Exporting Iran's Revolution

By Dominic Dudley

Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari: Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Guards

For the self-proclaimed revolutionary government in Tehran, the turmoil across the region this year could have been a golden opportunity to extend its influence. Iranian officials have tried to characterise the protest movements as a belated follow-up to their own 1979 revolution, insisting on calling it the ‘Islamic Awakening’ in any public pronouncements. Yet despite their best efforts, there is no sign of Iran successfully exporting its brand of revolution any time soon.

Several awkward, complicating facts have been getting in the way of Tehran’s preferred narrative, not least the fact that Iran’s only ally in the Arab world, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, has been in the firing line. And unlike the 1979 revolution, this year’s events have had almost nothing to do with religion. Just as importantly, Iran today is widely distrusted around the region.

In a speech on 13 September reported by the local Fars news agency, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said: “The huge Islamic moves in the Muslim world are a prelude to bigger developments and the rule of Islam. Our position comprises supporting these moves and strengthening them.”

However, Iran’s help is not in great demand. An opinion poll by the Arab American Institute conducted in June among more than 4,000 people in six Arab countries showed that Iran is often viewed negatively in the region and many are uneasy about its apparent pursuit of nuclear weapons. Even in Egypt, where the interim authorities have been reaching out to Tehran, two thirds of people have a negative perception of Iran’s role in the region.

“Iran is probably a loser in the Arab Spring,” said Gary Sick, professor at the US’ Colombia University, speaking at a public lecture at the London School of Economics on 7 September. “They’re not going to have much to pat themselves on the back about.”

When Tehran does try to exert its influence in the region, it often does so via the Quds Force, an arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp that was set up to deal with its international operations. This elite force has been active in Iraq and Afghanistan, among other places, in the past and it is strongly suspected of getting involved in events in Syria this year. According to the EU, the commander in chief of the Revolutionary Guards, Brigadier Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari, the head of the Quds Force Major General Qassem Suleimani and its Deputy Commander of intelligence Hossein Taeb have all been involved in providing equipment and other support to help the regime of Al-Assad suppress protests. All three were included in a fresh set of EU sanctions aimed at Syria in June.

Iran has repeatedly denied any such role, and not everyone accepts that it has been involved to any great extent. “I doubt there is very much Iranian involvement,” says one political analyst based in Beirut. “The Syrian regime, like a lot of these Arab regimes, has a large security apparatus. Maybe, there are a few people here and there as advisers or something, but in terms of actual people on the ground, I don’t buy it because they don’t need it. If there’s one thing that these Arab regimes have plenty of it’s oppressive ability.”

Although Iran has denied any involvement in Syria, the Quds Force is not always so shy or retiring about its activities. In 2008, Suleimani sent a message to General David Petraeus, who was in charge of US forces in Iraq at the time, via a senior Iraqi leader. Petraeus recalled the message during a talk at the Institute for the Study of War in Washington on 22 January 2010: “He said: General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qassem Suleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan. And indeed the ambassador in Baghdad is a Quds Force member. The individual who’s going to replace him is a Quds Force member.”

Petraeus then offered his own analysis of the situation. “Now, that makes diplomacy difficult if you think that you’re going to do the traditional means of diplomacy by dealing with another country’s Foreign Affairs Ministry because in this case, it is not the ministry. It is not [then Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr] Mottaki, who controls the foreign policy, for these countries at least. It is a security apparatus, the Quds Force, which is also carrying out other activities.”

The brazen nature of the message gives some indication as to the power that Suleimani and his Quds Forces now have in setting Iranian foreign policy. Frederic Wehrey, a senior policy analyst at US think-tank Rand Corporation, says the Revolutionary Guards has to some extent now become the foreign policy establishment in Tehran.

“The Revolutionary Guards has a significant role in shaping Iran’s policy of being arsonists and fireman. In places like Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan, it pursues this unconventional policy, using the clandestine method of the Quds Force. It supports armed proxies to create trouble and then presents itself as an indispensible force. It’s a dual track strategy and the Guards are at the forefront of that. You can argue they’ve probably displaced the Foreign Ministry as an executor and perhaps as a formulator of Iranian foreign policy.”

THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS HIERARCHY

Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari: Commander-in-Chief
Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi: Commander of Naval Forces
Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour: Commander of Ground Forces
Brigadier General Hossein Salami: Commander of Air Force
Major General Qassem Suleimani: Commander of Quds Force
Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Naqdi: Commander of Basij Militia
Abolqasem Mozafari-Shams: Commander of Khatam ol-Anbia Construction Base

Sources: Fars and Mehr news agency reports

Consolidating power

The Revolutionary Guards has become central to Iran’s foreign policy in another way too. As the body in charge of developing the fledgling nuclear industry, it is directly responsible for the international sanctions, which have been repeatedly heaped on the country.

Those sanctions have, to some extent at least, benefited the Revolutionary Guards by reducing the amount of competition for its business interests in the domestic economy, not least the activities of its main engineering subsidiary, Khatam ol-Anbia Construction Base.

“The domestic and international activities of the Revolutionary Guards reinforce each other,” says Ali Alfoney, resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. “The Revolutionary Guards uses its influence upon strategic decision-making to make Iran take a hawkish stance on the nuclear issue. The hawkish stance provokes international sanctions, which force foreign companies [out of] Iran’s oil and gas sector. In the absence of foreign companies, the government engages Khatam ol-Anbia in developing Iran’s oil and gas sector.

“Another example is the Revolutionary Guards’ use of its proxies to create a state of permanent crisis in Iran’s relations with its neighbours and the West. As Iran’s neighbours and the West respond to provocations, the Revolutionary Guards assumes more powers because of the state of emergency Iran finds itself in.”

The Revolutionary Guards is also intricately involved in developing Iranian defence capabilities. Its aerospace division, led by Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, is in charge of its missile development programme and its forces run war games in the Gulf and elsewhere, sometimes in conjunction with the regular army. The Defence Minister, Ahmad Vahidi, is himself a former commander of the Quds Force.

As in the case of Suleimani in Iraq, Jafari is not shy about projecting the group’s power in this area. In July, the Revolutionary Guards commander-in-chief gave an interview to the local Mehr news agency in which he threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, which links the Gulf to the Arabian Sea, if Iran was attacked. He also referred to the capabilities the Revolutionary Guards was developing in cyber warfare – a key issue for Iran in the wake of the Stuxnet computer virus, which appeared in 2010 and was apparently developed to target the country’s nuclear programme.

“Closing the Strait of Hormuz is on Iran’s agenda in special circumstances and in the event the country is threatened,” he said. “The [Revolutionary Guards’] mission in all spheres, including the military and cultural spheres, is defensive and they will carry out defensive operations in cyber warfare as well.”

Western concerns over Iran

The growing role of the Revolutionary Guards in Iranian political life has certainly not gone unnoticed by outside powers and has prompted unease in Western capitals. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has repeatedly voiced her concerns on the issue.

“Increasingly, more and more aspects of Iranian society – the security apparatus, the economy – are being controlled not by the clerical leadership, not by the political leadership, but by the Revolutionary Guards,” she said in February 2010, while on an official visit to Riyadh. “The space keeps shrinking for either religious or civilian leadership. And something else is filling that space, and so far as we can tell, it’s the expanded power of the Revolutionary Guards.”

While the US frets about the rising power of the Revolutionary Guards, there is little if anything that it can do to stop it. There is every chance the years ahead will see the group augment its influence by taking control of even more senior government posts. The links between the group’s domestic and foreign policy interests could also come into even stronger focus if, as some analysts speculate, Suleimani is able to accumulate even more personal power.

“Let’s imagine a situation where the supreme leader can’t get along with [President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad any more,” said Sick during his talk in London in September.

“What does he do about it? Well, he could declare a state of emergency and temporarily turn over the leadership to some member of the Revolutionary Guards. It’s not, to my mind, completely beyond the realm of possibility.

“Suleimani would be an ideal person. He knows the foreign policy. He has dealt with the US directly and indirectly, he has run their foreign policy in Iraq. I don’t think its particularly going to happen, but I don’t think it’s impossible.”

