Bahrain's Courageous Doctors

By Adil E. Shamoo

Bahraini medical personnel protesting in Manama (Photo: Dr. Nabeel al Ansari)

The United States continues to ignore the thwarted Arab Spring in Bahrain. Recently, a quasi-military court in the small Gulf state sentenced 20 doctors and nurses to up to 15 years in jail. The charge against them? Treating injured demonstrators opposing the regime.

Doctors and nurses in the Middle East have a long and proud tradition of treating the ill, regardless of the situation. In ninth-century Baghdad, for example, Hunayn ibn Ishaq was the Caliph’s physician. The Caliph asked this physician to prepare a poison to kill his enemies. The physician refused, risking his life, and was eventually jailed for one year. After serving his sentence, the Caliph inquired as to why he refused. The physician replied, “My profession is instituted for the benefit of humanity and limited to their relief and cure.”

So the doctors and other healthcare providers in Bahrain who treated the injured demonstrators were acting not only in the noblest tradition of the Hippocratic Oath but also in keeping with centuries-old Arab tradition. Medical ethics requires all physicians to be medically neutral toward those they treat.

Last February, Bahrain’s citizens joined the Arab Spring by holding massive demonstrations against the country’s corrupt, minority royal government. Bahrain’s security forces, assisted by Saudi-led troops sent by the Gulf Cooperation Council, brutally suppressed the peaceful demonstrations by force, resulting in the deaths of around 30 people, as well as hundreds of others wounded and arrested. At least 1,200 people were dismissed from their jobs. Opposition leaders were arrested, quickly tried, and sent to jail. Many detainees were tortured, and some women were sexually abused.

The government of Bahrain soon turned its attention to doctors and other healthcare providers, arresting, jailing, and torturing those accused of treating protesters. One female doctor told NPR that she was tortured and threatened with rape. In the same story, a man claimed that he was beaten unconscious. The authorities threatened the arrested individuals, saying that the security forces would arrest and torture members of their families if they didn’t sign a confession.

The doctors and nurses in Bahrain have called for support from the international community, especially from the United States. But the U.S. State Department has been muted in its comments about Bahrain’s abuse of hospital staff. This has led some medical professionals and other observers to lament that if such abuses had occurred in Syria or Iran, the United States would have condemned them vocally and emphatically.

U.S. policy toward the Arab Spring has been two-faced and unprincipled since its outbreak. When a hostile regime – in Syria or Iran, for example – has abused human rights, the administration has taken the moral high ground. However, in the case of friendly regimes – like those in Bahrain, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia – the administration has toned down its criticism or remained silent altogether. In the case of Bahrain, the United States still maintains a naval base there with 15,000 personnel.

The British Medical Association (BMA) issued a statement strongly condemning Bahrain’s behavior, stating, “BMA is shocked that these doctors are being persecuted for acting in accordance with their code of ethics.” The World Medical Association issued a similar statement. However, the American Medical Association merely invited physicians, if they wish, to write directly to Bahrain’s rulers to voice their opinion. The U.S. bioethics associations are silent.

Over the course of history, humanity has carved out zones of ethical conduct, whether in the conduct of war or the treatment of the sick and wounded. Medical ethics has a long and honorable history that U.S. officials and medical professionals must uphold for the doctors and nurses in Bahrain. Otherwise, the Arab Spring won’t bloom for long.

-This commentary was published in Foreign Policy In Focus on 07/11/2011- Adil E. Shamoo is a senior analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus and the author of the forthcoming book, Equal Worth – When Humanity Will Have Peace

Oman, Kind Of Not Quiet?

By Ra'id Zuhair Al-Jamali

Oman held parliamentary elections on October 15 -- two weeks before the Tunisian elections that captured the world's attention. But nobody paid them much mind. And why should they? There is not much more to be said beyond the high "participation" rate (76 percent of those who bothered to register), the solitude that the one elected woman may feel among her 83 male colleagues, or the election of three protesters. Tribal alliances still drove results in a country where political parties are not allowed and where, for most seats, 1,500 votes is enough to get elected.

But this might be deceiving. This has been Oman's least quiet year in a generation. The Economist scored Oman sixth highest within its (unsophisticated) Arab instability index in early February, a forecast met with wide incredulity at the time. A few weeks later, the country was shaken with memorable scenes of unrest: protests -- some violent, most peaceful, loyalty marches, regime concessions, a GCC "Marshall Plan," labor strikes and opportunistic demands, and regime crackdowns. The ground has significantly shifted beneath the feet of a regime that has overseen the rapid transformation of society over the last 40 years, underwritten by absolute power and facilitated by oil income.

Muscat witnessed its first significant demonstration only three days after Ben Ali fled Tunisia. By the second "Green March" -- on that first Friday sans Mubarak - it was undeniable that a new wind was blowing. Vibrancy of Bahrain's early Lulu scenes and the intensifying youth-led protests in Yemen only sharpened the palpable mood for change. Secure in its own rhetoric of Omani exceptionalism, the government chose not to confront crowds numbering in the low hundreds rallying mainly against corruption.

One week later, though, massive protests struck in the rapidly industrializing city of Sohar, setting in motion a month of unprecedented countrywide unrest, government concessions, labor opportunism, and even promises of GCC economic support. By mid March, however, specters of a bloody crackdown in Bahrain and Yemen fed fears of deterioration. On March 29, the army finally moved to clear the protests in Sohar, restoring safe passage for the industrial port area. Over the next month, order was gradually enforced through security and legal channels, culminating in the May 12 breakup of the last major protest site in Salalah. Whatever residual will for public manifestation there remained, summer heat soon dissolved.

