Monday, May 30, 2011

When The President Bombed His Own Tribe

By Salman Aldossary 
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 29/05/2011 

I am, of course, talking about President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and his tribe, the "Hashid" tribe, which is the largest tribe in Yemen. Saleh turned against his own tribe, harming and bombarding it. Indeed, the Yemeni President has turned against all [Yemeni] tribes, not just the Hashid tribe. Those observing the situation in Yemen must be aware that one of the main pillars of governance in Yemen is tribal alliances; however Saleh has hammered the final nail in the coffin of such alliances, which also represents the final nail in the coffin of his own rule.

Saleh's objective was not to open a battlefront with the Hashid tribe, but with the unexpected government escalation in this confrontation, Saleh is attempting to divert the public's attention away from the "revolution of the youth", as he is still bewildered as to the best way of dealing with this. Moreover, dragging the tribes into a conflict with the regime, particularly after some tribal gunmen occupied government facilities and ministries, gives the outside world the image that there is a confrontation taking place between the state and a group of outlaws. This is the pretext that will enable Saleh to divert attention away from the Yemeni revolution, as well as frighten the region and the entire world with regards to a possible civil war, one whose spark has already been lit.

Saleh is well-aware of the fact that he is facing his final scene in the film of his 33-year reign. He knows that his time in power is effectively at an end, and so the only option left for him is to confront his people in this manner, in the hope of winning one final round which will allow him to hang onto power for a few more days. Saleh now finds himself in a desperate situation, with his back against the wall, and is therefore unconcerned about the consequences of this mad scheme. Who said that Arab president's are concerned for the welfare of their people? For here we see Saleh igniting a civil war just to preserve his seat of power, whilst [Syrian president] Bashar al-Assad continues to suppress his people, even if this means the deaths of more than a thousand of his own people. As for the master of brutalizing one's own people, this is Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi, who continues to destroy his country and its unity. Indeed Libya is already effectively divided, whilst thousands of Libyans have been killed.

The Yemeni regime has entered the final most dangerous juncture by initiating direct conflict with the tribes. The tribal forces have been supportive of the revolution of the youth, but they never been directly targeted the government, which is what is happening now. Since the outbreak of this peaceful revolution, the people of Yemen should be given credit for not taking up arms against the regime, and this is despite all of the regime's provocations and deliberate attempts to incite the protestors to violence. As for the latest escalation, Saleh has succeeded in provoking the al-Ahmar family, and its supports within the Hashid tribe, to take up arms against the regime. Saleh then wasted no time in attacking the residence of Sheikh Sadeq al-Ahmar, utilizing missiles and fighter jets. Can you imagine that? A head of state ordering an attack on the residence of a tribal chief? This is indeed what happens in Arab Republics, and particularly in Yemen.

The Yemeni president's removal from power has been written by Saleh's own insistence on remaining in power, slamming shut the only remaining window through which he could have saved his country, namely the Gulf initiative. Thanks to Saleh, this initiative was suspended and withdrawn. The Gulf mediators were besieged [by pro-Saleh gunmen] in the UAE embassy, before being rescued by helicopter, although Saleh later issued an apology to the UAE president for this. Leaders of the Joint Meetings Party and members of the mediation commission were also subject to attack whilst convening at the al-Ahmar residence. Yemenis have described such behaviour as being a "black shame"; is Saleh aware of the punishment for committing a "black shame" in Yemen? He must be, for he is a member of the Hashid tribe, and is fully aware of the punishment for attacking tribal chiefs whilst they are acting as mediators.

Sunday, May 29, 2011

Nuclear Talks Call Iran's Bluff

The west has already demonstrated how effective a two-pronged approach of diplomacy and sanctions can be 

By Meir Javedanfar
This commentary was published in The Guardian on 29/05/2011

IAEA flag flatters in the wind in front
The International Atomic Energy Agency headquarers in Vienna. The IAEA has indicated Iran wants to make a nuclear bomb. Photograph: Joe Klamar/AFP/Getty

Last week brought new indications that the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran want to make a nuclear bomb.

