New Syrian Order Cannot Be Ignored By Assad Regime

The Syrian opposition has been badly divided, but that is now changing; new forces represent a political reality the Al Assad regime will ignore at its peril.

By Muhammad Ali

                                 Syrian President Bashar al-Assad

Until very recently, the opposition to Syria's ruling regime seemed to be hopelessly divided.

Since the eruption of protests more than six months ago, the expatriate opposition has been fissured, and inside the country those who organise protests are divided among disparate groups.

The divisions seemed to be deepening further after a day of protest last month under the profoundly contentious slogan "international protection".

But then Sunday brought the news that the opposition has been waiting for: the formation of a unified Syrian National Council in Istanbul. It is too early to gauge how much influence this new council will have, but the early signs indicate the majority inside Syria are happy to lend support to it. The council is still a work in progress.

Still, the reasons for the earlier disconnect among protesters should not be ignored: that is, the emergence of powerful opposition forces inside Syria that control the events on the ground and are ideologically different to the traditional forces.

When protesters took to the streets in Deraa in mid-March, they had no leadership. They were not sponsored or led by the opposition. The protests were spontaneous and were driven by anger at the torture and humiliation of 15 school boys in early March.

Slowly, protesters began to organise themselves and formed small organisational committees - initially consisting of as few as two members - to draft slogans and mobilise other Syrians to join the demonstrations. Those small committees are credited for expanding protests town by town and city by city. The committees have performed wide-ranging roles, from intercommunication and logistic support to passing on news materials to Syrian activists outside the country, who turned their rented rooms in Beirut and Istanbul to studios, to send the videos and news on to the international media. They helped keep Syria in the spotlight despite the absence of professional news reports from inside the country.

As the protests grew, the mission of the committees became more complex and required more coordination to provide activists with necessary equipments to cover the events and pass donations to victims and affected areas.

So, more coordination committees were established and as days went by they came under one bloc: the largely secular Local Coordination Committees in Syria (LCCS). Another bloc, the predominantly religious Syrian Revolution Coordinators Union (SRCU) was created later. The establishment of the union was clearly a result of disagreement in viewpoints among the protesters themselves, especially as they both performed similar roles. The union members might have been unhappy with the committees' rejection of any foreign help. Many protests had no qualms in asking for foreign help, although they both reject military intervention.

The two blocs agreed on sensitive matters such as peaceful uprising, civil state, unity of Syrian people and rejection of dialogue with the regime. One could sense, however, an elitist attitude on the part of the local committees - judging by the statements they have issued in relation to political positions and statements. The union's statements lately echoed the protesters' demands to form a national council which the local committees were until recently reluctant about. To make the council a reality, the union formed the Syrian Revolution General Commission which has included activists from inside and outside the country, tasked to set up a national council for the opposition.

Early last month, another bloc was formed: Syrian Revolutionary Council of Coordinating Committees. It is a dubious council that has no apparent new significance, headed by Muhammad Rahhal, who claimed to be the only member who lives outside Syria. Mr Rahhal openly called for arming the protesters.

Another issue worth highlighting is the source of funding. The regime often argued that because protesters would need funding for such facilities, that indicates they receive funds from foreign hands. I have learnt through contacts in Syria that a large number of businessmen have secretly joined the anti-regime protests. Their support has direct effect on the ground, as protests become more organised. Many businesses in the affected areas are closed but the owners are still paying their staff as well as donating to victims and the unemployed.

Protesters also do not need a lot of money to operate, relying on basic communication equipments despite their security risks and the firm restrictions on the internet.

Still, the regime accused them of receiving foreign funds and refused to recognise them as legitimate partners in dialogue. In the "national dialogue conference", held on July 10 and headed by Vice President Farouk Al-Shara, the regime selected opposition figures - some respectable figures - who have no direct contact with the protest movement. The regime realised that recognition of the new blocs would legitimise them For that reason, the security forces chose to hunt them down and arrest them. Now the Assad regime might have no choice but negotiate with the newly-formed Syrian National Council.