Yet roots of the Omani protests extend deeper than a simple imitation of the prevailing Arab mood. Throughout the past decade, new and unregulated channels for disseminating information and expressing opinion proliferated. Internet forums dynamically altered the hitherto rigid political mood. With over 100,000 members and 200,000 daily visitors, thorny samizdat Al-Sablah endured episodes of closure and litigation until Oman's own "Spring" forced a major concession -- the royal court now operates an official account.  This and other examples of compelled accommodation illustrate how much the regime's capacity for containment was challenged -- most dramatically since the defeat of the 1970's Marxist insurgency led by the Popular Front for Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). Yet this year's confrontation was less ideological, more pragmatic. It's about a youthful, worldly, more connected population who basically want a voice -- publicly accountable ministers, free and independent press, even separation of state powers. It's also about an economy in which during 2009, nearly 75 percent of private sector jobs drew monthly wages of OMR 200 or less (USD $520), and in which non-nationals in the active workforce outnumbered nationals by more than two-to-one. Oil income may be near historic highs, but with the inequitable distribution of revenue, it's far from enough to pamper the entire population. Even narrowing it to "jobs and economy" entails a political undercurrent: a limit of rentier social contract is fast approaching.

Cognizant of the situation's unfolding gravity, the Omani authorities responded by bombarding the population with far-reaching decisions. One third of the Cabinet of Ministers was replaced. Some top officials, previously thought as immovable, were dismissed. There was an immediate creation of 50,000 jobs -- in a country where the total active national workforce, public and private, was probably 300,000. Minimum wage was raised by a one third (OMR 150 to 200). It did look quite ad hoc, even if the careful sequence of changes -- individually or in aggregate -- indicates that Oman had intellectually digested the risks and opportunities presented by its own youth bulge phenomenon.

But the treatment did not just stop at analgesics. Public prosecution gained independence from the police force and there was an expanded remit for State Audit committee. Constitutional changes were announced, with the bicameral house eventually gaining legislative and regulatory powers. These are actually deep institutional changes which are remodeling the scope of possibilities. Power is becoming more inclusive, with the elected Shura Council being granted extra voice and, while in the appointed State Council, civil society being recognized as the emergent social force.

The thing that is less clear is whether the Omani system can manage this adaptation. The regime is quite set in its ways. Many of the key figures are septuagenarians (or were, until March, when the average age of ministers significantly decreased). Since the resignation of his uncle nearly 40 years ago, Sultan Qaboos has not warmed up to the idea of a prime minister. The Sultan retains nominal ministership of defense, foreign affairs, finance, plus command of various military and security apparatuses. (With March's cabinet sackings, the lightening rods had vanished and it was expected that a PM was needed more than ever. Yet that still hasn't happened.) Considering the widely acknowledged need for a more reactive, flexible form of governance, what type of power transfer can thus be expected? Moreover, as placements of individuals to public positions often proceed without their foreknowledge, this unpredictable all-powerful agency maintains a sense of public passivity. And of course: whenever a singular, i.e. extra-ordinary, power becomes the defining factor for an entire system, perennial uncertainty breeds.

Many Omanis worry as well about the regime's efforts to re-impose control over the public sphere by drawing new "red lines." For example, the amended penal code article headed "on undermining the state's position" outlines punishment for those who undermine "prestige of the state" ?or weaken confidence in its financial reputation. Or another article in the press and publications law that prohibits "disseminating all that would compromise state security, internal or external." Not to mention the ongoing appeal by Azzaman newspaper, slapped with prison sentences and one month closure.

Previous Omani reforms have typically responded to major external challenges. The Shura council was founded at the end of a year of intense world scrutiny bearing upon Saudi Arabia and the GCC consequent to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Female inclusion could be seen as another proactive move, partially to stem the spread of Islamist currents of the 1990s. Post 9/11, a different set of acute outside pressures resulted in further overtures, proactive and reactive: non-opposition of benign Western reform agendas, symbolism of a 100-fold increase in base of possible voters in 2003 versus 1991, acquiescence to a regionally assertive United States on free trade. As these external pressures subsided, so did the reforms. The events of 2011 are a departure from the past as the first sustained, significant pressure from within. It remains unclear whether genuine pluralism can evolve within a domineering power structure, and more critically whether a democratic transition can be managed whilst preparing society for the post-oil terra incognita. At least if the exceptional number of Royal Decrees is any indicator, clearly some kind of shift is taking place.

-This commentary was published in The Foreign Policy on 07/11/2011
-Ra'id Zuhair Al-Jamali, @rzj,  lives in Muskat, Oman. Olivier Renard contributed to the editing and review of this article. The views expressed in this article are solely the opinions of the author

Saudi Arabia: Keeping It In The Family

By Jane Kinninmont

The New Saudi Crown Prince Nayef Bin Abdel-Aziz Al Saud

The naming of Prince Nayef bin Abdel-Aziz Al Saud as Saudi Arabia's new crown prince was no great surprise, but has nonetheless highlighted ongoing questions about the generation gap in Saudi Arabia, and about the capacity for the country's political system to evolve in a changing Middle East. Prince Nayef, who has been the Interior Minister since 1975 and who was appointed to the second deputy prime minister in 2009, had long been seen as the most likely successor to the previous crown prince, Prince Sultan bin Abdel-Aziz Al Saud. After King Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz Al Saud, Prince Nayef is the most senior of the surviving sons of the country's founder, King Abdel-Aziz, who passed away in 1953. Saudi Arabia has had six kings since then, all brothers. Of course, this generation is aging; Prince Sultan was at least 83 when he died and Prince Nayef is 78. One of the biggest questions about Saudi Arabia's future is how it will manage the transition to the next generation of princes. King Abdel-Aziz had 37 sons; the grandsons are far more numerous.