The disclosure was part of the newly released nine-page report by the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It stated that "Tehran has conducted work on a highly sophisticated nuclear triggering technology that experts said could be used for only one purpose: setting off a nuclear weapon".

This is not the first time that the IAEA has come across evidence that indicates Iran has military ambitions for its nuclear programme. In November 2009, as revealed by the Guardian, the IAEA asked the Iranian government to explain "evidence suggesting that Iranian scientists have experimented with an advanced nuclear warhead design".

These revelations show that the international community has good and valid reasons to seriously doubt the Iranian government's claims that its nuclear programme is for civilian purposes only.

They also provide the west with more valid justification to impose even tougher sanctions against the Islamic regime for its illegal nuclear activities. However, sanctions alone are not enough.

When it comes to efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, since 2008, the international community and especially western countries have discovered another powerful tool at their disposal: diplomacy. This is why they have been more successful in isolating Iran than ever before.

More of the same should follow. Direct negotiations with the Iranian government should be offered with more vigour than in the past, as the west is likely to emerge as the winner under both possible scenarios.

The first scenario is that Iran decides to take up the offer and negotiate seriously.

Under the current circumstances, due to its increasing isolation, Iran would most probably emerge as the weaker party, much to the west's advantage. The new revelations by the IAEA will make it even more difficult for Iran to persuade the Chinese and the Russians to back its position, thus leaving Iran more isolated at the international level. This is in addition to Iran's regional problems, which have been exacerbated by its cold war against the Saudis, currently being played out in Bahrain.

Except for Iraq, no government in the Middle East is siding exclusively with Iran's position. Not even the Syrians (whose leader Iran is assisting in his battle to crush the opposition) nor Egypt, which Iran was hoping to count on as an ally after the fall of Hosni Mubarak. Such isolation gives the west the upper hand in its diplomatic dealings with Iran, something which it can use to extract further concessions from Tehran during the talks.

The second scenario is that Iran attends the negotiations with the goal of dictating its own demands, or merely to buy time – as it did in the previous rounds of talks. This would also be to the west's advantage, judging by the recent performance of Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili.

In fact, Iran's current nuclear negotiation team is one of the least professional and worst performing in the history of the Islamic Republic. The P5+1 negotiators, headed by the EU's foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, had a chance to experience this at first hand during the last round of negotiations in Istanbul on 15 January.

During the first day of talks, at 12pm Jalili excused himself to go for prayers. He kept everyone waiting for three hours, until he decided to return. And when he did, it was with complaints that he had a headache. After that, Iran's unwillingness to drop its preconditions led to the talks almost breaking up on the first day, which then caused the Iranians to drop their preconditions.

Even then, negotiators' intransigence made it difficult for anyone to believe that Iran was serious about reaching a deal. A repetition of such a scenario would be useful for the west as the P5+1 participants, including the Chinese and Russians, will become even more convinced that Iran is not interested in serious negotiations, thus helping to promote western plans to impose tougher UN sanctions, with Chinese and Russian support.

Sanctions against Iran work. There is no doubt about it. Iran's nuclear programme is being slowed down because of them.

So does diplomacy. With this method, the international community, and especially the west, has called Iran's bluff. Now the Iranians can't accuse the west of only being interested in "threats and hostilities". And thanks to Iran's isolation and behaviour as was demonstrated in Istanbul, this option has turned out to be a gift that keeps on giving.

The west should continue to use it – and what better time than now, for no one knows what tomorrow could bring. If Iran's supreme leader decides to stop backing hardliners such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Jalili, who cause so much damage to Iran's position, then the tables could turn against the west.