The formation of the council was delayed for six weeks largely due to differences over the scale of representation for activists on the ground. Eventually, it was agreed to give them the majority of seats. These emerging forces are the new political reality in Syria and can no longer be ignored. It is they who will eventually help end the rule of the Baath party.

-This commentary was published in The National on 05/10/2011
-Muhammad Ali is a Syrian political analyst and activist based in Istanbul

U.S. 'Paid A Price' On Egypt

The United States’ Gulf Arab allies no longer trust Washington since the White House yanked its support for Hosni Mubarak in February, former Obama adviser James Jones told a private meeting.

By  Eli Lake

                                       
 Anti goverment protest in Cairo

In a blunt assessment, President Obama’s first national security adviser told a private audience this week that there is a “chasm” between the United States and its Gulf Arab allies that has yet to heal since the White House very publicly ushered Egypt’s president out of power in February.

Retired Marine Gen. James Jones, who served as national security adviser in 2009-10, told a private meeting at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that the United States’ Persian Gulf allies interpret the president’s handling of the Egyptian revolution as a sign that Washington will dump their monarchies or governments if enough demonstrators take to their streets, according to a recording of the speech reviewed by The Daily Beast.

“We have paid a price,” Jones said of the decision to call for Hosni Mubarak’s ouster. “Our policy with regard to Mubarak as interpreted by some of our closest Arab allies in the Gulf has not gone over well.”

“In their interpretation of our dumping President Mubarak very hastily, [it] answered the question of what we would be likely to do if that happened in their countries. So there is a chasm there that somehow has to be bridged,” he added.

Jones did not immediately return a call to his office seeking comment Tuesday.

The remarks from the former national security adviser, who left the White House last year, comprise one of the frankest assessments of the U.S. relationship with its oldest and most important Arab ally, Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have been aligned with the United States since the last Roosevelt administration, providing oil to the West in exchange for security guarantees from the U.S. military.

Over the years, the intelligence and security relationship in particular between the United States and Saudi Arabia has grown increasingly interconnected. At the same time, since the 1960s the Saudis also have supported a foreign policy to spread political Islam throughout the Muslim world, exacerbating tensions with Washington since the 9/11 attacks. Many of the al Qaeda attackers were of Saudi descent. Still, the Saudis remain a significant ally in the war on terror.

“In general, yes, there is that concern, certainly among the Gulf countries, that the United States does not stand by its friends in the region,” said Marwan Muasher, a former foreign minister and deputy prime minister of Jordan. “In the case of the Saudis there is an additional point, which is a concern that the United States is not serious about the peace process.”

Since the fall of Mubarak, the Saudis have begun to bolster Arab governments that have not fallen to the Arab spring. In July, Saudi Arabia announced a $1 billion grant for Jordan. Meanwhile, the Saudis have provided logistical and military support to the government of Bahrain, which has sought to suppress popular unrest. The Saudi kingdom, however, has not supported the regimes in Libya or Syria during the Arab Spring.

According to some Egyptian observers, the Saudis also have sought to bolster political parties in Cairo ahead of the upcoming elections in Egypt.

Shadi Taha, deputy to the liberal Egyptian political leader Ayman Nour, said in an interview that since March he has been urging U.S. diplomats in the region to use American influence with Gulf countries to curb unaccountable funding for political groups that are sympathetic to the return of Mubarak.

“The funding is coming from charities,” Taha said. “It’s not the government, it’s from families. But the Saudi government can stop this easily.”

The Saudi ambassador in Cairo has publicly denied any role in funding political parties in Egypt. Along with other Gulf countries, the Saudis have made grants to Egypt for development in the country after the fall of Mubarak.

Taha said he was frustrated that the U.S. has not responded to him about funding from Gulf Arab countries to Egyptian political groups. “I have heard nothing back from the State Department, from the U.S. Embassy, or from the organizations that work closely with Egyptian parties,” he said. “This leads me to think that there is probably a greater power than me on this. I think there is a strong network of lobbying in Washington from Gulf countries that are frankly more important to this administration than Egyptian democrats.”