As interior minister, Prince Nayef already has a significant power base; his ministry oversees most of the well-funded internal security, paramilitary, and intelligence forces, including the public security forces, civil defense, border guards, the special security forces, and the religious police. However, authority over the security forces is divided, preventing anyone from having total control and thus reducing the risk of a coup; there is a regular army that reports to the Ministry of Defense, and a separate National Guard that reports directly to the king. The interior ministry also has extensive patronage networks because it is a major employer with a large budget. Indeed, one sign of Prince Nayef's growing power came in March when the king announced that 60,000 new jobs would be created in the interior ministry as part of a massive program of new government spending that was estimated by the Saudi investment advisory firm Jadwa to be worth SR 500 billion ($133 billion) over several years. This boost to the number of people on the interior ministry payroll can also be seen as an expansion of Prince Nayef's personal patronage network and power base.

Despite the scripted succession, a wide range of reformist groups, including women's rights campaigners, liberals, human-rights campaigners, and activists from the country's Shia minority are concerned about the growing power of one of the country's most politically conservative princes. For instance, Mohammed Al-Qahtani of the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association said Prince Nayef does not have reformist qualities and that the country would lose out by appointing a hardliner.

This concern may be warranted. Crown Prince Nayef has said in the past that he does not see the need for women to vote, and he has recently blamed unrest in the Eastern province on foreign intervention, ignoring the longstanding domestic grievances around the political marginalization of the Shia population there. Nayef's supporters in Western capitals suggest that as king he would adopt a less conservative approach than is required by an interior minister, but this is likely wishful thinking.

The consequences go beyond Saudi Arabia. The country could become increasingly out of sync with a changing Arab region. While seniority remains extremely important in Saudi politics, other Arab countries are being dramatically altered by new youth-led social movements. Recalling that Prince Nayef became interior minister before Hosni Mubarak even came to power in Egypt,  the vast majority of the population in Saudi Arabia is less than half the age of Prince Nayef. The Arab monarchs that currently hold out the most promise of political reform -- those of Morocco and Jordan -- are men in their forties who both came to power in 1999. Almost no one of Prince Nayef's generation remains in top positions in the Arab world; the exceptions include the Sultan of Oman, Qaboos bin Sayed Al Sayed, who came to the throne in 1970, and the prime minister of Bahrain, Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, who assumed his position upon Bahrain's independence in 1971.

Indeed, there is a widespread view in Bahrain that Prince Nayef was a key force behind the Saudi intervention there earlier this year. The entry of Saudi (and UAE) troops to Bahrain in March was officially part of a GCC drive to protect the ruling Al Khalifa against a foreign plot. It was also a clear demonstration that Saudi Arabia would not tolerate people calling for a republic in the GCC, and as such was a warning to Saudis as well as to Bahrainis. However, the groups calling for a republic in Bahrain were a minority. The mainstream opposition sought a constitutional monarchy with a stronger parliament -- and an elected prime minister. The Saudi intervention in Bahrain did not just support the ruling family. It directly protected the prime minister from the risk that the opposition would strike a deal with some of the ruling-family reformists to remove him from power as a step towards a new political era. Such a move would have set an unwelcome precedent from the point of view of a senior Saudi prince such as Nayef, poised to take the crown prince title.

Prince Nayef is also seen as a leading force in Saudi policy towards Yemen. Traditionally, Prince Sultan had led on Yemen policy, but his illness had been limiting his role for some time. Meanwhile, the interior minister has been concerned with the possible risks that Yemen could pose to Saudi national security, particularly through the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula militants based there. One of these militants, a Saudi national, tried to assassinate Nayef's son, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, the assistant interior minister, in 2009. Prince Nayef approaches Yemen mainly through a counterterrorism lens -- not unlike the U.S.

Additionally, there remains the question of who will succeed Prince Sultan in his other role as the minister of defense. This is one of the top ministries in the country and represents a major power base for whichever prince heads it. One option would be the long-serving vice-minister of defense, Abdulrahman bin Abdel-Aziz Al-Saud, a brother of Prince Nayef and half-brother of the king. Alternatively, media reports on Monday claimed that Prince Salman bin Abdel-Aziz Al-Saud, a half-brother of King Abdullah and Prince Nayef, and the current governor of Riyadh, would be the next defense minister. Prince Salman is regarded as more liberal, is said to be popular among younger princes, and is himself relatively young by Saudi government standards, being merely in his sixties.

Another option might be to elevate one of Sultan's sons, Prince Khaled, who is already the assistant minister of defense. Such a move would be an important transfer of power to a next-generation prince. But this would place added pressure on other senior princes, including Prince Nayef, to seek further advancement for their own sons. Another of Prince Nayef's sons, Prince Saud bin Nayef, formerly ambassador to Spain, joined the interior ministry in July as an advisor to his father.

To help manage the complicated transfer of power to the next generation, King Abdullah has set up a council of senior princes to advise on the succession in the future. According to a 2006 law, this Allegiance Council will ultimately have the right to reject the king's nomination for crown prince and to suggest an alternative if a majority of its members are agreed. Legally, it also has the power to remove a king if an independent team of medics finds him to be incapacitated. The law establishing this council stated that it would not come into effect until after the current king. The Saudi state media reports suggest that it was briefly consulted on Prince Nayef's succession, but it seems not to have had any lengthy debate; presumably there was already sufficient consensus.

In the future, given the advancing age of the current generation of senior princes, the council's ability to remove a king for medical reasons could be an important tool. But overall, the Al Saud family has a big incentive to maintain consensus and avoid damaging splits over succession issues -- lest this encourage their growing young population, who have been watching the regional developments on satellite TV and YouTube, to challenge the entire concept of family rule.