Any major shift in his support towards conservatives, such as parliament speaker and former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, who knows a thing or two about negotiations and building regional influence, could mean a reversal of fortunes for the west. The frightening idea of a nuclear-armed Iran with regional influence and more leverage against the west would then look more likely

'Resumption Of Peace Negotiations Is All But Impossible'

By Musa Keilani
This commentary was published in The Jordan Times on 29/05/2011 
 
There was a sense of expectation attached to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s meeting with US President Barack Obama, his appearance before the pro-Israeli lobby, the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the joint session of the US Congress. The expectation was that something would be unveiled during Netanyahu’s visit to the US that would be positive to the quest for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

It proved to be hollow, since all Netanyahu did was to reiterate his known positions and firmed up his refusal to accept the legitimate rights of the Palestinians as the basis for peace negotiations. Moreover, the Israeli prime minister distorted facts and realities on the ground to support his argument that Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories and its policies towards the Palestinians living under its military occupation were not in violation of international law.

Of course, his audience at the AIPAC conference, an annual pilgrimage for US businessmen and politicians to reaffirm their pro-Israel credentials, and at the US Congress, cheered and applauded him.

Many observers praise Netanyahu for saying he would recognise an independent Palestinian state. But they overlook the fact that Netanyahu’s definition of “independence” remains as far as ever from the Palestinian dream of independent statehood after decades of struggle and heavy sacrifices.

Netanyahu’s talks with Obama and his statements changed little, except that every party involved in the elusive quest for peace knows where exactly it stands.

Of course, Obama deserves credit for clearly reaffirming that an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord should be based on the lines that Israel held at the outset of the 1967 war, with negotiated exchange of territory to accommodate the Jewish settlements in the occupied land. Obama was not exactly breaking new ground by referring to the 1967 lines, since it is obvious that they should indeed be the starting point for negotiations.

Instead of picking up where Obama left off, Netanyahu misrepresented what the US president said and went on to lecture him in public on how Israel found it impossible to “defend” the 1967 lines.

If anything, it should have been a humiliating experience for the US president to be told in public that he was pipe-dreaming in his vision of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

It is not the first time this happened. In their confrontation last year over the US demand for a total freeze of Israel’s settlement construction in the occupied territories, it was Obama who had to step down and accept defeat in the face of an uproar raised by the pro-Israeli political establishment in the US, including his own Democratic party.

As things stand now, a resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations is all but impossible in view of Netanyahu’s rejectionist stand and the Palestinian refusal to accept Israel’s conditions for peace.

The US, whose support over the decades recreated Israel to what it is today, wants to help, but is told to go take a hike by its “strategic partner” in the Middle East.The US president has no independent options except those dictated by his political imperatives ahead of his bid for reelection next year.

The Palestinians have taken a step or two in asserting their freedom of action to serve their interests. Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas would have preferred to have found some opening that would have allowed him to go back to the negotiating table with Israel, but Netanyahu, wittingly or unwittingly, made sure there was none.

He says the Palestinians should not have any preconditions for talks, but attaches several of his own that are impossible to be met. He demands that Abbas should renounce the recently signed Palestinian reconciliation agreement that has allowed him to work on a united Palestinian platform to deal with all issues, including the continued struggle for liberation and statehood.

Netanyahu argues that Israel cannot negotiate with a group like Hamas, which refuses to recognise it. And Hamas is unlikely to meet his demands that it recognise Israel, give up armed resistance and accept past agreements signed by the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Israel (one fails to see the relevance of the third demand since it was Israel that violated those agreements in the first place).

The bottom line is that Hamas has conditioned Palestinian recognition of Israel on the latter’s recognition of the former. And Netanyahu has no intention to do so. He has brushed aside Abbas’ assurance that it would not be Hamas that would conduct negotiations with Israel and that Abbas himself would be in charge in his capacity as the chairman of the PLO.

Adding insult to injury to the Palestinians were the warnings, issued by both Obama and Netanyahu this month, that the Palestinians not go ahead with their bid to secure international recognition of their token statehood by September, the same deadline set by Obama for a two-state solution in Palestine.