A senior administration official who spoke on the condition of anonymity, citing diplomatic sensitivities, said, “We share the concern expressed by some Egyptians that not all countries are as transparent and nonpartisan as the U.S. in their support for the election process.”

The official added, “Senior U.S. government officials have raised our concerns with senior Egyptian officials and Egypt’s neighbors, and urged that appropriate measures be taken to ensure the Egyptian election process is protected from outside influence.”

A major concern for the United States has been the influence of Iranian money, according to three U.S. officials.

Taha also said he is urging the U.S. government to publish a list of political organizations that have received support from the U.S. government for democracy assistance in order to prove to the public that his party, al-Ghad, does not receive U.S. funding. For years al-Ghad has been accused in Egypt of being a pawn of the United States.

“We have repeatedly asked to clear our name because we haven’t received foreign funding,” he said. “We are hoping we hear from a U.S. official that the United States did not fund political parties, among them al-Ghad party.”

The United States has provided $60 million for democratic transition in Egypt since Mubarak’s fall from power in February. Some of that money goes toward technical election training like platform writing, election law, and other programs aimed at building a democratic civil society.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said the United States will be prepared to meet with a number of political parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood. A U.S. official told The Daily Beast on Tuesday that a “handful” of members of the Muslim Brotherhood have “availed themselves of programs” funded by the United States for election training.

Jon Alterman, the director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the funding for election training executed by groups like the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute are not ways to influence the outcome of foreign elections.

“If the United States were trying to shift the outcome of the Egyptian elections, it would not do it through the democracy assistance money,” Alterman said. “If you want to influence elections, you do it covertly. There is too much transparency in how [the democracy assistance funding] would be used.”

-This commentary was published in The Daily Beast on 04/10/2011- Eli Lake is the senior national security correspondent for Newsweek and the Daily Beast. He previously covered national security and intelligence for the Washington Times

Baghdad Film Fest Aims To Break Cultural Isolation

The Baghdad International Film Festival, which runs all this week, is the latest effort by Iraqis to use an improving but precarious security situation to break their decades-long cultural isolation. The opening ceremony on Monday had all the glitz of a major film premiere. A huge crowd, mostly young, massed along a red carpet as ushers handed out glossy programs at the entrance to the national theatre in the city centre. Inside, television news crews raced between interviews, jostling particularly fiercely to interview Abdelaziz Belrhali, a Moroccan who heads a festival of short films from across the Arab world in his home country and who is the only international member of the film festival's jury.

Culture, in Iraq or elsewhere, is like the sea without a shore-it has no end, no barriers, it cannot be stopped," he said. More than 150 films from 32 countries will be aired at venues across the capital over the course of the eight days of the festival, the third of its kind since the US-led invasion of 2003. The previous edition lasted four days in December 2007, screening 63 films at the Palestine Hotel in central Baghdad. The first film festival was held in September 2005, screening 58 locally-made short films over six days at the Mansour Melia hotel, also in the city centre.

Films this year will be judged for awards in three categories-best drama, best short film and best documentary, with two other prizes reserved for the best young Iraqi director, and the best female Arab filmmaker. Despite Belrhali's optimism, however, the film festival faced difficulties it was hampered by a shortfall in funds and a lack of interest from the authorities, obstacles that go some way towards explaining why the last film festival was held four years ago. Taher Alwan, one of the festival's directors, said that he had worked for months to put the week-long program together.

We contacted all the senior officials in the government and told them about the festival, but the response was very weak because no one believed we would actually organize the festival," he said. Alwan also suggested he had been made to pay to obtain authorization documents to hold the festival at all, a sign of Iraq's pervasive graft.

Transparency International ranks it among the four most corrupt countries in the world. Alwan said that funding problems and question marks over Iraq's security were why no festival had been held since 2007 but voiced hope that it would soon become an annual fixture. Despite a sharp reduction in the number of attacks since unrest peaked in 2006 and 2007, Iraq remains one of the world's most violent countries.