This article was published in MEED in Issue 39, (30 September-6 October) 2011

Muammar Gaddafi And The Justice Tyrants Face

If the Libyan dictator is taken alive, Libyans will decide how he will be tried. We forget how recent a historical precedent this is

By Mark Vlasic

Former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in Rome in 2009; if captured alive, Gaddafi likely faces a tribunal prosecution in Libya for crimes against humanity. Photograph: Reuters/Max Rossi

When Interpol announced its "red notice" arrest warrants for Muammar Gaddafi and his son, Saif al-Islam, it served as a reminder that if they are captured, it won't just be the Libyan rebels knocking at the Gaddafi door, but also the knock of justice. Times have changed since "Brother Leader" took power in 1969. Back in the 20th century, and for all the centuries before it, no head of state had ever been brought to justice for war crimes. But in this new century, the drumbeat of justice has gotten louder – and it has taken its toll on some of the most infamous dictators of our time.

Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein and Charles Taylor never thought they'd find themselves in the dock – but they did. And if Gaddafi is captured alive, whether he will be tried at home or abroad, justice will be served; and the impunity so often enjoyed by dictators of the past will find itself in "the dustbin of history".

With the UN's recent recognition of the Libyan Transitional National Council (TNC), the TNC must consider what to do with Gaddafi – and how the former "colonel" will be held accountable for the atrocities perpetrated on his watch. This decision will determine whether the Gaddafi's path to justice will follow that of a domestic court, an international ad hoc or hybrid tribunal, or the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague.

The forums in which former heads of state have been tried have been diverse and widespread. When Slobodan Milosevic was captured following the war in the Balkans, justice was done via a United Nations-formed an ad hoc tribunal. A UN security council-charted institution, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia – where I once served – was established to investigate and prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and grave breaches of the Geneva conventions, perpetrated after 1991. With this mandate, the ICTY indicted 161 individuals, and recently captured its last remaining targets, including Bosnian-Serb General Ratko Mladic, indicted, in part, for his role in the Srebrenica genocide.

More recent trials of heads of state, including Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Charles Taylor of Liberia, have incorporated both international and domestic law, operating in hybrid court-type scenarios. In an effort to bring visible justice to the people of Iraq after Saddam Hussein was removed from power, the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) was established. The IST operated in Baghdad, under the domestic laws of Iraq, but the judges were also given special training in international criminal law, which complimented the Iraqi criminal code. Charles Taylor, however, is currently being tried in The Hague by a full-fledged hybrid tribunal, the special court for Sierra Leone, which is supported by the United Nations.

In many ways, however, Gaddafi's possible move to the Netherlands may already be in play. After the UN security council's referral of the Libyan matter to the ICC, prosecutors in The Hague pursued a criminal indictment and the court issued arrest warrants for the Libyan leader, as well as his son, and his military intelligence chief, Abdullah Senussi. All three stand accused of crimes against humanity, including killing civilian protesters during Libya's Arab Spring.

It is possible, however, that an ICC, ad hoc or hybrid model of justice for Gaddafi may not provide the visible justice that the Libyan people will demand. In this case, one might consider that only a national court, or truth commission, may provide the accountability and closure of seeing the former tyrant or his henchmen before a local tribunal. No doubt, Libyans are watching Egypt and taking notes as events in Cairo play themselves out.

No matter what path it chooses to try Gaddafi, the TNC may consider establishing a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC). Past TRC-type institutions include the Sierra Leone commission that ran from 2002-2004, the Rwandan Gacaca courts that are ongoing, and the post-apartheid South African truth and reconciliation commission, which invited witnesses who were identified as victims of gross human rights violations to give statements about their experiences, while also giving an opportunity for perpetrators to give testimony and request amnesty from both civil and criminal prosecution.

In the case of Sierra Leone and Rwanda, truth commissions were designed to compliment ad hoc tribunals, which tend to focus on those most responsible for atrocities, thus extending some sense of justice to those who may never otherwise see the inside of a courtroom. In so doing, truth commissions have been effective at providing visible justice to those most acutely affected, by bringing witness testimony and official reforms to local communities.

The TNC maintains that it will pursue the avenue of justice most desired, and most appropriate, for the Libyan people. Accordingly, we must accept that the best option for the Libyan people may not be the one that is pushed by the "internationals". During my time working on the Milosevic prosecution team, I never met a Serb in Belgrade who didn't think that the former "Butcher of the Balkans" should have been tried first in Belgrade for corruption. Many individuals I met during my time at the UN, and since, have expressed to me that they thought the UN war crimes tribunal robbed them of domestic justice when Milosevic was whisked away to The Hague.

