure you from my experience that there will be no foreign military intervention."

When the US ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, visited Hama in July, protesters filled the streets. The belief was that the US would not allow another massacre like those that happened several decades ago, the best known of which was the Hama massacre in 1982, when tens of thousands of civilians were killed and neighbourhoods shelled.

When the regime escalated the violence in October, Mr Ford left Syria, apparently in another sign of support for the protest movement. But his return shortly thereafter gave breathing space to Mr Al Assad. Then last month, the US closed its embassy in Damascus. And such "one step forward, one step back" diplomacy has been mimicked by European countries.

The US has consistently followed every condemnation with a reassurance that military intervention has been ruled out. The anonymous US officials' statements came one week after two other officials "leaked" information that the US administration was moving towards support of the Syrian opposition.

The more recent comments about Mr Al Assad's staying power were possibly meant to pressure the opposition to make reassurances about a post-Assad Syria.

But the statements disregarded the nature of the Syrian regime, which makes it difficult for members of the inner circle to defect. The loyalty of top officials might be based on fear for themselves and their families. The regime has increasingly tightened its control over the inner circle since 2004.

Damascus seems to have learnt from the case of the former interior minister, Ghazi Kanaan, who allegedly planned to defect after the 2005 assassination of Rafiq Hariri. Kanaan was killed in his office on the same day that he gave an interview to a Lebanese radio station about the assassination.

Top officials are unlikely to defect - unless there is a real threat of intervention and an end in sight for the regime. Until then, Mr Al Assad's lackeys will continue to use tanks and artillery against civilians.

Why should the US care? In 1949, the CIA engineered a coup that deposed Syria's first elected president, Shukri Al Quwatli. According to former US agents, the coup was carried out after Syria's parliament refused to ratify the Tapline (trans-Arabian) pipeline that would secure the right of way for Saudi oil through Syria.

The respected Al Quwatli was replaced by General Husni Az-Zaeem, who suppressed the media, the political opposition and the vibrant civil society. While it would be overly simplistic to blame the United States entirely for Syria's subsequent decline, that military coup, the first in a series of 12 over the next 20 years, set the scene for unelected governments and their extrajudicial abuses.

Syrians believe that the US bears some responsibility for their stifled political life. Yet, as so many people across the region have done, Syrians have shown time and again that they trust the US to support their aspirations and protect them from their regime. Even if that regime is, in part, a product of US meddling.

-This commentary was published in The National on 13/03/2012

Syria’s Carnage, As Seen By A French Doctor

By MAÏA de la BAUME from Paris

A Surgeon's Call to Duty: Dr. Jacques Bérès, a 71-year old French surgeon, smuggled himself into Homs, Syria, to treat the wounded in a makeshift hospital.

At the age of 71, Dr. Jacques Bérès, a veteran of war zones, left his comfortable Paris life last month to smuggle himself into Homs, the center of the Syrian revolt, to tend to the wounded and the sick.

Working in secret, in a dark, abandoned house, with only one operating table, three beds, four local aides and intermittent electricity, Dr. Bérès operated on 89 people, he said; all but nine survived.

Dr. Bérès, a surgeon with a thin white beard who was part of the group that founded Médecins Sans Frontières, or Doctors Without Borders, appears to be the only Western doctor who has been able to enter Homs, where security forces have been carrying out a brutal assault. His account offers a rare glimpse at the medical emergency that has developed as the Syrian conflict rages on.

His journey into Syria began in early February when he crossed the Lebanese border with the help of smugglers, carrying luggage filled with medical equipment. He then traveled by car and motorbike to Al Qusayr, another besieged city that is part of Homs Province, where he worked for a few days with a Syrian doctor. When he finally made it to Homs, he spent about two weeks there.

In Homs, he was forced to move once — “I sensed that the building had become a target for government forces” — and conditions were far from ideal. “The place was so crowded that we had to walk between the stretchers,” Dr. Bérès said in an interview late last month in his Paris apartment, just days after returning.

“I treated all kinds of wounds, from heavy mortars, shots from long-range sniper rifles, high-velocity rounds, shrapnel,” he said. His makeshift hospital was only a few minutes from Baba Amr, the neighborhood that saw some of the heaviest shelling and fighting.

One day, he said, 11 people died in his hospital, some before he could even begin to treat them. “Some of them had brain damage and arrived already dead,” Dr. Bérès said. “Others were so severely injured that they could not be saved.”