I believe this festival will stimulate cultural life in Iraq, and we will try to restore the culture of cinema in Iraq," Alwan said. "As you know, after 2003, everything was closed-the cinemas were closed, there was no cinema activity, so Iraqis felt isolated from the world." Film-going, like most other leisure pursuits, came to a virtual standstill in Baghdad in the years following the invasion, as families chose to stay at home and many cinemas were burned down during a brutal sectarian war. The Iraqi film industry dates back to the 1940s and was at its most popular in the 1970s and 1980s, when going to the cinema became a weekly family outing.

However the 1991 Gulf war and the economic sanctions that followed saw cinemas go into decline. The turmoil that followed the 2003 invasion saw many cinemas burned down. Alwan added that by showing their work and meeting fellow filmmakers from other countries, the festival would build confidence among young Iraqi professionals and aspiring moviemakers.

Athraa, a film student attending the first day of the festival and a member of the generation Alwan is hoping to inspire, said she had come to "watch and learn, especially regarding their use of sound and special effects.""It is a great help for us," the 20-year-old said. Alwan, who described himself as a screenwriter, documentary filmmaker and movie critic, said he hoped the festival would mark a "turning point" for Iraq's film industry."We have thousands and thousands of stories that are very suitable for cinema, but where is the system of production?" he asked.-AFP

This article was published in The Kuwait Times on 05/10/2011

Yemen’s Problems: The President And Al Qaeda

By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed

                                     Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh

For the Americans, Yemen has become an extremely significant country, not out of love for its people or resources, but rather out of fear of Al Qaeda. Indeed, an Al Qaeda offshoot opted to hide out in Yemen’s mountainside over the past 3 years, fleeing Afghanistan’s mountains and Pakistan’s valleys, feeling the net closing in around them. The group believed that Yemen, thanks to its geographical features, would be a safe haven for them.

Yemen found itself in the international spotlight following two terrifying incidents, which potentially represented the most dangerous terrorist operations since the 9/11 attacks. The first incident was a number of parcels containing explosives being sent from Yemen by plane to Chicago. The second incident is that of a Nigerian youth – trained in Al Qaeda’s camps in Yemen – attempting to blow up a US commercial plane bound for Detroit. Luckily, both terror plots were foiled. Since that time, Yemen has become like Afghanistan; a battlefront in a global war. Earlier this year, US troops trained in counter-terrorism, along with US drones, have hunted down Al Qaeda members and bombed their positions in Yemen. Official reports have claimed that these attacks and operations are being carried out by Yemeni forces, however it has been widely reported that Washington has lost confidence in the Yemeni regime to the extent that they no longer inform the Yemeni authorities of their operations, after a number of such operations failed due to leaks from within the regime.

The reality is that within the past two years, many people have become increasingly concerned about the way that Al Qaeda has been operating in Yemen. As a result of this, a number of stories have been put forward, from Al Qaeda being in possession of secret weaponry, to Yemen secretly collaborating with the terrorist organization, as well as Iranian forces and Somali armed groups being present on and utilizing Yemen’s coasts. Many people believe that one of two things is happening; either the Yemeni government is purposely turning a blind eye to Al Qaeda activities, whilst also supporting the US counter-terrorism efforts, or the Yemeni regime today is too weak, and cannot effectively control the actions of its apparatus and officials.

The regime has found itself in an extremely weak position after the Yemeni people took the street earlier this year, protesting against Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, joining the wave of Arab protests and revolutions. Much of Saleh’s military and tribal support defected from his regime, and the capital Sana’a has been a battlefield between protesters and the government for the past 7 months. We all now know which direction things in Yemen are moving towards.

There can be no doubt that the Yemeni government has not been serious in confronting Al Qaeda over the past few years. However is this out of fear of Al Qaeda, or rather because Sana’a has been using Al Qaeda to serve its own political interests? This is an extremely worrying question that remains without an answer. During the current crisis faced by Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Al Qaeda managed to seize the city of Zinjibar and thus gave rise to fears that Al Qaeda in Yemen could seek to do what Al Qaeda in Iraq had been doing, namely forcibly taking control of cities. It took the Yemeni forces 90 days to expel Al Qaeda from Zinjibar. With the help of the Americans, the Yemenis were able to reinforce two besieged Yemeni military battalions. Two weeks later, one of the most important Al Qaeda leaders in Yemen – US born cleric of Yemeni descent Anwar al-Awlaki – was killed.