Historians may yet decide what would have been best in the case of Milosevic; for the moment, the critical decision in Libya has already been made by the TNC. Gaddafi will be tried for his crimes. And no matter what the forum, with his trial will come the justice his victims deserve to see – and an end to the impunity so often enjoyed by these tyrants.

-This commentary was published in The Guardian on 01/10/2011- Mark V Vlasic is an adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University and partner at Ward & Ward PLLC, and has served as head of operations of the World Bank's stolen asset recovery initiative. A former member of the Slobodan Milosevic prosecution team, he currently serves as international legal adviser to the Charles Taylor/Liberia asset recovery team and as a senior fellow at Georgetown's institute for law, science and global security

Fraser's Unfair Ranking Of GCC Economies

Strangely enough, the report provides no rankings whatsoever of Qatar and Saudi Arabia

By Jasim Ali

The Abu Dhabi skyline. GCC countries cannot afford to overlook international comparative studies which could help attract investment to the region.

The recently released Economic Freedom in the World 2011 issued by Fraser Institute provides unfair characteristics of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) economies. The Fraser Institute in based in Canada.

Strangely enough, the report provides no rankings whatsoever of Qatar and Saudi Arabia; in essence, one third of GCC member states are not included in the study. A simple logic for that is absence of a consistent amount of data on a sustained basis.

This is a regular problem in GCC countries, a practice that should come to an end one way or the other. The best way forward is for GCC countries to commit themselves to publishing statistics and reports on economic developments at certain dates of the year, with no intervention from the authorities for political purposes if only to ensure credibility. This is the practice in a number of Western countries.

Much to its credit, the report relies on a sizable number of variables or points; a total of 42 separate ones, in turn grouped into five broad areas. These are: 1) the size of government in terms of expenditures, taxes and enterprises; 2) the legal structure and notably property rights; 3) access to sound money; 4) the freedom to trade internationally; and 5) regulation of credit, labour and business.

Subjectivity

However, one such shortcoming of the report is its reliance on 2009 statistics despite the fact that figures relating to the GCC's economic performance in 2010 are available. Also, it is fair to conclude that a great deal of subjectivity goes into assigning figures. So is the case because the study relies on secondary data rather than conducting actual field research. Use of secondary data is constrained by being generated for other purposes. One can hope that future reports need to be modified with regards to some of its basic assumptions, possibly relying on a lesser number of variables but ones supported with statistics for all reviewed economies.

The Economic Freedom in the World 2011 gives ranking numbers 11, 14, 28 and 47 for Bahrain, the UAE, Oman and Kuwait, respectively among 141 economies. Interestingly, the latest report ranks Bahrain as the freest Arab economy for eight years in a row, or since the inception of the first report in 2002. Probably, the researchers conveniently overlook evolving developments in GCC economies or just rely on past practices.

The suggestion that the level of economic freedom in the UAE compares unfavourably with Bahrain is a hard sell. Among others, the UAE is known for being uniquely open to international trade, with Dubai serving as the region's leading entry port for trade.

The UAE and Bahrain received ranking numbers 25 and 37 respectively in 2011-2012 version of the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). Still, Bahrain's ranking is the worst among GCC countries after Kuwait. A primary problem for Bahrain is the limited size of its economy. The value of Bahrain's gross domestic product (GDP) amounts to nearly $22 billion (Dh80.8 billion), hence it is unpopular with some firms. By comparison, the UAE's GDP is valued around $268 billion.

The GCI forms an integral part of the Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012, published by the World Economic Forum. Yet the same GCI gives ranking numbers 14 and 17 for Qatar and Saudi Arabia, respectively. As indicated above, these two GCC countries are not ranked in the latest Fraser Institute's report.

Nevertheless, GCC economies cannot afford overlooking international comparative studies with all their pluses and minuses. Undoubtedly, international investors consider such indexes while evaluating options for placement of their investments. In turn, foreign investments are needed to help address local economic challenges.