Many of his patients were minors, he said. At least 400 children have died since the beginning of the uprising, according to Unicef.

He was clearly affected by the death of a teenage boy, “who had pale skin, handsome features, a slightly mischievous look and a cap on his head which made him look like Gavroche in Victor Hugo’s ‘Misérables.’ ” The boy, Dr. Bérès said, “had almost been cut into two.”

Dr. Bérès left Syria before the government began its all-out assault on Homs in late February. “I was sad,” he told the French radio network RTL after his return to Paris. “I saw useless suffering, cruelty, meanness, the suffering of children, of families.”

But those who worked with him described Dr. Bérès as a remarkable man, and praised his composure and quiet energy in the face of suffering and death.

“We went through very tense moments,” said Nicolas Hénin, a video journalist and a friend of Dr. Bérès who filmed him on the first days of his mission in Al Qusayr. “But while everyone around him got agitated, Dr. Bérès remained extremely calm, as if all this agitation didn’t affect him.”

Dr. Bérès’s trip to Syria was partly sponsored by two associations: France-Syria Democracy and UAM93, a federation of Muslim associations in Seine-St.-Denis, an area in the Paris suburbs largely populated by immigrants. Dr. Bérès said the participation of the Muslim federation was crucial.

But gaining its support was not easy. “I was strongly against this trip,” said M’hammed Henniche, the director of UAM93, who said he thought it was too risky. “But Dr. Bérès insisted so much that we finally paid for his ticket and begged him to keep his mouth shut during his stay.”

Mr. Henniche said that Dr. Bérès left because he could no longer cope with the violence and harsh living conditions in Homs, including the lack of hot water and electricity, and because he was exhausted from treating so many patients. “We also thought that he had to escape before the city was entirely besieged,” he added.

Dr. Bérès described weeks of tension and sleepless nights; he struggled with the noise of bombardments, cold weather, mud in the streets, a lack of food and a shortage of child-size masks for anesthesia. He said there was not enough equipment to allow for anything but the most basic treatments.

“Some people walked out of the hospital with bandages that had barely stopped the flow of blood, only three hours after they had been operated upon,” he said.

But he also emphasized the professionalism of his aides and the character of the Syrian opposition, as well as the spirit of solidarity among the city’s residents.

“The members of the opposition are formidable,” Dr. Bérès said. “They’re very smart, they’re very, very motivated, their morale is very strong regardless of what happens to them.”

Donations of blood, which are often difficult to obtain in war zones, “never caused us any trouble,” the doctor said. “There was almost a line of people ready to offer their blood.”

Born in 1941 and married twice, Dr. Bérès learned battlefield surgery in Vietnam in 1967 at the French hospital in Saigon where he did his military service. Surgery was primitive, Dr. Bérès said, and some doctors were reluctant to use techniques “often inherited from the First World War.”

He was among the dozen or so co-founders of Doctors Without Borders in 1971 and of a similar group, Doctors of the World, in 1980. He has spent more than 40 years in some of the most dangerous war zones around the world, experiencing conflicts in Vietnam, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Chechnya, Iraq and most recently Libya.

“In Baghdad, I used to operate on people with an aide hanging an oil lamp over my shoulder,” Dr. Bérès said.

He said he wanted to return to Homs because the need was great and international aid was meager.

“I don’t know what the future of Syria will look like,” Dr. Bérès said. “But I admire the Syrians so much.”

-This article was published in the New York Times on 12/03/2012

Lessons From The Saudi “Spring”

By Christoph Wilcke

                                                     King Abdullah of Saudi Arabaia

On March 11, 2011, Saudi Arabian activists called for a "Day of Rage" wishing to bring the rising tide of protest to the kingdom. Only one person showed up. But underneath the quiet surface, some things have changed in Saudi Arabia and dissent is brewing. One significant change is that activists can, sometimes successfully, challenge arbitrary detention in administrative court. The second change is that in order to avoid such challenges, the security services now level formal charges against detained dissidents and bring them to trial for their activism. In a country without written criminal law, forcing the government to submit to judicial process gives dissident grievances a legitimate platform.

The official Saudi response to the attempted protests showed that the government would not cede an inch of political space to popular calls for reform, choosing instead in February and March 2011 to placate Saudi citizens by doling out an estimated $135 billion in subsidies. The ruling Saud family, whose senior members occupy not only the throne but also key ministries and all provincial governorships, clamped down early on dissent. But for all government efforts to project an air of normality and suppress protests, popular displays of discontent continue.