Jane Kinninmont is the Senior Research Fellow on the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, a UK-based policy research institute

You Say You Wanna Bomb Iran? Take A Number And Stand In Line

By Tony Karon

Ballistic missiles are paraded past a podium from which Major General Hassan Firoozabadi and other military commanders observe a parade commemorating the 31st anniversary of Iran-Iraq war on September 22, 2011 in Tehran, Iran. (Photo: Kaveh Kazemi / Getty Images

Yes, you heard right: Britain  is preparing to bomb Iran. Well, that's if the latest reported leaks from the British government are to be believed. The Guardian -- not known, like some of its British rivals are, for frequent breathless front-page claims of imminent military strikes on Iran -- reported Wednesday that Britain's Defense Ministry has stepped up plans for military action against Iran. Not that the Brits would kick things off, of course; their contingency planning is ostensibly geared towards playing a largely symbolic support role (think "Coalition of the Willing")  should the Obama Administration "decide to fast-forward plans for targeted missile strikes at some key Iranian facilities."

Beneath the attention-grabbing headline, the story is a familiar one:  British officials believe that while President Barack Obama "has no wish to embark on a new and provocative military venture before next November's U.S. election ... the calculus could change because of mounting anxiety over intelligence gathered by Western agencies, and the more belligerent posture that Iran appears to have been taking."

The Guardian's sources create the impression of dramatic new developments and a ticking clock, although the consensus among the  world's intelligence agencies that Iran remains some years away from having  nuclear weapons, and has not yet decided to actually build them even though it is assembling the means to do so. But the alarmist messaging certainly jibes with an Israeli diplomatic campaign launched to persuade reluctant governments to impose tough new sanctions on Iran if they hope to avoid a potentially catastrophic war. Israel underscored the point, Wednesday, announcing it had successfully tested a missile capable of reaching Iran -- at the same time as Israeli papers were filled with stories claiming that  Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is seeking cabinet approval for bombing Iran.

That, too, is an old story warmed over, and former Israeli intelligence chiefs have publicly denounced the idea of a military strike on Iran as misguided and potentially disastrous for Israel -- it could at best only succeed in delaying Iran's program (and ensure that it pursues a nuclear deterrent) but it would unleash a protracted regional war that Israel couldn't win, warned former Mossad chief Meir Dagan earlier this year. But regardless of its real intentions, dangling a threat to bomb Iran has been a central part of Israel's strategy in recent years.

President Obama's point man on Iran, Dennis Ross, had written before joining the Administration that if governments reluctant to impose harsh measures on Iran believed the alternative was Israel starting a war, they would be more inclined to back new sanctions. And there's certain a new sanctions push in the works, right now. The "intelligence" being cited by the Guardian's sources to suggest a new urgency is hardly new -- it's material collected some time ago by Western agencies that purports to show that Iran has been doing theoretical work on designs for a nuclear warhead. What's new is the fact that the U.S. has been pressing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to include those allegations in its latest report on Iran, scheduled for release later this month. The IAEA has questioned Iran's intent and  raised questions about many of is activities, but it has not until now accused Iran of running an active nuclear weapons program. A Western official told the Guardian that revelations about bomb-design work will be a "game-changer" that forces Russia and China to get on board with U.S. sanctions efforts.

It's not clear, though, whether those charges will  make it into the IAEA report -- China and Russia are lobbying against what they see as an attempt to enlist the nuclear watchdog in the service of a U.S. agenda --  but even if they're in the report, Moscow and Beijing are unlikely to join the sanctions push. It wouldn't be the first time the U.S. had assumed  that  some new 'gotcha' piece of intelligence would change the game, only to be disappointed.

Indeed, former Bush Administration national security staffer Michael Singh argued in Foreign Policy this week that the only way to change China's position on sanctions would be to prepare for a military attack, which, if it went ahead, would disrupt China's energy supplies. A familiar argument, that one.

As to the claim by the Guardian's sources  that Iran had lately adopted a more belligerent posture, the evidence offered  was the bizarre Saudi embassy bombing plot, which much of the international community remains to be convinced was actually an official Iranian effort.

For the rest, there's not much new: Iran is restoring its uranium enrichment capability damaged by the Stuxnet computer worm and protecting it in hardened facilities. But none of that provides anything close to a casus belli that might be deemed credible by most of the international community. The chances of getting legal authorization for a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities from the U.N. Security Council right now are slender, at best.

The Guardian piece, in fact, deflates its own alarmist premise when a government source notes that there has been "no acceleration toward military action by the U.S. but that could change." Well, yes, although it's hard to imagine why a government source would require anonymity for sharing a truism. There's no obvious reason for the urgency of the timetables suggested by the officials briefing the Guardian -- they suggested Obama would have to make a fateful decision next spring -- other than the fact that the Iranians haven't changed tack,  despite four rounds of U.N. sanctions plus a raft of additional measures adopted unilaterally by Western powers, and considerable saber rattling by the Israelis. The urgency would need to be politically generated, however, because of the  assumption that Iran wins the long game absent some dramatic game-changing action on the part of its adversaries. And then there's the fact that the U.S. is entering an election year.

