Sad Commemoration

This editorial was published in The Jordan Times on 16/05/2011

This year, commemorating Nakbeh was a bloody affair. Israel yesterday killed 13 people trying to cross the borders from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria into Palestine and the annexed Golan Heights, living up to its brutal belligerence and its promise to erase the word from the Palestinians’ memory.

Remembering the creation of Israel, on May 15, 1948, as the Nakbeh - or the catastrophe - is most fitting since that day of sad remembrance brought, indeed, devastation to the Palestinians, particularly, and the Arabs in more general terms.

The 63-year-old conflict between Israel and the Arab world sprung from that fateful day and is still with us, having brought about occupation, destruction, dispossession, death and misery - with no end in sight.

The Palestinians, the Arab world and indeed the entire international community are still paying the price for the establishment of a state on stolen land.

Israel was created not only by a unilateral decision of the Zionist leadership in Palestine but also by the barrel of the gun, and in the process, thousands of indigenous Palestinian Arabs were driven away from their homes.

Israel was declared by the Zionist movement and recognised by some governments even though it had illegally grabbed more land than stipulated by the 1947 UN partition plan.

Now, decades later, the conflict with Israel is still alive, a festering sore and a source of instability not only for the region but for the world at large.

Outstanding issues in the now-on, now-off peace process - the right of return for the Palestinian refugees, borders, Jerusalem - have yet to be tackled.

One UN resolution after another has been issued protecting the rights of the Palestinians, yet Israel is getting away with not honouring them - with impunity.

Every Nakbeh day there is hope that the single oldest occupation in contemporary history will come to an end, that the rights of a dispossessed people will be restored and that justice will finally prevail. Hope that there will be no more reason to commemorate a catastrophe.

War Should Never Be The Default Stance

Gary Younge writes: Libya shows again that successful regime change can only be brought about by ordinary people, not by foreign bombs 
This commentary was published in The Gulf News on 16/05/2011 

Despite the enormous power of the American government," argued the renowned Trinidadian intellectual and activist CLR James in 1950, "its spokesman, the man on whom it depends and has depended for years to give some dignity and colour to its international politics, is an Englishman, Winston Churchill."

So it was with former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher and former US president Ronald Reagan as well as former British prime minister Tony Blair and former US president George Bush. But when it comes to Libya, the tables seem to have turned. For the clearest explanation of the war aims has emanated not from Britain, or indeed Europe, but the White House. While Britain has blundered (foreign minister William Hague suggested at one point that Muammar Gaddafi had fled to Venezuela) and French President Nicolas Sarkozy has blustered (starting the bombing without telling his allies), US President Barack Obama has offered the most lucid justification for military intervention.

The trouble is that at each moment the goal of the intervention not only changes, but also contradicts any justification given earlier. Shortly before the no-fly zone was imposed, Obama assured a bipartisan group in Congress that the action would take ‘days not weeks'. More than a week after the bombing had started he told the nation the aim was limited to purely humanitarian ends. "I refuse to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action," he said.

He also stood steadfastly against regime change. "If we tried to overthrow Gaddafi by force, our coalition would splinter." Two weeks later, in a joint letter signed by British Prime Minister David Cameron and Sarkozy, he brazenly conceded it is about regime change. "It is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power."

Legal disaster

Assassination is now, apparently, the foreign policy du jour. On May 8, the British defence minister, Liam Fox, insisted: "Nato does not target individuals." Instead they go for families. Just over a week ago, they killed Gaddafi's son and three of his grandchildren.

So here we are with a conflict that was supposed to last days and was not about regime change that has gone on for six weeks and won't end until the regime has changed. Even as the west prepares to negotiate a truce with the Taliban, Gaddafi's offer of a ceasefire has been rejected summarily. In the name of humanitarianism, the war must be prolonged. The problem is not mission creep, it's the mission.

UN support makes the bombing legal, it does not make it legitimate. This is no mere semantic matter. Just because something is within the law does not make it a good idea. International law should be a prerequisite for action, not the basis for it. The Iraq war would still have been a disaster even if the UN had endorsed it. It would just have been a legal disaster. The international support also changes the character of the war. Americans do not have a monopoly on arrogance or hubris. It was the French who led the charge to war.