Both sides, the government and the opposition, exchange accusations of supporting terrorism. The opposition accuses Saleh of such, and claims that he masterminded the fall of the city of Zinjibar. In the meantime, some government figures claim that Al Qaeda is being sheltered by the opposition. For the Yemeni citizens, the problem lies in President Saleh’s refusal to step down, and his intent to transfer power to his sons and relatives. As for the world powers however, the problem is Al Qaeda.

In my personal opinion both are right; Al Qaeda is a problem and so is Saleh. Saleh has been walking a tight rope and accordingly Yemen remained undeveloped for more than 30 years. He only cared about remaining in power by achieving tribal and regional balances, once with Saddam Hussein, another time with Gaddafi, and now probably with Al Qaeda, when it is time for him to leave. The world will not tolerate a regime that has been rejected both domestically and internationally.

-This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 05/10/2011
-Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed is the general manager of Al -Arabiya television. Mr. Al Rashed is also the former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al- Awsat, and the Pan- Arabic weekly magazine, Al Majalla

Syria: The Opposition Position

The Syrian revolutionary movement now has officially formed a national council. And it's not as fragmented or weak as you think.

By Ausama Monajed

There's no use denying it: From the outside looking in, Syria's revolution sometimes appears to be little more than an unending cycle of violence, with no end in sight. Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has exploited this perception to apply all possible means to crush the revolt.

The conventional wisdom, however, is wrong. While the world has been preoccupied with crises such as the European financial collapse and the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime, the Syrian protest movement has grown by leaps and bounds, expanding its base of support and uniting its disparate groups. Much to Assad's chagrin, the more his security forces take action to suppress the opposition, the more the people's resolve to topple the regime increases. Far from the gloomy reports of impending civil war, Syria is heading toward a more peaceful and democratic future.

The evolution of this revolution from its early days has been dramatic. It began last March, with a few young boys scribbling anti-regime graffiti. During its early days, demonstrations were small, spontaneous, short-lived events that occurred in disconnected and confined areas of the country, like the towns and cities of Daraa, Jisr al-Shughour, and Hama. They were limited to Fridays, after prayers. Today, demonstrations are occurring daily and have swelled to include hundreds of communities throughout the country. Last week, for example, hundreds of demonstrations were reported in all regions, including Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Latakia, Banias, Tartus, Sweida, and Hasakah.

Thanks to the young and technologically savvy grassroots movements that have sprouted all across Syria since March, demonstrations have become well-planned, coordinated, and carefully executed events -- including in Damascus and Aleppo, whose residents were first viewed as silent bystanders. While demonstrations were usually confined mostly to young men, today they include Syrians from all walks of life, with women and schoolchildren on the front line.

Demonstrations are lasting longer, and the youth movements have set up protocols to ensure that the injured are treated safely and those wanted by Assad's security services are protected and well hidden. And popular resistance is adopting new, innovative, cross-sectarian tactics to express dissent. On Sept. 24, for example, children in Idlib made a human formation of a cross and a crescent to show a united opposition.

While nobody a few months ago would have expected defections from the Syria army, the number of defected soldiers was recently estimated at 10,000 by a U.S. official, and the Free Syrian Army is swelling to include officers from all ranks. The Free Syrian Army has been providing an alternative to peaceful demonstrations for those living in areas under severe and brutal military campaigns, such as Homs, which has been subjected to horrendous crimes including rape, organ theft, skinning, and kidnapping of children.

Similarly, hundreds of members of the Baath Party, the government, and the unions have resigned in protest throughout Syria. The country has been hard hit by the economic losses caused by the demonstrations and the ensuing crackdown. Inflation has made everyday items some 30 percent more expensive, according to the latest increase in the consumer price index. The regime has reacted by suspending all new car imports to the country and is considering bartering its oil products in a desperate effort to cut costs and preserve Syria's foreign exchange reserves.