In a companion piece to its UK preparations for military action story, the Guardian notes that despite Obama's reluctance to drag the U.S. into another Middle East war with potentially disastrous consequences, he enters his reelection year under pressure from Israel over Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu could even force Obama's hand by initiating an attack on Iran that the U.S. might feel compelled to join in order to ensure its success. (The Israeli leader has certainly shown a willingness to defy Obama on issues where he believes he has the support of Capitol Hill, and attacking Iran would certainly be one of those.) Obama is no closer to persuading or pressuring Iran into backing down on its nuclear program than when he ran for office four years ago, promising the engagement he said had been missing from the Bush approach. Washington hawks say engagement was tried and failed, and it's time to ratchet up the pressure. Doves argue that engagement wasn't given a serious go or was disrupted by Iran's internal power struggle, and should be resumed.

Electoral calculations, however, would more likely prompt Obama to toughen up his stance. The problem, of course, is that a harder line appears no more likely to persuade Iran to back down than a softer one, but more bellicose rhetoric from Obama could have the unintended effect of narrowing his options. A U.S. military strike on Iran would not mark the first time in history that a country had found itself marching to war without having really intended to do so.

-This commentary was published in Time on 02/11/2011

Why Bombing Iran Is Still A Bad Idea

By Dalia Dassa Kaye

In the days since the Justice Department unveiled its charges of an Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington, conservative pundits have dusted off their attack Iraq language from 2003 and begun to apply it to Iran. It didn't take long for many to advocate a military response to Iran, in some cases not just against the revolutionary guard members believed responsible for the plan but also against Iran's nuclear program. The martial rhetoric from inveterate hawks was predictable. But even President Obama suggested that the United States would not take any "options off the table," a phrase that is understood to leave open military options.

They should not be. Even assuming the worst -- Iranian Government involvement at the most senior levels -- a military response is just what it was before the plot became known: a dangerous and unpredictable option that should be avoided. 

Much remains unclear about the alleged terrorist plot itself. According to the Justice Department, an Iranian-American used-car dealer and his cousin, an operative of the Quds force of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corp, are at the center of a bizarre, sloppy and, audacious terrorist plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States. A large number of experts on Iran have expressed skepticism about the plausibility of these allegations. Still, the U.S. Government clearly believes Iran is responsible. The Obama administration has made public accusatory statements that can hardly be walked back at this point, and it is difficult to believe that it would have staked its reputation on a flimsy case. 

If the Justice Department has the story right, and if the clerical regime actually had knowledge of the plot, Iran has crossed a dangerous redline. As bad as United States-Iranian relations are now, they are bound to get worse. Only evidence that leads the administration to back down on its claims -- an unlikely scenario -- could avert at this point a serious escalation in United States-Iranian tensions.

The public exposure of this plan, coming alongside continued Iranian progress on its nuclear program and United Nations reports of egregious human rights abuses, may have been meant to show toughness against Tehran and to build international support for sanctions. But it has also created new opportunities for advocates of the military strike option to more forcefully press their case. In a presidential campaign season in which potential Republican candidates are searching for ways to attack Obama and to differentiate themselves from each other, all the incentives push toward ever more hawkish public rhetoric. It is not clear that the administration anticipated the political pressure that is now being mustered to demand a forceful response that matches the severity of these allegations.

The escalation has already started with U.S. efforts to increase international economic and diplomatic isolation of Iran. However, such efforts are likely to face resistance from critical countries like Russia and China, particularly as U.S. officials lack or are unwilling to expose indisputable intelligence to implicate Iranian officials in the plot. The difficulty of garnering sufficient international support for effective sanctions will now be associated with a failure to adequately respond to what lawmakers across the political spectrum have called an act of war against the United States.

Military alternatives will again very likely become part of the Washington conversation, even if senior U.S. officials had previously all but ruled them out (and encouraged Israel to do the same). At this stage, there is little chance of retaliatory U.S. military action. Pentagon officials have already issued statements suggesting this incident requires a diplomatic and legal response. But if such responses appear lackluster and ineffective, political pressure will mount to make military options more credible. At the very least, Israeli and Saudi officials who favor military strike options against Iran's nuclear program may now receive a more receptive audience in Washington.

The sad reality is that there is no silver bullet solution to the Iranian challenge, and a creative combination of engagement, containment, and deterrence will likely be necessary to address it. Despite this new plot twist, a military strike remains among the worst options possible, whether it comes from the United States or Israel, as the United States will be implicated either way.

First, the operational challenges of a military attack remain daunting. Iran's nuclear facilities are widely dispersed and deeply buried and so difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate. An Israeli attack would be even more challenging, though not impossible, due to long distances to Iranian targets and over flight challenges. Second, and more significantly, the aftermath of an attack could be devastating militarily and politically. It could unleash a wave of Iranian retaliation against U.S. forces, allies, and interests. Iran maintains a wide array of levers across the region, including militia groups it has trained and funded, that it could employ to retaliate against U.S. forces or diplomatic personnel, particularly in countries like Iraq. Iranian missiles have ranges that can reach Israel and all its Gulf Arab neighbors, including those hosting U.S. military forces. Such an attack could also backfire by fomenting nationalist sentiment within Iran (particularly if large numbers of civilians are killed) and boost support for more hard-line elements within the regime that current policies are attempting to marginalize. It could also increase Iranian incentives to obtain nuclear weapons to avoid such attacks in the future, while undermining painstaking U.S. efforts to bolster international and regional support for economic and diplomatic pressure against Iran. In short, there are serious risks associated with this option with little potential to actually solve the problem, and possibly making it harder to solve in the future.

A military strike would be particularly damaging in a post Arab spring environment, in which public opinion is already hostile toward U.S. policies. Even if Arab governments may quietly welcome forceful U.S. actions, Arab publics are far more sympathetic to Iran's anti-Western positions. Despite Iran's waning regional influence as Arab revolts and Turkish activism have decreased its relevance in the resistance narrative, Arab publics would likely rally behind Iran in the face of an attack. Additionally, they could constrain their governments' ability to support US-backed efforts to isolate Iran.