Britain was also gung ho. But it rapidly became apparent, as they both begged the US to step up its involvement, that they started a fight they could not finish.

The Libyan rebels' demands are important. But solidarity does not involve unquestioningly forfeiting responsibility for one's own actions to another, but rather it is a process of mutual engagement demanding an assessment of what is both prudent and possible. It is now clear that the Libyan uprising, like other revolutions in the region, could not succeed militarily.

Revolutions and civil wars have no guarantees of a happy ending, and foreign intervention is rarely the answer. We've seen from elsewhere that the most successful way to build democracy in the region is by ordinary, local people from below, not by foreign precision bombs from 50,000 feet above. Either way, what was clear from the outset was that such an intervention was not sustainable without regime change and then occupation. The mission had to creep, because as it stood it wasn't going anywhere.

Sometimes there are no good answers. But that doesn't mean war should be the default position. Because some answers are worse than others. And this is shaping up to be predictably bad.

Obama Speech Shouldn't Ignore Peace Plan

By James J Zogby     
This commentary was published in The Kuwait Times on 15/05/2011 

A few days back, the New York Times reported that President Obama was planning to deliver a major speech designed to "reset" US relations with the Arab World. I found the article troubling. According to "unnamed US officials" cited in the story, "Mr Obama was casting about for ways to tie together events in the Middle East [i.e. the Arab Spring and the killing of bin Laden] and that "the current plan is for the President to keep his focus on the broader changes in the Arab World, rather than to present a specific new plan for reviving the [Israeli-Palestinian] peace talks".

All I can say is I sure hope the New York Times got the story wrong. I believe that most Arabs are not looking to the United States to "sprinkle holy water" on their Arab Spring (with Libyans being the singular exception). Nor do they need help in understanding the significance of, or the consequences of, this moment in their history. Arabs are not looking to the US President for an analysis of their circumstances. While what they want from America may differ in some details from country to country, a core concern shared by most Arabs is that America demonstrates leadership in resolving the Palestinian issue.

In anticipation of Obama's speech, I have been asking a wide range of Arab friends and acquaintances, from revolutionaries and intellectuals to government officials, what they want to hear from the US President. While offering a diverse menu of issues (Libyans want arms, Egyptians and Tunisians want economic assistance and investment to create needed employment, etc), two strong points of consensus emerge regarding the issues they hope Obama will address.

On the one hand, these Arab interlocutors make clear that the US is still paying a price for Bush era policies, and that President Obama is still suffering from a "post-Cairo speech" let down. That speech raised expectations which were not fulfilled, shaking confidence in US leadership. Therefore, they caution against another "big speech" that promises a lot and delivers too little. And because the headline leading up to the 2009 Cairo University speech and then coming out of that speech was the President's commitment to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, failure to address this issue now, or to address it only in generalities or with more vague promises "to advance the peace process," will either deepen mistrust or provoke scorn or rage.

In recent days, the importance of the Palestinian issue has only been heightened by the resignation of former Senator George Mitchell and by what is expected to be Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's triumphant appearance before the US Congress. While Mitchell's much heralded appointment as Special Envoy raised hopes among some in the Middle East, his tenure has been disappointing. His departure is being viewed as an admission of a collapse of the process in which he and the President had invested a great deal of political capital. And with Netanyahu and Congress both in agreement on blocking the recently completed Palestinian reconciliation pact and the Palestinian leadership's efforts to seek the United Nations' recognition of their state in September, it would be viewed as a glaring omission and a lack of serious intent should Obama fail to address the issue of Palestine in whatever Middle East speech he is to give.

Now, to be sure, there are voices here in the US maintaining that the Arab Spring has eclipsed Palestine and that Arabs now have bigger issues on their plate. They argue that Palestine was always nothing more than a diversion which Arab rulers used to distract their subjects - to redirect their anger away from home at Israel and the US With revolutions now underway in many parts of the Middle East, the removal of Osama bin Laden from the scene, and with Arabs concerned with Iran's push for regional hegemony, these analysts say that it is these issues, not Palestine, that should be the topics dominating the President's message.