-This commentary was published in The Gulf News on 02/10/2011
-The writer is a Member of Parliament in Bahrain

Netanyahu Barely Bothers To Pretend To Care About Peace

Benjamin Netanyahu, acting as if he had won a big victory at the UN last week, just keeps building new settlements.

By James Zogby

                                                       
Benjamin Netanyahu

When I was in elementary school and in the Boy Scouts, pupils would often be enlisted in fund-raising drives going door-to-door in our neighbourhoods collecting money for various charities or causes (school or church-related projects, scouting trips, etc). Engaging in this exercise, year after year, taught us some lessons about human behaviour.

We learnt that there were those kind and generous souls who would give, and those who would not. Among the latter, we took note of those who would simply say "no", which was fine. But then there were those who felt the need to make up all kinds of excuses. A line we heard all-too-often was "I already gave at the office". This, we knew, meant the individual in question not only would not give, but also wanted to pretend that, really, he was not cheap or heartless.

We knew that the "gave at the office" line was a fabrication, since the charities for which we were raising funds did not collect at offices but relied on our door-to-door solicitations. Because the lie was so overused, it entered everyday language to signify a transparently false excuse.

I was reminded of how annoying this was this week as I read an interview with Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in The Jerusalem Post. At one point, the interviewer pressed Mr Netanyahu on whether or not he would consider a new "settlement freeze" to help to restart peace negotiations with the Palestinians. Mr Netanyahu's response was short, but telling: "I think we already gave at the office."

At first, I became angry as I recalled my disingenuous and dismissive neighbours trying to put me off by using this trite lie. And then, I thought, how interesting that this prime minister, who prides himself on his debating skills, could make such an obvious mistake.

Finally, I wondered whether Mr Netanyahu actually misspoke. Maybe he really meant: "I've been getting away with this ruse for years, so go away and leave me be. I didn't give before and won't give this time either."

In the rest of the interview, Mr Netanyahu told why he would continue to build where, when and how he pleased. Given recent events, he clearly feels emboldened to continue this way. Shortly after he returned from the UN stand-off over recognition of a Palestinian state, Israel moved forward on 1,100 new housing units in Gilo, a settlement on confiscated West Bank land that Israel illegally annexed to Jerusalem.

Mr Netanyahu returned from New York believing that he had won a great victory. He had helped to manufacture a crisis mood in Israel over Palestinian statehood by warning that a UN vote would be "doomsday". And, having trumped up a phoney crisis and survived, Mr Netanyahu considered himself to be a conquering hero.

It is true to form for Mr Netanyahu's record, which shows a pattern of outright deception accompanied by triumphalism. In his first term as prime minister in the 1990s, his platform promised to end the Oslo peace process. After he was forced by Bill Clinton, then the US president, to sign the Wye River Memorandum with the Palestinians, he refused to implement the same agreements.

He has consistently betrayed his "allies" in Washington, again crossing Mr Clinton when he destroyed Jabal Abul Ghanaim, the last green hill between Bethlehem and Jerusalem, which is now the site of Har Homa, a town of 18,000 settlers. All those settlements the US once called illegitimate - and the EU called illegal - are now "accepted realities" in the language of both the US and the EU. Remember the "outposts" that Israel promised to dismantle? They now have been linked to the rail network and utility grids.

In Mr Netanyahu's second term as prime minister, with a new US president warning against settlements, he again pretended to agree. Then, with support in the US Congress, he stood up to President Barack Obama on his home ground.

The US Congress is eating out of his hand, Republican presidential candidates are attacking Mr Obama and in an election year the Americans appear to believe that they have no choice but to support Israel. And if this were not enough, Mr Netanyahu just defied the entire United Nations.

His record is one of arrogance and transparent duplicity. After decades of peacemaking efforts, Mr Netanyahu has effectively ended the peace process, as Mr Clinton said late last month. But, as troubling as Mr Netanyahu's behaviour is, deeply dysfunctional US politics are enabling this obvious liar.

Mr Netanyahu did not "give at the office" or anywhere else. He has been playing the Americans for fools for decades. The longer this goes on, the dimmer the prospects for peace and the weaker the United States looks in the eyes of the world.

