Monday, March 21, 2011

Sounds Of The Persian Horn

By Ahmad al-Jarallah
This commentary was published in The Arab Times on 21/03/2011

ONE of the wonders of our times is the delusional claim of Hassan Nasrallah that he is the savior of nations. He declared himself as the liberator of nations as if he were the Arab counterpart of Che Guevara, while hiding in the basements of the southern suburb. Nasrallah cannot even meet his supporters personally. He addresses them through the television, so how can he claim to be the ultimate ruler?

What is even worse is his illusion that he can use his weapons to eliminate other factions in Lebanon. He thinks he can curtail their freedom and stop them from expressing their opinions, as if he were the one and only power in the world that controls the destinies of all nations. Nasrallah and his party seem oblivious to the fact that nations can only be patient for a limited period, after which they become fed up and issue a very harsh judgment. Only then will Nasrallah realize his end.

He may not also be aware that in his televised speeches, as he blabbers to spread division and sedition between nations and their governments, he forgets that the nations are free to make their own choices, especially in terms of their relationship with their governments and rulers. These nations do not need the sound of a Persian ‘horn’. They are not hostages to the power of his weapons like the residents of the southern suburb.

Nasrallah must wash his hand of the Lebanese blood that he spilled before he extends it to support what he calls “the revolutions of the people”. He must first extend it to his national partners and handover the weapons of his militias to the state’s army, and not threaten the destiny of four million Lebanese.

This person, who has been hiding in the den, must realize that Bahrain does not need his speeches. Majority of its people know who he really is and they know that his movements are controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Army. The people of Bahrain know themselves well and they fully understand the nature of their relationship with the ruling family in their country. The people supported the ruling family when a group representing the Mullahs tried to sabotage the security and stability of the Kingdom. It is then enough to say that the Bahrainis have refused to bow to external and regional forces, similar to what Nasrallah did when he led Lebanon to wars that caused massacres in favor of the Persian expansionist scheme. 

It is sufficient for Bahrain to have a government that is not hostage to the calculations of Hezbollah and other followers of the terrorist evil project, which merely sabotages the security of several countries. Nasrallah prevents his people from having a government that runs their daily affairs; thereby, speeding up the security and economic collapse of Lebanon.

If you have no shame, then you are allowed to do whatever you want. Political agents are the most shameless because they usually commit the worst crimes against their own people. This is why their people do not count on them, especially if we talk about the Bahrainis whose awareness and sense of national belonging are stronger than the delusions of Nasrallah and his employers in Iran.

A Lesson From The [Gulf] Cooperation Council

By Mohammad el-Ashab
This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 20/03/2011

Tunisia has changed but its stance on regional realities has not. Thus, the visit of its Prime Minister Beji Caid el Sebsi to Rabat was an occasion to discuss the revival of the Maghreb Union, with the aim of guiding it out of the recovery room.

Neither the idea nor the option of the Maghreb Union has died. However, these have not been tested sufficiently to help categorize the Union either as a viable gamble – if the differences that led to its slump are to cease existing – or as mere illusions that must now be discarded and replaced by a different alternative. At a time when the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] seems to have proven its worth by dealing with the events in Bahrain and the Sultanate of Oman, in a framework of a commitment that reflects a maximum level of solidarity, its counterpart in the Maghreb area has not made a single move vis-à-vis many of the events and developments transpiring, such as with the far more deteriorated situation in Libya.

The Arab League might be a suitable framework for shaping stances and positions. However, this does not negate the fact that the Maghreb Union should follow the example of the Gulf experience, all the while taking into consideration the major differences in what regards the assessment of developments. If the [Maghreb] Union is not active in times of crises, then it will not be expected to be active in regular times. Therefore, its current situation raises several questions implying that this Union is nothing more than a token of the past that draws nostalgia from time to time.

Some assumptions indicate that the Maghreb Union will act as a wagon that could pull the North African countries away from the state of division, fragmentation and conflict to the banks of unity, solidarity, and agreement. The founders [of the Maghreb Union] meant for it to engage in a three dimensional dialogue, especially with the European Union to the north and the GCC to the east. Some parties also thought that it would complement Arab countries located in Africa, such as Egypt and Sudan.