 Six months ago, skeptics did not think that the opposition would be able to achieve the organization or common vision necessary to create a united opposition front. Today, the opposition is represented by the Syrian National Council (SNC), which has gained recognition from the demonstrators on the streets, Syrians abroad, and the international community. The formal establishment on Sunday, Oct. 2 of the council -- which seeks to topple the Assad regime and provide a credible, legitimate basis for a post-Assad transitional government that could peacefully usher in democratic change and build a modern civil state -- is a key milestone for the revolution.

We are well aware that a difficult road lies ahead. As the revolution matures, so have the tactics the regime is using to counter it. Security forces are resorting to tanks, bombs, and rockets to quell the demonstrations. They are destroying homes, businesses, livestock, and places of worship in the process. Entire communities are besieged, with cutoffs of their water, electricity, and phone lines. Rape and torture are routine, and there is evidence from credible sources that interrogators are exhausted from the sheer number of detainees.

Security forces are dressing up as civilians to confuse people and are using shrewd tactics to infiltrate the opposition. This month, the Syrian government set up an armed youth intelligence unit in which pro-regime youth volunteers receive training in special-forces camps before being dispatched to infiltrate the opposition and assassinate their leaders. According to U.N. sources, 3,545 people have so far been killed in this crackdown, including 217 children. And at least 20,000 have been detained, including intellectuals, writers, lawyers, and activists, some from Assad's own Alawite community, which is seen as the most supportive of his regime.

There is no doubt that the revolution is making progress toward toppling the regime. One only needs to dig a bit to see how the revolution's social base has widened, how the opposition has grown, and how the country has changed. Today, Syria is not on a road to nowhere. It is moving in the only direction it can go: onward and forward. There is no turning back.

-This commentary was published in The Foreign Policy on 03/2011
- Ausama Monajed is a member of the Syrian National Council and executive director of the London-based Strategic Research and Communication Centre

Is The Impasse In Yemen Leading To “Sudanization”?

By George Semaan

It does not seem that the balance of power in Yemen has tipped in favor of any particular side. While it is indeed tilting in favor of the regime in the military institution, it is angling in favor of its opponents in the “tribal” institution, and this may explain why the horizon for any peaceful solution remains blocked, and why the implementation of the Gulf initiative has stalled. President Ali Abdullah Saleh was clear when he set out the conditions for his exit. He linked it – in his last statements to the Washington Post – to the departure of his opponents who, only yesterday, were the backbone of the regime. While the popular uprising’s main demand is to see the regime depart, this change in the opinion of its head should include all the faces who were responsible for running the country throughout the last 33 years, i.e. General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, the commander of the first armored division, among others. This clearly means that the conflict among the leading figures in the regime has become the prevalent characteristic of political developments in Yemen.

The battles between General Al-Ahmar’s forces and the fighters of Sadek al-Ahmar on the one hand, and the Presidential Guard on the other in May and June – which were renewed in more than one location and ended with the attempted assassination against the president in the presidential compound four months ago – prove that change in the country might not be proceeding in the direction hoped for by the youths protesting in the squares. Nor is this reassuring to all those who have since joined them, including Southern and Northern factions, under the umbrella of the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP).

In light of the current balance of power in Sana’a, it seems that the situation has reached a dead end and that the conflict will not end any time soon. However, the card of those opposing the authorities might appear to be the winning one on the long run, since it is the president’s team that is required to leave on the regional and international levels, and since its rivals – i.e. yesterday’s partners – have stood alongside the youths since the beginning and have transferred their partnership to the JMP, which is the most widely represented side throughout the country. However, this status quo is not encouraging the participants in the uprising who have started to feel, as time is passing by, that they are being ever more marginalized in this bipolar power struggle.

There is no doubt that the Houthis in Saada – who engaged in six rounds of war against the regime – have not yet forgotten they were confronting both the sides now involved in the current struggle over power. There is consequently no doubt that today, they feel they have grown stronger as their enemy has become divided, and will not reunite in light of the blood that was spilled in Sadek al-Ahmar’s home and the presidential compound. Hence, they now have conditions in any new authority, i.e. “a share” in the next regime, and they are more capable than they were in the pre-uprising “rounds” to impose these conditions. Indeed, the weaker the central authority is, the stronger the peripheries grow.

