Monopolizing Weapons…And Other Monopolies

By Elias Harfoush

This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 15/03/2011

 

Hezbollah has gone through drastic changes since it first accepted to participate in politics in Lebanon. The party, whose resistance against Israel used to be the object of a quasi unanimous internal and regional acceptance, is now busy using the resistance credits earned in the past to improve its political position in the face of its internal adversaries. Thus, the party is no longer different, neither through its actions nor through its methods, than many of its predecessors that brandished the slogans of resistance in the region. [Hezbollah’s] latest campaign against its opponents went further than the regular political criticism and the respect of the others’ right to disagree, and accused those opponents of being traitors and foreign - and sometimes Israeli - agents. Also, under the pretext of being a resistance party, it is now granting itself the right to several monopolies – the monopolization of arms being but one of these. This is taking place although the circumstances of resistance action have drastically changed in the past five years with respect to the conditions and practical capacities due to the measures imposed by resolution 1701 on the field situation in the border zone. This situation is echoed in several other silent borders between Israel and the rest of the confrontation countries. However, this did not lead to a change in the language and slogans of “objection” brandished by those countries.

And in the framework of its internal battle, Hezbollah granted itself the right to distribute certificates of patriotism, in addition to the right of leading the project of the confrontation of Israel and the “imperialist and Zionist plans.” It is deeming itself the pioneer of the “objection” train of thought and the undisputed leader of the sides that adopt this train of thought in the region. These actions of the party are not new if compared to the legacy left by the similar movements such as the Nassirism, the Nationalism, the Baathism, the Islamism and others. These movements, under the slogans of the liberation of Palestine and the confrontation of the Western projects of hegemony, have climbed to the ruling platforms and have monopolized the capacities of the Arab populaces for decades. However, the promised liberation never came true, nor were the projects of hegemony aborted. On the contrary, a number of those movements ended up working on gaining the sympathy of the authors and perpetrators of the projects of hegemony, with the sole aim of remaining in power.

The long confrontation with Israel, which has been going on for more than six decades, has helped in the establishment of parties and organizations in the Arab region that found in the task of confronting Israel, a good technique to invest internally in confronting their opponents. Thus, they used this technique in order to hinder the freedom of expression, enhance prisons and detention camps, and block the road for any democratic movement. All this was carried out under the slogan of “no sound must rise above the sound of the battle.” As a result, every opposition voice was deemed a traitor, even if that opposition only aimed at internal reform, because this opposition was considered to represent “treason” of the higher nationalistic objective, the objective of liberation. But liberation remained farfetched as a result of the nature of the politics of hegemony and domination, as well as the major power imbalance. In order to achieve balance, there is a need, primarily, for an internal, sound and cohesive structure before weapons and military equipments.

Where did all this lead to? It led to a complete incapacity on the confrontation arena, a major collapse of the Arab defensive base, and broken regimes controlling their populaces by force while suffering on the domestic fronts much more than their suffering on the lines of the confrontation border [with Israel].

The sectarian structure of Lebanon has pushed Hezbollah to be more immersed in the internal politics and to have its activities tainted with a sectarian color compared to the national support it once had. The tool it is now using in the face of its adversaries is its proficiency in the field of resistance and “objection,” where the party outruns the others according to its own claims. However, the outcomes of this proficiency contradict with the rules of correct democratic work, which is based on giving equal chances to the competing parties. This has pushed Hezbollah to use the tools - that had been prepared to be used in the confrontation with Israel – in its internal confrontation, as it now believes that winning this confrontation is as important as winning the other confrontation, and even compensates it.

Iran Is Sectarian...But The Joint Peninsula Shield Force Is Not

By Tariq Alhomayed
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 15/03/2011

Once it was announced that the first deployment of the Joint Peninsula Shield Force (JPSF) had arrived in Manama, in response to the request of the Kingdom of Bahrain, to contribute to the re-establishment of security and stability in the country, several critical statements were issued from the Shiite opposition, and others, in Bahrain. However, what was most serious was the subsequent Iranian statement.
 
The Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, said: "Iran will not stand by idly, in the event of any Saudi intervention to eradicate the Shiites of Bahrain". This statement alone, from the mouth of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, is stark evidence of Iran's sectarian mentality.
 