None of that came true, and even the bets on the Union’s economic dimensions – in the context of integration and the movement of people and goods without any barriers over the Maghreb world – was faced by political differences that abide by the traditional and isolationist notions of sovereignty; how dissonant it is for one to preach in the desert.

In terms of its historical background, the Maghreb Union sought to preempt stormy international changes, mainly, the end of the Cold War. But the trend then became to create a framework for the whole of Middle East and North Africa. Thus, developments resulted in the initiative for the Union for the Mediterranean, all the way to other ideas revolving around a possible partnership with Europe and the United States. During all these phases, the Maghreb Union was carrying its crisis on its shoulders, not in terms of it as an idea and a choice, but rather as practices that had a limited effect. This meant that the Union was a static, unresponsive body.

Do things seem different this time, in light of the repercussions of discontent in the Maghreb Street, which is longing for freedom and dignity, or is it too late now to take resort to this option? In any case, the need for this Union is too important to be obscured by emerging events. In fact, the current crises will soon impose a reality where joint fateful policies need to be considered once more. And there is nothing problematic about reviving an option that encompasses elements of resistance and endurance within it.

The Tunisians have set off on a new path, emboldened by the logic of change. And the Moroccans are about to experience the constitutional recipe for dealing with their crises. In addition, the Algerians, as well as the Mauritanians, will be no exception, pending the emergence of the light at the end of the Libyan tunnel. These transformations are essentially based on the repercussions of the popular demands for change, which are affecting everyone. But the benefits of complying with these demands could be achieved through the Maghreb Union as well, at least through political and economic openness, which would help in containing internal difficulties.

It is now also a fact that a given country cannot rely on an isolationist project to guarantee stability. Thus, there is no alternative to reviving the Maghreb agenda, which achieves equilibrium, be it on the level of complementary and solidarity policies, or through playing a regional role that guarantees a wider and strategic stability. The lesson of solidarity in periods of harshness and prosperity, which is offered by the GCC, is perhaps the best guiding light towards achieving a similar experience in the western part of the Arab world.

What Does Iran Want From Bahrain?

By Mshari al-Zaydi
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat in 20/03/2011

The current talk in Bahrain is not focused on the legitimacy of protesting, or the grievances which have been inflicted upon the Shiites, or any other group. It is not about the nature of the protestors' demands, the provision of more authority to the opposition, the transformation of Bahrain into a constitutional monarchy, or even an opposition-nominated Prime Minister. Rather, talk has now turned towards transforming the island of Bahrain into a republic. The man leading this demand is Hasan Mushaima, an opposition figure with overt links to the political Shiite revolutionists of Iran. A few days ago, Mushaima announced the formation of the "Coalition for a Republic" in Bahrain.
 
At the beginning of the Pearl Square protests, the opposition contained a mixture of Shiites and Sunnis, with a significant Shia majority. Nevertheless a group of Sunnis shared in their demands, regardless of their political and economic nature. However, now the protests in Bahrain are being led by Shiite extremists, with demands far exceeding the terms initially set out by "al-Wefaq" opposition group, and its leader Sheikh Ali Salman. Those terms were tough to meet in the first place. The young Crown Prince of Bahrain has struggled to find common ground with "al-Wefaq" and its allies. Yet with the return of Mushaima and his group from abroad, "Al-Wefaq" have been made to look like a flock of peaceful doves! With a large crowd cheering him on, Mushaima delivered an address calling for the king to be dethroned, and for a republic to be established in Bahrain.
 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has threatened the Gulf States, who activated the common defense pact to dispatch the Joint Peninsula Shield Force to Bahrain, at the request of the government there. Ahmadinejad brazenly likened such action to the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's troops in 1990. However, he did not draw parallels with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, in order to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. Perhaps he abstained from this analogy because Iran considers the invasion of Iraq, in order to oust the "lesser devil" Saddam Hussein, to be a relatively legitimate act, even though it was committed by the "greater devil", America.
 