But what is more dangerous in terms of this stalemate is the feeling prevailing among the Southerners regarding the fact that the current conflict is distancing them from decision-making positions. The uprising gave the impression to the hardline team that the benefits of change in light of unity would alter the previous situation, and eliminate marginalization, exclusion, tyranny and discrimination. Some in the South – who until the eve of the uprising were calling loudly for the independence of the marginalized South - will benefit from the current marginalization to enhance their positions and their calls for leaving a united Yemen. Hence, if a team in the regime is drawing inspiration from what is happening in Syria and Libya, some in the South are drawing inspiration from the Sudanese experience which resulted in two Sudans. Now, in light of the “people’s struggle” in Sana’a, they are more capable of acting in this direction, and of confronting the powers that deterred their efforts during the secession war in 1994, and of re-convincing some powers which backed them up at the time about the purpose and benefits of “Sudanization.”

But what is more dangerous than the Southerners’ and Northerners’ feeling of exclusion vis-à-vis what is happening in Sana’a, is their feeling that neither the regional powers – especially the GCC states – nor the international powers – especially the United States – have so far succeeded in paving the way for the desired change. Some among them even believe that all these powers have failed to put enough pressure to convince President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down, for considerations related to each side. They know that Washington was and still is supporting the Gulf initiative that regulates a peaceful and smooth transition of power, due to fears of seeing change affecting the position of Sana’a in the “war on terror” and seeing the arrival of extremists to power.

A long time went by before Washington hastened President Saleh’s departure, as it was not convinced by the opposition’s accusation of the regime of standing behind the exaggeration of the extremists’ positions and the threat they pose on Gulf and Western interests. And while President Saleh’s team believed it can exploit the death of Anwar al-Awlaki to enhance its position, Washington quickly tried to foreclose this, this time around. It thus recognized that “cooperation with the Yemeni government was important in the killing of Al-Awlaki,” warning however that this “is separate from the belief that Saleh should immediately start the transition towards democracy in accordance with the Gulf initiative.” So, will Washington be sincere in this, bearing in mind it has not adopted any steps hinting to the exertion of pressures on President Saleh to hasten his departure?

The card of the Islamic extremists is no longer useful to the regime, the way it used to be in the past. It is no longer useful for it to warn against some components of the opposition, led by the Yemeni Congregation for Reform – Al-Islah - which includes some individuals wanted on ‘terrorist lists’. Indeed, the people participating in the uprising know that alongside the Islamists, the Congregation includes many businessmen, tribal dignitaries and moderate figures, and that the late Abdullah Bin Hussein al-Ahmar was the one mainly deciding the direction of Al-Islah. He used to set the tone of the Islamists in the Islah Party, and distance them from the forefront of the events when necessary. And just like the president manipulated opposition forces to reaffirm his strength in the face of Al-Ahmar tribe, the latter used the card of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic forces gathered under the banner of the Congregation. Still, the tribal factor remains the strongest in defining the directions of the Congregation, whose traditional members know how difficult it would be to monopolize power without a clear regional backup from the neighbors and the West for a country living under the poverty line and a country whose unity is threatened by the aspirations of hardliners here and there, in the North and the South.

While foreign pressures have so far failed to push the situation in Yemen towards change and while the opposition squares are consolidating the existing balance of powers on the ground, the question is: Will the youth on Change Square and the moderate powers refusing to join this or that camp, or to hear the voices calling for secession rising once again, ultimately give up? The shortest way out of the tunnel is a new path, i.e. the emergence of a third power that would lead the uprising away from the struggle between those aspiring to inherit the authority instead of changing the regime. Any reluctance to form such a power will exacerbate despair among the youth, but more dangerously will strengthen those who do not see any interest in the unity of the country.