Some may view the assassination plot as an opportunity to bring the military option back to the table, believing that only a forceful response to Iran's actions will prevent the country from striking again. However this type of response would be a strategic mistake. A military attack would isolate the United States rather than Iran, further weakening U.S. influence regionally and globally while giving an increasingly isolated and vulnerable Iran a second chance.

Dalia Dassa Kaye is a Visiting Professor and Fellow at UCLA's International Institute and Burkle Center for International Relations.

Luxury Condo, For Saleh Or Rent

Why is Yemen’s presidential family loaded up with millions of dollars in D.C. real estate?

By Ken Silvestein

Shortly after being named one of the three winners of the Nobel Peace Prize this month, Yemeni activist Tawakkul Karman said that if embattled President Ali Abdullah Saleh is driven from power, investigators should immediately begin searching for assets held abroad by members of his government. The money "plundered" by the regime, she said, should be "brought back to the Yemeni people," according to an account on an opposition website.

If Saleh is forced out -- he has held power for more than three decades -- the asset hunters might want to begin their search in Washington, D.C. Real estate records show that in 2007 a man named Ahmed Ali Saleh bought four condominiums in a luxury building in Friendship Heights, right near one of the capital's swankiest shopping areas. He paid $5.5 million -- in cash -- for the condos. He also owns a property assessed at about $220,000 in Fairfax, Virginia, bought in the 1990s.

Saleh is a common name in Yemen, and the Yemeni embassy in Washington won't comment on the matter, but substantial evidence indicates that the Ahmed Ali Saleh who owns the condos is the eldest son and longtime heir apparent of President Saleh. He also heads the elite Republican Guard, which has allegedly led many of the attacks on the country's largely peaceful protesters at Change Square in Sanaa.

Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab world, erupted in revolt against the Saleh family's rule in February, soon after the fall of Tunisia's Ben Ali. Tribal fighters, young pro-democracy activists, and government security forces have been vying for control ever since. In recent days, the capital has been gripped by violence. International human rights groups say the government has killed at least several hundred demonstrators since the uprising began; some estimates are many times that.

The unrest in Yemen was triggered in part by anger over the ruling family's self-enrichment, of which the military has been a prime beneficiary. (In addition to the Republican Guard, President Saleh's close relatives control other key branches of the military and security establishment.) Yemen is rapidly running out of oil, which underpins the economy, and other resources, which makes the situation all the more explosive.

In Washington, at least some members of the president's family live in posh style. Among the four condos owned by Ahmed Ali Saleh, the most expensive unit, which he bought for $1.7 million, is currently up for rent (furnished) for $7,500 per month. That's more or less equivalent to what a typical Yemeni makes in seven years. The rental listing describes the 2,019-square-foot unit as "LUXURIOUS and SPECTACULAR," with two bedrooms, walk-in closets, two-and-a-half baths (one with whirlpool), hardwood floors, and marble and granite trimmings. The listing also boasts of the building's 24-hour front desk and fitness center, as well as its location "steps from ... [the] best shopping in DC."

Indeed, Saleh's condos are just around the corner from Bloomingdale's, Neiman Marcus, and a multitude of high-end retailers at Mazza Gallerie shopping mall on Wisconsin Avenue. "So perfect, you'll want to move in immediately!" says the listing.

Frank Goldstein, who headed the building's condo owners' association until earlier this year, said that young Yemenis "in their 20s" lived in the condo units and that he was told by his designated contact at the Yemeni embassy that they were cousins and nephews of the president who were attending universities in Washington. Legal records show that Khaled Saleh, which is the name of another son of President Saleh, was living in one of the condos in 2009. A public record database search found that one of President Saleh's grandsons has lived at Ahmed Ali Saleh's Fairfax property. Khaled Saleh and at least two other relatives of the president are currently on the embassy's payroll, according to a document filed by the Yemeni government with the U.S. State Department. (Ahmed Ali Saleh himself lived in Washington in the mid-1990s and graduated from American University, one U.S. source told me. The university confirmed that an Ahmed A. Saleh graduated in the 1990s, but would provide no other information.)

Several people connected with the building, including Goldstein, told me that they never met the condo's owner -- but that the Yemeni embassy in Washington was the contact point when issues arose. When I called the concierge service at the building and said I wanted to get in touch with Ahmed Ali Saleh, the person I spoke with said, "He doesn't live here. If I need anything I call the embassy [of Yemen], and they get someone for me. If you want anything to do with those units, you have to go through the embassy."

Daphne Coates, who manages the units for Legum & Norman Realty, told me: "I've never met him [the owner] or talked to him. I don't know where he lives, here or in Yemen. When I need something I call the embassy, and they find someone for me to talk to."

Goldstein said he was told by his contact at the embassy that one of the president's brothers owned the units. Yet Mohammed al-Basha, a public affairs officer at Yemen's Washington embassy, said the president has no brother named Ahmed Ali Saleh or any relative of that name other than his eldest son. "I don't have answers to your questions," he said when I later asked him directly if the condo owner was the president's son. He suggested I contact the press secretary for Ahmed Ali Saleh in Yemen, who failed to reply to an email seeking comment.

I called the Yemeni embassy on Monday, Oct. 17, and told the receptionist I wanted to speak to the person at the embassy who handled Ahmed Ali Saleh's condos. She put me through to a woman who became indignant when I told her I was seeking confirmation that the president's son owned the units. "So you're asking questions that don't pertain to you," she said. "What business is it of yours who owns the property?" When pressed, the woman, who wouldn't give her name but said she worked with the ambassador, said she would get back to me on the question of ownership. So far she hasn't. When I asked her how else I might confirm ownership, she replied, "Try contacting the government of Yemen and see how far that gets you."