The only option before the Palestinian leadership today is to continue along its path for world recognition of statehood. In the meantime, the Palestinians should embrace the goal of absolute unity without reservation.

There is still the possibility that Hamas and Abbas’ Fateh could fall out over conflicting ideas about the unity government to be formed and how the Palestinian territories should be governed in the interim period during which the new government would prepare for parliamentary elections in one year. Unexpected developments in the occupied territories could also derail the Palestinian move towards unity for the common cause.

Paramount among the requisites today istrust among the Palestinian factions. Hamas and Fateh might have differences over the political shape of the sought-for Palestinian state, but they should not allow themselves to be turned into feuding parties by the Israelis.

Hizbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah described Netanyahu’s statements as a godsend gift to justify the annulment of the Arab League Initiative to make peace with Israel.

Syria Army Loyal, But Not Fail-Safe

By Lachlan Carmichael 
This commentary was published in The Kuwait Times on 29/05/2011 

The Assad family's decades-long rule in Syria has been built partly on a loyal and stalwart army, but the institution is not fail-safe against an unprecedented pro-democracy movement, analysts said. Though it is commanded by officers from the same minority Alawite religious community from which the Assads hail, it has a large Sunni rank-and-file who could mutiny and turn, in the long run, into an anti-regime force, one said. Under another scenario seen by other analysts, the commanders could eventually be induced to switch sides if many of their own soldiers mutiny and the international community takes a much clearer stand against the Assads.

 Andrew Terrill, research professor at the US Army War College, told AFP the army is "very much structured to be loyal to the regime" of President Bashar Al-Assad, who in 2000 took over from his late father Hafez Al-Assad. The elite Fourth Armored Division and the Republican Guard are run by Assad's brother Maher and are almost entirely Alawite, an offshoot of Shiism, he said. The non-elite army units still have Alawite officers in key positions. The army is also "very much under surveillance of the Syrian security forces," which are run by the Assad family and which "are very, very efficient at what they do," he said.
This is going to be nothing like Egypt where you had the army start to show an independent voice and start to tell the regime what to do," Terrill said. "The army and the Alawite leadership of the army is going to stand behind the Assad regime because they're scared to death of what's going to happen if Alawite control ends in Syria," he said. However, the army is not all-powerful, he said.

 Last week's protests were being promoted under the slogan "Friday of the guardians of the homeland", a reference to the army and a play on the words used in the first verse of Syria's national anthem. Terrill said the protesters seem to be trying to win over the many Sunni soldiers in the army in the hope they will mutiny and join the pro-democracy movement, he said. However, he said, a "ragtag group of rebels" would face "an awfully difficult force" in the elite Fourth Armored and Republican Guard Divisions, which are the best trained and have the best equipment. "Maybe at some point after a prolonged struggle, they might be able to defeat the Alawites. They've certainly got the numbers, but it's not something that's going to happen overnight and it's not going to happen pretty," Terrill said. In short, it could be a long, bloody civil war, he said.
Ammar Abdulhamid, a Syrian dissident and democracy activist who heads the Washington-based Tharwa Foundation, agreed the army's command fears a revolution because they do not know how the majority Sunni will react to the Alawites. However, he believes the "army generals will begin to review their calculations and reconsider their connection to the Assad regime" if the United States and other powers decisively side with the protesters.

Until now, Washington and other capitals have urged Assad to reform the system or step down, which puts the emphasis on reform, he said. "This is not a Sunni revolution against the Alawites," he said. "This is a Syrian revolution against the corruption of the Assad family, and we want the army to play a role in the transitional process... and in protecting the interests of the minority basically in the transition," he said.
Ahed Al-Hendi, the Arabic program coordinator of the US-based human rights group Cyber-Dissidents.org, said the "army may be the regime element most likely to join the uprising", despite the popular belief it is loyal to Assad. "Although many high-ranking military officers are Alawite, the majority of their divisions are not," Hendi wrote in Foreign Affairs. "Should the soldiers in those divisions begin to mutiny, they could compel their commanders to rebel against Assad. The Alawite army leaders may also fear a backlash and revenge attacks against Alawite sects due to Assad's policies.