-This commentary was published in The National on 02/10/2011
 -James Zogby is the president of the Arab American Institute

Libya Endgame Carries New Risks For NATO

By Justyna Pawlak

NATO commanders face a tough balancing act during the bloody battle for Muammar Gaddafi's last strongholds, Sirte and Bani Walid. NATO allies would like to let the National Transitional Council (NTC) claim victory in these battles and war for itself. That would enhance the council's legitimacy as the new ruler of Libya after Gaddafi's four decades in power, and bolster the chances of a stable democracy taking root in the country. But the European governments that led NATO's air campaign in Libya also need to remain long enough and engaged enough to make sure the success so far is not diminished by a messy withdrawal. If NATO quietly stepped aside but fighting restarted, that would diminish Europe's standing in Libya and tarnish a campaign that has been seen as a success for Europeans.

To achieve this, experts say, NATO forces are keen to cut back the bombing campaign that was instrumental in giving the NTC a military edge. Instead, NATO will likely step up other operations such as surveillance and air support to eliminate any remaining weaponry that could threaten peaceful transition. NATO declines to comment on its immediate operations. "As we approach the endgame, it is very clear NATO's role will become very much the eyes and ears of the NTC, rather than the hammer," said Tim Ripley, a London-based military expert at Jane's Defence Weekly. "The next phase in Libya will amount to a more deliberate mopping up of the country as the NTC moves to establish their control and presence.

One problem is that Gaddafi's remaining loyalists are in Bani Walid and Sirte, which are densely populated. That makes it risky to try to bomb them because of the danger of civilian casualties. NATO, argues Shashank Joshi, an analyst with the Royal United Services Institute in London, lacks sufficient intelligence to allow it to pinpoint targets in Sirte and Bani Walid without endangering civilians. "We are in a fortress situation where the city is under siege. If you don't know that a particular building is being used as a school or a mosque, even the best intelligence won't give you the details," he said. "In Tripoli, you had rebels, you had (Western) special forces, networks of resistance. We don't have that kind of information in Sirte or Bani Walid. So targeting is inherently difficult.

To a degree, battle conditions with Gaddafi's remaining loyalists necessitate a change of operational approach because of the limitations of NATO jets' firepower which is too dangerous to use, said Ripley of Jane's Defence Weekly. "Gaddafi forces are no longer using tanks and artillery that were easier to hit and identify. The NTC is using infantry to drive Gaddafi's forces from building to building," Ripley said. "Both sides are operating in such close proximity that differentiating between the sides is difficult. That makes it very difficult to use air-drop weapons (bombs).

Experts say other constraints also complicate NATO's operations in Sirte and Bani Walid as its military commanders plan how to fulfill the alliance's United Nations mandate in Libya to protect civilians during the civil war. So far, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has said, there are no confirmed cases of civilians being killed by NATO power, although alliance officials say some cannot be ruled out.

Human rights organisations have called on the alliance to lean on NTC fighters to do more to protect civilians as worries mount for people trapped in Sirte. Desperation is growing in the besieged city as civilians try to flee the battle, both sides are accusing each other of endangering civilians, and aid agencies say a humanitarian disaster is looming because of shrinking supplies of water, electricity and food. "NATO has significant influence over the actions of (NTC) forces," said Peter Bouckaert of Human Rights Watch. "And needs to use it to ensure that the NTC meet their legal obligation under international law (to avoid civilian casualties)," he said.

Another challenge for NATO, Bouckaert added, was preventing NTC forces from taking action against civilians they suspect of siding with Gaddafi loyalists. "It is essential that those civilian populations, even if they are pro-Gaddafi, do not suffer from vengeance," he said. NATO officials acknowledge difficulties they are facing in Gaddafi's last strongholds but have given little indication of how much firepower the deposed leader has at his disposal, other than "small logistical and mobility capabilities.

Their actions are limited to tactical initiatives in isolated pockets, representing a fraction of Libya's territory and population," said NATO spokesman Colonel Roland Lavoie. "They don't control many access routes within Libya. The mission is not yet over but the end is near". Focusing on Gaddafi loyalists' access routes to supplies or way out of their strongholds might be an important part of NATO tactics in the near future, military experts said. "A very big role NATO can play is to dominate the terrain, the roads outside of town," said Ripley. "They can enforce the siege but they cannot finish off Gaddafi forces. They can prevent them from rebuilding, replenishing or escaping.