I spoke on backgroundwith four U.S. experts on Yemen who have many decades of combined government and private experience in the country and intricate knowledge of the ruling family. They all said that given the evidence -- including the obvious wealth of the properties' owner -- the president's son almost had to be the proprietor. One termed it "virtually impossible" that he was not, adding, "It is inconceivable that there is another Ahmed Ali Saleh in Yemen who has $5 million to buy condos in Washington." Another said that during his conversations with Yemeni diplomats, several had mentioned that the president's son owned property in Washington.

A New York Times story last year said there was a sense in Yemen that the country was run as "a family corporation." A 2005 State Department cable, written by an officer at the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa and released this year by WikiLeaks, made the case that "Rampant official corruption impedes foreign investment, economic growth, and comprehensive development." The State Department's most recent annual human rights report on Yemen says that "officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity" and that international observers "presumed that government officials and parliamentarians benefited from insider arrangements and embezzlement."

"It's a poor country, so there isn't a lot of money to steal, but because it's poor it needs every dollar it can get," David Newton, who served as U.S. ambassador to Yemen between 1994 and 1997, told me. "Corruption really hurts."

President Barack Obama's administration -- which has been targeting suspected al Qaeda militants operating in Yemen with drone strikes, including U.S.-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed in late September -- has worked closely with Saleh's government on counterterrorism matters but has spoken out against the regime. During his address to the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 21, Obama said Yemenis calling for Saleh's ouster were seeking to "prevail over a corrupt system" and that "America supports those aspirations."

The State Department has asked for $35 million in foreign military financing for the next fiscal year for Yemen. Total military, security, and economic aid to the country has surpassed $100 million during the past two years, according to a report by the Congressional Research Service.

Stephanie Brancaforte, the Berlin-based campaign director for Avaaz, a global human rights group that has worked extensively on Yemen and that alerted me to the D.C. properties, criticized U.S. policy. "Saleh's forces have not only killed protesters -- they have inflicted a humanitarian crackdown by intentionally cutting off water and electricity to millions of people," she said. "The U.S. invested more than $100 million to fight terrorism in Yemen, but that money has primarily gone to prop up a corrupt family.... Meanwhile, the average Yemeni is less likely to be a victim of terrorism than malnutrition."

Ahmed Ali Saleh is one of the most powerful men in Yemen, and his father has long groomed him to be his replacement (though the president recently promised that his son would not succeed him). When President Saleh was evacuated to Saudi Arabia in June after he was seriously burned in an attack on the mosque he was attending, the younger Saleh moved into the presidential palace and took charge. His troops have been directly implicated in some of the worst abuses against protesters.

A September 2005 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, released by WikiLeaks, said the president was using the years leading up to a scheduled 2013 election to "groom his son (a la Mubarak), make him increasingly visible, and place him in positions of higher responsibility so that he will be seen as an acceptable candidate." But the cable said that "there are considerable doubts as to his [Ahmed Ali Saleh's] fitness for the job" and that he did "not currently command the same respect as his father."

The cable also called Ahmed Ali Saleh a force of "the status quo, [which] is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, given a declining economy, rising frustration over official corruption, and increasing U.S. and international pressures on the regime to change the way it does business."

Ahmed Ali Saleh is certainly not the only controversial foreign official to have bought real estate in the United States, but the transactions could attract scrutiny if, for example, the funds used for the purchases could be shown to have originated in corruption. Ahmed Ali Saleh clearly fits in the category of "senior foreign political figures" as defined by the USA PATRIOT Act, who are supposed to be subject to especially careful due diligence by American financial institutions before accepting their money.

Jack Blum, an attorney and former Senate counsel who played a key role in investigations into the Bank of Credit and Commerce International and the Lockheed Corp.'s overseas bribery scandal, summarized the key questions surrounding Ahmed Ali Saleh's condo-buying: "Was an American bank involved at any point in the transactions, and if so, did it file a suspicious activities report? If so, was anything done with it, or did it just make for interesting wastepaper? Where did he get the money? Could he have afforded to buy the properties on his official salary?"

Al-Basha, at Yemen's Washington embassy, would not provide information on the salary of President Saleh, his son, or other top government officials.

Meanwhile, back in Yemen the uprising continues. President Saleh has repeatedly said he's going to leave office -- only to back away at the last minute.

The rental listing suggests that neither the president nor his eldest son plan on retiring to Washington anytime soon, however. The property owner "will consider long term lease," the listing says, so it looks as though Ahmed Ali Saleh isn't ready to move in to his luxury condo just yet.

-This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 18/10/2011
-Ken Silverstein is an Open Society fellow and contributing editor at Harper's Magazine

Iraqi Militants Encourage People Of Khuzestan To Launch Jihad Against Iran

                                          Khuzestan, Iran

Influenced by the upheaval that has stricken many Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa, the people of southwest Iran’s Khuzestan Province have tried to start their own protest movement.  Khuzestan is inhabited by a majority of Arabs and is home to more than 80% of Iran’s oil reserves. In the Arabic literature of the political and cultural organizations of the province, the area is called al-Ahwaz. [1]

The calls for an uprising in the province earlier this year tried to emulate the April 2005 protests in Khuzestan, which were quelled by the use of violence by Iranian authorities. The Iranian state media reported no news from the province during the current protests but opposition sources claimed that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards opened fire on the protesters and killed three people. It was also reported that dozens were arrested (Alarab.net, April 18).