Ahmadinejad was not alone in his criticism of the Gulf States. The supposedly moderate Chairman of the Iranian Parliament Ali Larijani followed suit, and warned the Gulf States about the consequences of their act. Muqtada al-Sadr, Hezbollah, and several Shiite MPs in Kuwait were among others who joined the ranks.
 
Unfortunately, we are now facing an explicitly sectarian scene. As deplorable as this is may seem, when the demons who politicize religion walk through the door, the birds of religious tolerance fly out of the window. The truth is that Iran is now in a state of war with the Gulf States, full stop. In view of that fact, the Gulf States have every right to protect themselves from attack. It is an established fact that Iran harbors age-old ambitions in the Gulf, especially with regards to Bahrain. Last year, Khamenei's media advisor issued a statement indicating Bahrain's subordination to Iran. It would be futile to argue against Iranian ambitions in Bahrain and the Gulf, for they are glaringly obvious.
 
Now we must stand firm and confront the threat without hesitation. Afterwards, we must ask ourselves, have we ever had a proper mechanism for fostering the concept of citizenship, creating an all-encompassing allegiance to national interests, and purifying religious discourse from fanaticism? The answer is clearly "No".
 
Let us hope that these recent developments serve as an eye-opener, to make us realize the need to foster national unity. What is important now is to thwart Iran's plans, by raising the awareness of Shiites and Sunnis throughout the Gulf, and by earnestly and vigorously fostering a sense of belonging in the region, immune from foreign interference. The fortress of justice and tolerance is the best remedy for ailing hearts and twisted minds.

Sunday, March 20, 2011

A Clear Message To Those Trying To Destabilise Bahrain

GCC forces have been deployed not only to fend off foreign threats but also to tackle domestic challenges

By Abdullah Al Shayji
This commentary was published in The Gulf News on 21/03/2011

While the world was transfixed by the earthquake, the devastating tsunami and the anxiety over a possible nuclear meltdown at a nuclear power plant in Japan, Arab attention was focused on their own brewing revolutions. The GCC leaders and people are besieged by multiple socio-economic and political challenges given the unrest in both Bahrain and Oman. The GCC strategy seems to be: united we stand, divided we face the abyss.

The Arab winter of discontent is giving way to a bloody spring in which leader Muammar Gaddafi's onslaught continues in Libya and Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh's defiance leads him to commit atrocities. Both continue to use excessive force against their own people. The people's only crime is demanding reform, and rebelling against decades of marginalisation, failed policies, stagnation and corruption.

After the almost peaceful revolutions which toppled former president Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and former president Zine Al Abidine Bin Ali in Tunisia, things have taken a turn for the worse.

Arabs regained their self-confidence and started to believe in people's power and bringing about change through peaceful means, rather than through American tanks or through terrorist movements. Now, there is a new way of enacting change in a new Arab order, which has eliminated the negative stereotype about Arabs being resistant to change.

There is no doubt the Arab political landscape has changed for the better with the newly empowered masses, buoyed by information technology and social media, which helped them push fearlessly for change and overcome their fear.

While the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions unfolded quickly and at minimal cost, the Libyan and the Yemeni revolutions and, to a lesser extent the upheaval in Bahrain, reversed the trend which was becoming the model of change in the region. But for a trend to be widely adopted, it needs to weather many storms.

The bloodiest version of change is happening now in Libya, where Gaddafi's slaughter of his own people has warranted international military action. Gaddafi was not cowed by the United Nations Security Council resolution imposing a no-fly zone over Libya and the air strikes. 

Writing on the wall

Yemen is another example of a president refusing to see the writing on the wall and continuing the onslaught against his own people. Last Friday his forces shot dead at least 50 people and injured hundreds. It is ironic that both Gaddafi and President Ali Abdullah Saleh are the two longest serving Arab heads of state.