Already, NATO figures from recent days show the alliance's targeting has focused on storage and command facilities and less on tanks and artillery assets. Outside of Sirte and Bani Walid, NATO forces will likely concentrate on hunting down any weaponry left behind by the Gaddafi regime, experts said. "There is a lot of kit left in the country," said Douglas Barrie, a military aviation specialist at London's International Institute of Strategic Studies. "The bombing campaign didn't destroy all of the regime's military capacity by any stretch of imagination. We didn't have enough aircraft, we didn't have enough time. "I suppose the (NATO) thinking is they don't want to leave any credible rump of military capabilities that could cause problems for the transitional council." – Reuters

This analysis was published in The Kuwait Times on 02/10/2011

The Arab Spring In Lebanon

By Abdullah Iskandar

                                   
Maronite Patriarch Bechara Al-Rahi

The March 14 Alliance in Lebanon has claimed paternity of the Arab Spring, considering its opposition to Syrian presence in Lebanon, which was followed by the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005, to have been in defense of national sovereignty and of democracy, and for lifting foreign tutelage. The March 8 Alliance, or its political authority of reference as embodied by Iran, has also claimed paternity of the Arab Spring, considering the Islamic Revolution against the Shah to have been the inspiration for the Arab youth to rise up against their rulers.

Regardless of the true nature of the Arab Spring, and of the reasons and the motives behind it, such paternity claims by the two main political camps in Lebanon should have led to finding common grounds between them, grounds connected to the meaning of the state of law, compliance to the authority of state institutions, and peaceful political activity – and thus to reshaping political life in a manner that goes beyond sectarian and confessional division, and beyond reliance on and threats of making use of armed force.

Yet we are today witnessing a deepening of the confessional divide on the domestic scene, one from which those concerned have not been able to emerge. In fact, they have taken two contradictory stances on a single issue in two Arab countries witnessing popular upheaval, i.e. Syria and Bahrain. This means that confessional alignment remains much stronger than any affiliation with the Arab Spring and its slogans. Thus announcing their paternity of the Arab Spring becomes a claim devoid of substance. More than this, in fact, as it represents cover for sectarian and confessional fundamentalism, and denial of the meaning of citizenship in a national state.

The debate over the statements made by Maronite Patriarch Bechara Al-Rahi about the developments in Syria has come to confirm this sectarian and confessional outlook. Indeed, no one has managed to depart from their own community’s view of itself and move towards the broad-minded perspective of demanding freedom for all and democratic change that would allow for equality among all. Rahi may have, from his religious position, expressed apprehensions connected to the fate of Christians under a situation of Sunni-Shiite sectarian conflict, as took place in Iraq. And these are apprehensions such a conflict would justify. Yet the contradiction between such statements and the significance of the Arab Spring lies in considering the protection of Christians to be linked to a certain regime, not to the nature of such a regime.

Confirming that the Lebanese remain outside the framework of the Arab Spring is the fact that Rahi turned overnight into an active member of the March 8 Alliance (not to say Hezbollah) from the perspective of the March 14 Alliance, and into a champion of Hezbollah’s resistance from the perspective of the March 8 Alliance. In other words, he has been turned from one holding a religious position with a role and a history in Lebanon into a “militant” in confessional struggles – this knowing that the Maronite Patriarchate has in the past been biased towards one group of Lebanese at the expense of another, yet only in order to save the unity of the Lebanese. This happened between Patriarch Meouchi and President Camille Chamoun when the latter sought to renew his mandate in 1958. This also happened between Patriarch Sfeir and General Michel Aoun when the Taif Agreement was ratified in 1989. In both cases, the Patriarch became biased towards the consensus among the Lebanese, including Muslims, at the expense of a minority within his own sect.

Indeed, neither those who have criticized Rahi nor those who have praised him have paused at the historical experiences of the Patriarchate, because doing so would have referred them to the necessity of returning to the state of law and its requirements. That is something that seems to have no place on the agenda, especially on the background of waiting for the outcome of the events in Syria, and for its repercussions on the balance of power between confessions in Lebanon.