Of course any Presidential address on the Arab World today will have to comment on the changes underway, the killing of bin Laden, and regional concerns with extremism. But none of this can justify ignoring Palestine. It is not an either/or proposition. Our polling across the Arab World consistently demonstrates the importance of Palestine for Arabs from Morocco to the Arab Gulf. And the President, himself, knows that efforts to diminish the centrality of Palestine are wrong. Obama understands the importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in creating a more stable and secure Middle East and in improving US standing in the Arab World. That is why he invested so heavily in efforts to address the issue and that is why he has repeatedly and publicly made the case for the importance that this matter holds for US national security interests in the region.

That his peace-making efforts have been stymied by circumstances beyond his control is unfortunate, but to advise him to surrender to these circumstances at this point would be a tragic mistake. He cannot, of course, make peace by himself. And he must always be attentive to the domestic political consequences of any actions he may attempt. But even with these constraints, there are things he can do in a speech that would demonstrate leadership at this critical time.

The President can make clear in a speech the parameters of what would constitute a just solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Building on the Taba framework, which was nearly completed by Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in 2000, and the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, the President can put forward an Obama Plan. But he must go further by laying down firm markers for behavior and binding timetables for implementation, backed up by US commitments as incentives and the threat to withhold political support as a sanction. He then must sell this framework to the American public, the world community and especially to Arabs and Israelis.

To do all this will be difficult and will take leadership and determination. But no one should ever have expected that undoing years of neglect, entitlement, or bad behavior would be easy. If we want to be serious and be seen as serious, the issue must be tackled head on. To do anything less, would be a mistake. If the Times story is right and ignoring Palestine or downplaying this issue is what is being contemplated, then I would respectfully suggest skipping the speech entirely. Rather than appearing insensitive and out of touch, earning scorn or worse, it would be better to do nothing at all.

James J Zogby is the President of the Arab American Institute

Morocco And The Gulf Cooperation Council

By Mohammad El-Ashab 
This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 15/05/2011 

Beyond the immediate meaning of Morocco joining the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), this choice overcomes geographic realities and economic division, towards clarifying the features of the new directions in the Arab world, which will have many an implication, and on several levels. In fact, this move is tantamount to a quantum leap in the concepts of collaboration and cooperation. It is not the timing alone that underscores the importance of this endeavor, which once used to be a farfetched dream. The decision – that was undoubtedly taken in light of further communications, consultations, and analyses – is considered as a historic achievement.

On the one hand, this decision consolidates the unity of the Arab world, which was not affected by any deterrents or setbacks. It has reformulated the elements of common traits, whether in religion, language, and historic constituents, thus turning them into incentives, all in order to rethink the major Arab project that has so far remained unachieved. The so-called division based on geographic location has thus ended. So did the so-called contradiction between what is known as the Oil Arabs and the Water Arabs. We are now witnessing a single entity with different sources and extensions on the Arab, Asian, and African levels without the need to consider the geographic dimension, the per capita income or economic growth as obstacles.

And on the other hand, it strategically defines the political and security related challenges. It also renews the alliances born from the Arab womb rather than its surroundings, and curbs the attempts of some regional powers, which had tried to impose their agendas as a result of Arab retreat and restlessness. This in itself is an indication to the formation of a new strategic awareness, which will enable the Arab actors, including the Gulf citizens, the Middle Easterners, or the Maghreb citizens, to play a major role. This role will perhaps meet the successful experience of the GCC countries, which have demonstrated high abilities in endurance and in taking advantage of the experiences to anticipate changes.

The decision was probably surprising because it was unexpected, or, to say the least, the decision was taken following a planning period. Indeed, Jordan had previously made a similar request years ago while Morocco was eyeing the European horizon rather that the Arab extension. Thus, one can say that the regional and Arab factors that helped in shaping this position go beyond the effect of the present phase. In other words, the security concerns were not a pretext. In addition, the pressure of the changes currently being witnessed by the Arab street does not necessarily sum up all the questions because it was possible to respond to these challenges in the Gulf framework alone, without the need to seek the support of any external forces.