But the GCC's preoccupation is currently with events in Bahrain. The GCC alliance was formed in 1981 as a security and economic grouping to consolidate the states' power and resources to counter the threats and challenges. GCC states have been besieged by a host of soft and hard security threats. But the most vexing challenges have been the lack of a balance of power and threats by the big regional states, Iraq and Iran. With the unrest in Bahrain, and to a lesser extent in Oman, GCC states find themselves at the crossroads in a region which has witnessed three major wars over the past three decades.

Iran has loomed large for decades and has been a source of instability with the capacity for mischief in the region. Sidelining Iraq exacerbated the situation and enabled Iran to step in to fill the vacuum with its grand project, proxies and ideological-sectarian agenda. All of this is impacting Bahrain and making the unrest there different from others in the region.

What has been happening in Bahrain is a movement with demands for reforms and dialogue, which has been hijacked and transformed into a sectarian grouping, spreading mayhem and instability. The GCC stepped in and sent the Peninsula Shield forces to assist in protecting major installations. Bahraini and GCC officials described the GCC involvement as a move to defuse tension and to support the Bahraini government and to restore stability and order. This will pave the way for the Bahraini government and the opposition to resume their dialogue in order to reach a solution which could pull Bahrain from the abyss and relieve GCC anxiety.

Bahrain Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmad Al Khalifa has accused Iran of interfering in Bahrain's affairs and confirmed more GCC security forces are on their way to Bahrain.

This is the first time the GCC states have found themselves in this situation since the occupation of Kuwait two decades ago. The GCC states are providing generous support for both Bahrain and Oman through a $20 billion (Dh73.4 billion) fund over the next 10 years. That was followed by an agreement to stand by Bahrain politically and militarily and execute the provisions of the mutual defence pact, as the security of all GCC states is inseparable. The GCC troops will continue in Bahrain with the state of emergency. This is a clear message to Iran and its proxies and whoever has designs to destabilise Bahrain or any country in the GCC.

The message is clear and a precedent is being set. The GCC states will be there to deploy their troops not only to fend off foreign threats, but to tackle domestic challenges as well.

The Bahraini upheaval is increasing the distrust between Iran and the GCC. But more importantly, this episode reminds the GCC states again of the widening and changing nature of the threats and challenges. Once again the GCC states are scrambling to stay afloat.

Dr Abdullah Al Shayji is the Chairman of the Political Science Department, Kuwait University.

Libya Conflict: War On Gaddafi Is Personal - And He Is Unlikely To Retreat

Capturing or killing the Lybian leader has now become an end in itself for the Western allies

By Simon Tisdall
This commentary was published in The Guardian on 20/03/2011


Gaddafi forces attack rebel checkpoint near Ras Lanuf
Gaddafi forces attack a rebel checkpoint near Ras Lanuf. Allied troops will not relent until their nemesis is captured or killed. Photograph: Sean Smith for the Guardian


It's unlikely Muammar Gaddafi has watched the 1971 British film Get Carter, in which Michael Caine plays vengeful London gangster Jack Carter, who embarks on a violent rampage before being killed. But as the west's military might bears down on Libya, the Libyan leader might find the story line instructive.

This war is personal now. Its primary, stated aim is to halt the regime's attacks on Libyan civilians. But David Cameron and other leaders have made it plain they also want the Libyan dictator removed from power. The US and its allies will not relent until they "get Gaddafi" and their nemesis is captured, jailed or dead.

This is a familiar scenario. When international disagreements deteriorate to the point when Washington feels it has no choice but to use massive military force, the person held most responsible is ruthlessly hunted down.

Manuel Noriega, Panama's mafia boss in the 1980s, was toppled in a US invasion in 1989 and ended up in a maximum security jail in Illinois. Slobodan Milosevic was put on trial in The Hague, where he died in custody. Saddam Hussein was dug out of a hole and sent to the gallows.
Gaddafi has no reason to expect that he will be treated any differently – a consideration that will certainly influence what he does next.

Cameron has offered high-minded justifications for the American-led "Operation Odyssey Dawn" air and missile strikes that Tripoli claims have killed more than 50 people. But his language also conveys a developing personal animus. Gaddafi had "lied to the international community" and broken his word on the ceasefire, the prime minister said. This was behaviour akin to that of a pupil caught cheating during prep. It just couldn't go on.