 Apart from the Republican Guard and the Fourth Armored Division, the army has not been involved in the crackdown, Hendi said in the May 3 article. However, "to convince the army to switch sides, the dissidents require international assistance," said the rights activist. Hendi said the world community should impose "severe sanctions on targeted elements of Assad's regime," which has happened, and also try to "widen the cleavages" between the army and the elite divisions run by Maher Al-Assad. - AFP

National Consensus For The United Arab Emirates

Mishaal Al Gergawi writes: As the country contemplates reinventing the welfare model, a legislating FNC would not aid it 
This commentary was published in The Gulf News on 29/05/2011 

On a summer's day in 1967, a teenager is walking down the now old Sabkha in Dubai. His breathless friend finds him and tells him that they're recruiting volunteers for the war. A passionate believer in the Arab cause, the teenager signs up immediately and is shipped out. The war's over by the time he makes it to Basra.

My father enlisted because he believed that Jamal Abdul Nasser was a patriot and wanted to free Palestine. Today, he acknowledges that pan-Arabism failed but absolves Nasser from blame. He blames the incompetence of his lieutenants and treachery of his contemporary Arab leaders.
The Islamic awakening, Al Sahwa, was primarily the emancipation of the view that the Arabs lost their wars with the Jews because they left God out of the equation. In other words, the Arabs lost because they effectively stopped being Muslim. Friday sermons were reminding devastated Arabs that they were people that only knew glory after embracing Islam and would only know it again if they embraced it once more. Nowhere did this resonate as vividly as it did in the Arabian Gulf.

As the years went by, Al Sahwa was no longer a phenomena but very much the norm. I often heard elders when reflecting on the liberal 1960s and '70s conclude by saying: "We were living in ignorance." Then came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which pretty much ushered jihad's pop-culture decade. It would be the last time an American president would speak in defence of the Mujahideen. Recruitment offices were opened across the world — the Gulf included.
This ended with the invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf states' fatal fallout with Osama Bin Laden & Co. Islamism, the very tool that Gulf countries had used to thwart Nasser's pan-Arab ideological march, was now turning against them. Islamic jihad had mutated into terrorism. The 1990s represented a marriage of liberalism and nationalism that would remain uneasy until the 9/11 attacks; after which it would very much be consummated. Tolerance, coexistence and the denouncement of violence were the main products of the marriage.

Impact at home
Today and amid the Arabs' spring and winter, as liberals and Islamists (temporarily?) unite in their call upon (all?) Arab states to reform, Emiratis are bemused by the idea that this could, would or should happen in their country.

The argument for the UAE's little need of an Egyptian revolution or even a constitutional monarchy isn't one of papal infallibility but one of proverbial context.
Maintaining a column for the last three years, I have never been in short supply of things that I could note and recommend to be revamped, improved or totally replaced.

A Dubai-based Kuwaiti friend recently told me that, unlike in his hometown, he feels hopeful in the UAE because of a general sense that ideas can be realised here. And it is precisely because I have hope that I have taken the effort to analyse issues relating to the UAE's development and competitiveness.
The UAE will turn 40 at the end of the year. It has only had two presidents and three prime ministers so far. In other words, it is a young country. Its successes and shortcomings have been the product of the best efforts of individuals, not institutions. Above and beyond the offensive circumstances surrounding the UAE's petition calling for a fully elected Federal National Council (FNC) with legislative powers, I fundamentally disagree with it and will make my case against it.