Contrary to the theories indicating that the reason [for this decision] is the similarity among regimes – i.e. monarchies –experience has actually showed that joining a regional structure is open, regardless of the political structures. This is the case of the Arab League or the Islamic Conference Organization. It seems that the strictness of the Gulf was not due to the similarity among the regimes, but rather to the similarity of interests and objectives. In this sense, joining this Gulf bloc is possibly based on joint characteristics in terms of the challenges and choices the members face. But as the initiative was at the Riyadh Gulf Summit, this implies that the decision was quintessentially a Gulf one. The decision might also have been dictated by some considerations that might lead to the formation of new features of Arab solidarity. This implies that the issue transcends the Gulf region and that this group will be playing a larger role on the Arab arena and on the regional level. This role will have positive repercussions on several levels.

In a related context, the future of the Arab league must be closely observed, and one can look into the horizon of the upcoming strategic alliances that the Arab world will be witnessing. In addition, one can note the future repercussions of this kind of events. Indeed, this is not about momentary alliances based on circumstantial calculations, as it goes beyond that to include the restructuring of the Arab reality based on broader challenges. These are as broad as the borders that might bring Rabat for instance closer to Riyadh or to Manama, than to any of the capitals of the traditional surrounding.

Isn't Hezbollah An Islamist Group?

By Tariq Alhomayed 
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 15/05/2011 

It was only one lie, but there are disputes over the degree of its contempt. When the pro-Hezbollah "al-Manar" channel in Lebanon announced that parties have declared an Islamic emirate in Syrian villages, this is contempt par excellence, but it is also sectarian scaremongering.

When the Syrian regime uses the scarecrow of the Islamic emirate and the Salafis, it is trying hard to justify the suppression of unarmed civilians, but when the Hezbollah television channel repeats these lies, this is absurd in itself. The Iranian backed Hezbollah is an Islamic group, with an Islamic flag, and has kidnapped Lebanon under the threat of arms. It is this group which decides who governs Lebanon, and who doesn’t. So how can the channel of an Islamic party warn against Islamic groups, especially as Hezbollah itself serves the agenda of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Lebanon?

This matter can only mean one thing; that Hezbollah is trying to save the regime in Damascus, to serve its sectarian aims of course, and in order to serve the interests of Iran. [In the past] Hassan Nasrallah said that the Arab revolution in Egypt deserved support, and even apologized to the people of Tunisia because Hezbollah delayed in blessing their revolution (of course Nasrallah did not speak until after the Iranian Supreme Leader had claimed the revolutions in the Arab and Islamic world were following in the footsteps of Iran). How can Nasrallah support Egypt's revolution, and apologize to the Tunisians, and do the impossible in defending the Shiites of Bahrain, whilst its channel tarnishes the image of the defenseless Syrians, instead of supporting their uprising?

It is certain that Hezbollah is blinded by sectarianism, and in that respect it is similar to al-Qaeda in our region. The hallmarks of Hezbollah's acts of sabotage in our region are clear from Egypt to the Gulf, of course in Bahrain, and above all in Lebanon and Iraq. Today it is trying to discredit the innocent people of Syria. Many in the Arab media say that they can not verify information which refers to the involvement of Hezbollah inside Syria, but it is suffice to take note of how the party is trying, through its television channel, to discredit the Syrian uprisings.

One insider in Syria told me that the "al-Manar" channel has significant influence upon some of the security services affiliated with the Syrian regime, and thus through this channel they launch attacks on segments of Syrian society, or Arab figures because they have credibility amongst such segments. Therefore Arab satellite channels must confront this problem, i.e. Hezbollah, because newspapers, for example, do not have the same reach in Syria as satellite television. Of course, some Arab satellite channels are more concerned with hosting "analysts" from the Syrian regime, than broadcasting facts or refuting lies.

Each day Hezbollah reveals its sectarian face, not only in Lebanon, Iraq and Bahrain, but today in Syria as well. Yet Hezbollah, and those behind it, have failed to understand one thing, namely that the circle of time always revolves, and only the truth will remain.