"He must stop what he is doing, brutalising his people ... We'll judge him by what he does," Cameron told the Commons on Friday. But in other remarks, he was more forthright. "Gaddafi needs to go," he said, and Britain would help him on his way.

Canada's prime minister, Stephen Harper, was similarly blunt. "It is our belief that if Mr Gaddafi loses the capacity to enforce his will through vastly superior armed forces, he simply will not be able to sustain his grip on the country," he said.

Nicolas Sarkozy, Cameron's co-hawk, has been busy swapping insults with Gaddafi, with all the appearance of a personal vendetta. After the Libyan leader said the French president had "gone mad", Sarkozy responded in kind, condemning Gaddafi's "murderous madness".

Sarkozy has also spoken of "targeted" actions – meaning assassination – should Gaddafi authorise the use of his stores of mustard gas or other WMD. Even normally measured Barack Obama has been getting hot under the collar about the man Ronald Reagan branded a "mad dog".
Taken by itself, such name-calling might not matter so much. But the larger, unavoidable conclusion is that capturing or killing Gaddafi has now become an end in itself for the western allies (though perhaps not their Arab coalition partners), and that the war will not be deemed "won" until this objective is attained.

The implications are serious. Now the missiles and B52s have begun their dreadful work, Gaddafi knows, if he didn't already, that he's in a fight to the finish – and for him, there may be no escape. His course of action in the coming days will be influenced by this realisation, and may be consequently more extreme and more aggressive than otherwise.

His defiant overnight statement, when he condemned the "crusader colonialism" afflicting his country, was clearly aimed at Arab and Muslim world opinion in particular, and the non-western world in general (major countries such as China, India, Brazil and Germany have not supported the intervention). Regime claims about mounting civilian deaths will play big there, Iraq-style. Gaddafi will press his propaganda advantage for all its worth.

The demonisation of Gaddafi has made it impossible for western leaders to countenance his continuation in power. But without the ground invasion they have pledged not to undertake, he could well survive as the overlord of western and southern Libya following a de facto partition, hostile, vengeful and highly dangerous.

This seems to be his plan. Far from giving up or drawing back, Gaddafi escalated the fighting around Benghazi at the weekend. Rather than abandon cities such as Zawiya, as Obama demanded, he is reportedly moving his troops into urban areas where they can less easily be targeted from the air. Meanwhile, his apparent willingness to use "human shields", his threats of retaliation across the Mediterranean area, and his designation of the whole of north Africa as a "war zone" raises the spectre of possible terrorist attacks and an alarming regression to his old ways.

Gaddafi has personalised this war, too. And he is not going to go quietly. Military superiority in the air will count for nothing if pro-regime army and air force units, militia and security forces, and civilian and tribal supporters who have remained loyal refuse to turn on him or kick him out of Tripoli. By its determination to "get Gaddafi", the west has made this a fight to the death – and death may be a long time in coming.

Is This The Syrian Spark?


By Tariq Alhomayed
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 20/03/2011


Demonstrations emerged after the Friday prayers in several cities in Syria: Damascus, Homs, Baniyas, and in Daraa, in the south of the country on the border with Jordan. These demonstrations resulted in deaths, injuries and arrests, so are we now witnessing the Syrian spark?
 
Syria is by no means immune to what is happening in our region, in terms of demonstrations and uprisings, yet of course at the same time, Syria is not like other Arab states. As I have said repeatedly: Tunisia is not Egypt, and likewise Bahrain is not like either of those states, because there are sectarian motives there, and Yemen is also unique, for Sanaa is a highly complicated ticking time bomb, especially with the intransigence of the Yemeni president, whilst Libya remains open to all types of intimidation. As I noted above, Syria is not immune to what is happening in our region, but Damascus has always tried to avoid reality, using all tricks and excuses to postpone facing the truth. The problem it faces now concerns the internal situation and the Syrian people, rather than foreign affairs, which are somewhat favorable at the moment especially with the calm on the Israeli border. Indeed, the Syrian-Israeli border is currently less eventful than the Egyptian-Israeli border throughout the years of the Mubarak regime.
 