As I said, the UAE is a young nation that was founded against all odds. It had to adopt an aggressive welfare state model to domesticate much of its wayfaring tribes. Today, as it attempts to diversify its economy and contemplates reinventing that welfare model, a legislating FNC would not aid it in achieving those goals.
Example: Ahmad and Saeed are both running for the FNC and want your vote. Ahmad wants to lower government expenditure, privatise some non-core assets, introduce tax and overhaul the educational system. Saeed wants to raise salaries of government employees by 50 per cent and reduce the retirement age by three years. Who would you vote for? Everyone I've spoken to concedes that Saeed would be our very own Joe the Plumber's candidate. Almost every elected FNC member would be a variation of Saeed. But is that really what the UAE should do right now? As the Bric (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and others continue to climb the ladders of prosperity and innovation, should the UAE blow up its budget and numb its populace? I think it would take Tocqueville's tyranny of the — unaware — majority to new heights.

In a world primarily split between the Washington (now Seoul) consensus and the Beijing consensus, Singapore's shown that with vision, discipline and accountability, successful and unique domestic systems can emerge.
There is no reason why the UAE cannot develop its own consensus. In addition to addressing challenges of cultural creativity, academic innovation, economic diversification and social security, this consensus should end the decade-swaying pendulum of secular liberalism and religious conservatism and replace it with a national consensus that recognises the joint aspirations of the UAE's leadership, businesses, intelligentsia and, most importantly, its society.

Mishaal Al Gergawi is an Emirati current affairs commentator.

Democracies

By Mostafa Zein
This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 28/05/2011 

We are ashamed of our democracies, because the Arab parliaments are subject to the ruler. They execute his orders and pass his suggested legislations, most of which serve his own interest and that of his governing entourage. We are ashamed, because the lawmakers of these parliaments represent the interests of companies, families, sects, or denominations, instead of “representing the nation”, as cited in the constitutions of countries that actually do have constitutions.

We are also ashamed of the Arab parliaments, because they constitute –through appointment, forgery, or by gaining the support of the people in power- legislative bodies and councils that provide legitimacy to dictatorships that only care about remaining in power and achieve what they want through political submission to external desires that were never supportive of the peoples’ democracy, in spite of their allegations.

We were, and still are ashamed of our parliamentary democracies which have been clearely exposed when Syrian MPs were cheering at President Bashar al-Assad as he announced his reform program in the parliament. We blame these MPs for failing to play their role in discussing the program of the president. They failed to ask about the people who died in the protests and none of them presented any program, be it opposing or matching to that of Al-Assad.

We used to be ashamed and upset at our parliaments and we still are. However, as we saw the members of the two councils of the American congress stand up in admiration for Netanyahu, our shame turned to fear from the democracy that Washington is announcing to us. Then, it has become a right of ours to ask hundreds of questions about the reason why the USA has been exerting its pressure and dispatching its soldiers to our countries, in order to “help us” in consolidating democracy.

The honoring of Netanyahu by the Congress, and the right this man gave himself to judge others, based on their position towards Israel (the Syrian Liberation Act) do not constitute the sole reason that is pushing the Arabs to oppose American politics. In fact, there is a history of accumulating hostile American policies against them. All of these are connected to Israel, starting day one of this state’s history, to all the wars that Israel launched, with the help of American weapons and political support, all the way to the destruction of Iraq and to the attempts to destroy Syria.

After the scandal that we witnessed at the Congress, our many scandals turned into a mere funny caricature. After the eloquent speech of President Barack Obama, and his legitimate defense of the most racist and bloodiest country ever, we became certain that all the American support provided to the Arab Spring only aims at one thing: pressuring the regimes that were produced by this Spring, so that they proceed with the former policies vis-à-vis Israel, amidst bets on a greater acceptance of the Hebrew state by the new generations, or on their future apathy about its history. The biggest wager hinges on cornering any side that opposes the Hebrew state and [believing] that the intifadas were caused by poverty alone, while financial support can serve to hush these intifadas or to subject them to the will of the new regimes that are still orbiting in the American space. This is especially significant as the fear from Islamists dissipated, ever since the latter have started to practice piety and as there are signs that they might accept the Judaism of Israel in return of implementing an Islamic [rule] in the countries that they are planning to control. This is a “historic” swap that will most likely renew the conflict within the Arab societies and transform it into endless civil wars.