Post-Mitchell, The Air Of Resignation On Israel-Palestine Might Linger

By Daniel Levy 
This commentary was published in The Foreign Policy on 13/05/2011

On hearing the announcement of Senator George Mitchell's resignation as special envoy for Middle East peace, I skype-messaged the news to a friend in Israel known for her biting sarcasm. Her response was quick in coming and did not disappoint: "Mitchell is still the envoy, who knew?"

There's been quite a lot happening in the Middle East recently, and the Israeli-Palestinian equation has not been left untouched. Yet the special envoy for Middle East peace has not been to the Middle East since mid-December.

Sen. Mitchell was prone to remind audiences that in his last stint as a peace envoy, working on Northern Ireland, he had "700 days of failure and one day of success." Resignation day marked Sen. Mitchell's 842^nd day on the Middle East peace beat, but this time around there were no "days of success." Mitchell's original appointment came on Obama's second full day of office and was greeted in certain quarters with some enthusiasm and hope (including by this writer). In 2001, working with a strong back-office, he had produced the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report, noteworthy for its depth and sophistication of analysis. It is hard not to conclude that this time around, Sen. Mitchell has disappointed.

Not all of the blame belongs at Mitchell's door, of course. Throwing an envoy at a problem, even one with a distinguished record, is no substitute for a smart, strategic policy. Apparently the first misstep of the Obama administration on Mideast peace was its failure to step back and conduct a thorough review of what had already been tried, why things were so stuck, and to look at the structural flaws in the peace process they had inherited.

The official explanation thus far cited for Mitchell's resignation is "personal reasons." Given the timing of the announcement, days before an expected presidential speech on the Middle East and a much-anticipated visit of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, it would be almost unnatural not to speculate what else might be behind this announcement.

Two obvious reasons suggest themselves, with a third possibility that enters more counterintuitive territory. Sen. Mitchell is a Mr. Negotiator-type - that is his skill set and legal background. It may be that he sees no prospect for negotiations and therefore no reason to stay on. Some will no doubt claim that the recently signed Palestinian power-sharing deal, including Fatah and Hamas, scuppered the prospects for a resumption of negotiations. One would really have to not be paying attention to make such a claim. In the over two years of this administration, there have been 30 days in which Israelis and Palestinians were in negotiation mode and 813 days in which they have not been.

The PLO has reached the conclusion, and yes it took a while, that conducting negotiations -- absent terms of reference and against the backdrop of relentless settlement construction -- was not working so well. Israel was far chirpier with the existing negotiating modality, rejecting the change in formula as an unwarranted attempt to impose preconditions.

A second route for speculation places Envoy Mitchell on the losing side of an internal administration policy debate -- the suggestion being that Mitchell has advocated for a more forward-leaning U.S. approach, perhaps involving U.S. parameters for future negotiations.
The third, more unexpected explanation for this resignation has the administration utilizing Mitchell's final act as envoy, namely his stepping down, as a way of sending a message mainly to the Israeli prime minister that if he was not willing to step up his game in a serious way then the U.S. too could step back (something that might focus the Israeli leader's mind with a possible Palestinian move for recognition at the U.N. looming in September). There have been rumors for some time of Mitchell's imminent departure. Perhaps they were waiting for a moment of maximum impact, but more on that in a moment.

Going forward, the administration essentially has four options for approaching the Israeli-Palestinian file:

1. Lead -- A bold U.S. move to advance a solution or at least to agree a border on the '67 lines allowing for equal land swaps, creating a two-state reality. That would probably require a U.S. plan, U.S. cajoling, and a recalibration of how the U.S. applies incentives and disincentives to the parties, requiring a degree of patience and commitment over time to allow internal debates to play out in both publics.

2. "Lead from behind" (as it is now known, courtesy of an unnamed official via Ryan Lizza) -- The administration acknowledges its own limited wiggle space on this issue, given its reading of domestic politics, and allows for a more multilateral approach to achieving de-occupation and security for all. That might include an enhanced role for the Quartet and for the United Nations.

3. Follow Israel-- The administration gives practical backing and diplomatic cover to whatever conflict management approach is pursued by Israel. This is the de-facto reality that has prevailed for very many years.