Syria's problems are similar to those of other states which avoid reality and believe that time stands still, and that their tricks always succeed. Their modern history reminds us of empty slogans, yet the reality must be dealt with, before an uprising becomes inevitable. The facts cannot be overlooked by patronizing or lecturing the people, in the manner of Bouthaina Shaaban's articles, who writes as if she's based out of Switzerland. The best way to deal with the facts is to confront them. It is true that Syria is not like other troubled Arab countries, but the Syrians have arguably greater cause for grievance and resentment. Syria is the most deplorable example of a lack of balance between the minority and the majority, something the international community staunchly advocates these days. Yet some media, and likewise certain news agencies, have not been as engrossed with the Syrian protests as they have been with Bahrain for example. This is either because they have been prevented from doing so, or because Syria does not have the readily available sectarian motives and background as we saw in Bahrain, especially as depicted by some photographers and many biased sources.
 
If this is the Syrian spark, then the coming situation will be very difficult, especially after the Security Council resolution against Libya, and the international emphasis on the relationship between the minority and majority. There is a lack of international confidence in the Syrian approach, which is the product of years of erroneous Syrian policies, and Damascus' historic hostility towards the Muslim Brotherhood. We can add the critical internal situation to this, both politically and economically, and the wider crisis facing Arab republics in general. Thus the forthcoming era will be a difficult one, for experience tells us that citizens will continue to defy their repressive regimes, such as in Tunisia. When internal resentment is evident, the outcome is usually explosive.
 
What is happening in Syria must be seen as a good development, for we must be aware of the anxiety and tension now evident in both Iran and Hezbollah, whilst noting the extent of their extremism, and lack of credibility. Will they condemn, for example, the use of violence against the Syrians, and support the protestors' right to demonstrate peacefully, in the same way in which they criticized Bahrain? I think the reader knows the answer!

An Allied Intervention In Libya

By David Ignatius
This commentary was published in The Washington Post on 19/03/2011

Many Americans — and Arabs, too, for that matter — have a visceral sense that if there’s a war in the Middle East, the United States must be in the vanguard. I’m glad that’s not the case this weekend with the Libyan intervention. Americans should be happy to let France and Britain, who live in the neighborhood, take the lead.

President Obama is turning a page, by letting other nations take the first whacks at Moammar Gaddafi, no question about that. But that strikes me as good strategy, not a feckless blunder.
What’s increasingly clear watching the play of events over the past week is that Obama really does want to change the narrative about America and the Arab world — even at the cost of being criticized as vacillating and weak-willed. He senses (rightly, in my view) that over the past several decades America, without really intending to, became a post-colonial power in the Middle East. The narrative of American military intervention stretches from Lebanon to Iraq to Afghanistan, with the ghastly interlude of Sept. 11, 2001. Obama seems determined to break with it. He really is the un-Bush.

The administration has gotten criticized for changing course on Libya over the past week — resisting intervention and then supporting it. But the essential point, it seems to me, is that Obama was prepared to intervene only when it was clear there was an international consensus — with the Arab League and then the United Nations voting for action. That strikes me as the proper ordering of things, especially at a time when America still has big armies in two other Muslim countries.

The Libyan rebels deserve support, but that should not automatically mean unilateral U.S. military action. We are only beginning to understand who the rebels are and what they want. There may have been an emotional argument for military action on their behalf several weeks ago but not a sound strategic one.

How should this war unfold? What’s ahead is some fighting, which isn’t likely to last long, given what we know of Gaddafi’s military; then we’re likely to see a cease-fire and then political-military process — much of it taking place in the shadows — that leads to Gaddafi’s ouster and replacement by some sort of coalition government.

This Libya war may be messy and confusing, and it certainly won’t be what Pentagon planners would do if they could dictate matters. But that’s the point: America won’t be the writing this script on its own. And that’s a good thing.