-This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 02/10/2011
-Abdullah Iskandar is the managing editor of al-Hayat in London

Yemen: Kill And Reconciliation Will Occur

By Hussein Shobokshi

There is a popular proverb of Hadhrami origins which is well-known to the people of Yemen: "Kill and reconciliation will occur". The meaning of the proverb is clear. It simply s dictates that when matters escalate, things shall be decided one way or the other through reaching a mutually agreed upon solution as a compromise between the disputing parties. I recalled this phrase whilst watching the most recent statement made by Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh about the situation in his country, and his ridiculous announcement that he wouldn't step down until his rivals do so. People have grown sick and tired of the Yemeni President's statements; they know they are nothing but feeble attempts to buy time and extend the President’s stay Yemen, whilst at the same time he is employing all means of intimidation against his opponents, including threats and murder. The number of victims who have fallen since the return of the Yemeni President from his lengthy treatment in Saudi Arabia has reached alarming figures.

The state of affairs in Yemen requires assistance and intervention to end the current dire situation. Yemen has become a failed state par excellence, where the elements of corrupt governance, tribalism and religious extremism, each on their own, have played a role in the aggravation of the situation until it reached an impasse. If this situation persists, the country will be ravaged by a ruthless civil war.

Ali Abdullah Saleh has exhausted his time in power. The man has worn away all his pledges, and lost all his allies and backing supporters. Even his foremost traditional alliance which kept him in power all this time, namely the support from the most two pre-eminent tribes in Yemen: Hashed and Baqil, has disintegrated. After the passing of Yemeni tribal leader Abdullah al-Ahmar, his sons' ambitions to accede to the country’s highest leadership position began to surface. The issue became more heated amidst the rise in status of Ahmed, the President's son and commander of the Republican Guards Corps. This prompted the al-Ahmar family, especially the great economic magnate Hamid al-Ahmar, son of late Abdullah al-Ahmar, to advocate the revolution's demands via his satellite TV station "Suhail", and through charitable efforts to provide food and relief for the revolutionaries.

Hamid al-Ahmar is a very successful businessman, having participated in most of the major projects in Yemen when he was part of the regime. His economic contributions and close proximity to the regime were part of the “tax” imposed on Al-Ahmar family. Owing to their influence in some of the army's enclaves, and their tribal sway over certain members, the al-Ahmar family repeatedly turned a blind eye to the incursions made by Houthi rebels, out of a desire to embarrass Ali Abdullah Salah, his sons and his relatives. Being so powerful within the military establishment, the al-Ahmar family was able to do this effectively, however, Ali Abdullah Saleh soon became aware of what was happening and exploited it well.

Nevertheless, all of the aforementioned scenes provide conclusive evidence of the collapsing regime which Ali Abdullah Saleh had built. Saleh himself rose to power in highly suspicious and obscure circumstances, after the assassination of Yemeni President Ahmed al-Ghashmi. Ghashmi was mysteriously killed by a briefcase bomb delivered to him from the then President of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Salim Rubai Ali. One month later, Ali Abdullah Saleh assumed power.

Up until the very last moment, the Yemeni President is trying to pull surprises out of his hat. A few days ago, the Yemeni Ministry of Defence announced the assassination of Anwar al-Awlaki, the Yemeni-American cleric who was one of America’s most wanted terror suspects, in a rocket attack on his convoy (note that the assassination of al-Awlaki has been announced before on two occasions, but this time the statement appears correct). Saleh is sending a message to the world that he is the most capable man in Yemen to combat terrorism. By doing so, he is offering a “token of affection” to the world to keep him in power.

Restoring order in Yemen means uniting a practically war-torn country. The deplorable status quo is characterised by the predominance of corrupt rule, prevalence of nepotism and loyalist groups, triumph of tribalism over civilian law, pervasion of doctrinism and the spread of provincialism. Kill and reconciliation will occur. However, if matters in Yemen continue to move in the same direction, perhaps the proverb should read “kill and Saleh will remain”.

-This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 02/10/2011
-Hussein Shobokshi is a Businessman and prominent columnist. Mr. Shobokshi hosts the weekly current affairs program Al Takreer on Al Arabiya, and in 1995, he was chosen as one of the "Global Leaders for Tomorrow" by the World Economic Forum. He received his B.A. in Political Science and Management from the University of Tulsa