The JPSF did not go to Manama to support a particular sect, but rather it went in response to an official request from Bahrain. To say that this is an illegal act, as the Bahraini opposition are suggesting, along with a Shiite MP in Kuwait, is a claim that can be refuted: The JPSF went to Bahrain in accordance with the agreements and covenants of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and these were the same forces that came to Kuwait's rescue during the Iraqi invasion, something that the Kuwaiti MP ought to have remembered.
 
Furthermore, the JPSF arrived in Bahrain not as a military power, but rather as a security force, according to what I was told by a senior Gulf official. There were several reasons for sending this force, firstly: to respond to the request of Bahrain, as this is a commitment stipulated by the Gulf agreements. Secondly, the JPSF serves as a symbolic force, indicating that the GCC states will not allow Bahrain to deteriorate into a sectarian civil war, especially as sectarian tension has now reached its peak there. Thirdly, the GCC states want to send a clear message that they are committed to the security of Bahrain.
 
Of course, none of this implies a sectarian mentality. Sectarianism occurs when a particular section of society seeks to impose its political vision alone upon the state, without achieving such demands through national consensus. The Shiites on their own do not constitute the population of Bahrain, there are Sunnis as well. Democracy cannot take place with one sect being compared to another, but rather it must be conducted on the basis of participation and citizenship. Therefore, the Iranian Foreign Minister's statement shows the extent of the abhorrent sectarianism that exists in the Tehran government. Iran does not care for the security of Bahrain, or its civil peace, but rather it is interested in certain sects. Salehi's words about Saudi Arabia seeking to exterminate the Shiites is glaring evidence of the gravity of what Iran is doing in our region, and this is something we have been warned of at length.
 
The question is what are the implications of Iran's statement? The answer quite simply is as follows: The Gulf has dealt with Iran for a long time, in accordance with the famous saying uttered by the Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim, as reported by 'Wikileaks'. He said that relations with Iran were conducted on the principle of "they lie to us, and we lie to them". The game today with Iran has become widely exposed. Tehran wants to intervene in the affairs of the GCC, in accordance with its sectarian logic, whilst the GCC member states seek security and stability, and do not interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. Therefore, sending the JPSF to Bahrain is a sound, legal act, without sectarian motives, whilst the Iranian Foreign Minister's statement is explicitly sectarian.

Qaddafi Under Seige

A political psychologist assesses Libya's mercurial leader.

By Jerrold M. Post
This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 15/03/2011

The rambling statements of Muammar al-Qaddafi since the uprising in Libya began on Feb. 17 have led many to characterize the idiosyncratic Libyan leader as a madman, psychotic, out of touch with reality. Among the statements made by Qaddafi that have led observers to question his sanity are his characterization of the rebels as "drug-crazed youth" whose Nescafé the United States plied with hallucinogenic drugs. He also accused al Qaeda of being behind the rebellion, only to then again accuse the United States. In his first media interview on Feb. 28 since the uprising began, with BBC, ABC, and the Sunday Times, when asked about his countrymen rising against him, Qaddafi denied it:

"There are no demonstrations at all in the streets. Did you see the demonstrations? Where? They are supporting us. They are not against us. There is no one against us. Against me for what? Because I am not president. They love me. All my people are with me. They love me all. They will die to protect me, my people."

This led many to conclude that he was denying reality. He also went on a rant blaming al Qaeda:

"It is Qaeda, it is Qaeda, it is Qaeda, not my people. It is Qaeda, Qaeda, Qaeda, yes. They came from outside. It's al Qaeda. They went into military bases and seized arms and they're terrorizing the people. The people who had the weapons were the youngsters. They're starting to lay down their weapons now as the drugs that al Qaeda gave them wear off."

When he was asked in the interview whether he would step down, Qaddafi again denied that he has any authority:

"If they want me to step down, what do I step down from? I'm not a monarch or a king. It's honorary. It has nothing to with exercising power or authority. In Britain, who has the power? Is it Queen Elizabeth or David Cameron?"

Most recently Qaddafi indicated that the rebellion was the result of a conspiracy by the West to re-colonize Libya in order to gain control of its oil.