Although the movement did not develop into anything like the uprising of 2005, it attracted the attention of Iraqi Islamist insurgent groups. The Salafi-Jihadi Ansar al-Islam (AI)  group released a communiqué named “Message of solidarity with our brothers in Ahwaz,” calling on them to unify their efforts and launch a jihad against Iran (alboraq.info, May 11).Cooperation between the Iraqi insurgents and Ahwazi groups reportedly started soon after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. During the 2005 uprising in Khuzestan, the first agreement between activists from the province and Iraqi insurgents became known and a series of bombs struck Iranian government buildings and targets the following years (Islammemo.cc, June 12, 2005).

Arabs in the province accuse successive Iranian governments of pursuing a policy aimed at changing the demographic nature of the region by encouraging non-Arab Iranians to migrate to the province in large numbers. They are also critical of changes in the province’s borders that have seen southern areas with a majority Arab population detached and areas with Arab minority populations added in the north.

In an interview with the Jamestown Foundation, the leader of the disbanded Hizb al-Nahda al-Arabi al-Ahwazi (Ahwazi Arab Renaissance Party), Sabah al-Mossawi, revealed that there were Ahwazi fighters who had joined the Iraqi insurgency: “They went to fight the occupation [i.e. Coalition forces] but also to fight the Iranian-backed parties. They mainly joined the Islamic Army in Iraq and the Ba’ath party.”

Throughout centuries of conflict between Iran and the Ottoman Empire, the Khuzestan region managed to maintain a degree of relative independence, being ruled by a series of local tribal leaders. The last of these was toppled by the Iranian authorities in 1925 and the area came under the direct control of Tehran. After the Islamic revolution of 1979, the community’s demands for more rights and recognition of their distinct identity were not accepted by the new government. Subsequently a large-scale uprising broke out in the province. The Iranian authorities in turn repressed the protest movement ruthlessly and the area came under military rule. Iraqi-backed organizations launched a series of attacks on military and civilian targets during the uprising. The Ahwazi issue attracted international attention when a group of Ahwazi gunmen belonging to the Democratic Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Arabistan (DRFLA) occupied the Iranian embassy in London in 1980 and took hostages. After a six-day siege of the embassy by police, the gunmen killed one hostage, leading to a successful raid to release the hostages in the embassy by the British Special Air Service (SAS), a Special Forces Regiment.

There are various opposition groups which claim to represent the Arab population of Khuzestan. All of them are banned in Iran but operate in exile while claiming to have an active presence in the province. However the most prominent group that claims to be militarily active is the Ba’athist Arab Struggle Movement to Liberate Ahwaz (ASMLA) and its armed wing, the Martyr Mohye al-Din al-Nasir Brigade (MMDNB). The latter’s strategy is to target oil production facilities in the province as a means of weakening the Iranian economy, which depends heavily on the oil of Khuzestan Province. In 2007 the MMDNB recognized Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri as the new leader of the Iraqi Ba’ath party (Albasrah.net, June 24, 2007)

The majority of the people of Khuzestan are Sh’ia Muslims but there has been a growing movement among them to convert to Sunni Islam. This trend has escalated significantly over the last few years, driven mainly by a local identity problem. Resentment of Iran by some Shi’a Ahwazis is reflected in a number or ways, including a rejection of the Shi’a faith. None of the prominent Shi’a clerics in Iran or Iraq have clearly supported the Ahwazi cause. The most senior Ahwazi cleric and the most influential community leader, Shaykh Muhammad Tahir al-Khaqani, was forced to leave Khuzestan after the uprising of 1979 and put under house arrest in Qom until his death in 1986. No other local cleric emerged to preserve the Shi’a-Arab nationalist identity of the population.

Salafi-Jihadi groups from Iraq regard the conversions to Sunni Islam in Khuzestan-Ahwaz as genuine and are encouraging the integration of Ahwazi converts in the international jihadi movement. According to the AI communiqué: “The origin of the people of Ahwaz is that they are a Sunni nation. The Iranian occupation has imposed Persian and Shi’a culture on them. The policy of Persianization is based on the Rafidah faith (i.e. Shi’a Islam). Therefore there should be a clear distinction of the right faith (i.e. Sunni Islam). This distinction should be the foundation to be relied on for achieving political and geographical independence for the state of Ahwaz.” The AI message went on to set a strategy for the confrontation in Khuzestan, calling for its people to build a Sunni religious and political leadership: “There should be a unified Sunni-Jihadi movement in Ahwaz and it should join the global jihad” (Alboraq.info, May11).

The AI communiqué is very important. It is picking up on a growing trend and trying to direct it towards a jihadi goal. So far the revolutionary movements in Khuzestan have been based on the community’s Arab identity within a Persian and Shi’a Iran. With the increase of conversions to Sunni Islam among the population, it is not possible to rule out that a base for a Salafi-Jihadi organization could be established in the province. Such a development might well change the relationship between Salafi-Jihadi groups and Iran. The former have avoided a direct confrontation with Tehran so far, despite the often severe confrontations between the Shi’a and Sunni communities in the Middle East.  Iraqi Sunni Islamists will be heavily involved in such a struggle, putting the Salafi-Jihadists at the centre of one of the most significant geo-political conflicts in the region.

Notes:

-This article was published in the Terrorism Monitor, Volume: 9, Issue: 37, on 14/10/2011

1. Khuzestan was historically named Arabistan (the land of the Arabs). In 1935 the Iranian government of Shah Reza Pahlavi renamed it Khuzestan  i.e. “the Land of the Khuzis,” referring to the ancient name used for sugar cane farmers in the ancient kingdom of Susa
2-Local Arab people call the province al-Ahwaz and emphasize its history of independence under Arab rulers since the Arab invasion of 639 C.E.  Ahwaz is also the name of the Khuzestan capital