The legal treatment of protesters reveals that the courts remain pliant to political will despite King Abdullah's judicial reform project -- but subjecting dissidents to a judicial process is a significant gain for the latter who have a platform to defend their rights to peaceful expression, assembly, and association.  In February 2011, security forces arrested the first protesters, a group of people who intended to establish the country's first political party, and other intellectuals who advocated for political reform in a series of petitions issued that month. In March, ahead of the "Day of Rage" that had been announced on Facebook, the interior ministry and the Council of Senior Religious Scholars, the highest religious body tasked with interpreting Islamic law, issued a ban on all protests. Over the following months, more and more protesters in the heavily Shiite Eastern Province who defied the ban landed in jail. In March, and again in December, peaceful protesters in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, and Qasim, a northern province, were also jailed. In May and June, authorities arrested women who drove automobiles to protest the kingdom's informal prohibition on women getting behind the wheel.

Arresting dissidents is not new in Saudi Arabia. In the past, Saudi Arabia's feared secret police, the mabahith, have locked up thousands of suspected militants as well as individual peaceful reform activists. In some cases, they pretty much threw away the key. In others, the detainees have been released after the authorities thought they had served sufficient time -- conditional on repentance and a promise not to repeat the supposedly offensive activities. There was no judicial process.

What is new is that activists arrested in 2011 either for peaceful protest or written expression of dissent now are formally charged and sometimes tried in court. This is a small victory resulting from increased pressure from protesters and activists, as well as judicial reforms begun by King Abdullah in 2007. Abdullah ordered specialization of Sharia courts dividing them into criminal, civil, family, commercial, labor, and traffic courts, and added appeals courts. He also ordered the codification of criminal law -- however with no tangible progress to date -- and poured millions of Saudi Riyals into increasing and training judicial officials.

Ending arbitrary detention was the central demand of initial, small street protests in the Eastern Province and in Riyadh in 2011, and had been a longstanding concern of isolated activists. The former judge, and lawyer, Sulaiman al-Rashudi in 2006 and 2007 collected powers of attorney for detainees intending to sue the mabahith before the Board of Grievances, an administrative court, over arbitrary detentions -- until he was arrested in February 2007.

That year, King Abdullah declared judicial reform, with new and more streamlined courts and administration, a central pillar of his reforms. In 2009, the new Specialized Criminal Court began trials for hundreds of long-term detainees accused of militancy. In 2007, the mabahith could still arrest lawyers they considered a threat, or ignore verdicts by the grievances court, but the numbers and the organization of petitioners have grown. Since mid-February, the Saudi Association for Civil and Political Rights (ACPRA) has filed over two-dozen petitions with the grievances court. In previous decisions, the court has sided with the petitioners, for example, ordering the release last June of Thamir al-Khadhr, a human rights activist and student detained since March 2010 without charge.

Pressure through court cases and the king's judicial reforms have led the mabahith to initiate a semblance of legal process. Most activists arrested in 2011 have faced some formal charges and trials. This positive development has neither prevented arrests, nor precluded convictions, but it has starkly set out the judicial interpretation of relations between ruler and ruled, and defined what is considered a crime in Saudi Arabia given the lack of a written criminal law.

Here are some acts that the court has suggested are criminal:

Muhammad al-Bajadi, arrested in March 2011, is being tried for being a member of ACPRA, a peaceful, but unlicensed, rights organization.

Abd al-Aziz al-Wuhaibi, arrested in February 2011, was convicted in November and sentenced to prison for trying to found a peaceful political party.

Sad al-Rashud and others were convicted in January 2012 and sentenced to prison for taking part in a peaceful protest in December 2011.

Nadhir Al Majid, arrested in April 2011, is charged with providing information to an international journalist.

Mubarak bin Zuair, arrested in March 2011, was charged in December 2011 with "disobeying religious scholars," and "encumbering the affairs of the ruler" for petitioning the interior ministry to release his detained father.

Shaima Jastainah, a woman driver, was convicted in September for violating public order and sentenced to public lashing.