Characterizations of being psychotic have been leveled at Qaddafi since he took over the reins of Libya in a bloodless coup in 1969 at the age of 27. A Time magazine article from April 1986 quoted U.S. President Ronald Reagan as calling him "the mad dog of the Middle East." But for the most part, during his 42 years at the helm of Libya, he has been crazy like a fox.

While this is not a definitive clinical diagnosis, Qaddafi can best be characterized as having a borderline personality. The "borderline" often swings from intense anger to euphoria. Under his often "normal" façade, he is quite insecure and sensitive to slight. His reality testing is episodically faulty. While most of the time Qaddafi is "above the border" and in touch with reality, when under stress he can dip below it and his perceptions can be distorted and his judgment faulty. And right now, he is under the most stress he has been under since taking over the leadership of Libya. Thus, the quotes elaborated above probably accurately reflect his true beliefs. He does sincerely cling to the idea that his people all love him.

Qaddafi's strong anti-authority bent and his tendency to identify with the underdog can be traced back to his childhood. He was born in a tent in the desert to a Bedouin family in 1942. When Qaddafi was ten years old, Gamal Abdel Nasser took over the reins of Egypt at the head of the Free Officers Movement, which made a deep and lasting impression on the young Qaddafi. He initially attended a Muslim school, where he was recognized as being very bright, and was sent to Tripoli to continue his education, but was teased by the children of the cosmopolitan elite for his coarse manners, leaving him with a bitter resentment of the establishment.

In Libya at that time, a military career provided an opportunity for upward mobility, and Qaddafi entered the Libyan military academy in Benghazi in 1961. Nasser and his revolutionary nationalism assumed a heroic stature in the mind of Qaddafi and his fellow students. He first began to think of organizing a military coup against the corrupt regime of King Idris while in military college, and on Sept. 1, 1969, with a small group of junior military officers, formed Libya's own Free Officers Movement and successfully led a bloodless coup to depose the king.  

From the very beginnings of his leadership of the junta known as the Revolutionary Command Council, the deeply anti-establishment Qaddafi actively supported groups that he considered underdogs, who represented themselves as attacking imperialism. He became one of the world's most notorious supporters of terrorist groups around the world, with no particular benefit to Libya. His support of terrorism was both wide and deep. He sent arms to the Irish Republican Army, provided financial support to the social revolutionary group FARC in Colombia, and to the Red Army Faction in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy.  He reportedly provided major financial support to the "Black September" organization responsible for the massacre of the Israeli Olympic team at the Munich Olympics in 1972. He praised the terrorist attack by the Japanese Red Army on the Lod Airport in Tel Aviv, Israel, urged Palestinian terrorist groups to carry out attacks on Israel, and offered to provide financial support and training.

Following Nasser's lead, he attempted to create a pan-Arab nation, merging first with Egypt and Syria, and then later attempting to merge with Tunisia, but his would-be partners were quick to discover that to merge with Libya was to be taken over by Qaddafi, leading to the swift failure of these proposed unions. In Qaddafi's modest view, he and Libya were at the very center of three overlapping circles: the Arab world, the Muslim world, and the Third World.

Reflecting his deep antipathy to formal authority, Qaddafi not only disclaimed any formal title, but institutionalized this as a governing philosophy in what he called a "popular democracy," later "Islamic socialism." Dismantling parties and institutions, he formed "people's committees" across the country to establish a direct democracy. This principle was codified in the three slim volumes of his Green Book, the quixotic tome on political philosophy he published in 1976. Then, in 1977, at Qaddafi's bidding, the General People's Congress, which was in effect a committee of committees, conferred upon him the honorific title of permanent "Brotherly Leader and Guide of the First of September Great Revolution of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," (jamahiriya is loosely translated as democracy of the masses or state of the masses, with no formal organizations other than the "people's committees"). In this democracy of the masses, Qaddafi would have no formal leadership role. This was the basis for Qaddafi's explanation in his Feb. 28 press conference that he can't resign because he has no official position.