4. Strategic withdrawal -- The U.S. downgrades its active involvement in the "peace process" in gradually calibrated ways. The parties are therefore less able to take cover behind the U.S., a loss that is more likely to be felt on the Israeli than the Palestinian side.

The "leading" and "leading from behind" options suffer from similar domestic political shortcomings while the price for "following Israel" continues to accumulate on the side of the ledger marked damaging America's national security interests. The strategic withdrawal option is itself hardly cost-free. America would still stand by its ally Israel and be blamed for not using its influence -- it is an option that is not sustainable over time. But in the particular confluence of circumstances existing right now, strategic withdrawal might be an interesting interim choice.
Ordinarily an Israeli leader from the right might welcome having those pesky Americans off his back -- that is not though the situation today. Right now, Netanyahu needs Obama's assistance to avoid a politically embarrassing and diplomatically unnerving outcome at the United Nations in September. Given the Palestinian intention to take this to the General Assembly, a U.S.no vote will not be enough. Israel is looking to America to help prevent any U.N. vote.

So was the timing of this announcement designed to sow a little uncertainty into Netanyahu's calculations, nudging him to deliver something more meaningful during his visit? A stretch maybe, but the administration might consider an approach along those lines. Such an approach would anyway have to be limited in duration. For its own interests, the U.S. will not want to find itself isolated and discredited in any U.N. vote, especially one of the magnitude that surrounds recognition of a Palestinian state. As September approaches, holding a gun to Netanyahu's head in this way would begin to resemble the arrival of the new sheriff of Rock Ridge taking himself hostage at gunpoint in the Mel Brooks classic, Blazing Saddles.

Finally, where does all of this leave the president's planned Middle East speech? It seems that the speech will not be Israeli-Palestinian-centric nor will it be programmatic in offering a solution for the conflict. The speech will be about the region and there's certainly enough to talk about without getting granular on Israel-Palestine. Yet Israel-Palestine also cannot be ignored. It remains a central prism through which the region and the Muslim world view the U.S, something keenly appreciated by all recent Centcom commanders. To pretend that the so-called Arab Spring proves otherwise is delusional, overlooking numerous surveys of Arab opinion, ignoring changes already underway in Egyptian policy, and providing dangerous false comfort to Israel.

President Obama could use that speech to take to the next level the home truths he started to outline in the Cairo 2009 speech. The previous message of civil rights struggle could be taken up a notch, focusing his response to the recent Palestinian unity deal on the need for nonviolence, while acknowledging existing Palestinian non-violent protests and calling on Israel to hold true to democratic values in its response. The president might note the added urgency to achieving real progress given the changing regional environment. He might even draw on the experiences of his former envoy, Sen. Mitchell, when trying to secure a settlement freeze. In acknowledging how difficult freezing, let alone evacuating, settlements is for Israel, he might ask what the alternatives are and whether those are preferable: For instance, having settlers remain as residents in a sovereign Palestinian state on the '67 lines and what the Israelis would give in return for such an outcome (Palestinian refugees return as residents to Israel?); or would Israelis rather have one shared democratic state, thereby allowing all of the settlers to remain where they are?

Across four administrations and 20 years, there has been a developing assumption of what a two-state outcome looks like. Yet it has not been implemented and today would require the withdrawal of at least 100,000 settlers. It would be honest and timely to ask whether this assumption still has validity. Perhaps Israelis will find that old two-state option more attractive when set in such a context.

One thing President Obama might not overly concern himself with is the need to preempt Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's speech to congress on May 24. Yes, Netanyahu will receive a rousing ovation (sadly, that would probably be the case if Netanyahu read out the phonebook, in Hebrew). But he is unlikely to offer anything of substance to change the trajectory of developments in the coming months. The members of congress in attendance might want to chew on the fact that last time Netanyahu was given the honor of addressing both chambers in 1996, there were 140,000 settlers in the West Bank alone. When this year's speech is delivered, that number will have more than doubled to over 300,000.

Should the president decide that he does want to get out ahead and lead, there will be plenty of time to do so before September, and even to give a more detailed Israel-Palestine speech -- in the words of that ex-envoy, you only need "one day of success."