These cases are seminal in defining, in law, seemingly absolute powers of the ruler and denying basic rights of assembly, association, and expression to citizens. They underline that the courts remain pliant tools of government repression. But the cases have also given fodder to what by 2012 has become a large number of engaged citizens who use Twitter and other online expression to ridicule these verdicts, protest new arrests and trials, and demand their international human rights. The government has apparently taken note of this public opinion and released Khadhr, Rashud, bin Zuair, and others.

The House of Saud remains the absolute rulers, but the Saudi "Spring" has left its mark. Saudi absolutism has become less arbitrary and more defined, and thus open to challenge, in the courts and in public opinion. The government has to publicly defend its actions, and increasingly, members of the public are doubting its reasoning that portrays peaceful, often nationalistic and religious-based reform activism as dangerous subversion.

-This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 12/03/2012
-Christoph Wilcke is a senior Middle East researcher at Human Rights Watch who has long tracked developments in Saudi Arabia

Who Will Save Syria?

By  Shadi Hamid

A protester holds a handmade Syrian opposition flag as he shouts slogans during a protest in solidarity with Syria's anti-government protesters

The Syrian uprising began nearly a year ago, and despite renewed international efforts, the regime has intensified the killing. The death toll, approaching 8,000, is now five times what it was in Libya on the eve of the NATO intervention there. These are "crimes against humanity," a United Nations panel concluded recently.

Those of us who supported military action in Libya hoped that it might set a precedent that the United States and Europe would act quickly and decisively to protect civilian populations in the event of mass slaughter during the Arab Spring. The Syrian opposition has issued unambiguous calls for foreign military intervention. This is no Western imposition. It is Syrians—like Libyans before them—who are pleading that the West do more, not less.

Already, military intervention enjoys considerable Arab and Muslim legitimacy. The Turks, Qataris, Tunisians and Saudis have all called for various degrees of intervention, whether through “safe zones,” peacekeeping forces or arming the Syrian rebels. But these countries cannot do it on their own. They are waiting for the United States to lead efforts to assemble a coalition that can intervene effectively and then help stabilize Syria after hostilities cease.

No doubt the risks of intervention are considerable. But so too are the risks of not intervening. Opponents of intervention have warned of militarization, civil war, Iranian intervention and an exodus of refugees. Well, all these things have already come to pass. Syria today is in danger of becoming a failed state. The regime has lost control over large swaths of territory. Al Qaeda and other extremists are hoping to take advantage of the growing power vacuum. Can the world afford a failing state and protracted civil war in such a vital region?

If the objective of intervention is to protect civilian populations, then the first step is for the United States to help other countries provide Syrian rebel forces with both light arms and more advanced antitank and antiaircraft weaponry. The right to self-defense is a right guaranteed by international law. The second step would be the designation of liberated zones—particularly those along the border with Turkey—as safe havens, as was done in Bosnia during the 1990s. To protect these areas, air power and some special forces, preferably soldiers from Arab nations or Turkey, would be needed. The goal would not necessarily be regime change but rather to demonstrate international resolve, encourage regime defections and compel the Syrian government to alter its calculations about the use of force.

Currently, President Bashar Assad believes he can outlast the opposition and ultimately obliterate it through sheer force and brutality. Helping the rebels peel off large pieces of territory would demonstrate to Assad that he cannot win militarily, breathing new life into diplomatic efforts or—at the very least— securing cease-fire agreements around key population centers. Such efforts could be accompanied by a naval blockade and an air campaign against key government and military positions and installations— as in Bosnia, Kosovo and, more recently, Libya. In Bosnia, NATO power forced the Serbs to the negotiating table, eventually leading to the Dayton Accords and the introduction of multinational peacekeeping forces. The Gaddafi regime in Libya showed more interest in negotiating with the opposition after, rather than before, military intervention. Within a few weeks of the start of the NATO operation, Gaddafi envoys were engaging in cease-fire talks. In late May, an increasingly desperate Libyan regime went further, offering to negotiate with rebels and institute constitutional reforms. Intervention and diplomatic efforts need not be mutually exclusive. They should proceed in parallel.

None of this, though, will be possible without U.S. support and leadership. Despite budgetary constraints, this is not the time for the Obama administration to shrink from the challenge at hand. Even if the United States insists on “leading from behind,” it still needs to lead.