The flaw of our democracies lies in the fact that they are supportive of dictatorships. And the flaw of the American democracy lies in the fact that it is exclusively concerned with the protection of Israel and with covering up for its crimes.

Saudi Arabia: The Issue Of Women Driving Returns!

By Mshari al-Zaydi
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 29/05/2011 

Saudi Arabian society, for the most part, is a young one, whilst the majority of Saudi Arabians live in one of Saudi's three major cities (Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam). Saudi Arabians are also among the most internet literate people in the Arab world, with modern means of communication being extremely popular in the country. In addition to this, more than 1,000 Saudi Arabian students study abroad, most of whom in the US.

Saudi Arabia is a geographically diverse country, with a similarly diverse and multi-cultured society, in the same manner as any large, rich, and affluent nation.

During times of major social transformation and change, eyes are always drawn to the condition and role of women in society. This is what happened in Saudi Arabia when the state, during the reign of King Saud, decided to open state-run schools for girls. King Faisal also showed great resolve with regards to following this route [opening girls' schools], despite the protest campaigns that were launched by religious preachers. These preachers went so far as to dispatch a number of delegations to try to talk the ruler out of this decision. Indeed the first girls' schools in Saudi Arabia were, in some places, opened under the protection of military forces [due to the religious campaign opposing such schools].

We saw speeches, instigation and social mobilization calling for girls to be given the right to a modern education; however despite all of the above, this was something that had to be forcibly established. Whoever wanted to enroll their daughter in school was free to do so, and whoever didn't want to was not forced to, and so that is what happened. We have now reached the stage which saw Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz, opening the Princess Noura Bint Abdulrahman University for Girls, just a few days ago. This is a huge academic institute, which will be capable of graduating 60,000 female students each year.

We have arrived at a great time for women's education in Saudi Arabia, and we are proud to have a number of Saudi female luminaries such as scientist Dr. Hayat Sindi, researcher Dr. Ghada al-Mutairi, well-known political figure Thuraya Obeid, and scientist Dr. Khawla al-Kuraya, among many others, both inside the country and abroad.

Look at where we were when girls' schools in Saudi Arabia first opened, and how far we have come!

If we listened to the demands of those who were afraid and against this, back then, what would our fate have been today? Would we have scientists like Dr. al-Kuraya, Dr. al-Mutairi and Dr. Sindi?

The issue of women's right to drive is exactly the same; there are always those who reject anything new. This is a well-known custom in conservative societies, whether this is Saudi Arabia or elsewhere. The issue of women's right to drive has gradually been turned into a slinging match between one [social] current that views this as a matter of life and death, and another that believes that the ban on women driving represents Saudi Arabian women being denied their natural rights, particularly as all other Muslim women, including those in Gulf states, enjoy this right. The entire issue has been completely politicized, which is something that Asharq Al-Awsat editor-in-chief Tariq Alhomayed put forward in his article [Saudi Arabia: Don't politicize the issue of women driving, 26/05/2011].

This truly is an issue that is being given far more weight than it deserves, and has become an issue that the international media is using to criticize the humanitarian record of the country as a whole. I believe that the time has come to settle this issue for good, and turn over the page, and move away from this issue which has harmed all concerned parties. The issue is one of traditions, and a delay in the administrative decision [on the issue of women driving]; this is a state of affairs that lasted for so long that the issue of women driving began to be viewed as something untouchable. This is when such traditions become a problem, namely when everybody is afraid to try and change them.

Saudi women are part of the fabric of society and culture. Women driving will not change their culture or morals. Whoever has reservations can discuss these, and we will hopefully find logical solutions. However banning something for the sake of banning it is not a solution, but rather a short-term sedative.