Daniel Levy directs the Middle East Task Force at the New America Foundation and is an editor of the Middle East Channel

A Marshall Plan For The Middle East?

The US once reached out to change Germany's status from enemy to ally. A similar strategy is now worth considering 

By Jocelyne Cesari
This commentary was published in The Guardian on 14/05/2011

Barack Obama's Cairo speech plays on TV at a cafe in Sulaimaniyah in the Kurdish controlled north of Iraq in 2009. Photograph: Yahya Ahmed/AP

 

The recent demise of Osama Bin Laden marks a turning point for American foreign policy, as it has occurred at a time of unprecedented changes in the Middle East. It offers the opportunity to open a new phase and to consider a Marshall plan for the Middle East.

The Marshall plan was a decisive tool for the US and its allies to rebuild Europe after the second world war. The economic and political conditions now are different to what they were back in 1945, of course: the US is not at war with Muslim countries, and the damages of the "war on terror" are not comparable to post-war devastation. It is also improbable that today's fragile US economy can undertake a financial commitment similar to billions offered by the Marshall plan between 1948 and 1951. In these circumstances, financial aid to Muslim countries should differentiate between wealthy states and those in genuine need. It should also request from their rulers accountability and transparency on the use of the funds.

But more than economic aid, the Marshall plan was a communication strategy that emphasised Germany's importance within the community of Western nations and changed its status from enemy to ally through the discursive change with Europe, and especially Germany. This strategy could be replicated within the context of the Arab spring.

Since 9/11, the "war on terror" has dominated international relations and especially the relations between the US and Muslim countries – not only through direct American presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also through global monitoring of radical activism. Such a policy has tainted the image of the US among Muslims, even in friendly countries such as Turkey. In a survey published by the Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2010, only 17% of the population viewed the US favourably.

More recently, in April 2011, Pew research found that 79% of Egyptians hold an unfavourable view of the US. Thus, while the majority of Muslims also reject al-Qaida and global jihad, the current US strategy does not portray its shared interest in defeating global jihad. In fact, over the past decade, Muslims outside and increasingly inside the west doubt the sincerity of the US war on terror and believe it to be a war against Islam.

Such a rift between Muslim populations and the west urges a reconsideration of the current strategy of the war on terror.

The Arab spring is the most efficient antidote to the political strategy of al-Qaida because from Tunis to Cairo, the social revolts had their basis in demands for more freedom, justice and redistribution of power – not jihadi activism. It was the first time, since at least 1967, that political grievances were not phrased in terms of the kind of politicised Islam on which al-Qaida has thrived.

Even Islamist parties are shifting the focus of their political narratives away from Islamic topics, as reflected in the civil platform of the political party, Freedom and Justice, recently created by the Muslim Brotherhood. It is therefore the right timing for the west to send a clear message of support to the fight against autocratic regimes. Harry Truman's words of 1947 strikingly resonate in the current context of uprisings from Syria to Yemen and Libya: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

This discursive shift will mean coming to terms with the "clash of civilisations" discourse that has deeply affected the relationship with Muslim countries. Concretely, it means accepting regimes that may be led by Islamist parties provided they respect democratic principles. Americans and Europeans must insist upon the will of the majority, free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and freedom from political oppression in relations with the Middle East. Truman insisted that these were principles of "western civilisation"; today, these should be recognised as principles for all nations of the international community and be supported as such.

The obstacles to such a strategy are numerous within countries where radical activism remains an option – and, externally, from states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel, which will disapprove of such a realignment of western policy. Moreover, the struggle against radical activism should continue, but the war strategy must be integrated into a broader, more inclusive narrative and diplomatic effort.

It may be realistically argued that such an approach would sacrifice western interests in the name of principles, but others respond that committing to these principles will serve western interests. In his well-received Cairo speech of 2009, Obama called for partnership "based upon mutual interest and mutual respect", emphasising the "truth that America and Islam are not exclusive".

Moreover, Obama highlighted common principles of justice and progress, tolerance and human dignity. A reiteration of these principles could be the building block to implementing such a Marshall plan.