-This commentary was published by Brookings Institute on 11/03/2012
- Shadi Hamid, Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center

Ahmadinejad's Fall, Khamenei's Rise

The region will be more insecure as clerics gain more power and influence impacting fledgling democracy

By Osama Al Sharif

It was not Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s finest hour. For years he was described as the protege of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but now the 56-year-old president has been cast out by Iran’s most powerful man. Most of his supporters running for the country’s legislative elections have been trounced. They were defeated by relatively unknown ultra-conservative politicians loyal to Khamenei. Even Ahmadinejad’s sister was among the losers. Khamenei’s loyalists claimed more than 75 per cent of the 290-seat Majlis or parliament.

This was the first election to be held in Iran since the disputed 2009 presidential vote, which Ahmadinejad won, and which resulted in mass street protests. But this time the reformists, like other opposition leaders before them, were banned from participating. Their supporters called for a nation-wide boycott. It was a battle solely among Iranian conservatives of different perceptions. The result means that Ahmadinejad will finish his term, which ends next year, as a lame duck president. But what is more important is that Khamenei can now turn Iran into a full-fledged theocracy with undisputed clerical powers vested in him under Willayat Al Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist).

Few people associate the Islamic Republic with democratic rule. But in fact Iran has maintained a sophisticated structure of democratic institutions since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, including an elected President, Parliament, a Guardian Council and an Assembly of Experts which elects and dismisses the Supreme Leader. On the other hand, Iran’s has been a diminishing democracy with most opposition leaders now in jail or worse and reformists within the official structure under house arrest and banned from public office.

The rise and fall of one of Iran’s most moderate and reformist presidents, Mohammad Khatami, who served from 1997 to 2005, opened the path for Ahmadinejad’s confrontational presidency. And when he was challenged by reformist presidential candidates Mir Hussain Mousavi and Mahdi Karroubi in 2009, it is widely believed that the government had rigged election results in his favour.

Since then Iranian democracy took a nosedive. The government has been repeatedly condemned by international agencies for its human rights and press freedom violations. The fallout between Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader is not easy to understand. But the president has come under increased pressure from parliament for his failed economic policies and allegations of corruption. His abuse of power, as seen by conservative deputies, is believed to have changed Khamenei’s position from Ahmadinejad. The Supreme Leader has backed parliamentary efforts to investigate the president for corruption and has intervened to overrule some of his key appointments and dismissals.

Latest election results have underlined the extent of Ahmadinejad’s isolation and his estrangement from the Supreme Leader. This will unlikely affect progress with Iran’s controversial nuclear programme, which both men support, or its regional politics in relation to Syria, Iraq or the Gulf region. Khamenei’s hostility towards America, Israel and the West in general is only matched by that of the president.

The net outcome of the latest elections is simple; Iran’s theocratic nature will become more pronounced. Khamenei, 73, will follow the same hard line politics both internally and externally. And with a conservative parliament that is loyal to him he will have the ultimate say on the identity of the next Iranian president in 2013.

But it will not be a smooth sailing for the Supreme Leader and his conservative parliament. Domestically, a more religious parliament will have to face growing discontent among the republic’s 78 million inhabitants over many issues including human rights, freedom of expression, women’s rights, economic reforms, unemployment among the young, official corruption and many others. Western economic and oil embargoes will only make life tougher for millions of families who survive on government handouts in a country that is suffering from gasoline and food shortages in addition to collapsing national currency.

There is also the reformist movement within the existing structure, which while it is prevented from participating in public life, still carries influence with millions of Iranians who are fed up with the interference of clerics in political, economic and social life.

Externally Iran’s nuclear programme will continue to invite international sanctions and threats of a military strike by Israel. Relations with its Gulf neighbours are tense and the latest elections will only make Iran more introverted and isolated as the Supreme Leader gets more involved in his country’s foreign policy.

Not since 1979 and the long war with Iraq did the Islamic Republic face such existential challenges. No one will miss the neurotic rhetoric of President Ahmadinejad or his confrontational politics — he will still be around on the foreign policy front — but the region should feel a bit more insecure as clerics gain more power and influence in Iran, whose fledgling democracy is now in a free fall.

Furthermore, we will witness an ardent revival of Shiite ideologies under the Guardianship of the Jurist in Iran that coincides with a Sunni response in the Arab world, especially in the newly free  Arab countries. Such a state of affairs will determine the region’s course in the coming few years.

-This commentary was published in The GULF NEWS on 11/03/2012
-Osama Al Sharif is a journalist and political commentator based in Amman