After the revolution, Libya nationalized some 70 percent of the oil companies operating in Libya, including British Petroleum and Continental Oil, and joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), with a resultant large increase of oil revenues for Libya. Using Libya's petroleum wealth, Qaddafi not only bankrolled terrorists, but almost indiscriminately funded rogue leaders around the world, including Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Empire, Haile Mengistu of Ethiopia, and Daniel Ortega, leader of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

In reviewing Qaddafi's career, two things stand out. A consistent theme is his identification with the underdog, standing up against authority. And while he eschews the titles of power, he has, in fact, been quite ruthless in eliminating any threats to his own power. It has been estimated that some 10 to 20 percent of the Libyan population works for the people's committees, identifying threats to his power, dissidents, and regime critics, and eliminating them, forming a network of secret informers rivaling that of Saddam Hussein, Josef Stalin, and the East German Stasi. So sensitive to plots is his regime that even to engage in a discussion with a foreigner is a crime punishable by three years in prison. The fear of dissidents includes those living abroad, who have sought the sanctuary of exile, and he has dispatched assassination teams abroad to silence outspoken anti-Libyan dissidents, for example shooting at 10 anti-Qaddafi protestors in Britain in 1984. And his reach extended to the United States: In 1980, he attempted to assassinate a Libyan graduate student at the University of Colorado, seriously wounding him, and killed a Libyan exile just before his U.S. citizenship ceremony in 1990. Amnesty International once estimated that Libya carried out at least 25 assassinations abroad in the 1980s.

In Qaddafi's constellation of enemies, the United States was to occupy a special role. To have the courage to stand up to the world's only superpower would surely magnify his stature. And stand up he did. Reagan recalled in his diaries that Qaddafi mounted an assassination plot against him in November 1981. In early 1986, when Qaddafi declared the Gulf of Sidra as Libya's territory, which extended some 200 miles beyond the coast, and threatened attacks against anyone who dared to cross "the line of death," the U.S. Navy carried out a longstanding planned exercise that indeed crossed the line. Qaddafi sent two sorties of jets against the American fleet, which were promptly shot down. Qaddafi then thanked the United States for making him "a hero to the Third World."

Later that year, Libyan agents bombed the "La Belle" disco in West Berlin, a favorite hangout for the U.S. military, killing three and wounding 229. Intercepts revealed this was a Libyan plot, providing Reagan the long-sought "smoking gun" to fulfill his inaugural commitment to make attacking terrorism his No. 1 priority. The United States mounted a bombing raid against Tripoli, the Libyan capital, in reprisal. Qaddafi claimed his adopted daughter was killed in the raid. Now, Qaddafi was fully engaged with his arch enemy. A year later, a Japanese Red Army terrorist, hired by Qaddafi, was apprehended at a rest stop on the New Jersey turnpike with three pipe bombs discovered in his car. According to a February 1989 article in the New York Times, he intended to set them off in a Navy recruiting station in New York City on the first anniversary of the U.S. bombing raid on Tripoli. In 1988, the bombing of PanAm Flight 103 occurred over Lockerbie, Scotland, a flight filled with American students returning home after study abroad, killing all 259 people on board and 11 on the ground. Meticulous forensic examination traced the bomb back to Libya, leading to U.N. economic and political sanctions in 1992, which bit deeply, leading to Libya's economic and political isolation. The Libyan associate minister of justice, who recently defected, has confirmed that it was Qaddafi himself who gave the orders.

In 2003, the U.N. Security Council made the lifting of the sanctions contingent on Libya's accepting responsibility for the actions of its officials and payment of up to $2.7 billion in compensation for the victims of the 1988 attack. Libya watchers believe that his son and designated successor Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, who has a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics and was considered more worldly than his father, persuaded the colonel to agree to the compensation and abandon Libya's weapons of mass destruction program. (The question of whether the Ph.D. dissertation was ghostwritten and partially plagiarized is now under investigation.) This decision led to the lifting of the sanctions, ending Libya's diplomatic isolation. It represented a rare example of Qaddafi being able to exercise wisdom in pursuit of Libya's international position. But it did not exhaust his fondness for the United States as adversary. In 2009, Qaddafi found common cause with Venezuela's Hugo Chávez to propose a South Atlantic Treaty Organization to counter NATO.