Was this not said and promoted long before the birth of the South Sudan state? It is not logical for the conflict between the Presidential Guard and the First Division to dominate the entire political scene or for Yemen to remain trapped between the two lines of this bipolar confrontation. Even if one side were to win over the other in light of this equation, the issue of change will remain pending. So, will the squares produce a third party capable of changing the equation prevailing domestically and abroad?

-This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 03/09/2011
-George Semaan is the former editor-in-chief of al-Hayat

Kuwait: A Constitutional Emirate Or The “Arab Spring”?

By Salman Aldossary

        Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohammed Al-Sabiah

Kuwait is currently experiencing unprecedented social mobility, ranging from endless strikes, mass-gatherings, popular movements, and most recently the issue of bribery; where accusations of certain MPs “inflating their accounts” has preoccupied the local press. However, what is more important than all of this is the talk of the “Arab Spring” approaching the coast of Kuwait. While supporters insist on this as a means of forwarding their demand for a “constitutional emirate”, the government responded in a decisive manner through the words of Kuwaiti National Assembly member, Ali al-Rashed, who said on a television interview that those talking of the “Arab Spring” in Kuwait are “traitors to the nation and are calling for a coup against the government”.

So what is really happening in Kuwait?

Needless to say, the talk about changing the way in which the Kuwaiti Prime Minister assumes office, to be elected rather than appointed, is nothing new on the Kuwaiti street. There have been calls for decades, within the Abdullah Al-Salem hall in the National Assembly itself, advocating this direction. However, it is interesting that there are those calling for a constitutional emirate, while nothing in the constitution itself prevents the principle of an elected Prime Minster. The Kuwaiti Constitution of 11/11/1962 stipulates that the form of governance in the country should be in accordance with the constitutional emirate system, whereby the ruling family holds the positions of Emir and Crown Prince. As for the executive power (the government), there is no article that attributes any position to the ruling family. In the past, it was customary for the Crown Prince to assume the role of Prime Minister, yet these two posts have since been separated. Who knows, perhaps Kuwait, ahead of its parliament’s forthcoming session this month, will issue constitutional reforms from the Emir, stipulating the appointment of a prime minister from outside the ruling family.

However, the most important issue with regards to this call for a “constitutional emirate” is the fact that the National Assembly has held seven votes of confidence with regards to Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad, since he was appointed by the Emir. However, on each occasion the elected MPs were unable to oust him. Thus, the constitution itself does not prevent the Kuwaitis from changing their Prime Minister, or how he comes to office. Those who prevent them are the MPs themselves, who came to power via the votes of the electorate, and not through appointment. On each occasion there were those who voted for al-Mohammad to remain in office, so do we blame the constitution here, or do we blame the MPs who were installed in parliament by the people?

An observer of the Kuwaiti scene would hardly notice that there is a feverish movement to bring reforms to the ruling house; even these reforms are contrary to the constitution. Indeed the MPs opposed to al-Mohammad, having failed to topple him under the dome of the National Assembly, have now sought to make their demands outside the Assembly. How perverse matters must seem to the observer, when he sees these MPs violating the constitution, yet at the same time calling for it to be invoked?

It is not possible to criticize the Kuwaiti experience without the voters themselves bearing some responsibility for the serious errors in their voting and candidate choices. The MPs were unable to overthrow the Prime Minister through a vote of no confidence, as noted above, but the message was clear to the Kuwaiti leadership that there is a popular desire to choose a Prime Minister from outside the ruling family. However, the Assembly itself has insisted, session after session, on keeping the man who was appointed by the Emir, something no-one understands except the elected MPs themselves, seemingly satisfied with the Emir’s selection. This means that the Emir’s choice reflects the MPs, and thus represents the choice of the people.

If the majority of Kuwaitis insist that their Prime Minister should be a member of the general populace, then they should apply this in practice by voting for an MP who supports this theory. Otherwise, this means that their choice of MPs was wrong from the start, and this is another problem altogether, but the constitution is certainly not to blame!

-This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 03/10/2011
- Salman Aldossary is Asharq Al-Awsat's Assistant Editor in Chief