The recent violence against unarmed civilians has disaffected many within Qaddafi's diplomatic corps and the military. What began as a small stream has now become a virtual river of resignations and defections, perhaps attempting to dissociate themselves from a regime accused by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon of "serious transgressions of international human rights and humanitarian law." Several senior military officers are now leading the rebel forces, and the former ambassador to India, Ali Assawi, has now become the foreign minister for the new rebel shadow government, the Libyan National Council, which is headed by Qaddafi's former justice minister.

Throughout his life and career, Qaddafi has lived out his core psychological value, that of the outsider standing up against superior authority, the Muslim warrior courageously confronting insurmountable odds. A man does not mellow with age, especially a highly narcissistic leader consumed by dreams of glory. Indeed, as a man grows older, he becomes more like himself. But as the stress has mounted, Qaddafi seems increasingly to have lost touch with reality. Having dedicated his life to Libya, his creation, he finds it inconceivable that his people are not all grateful to him, and when he says his people all love him, he believes it. And therefore, anyone contesting his authority must be responding to foreign agents from the United States or al Qaeda. When he says he will fight to the "last drop of his blood," he means it. Qaddafi will not commit suicide nor slink away to a lush exile.

When he speaks of "my country," he means it literally. Qaddafi is Libya and a Libya without him at the helm is unimaginable to him. In an article in the Economist magazine from February 2011, he is quoted as having declared that "I was the one who created Libya, and I will be the one to destroy it." The West should take this statement very seriously. Qaddafi is indeed prepared to go down in flames, and the question is how many of his supporters are prepared to fight to "the last drop of blood."

Jerrold M. Post is professor of psychiatry, political psychology and international affairs and director of the political psychology program at the George Washington University. Before assuming his position at GWU, he had a 21-year career at the Central Intelligence Agency, where he was the founding director of the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior. He is the author of Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World.

West Walks A Tightrope On Libya

Sami Moubayed writes: No-fly zone is expensive and difficult to enforce, but Gaddafi's survival will mean unprecedented bloodshed

This commentary was published in The Gulf News on 15/03/2011

Depending on who one listens to, the no-fly zone that might get imposed on Libya is either a brilliant idea, or a sad excuse for international engagement to prevent the spilling of more blood in the country.

Advocates of the no-fly zone are many, starting with British Prime Minister David Cameron who first proposed the idea, followed by the US, France and, surprisingly, the Arab League, which endorsed it over the weekend despite a famed reputation for inaction in times of crisis.

With only a handful of exceptions, like its dealing with Egypt after Camp David in 1978, the Arab League has rarely sanctioned any member state in its 67-year history. Amr Mousa, Secretary-General of the Arab League, however, described the no-fly zone as a "pre-emptive measure" whose goal is to "protect Libyan citizens" while the League extended legitimacy to the interim transitional government in Benghazi.

Within the US administration, there are sceptics like Defence Secretary Robert Gates, who realises that a no-fly zone would be practically ineffective without air support. The US can certainly commit itself militarily, but what about the political costs — given that the US army is already suffering from bloody wars in two Muslim countries?

According to the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, a Washington-based think-tank, a no-fly zone in Libya could cost the US up to $300 million (Dh1.10 billion) a week — an astronomical sum to which American taxpayers are certainly going to object.

Upon returning from a recent visit to Bahrain, Gates said, "A no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defence. That is the way you do a no-fly zone. And then you can fly planes around the country and not worry about our guys being shot down." Basically, he added, "it requires a big operation in a big country".

Obama's dilemma

President Barack Obama clearly finds himself caught in a bind while his ships are stationed off Libyan shores, ready for battle — awaiting orders. He is aware of the fact that he needs to do more to help the revolutionaries, but is also certain that the greatest disservice he could ever do to them would be outright US protection or support.

That would simply add to Muammar Gaddafi's argument that the revolutionaries are nothing, but western infiltrated "rats" who are connected to the US and Zionism. The interim transitional government in Benghazi, however, is strongly in favour of the no-fly zone, arguing that if Gaddafi's forces return to the second-largest Libyan city, a "catastrophe" can take place with up to 500,000 people killed.

One option is to impose the no-fly zone only on the Libyan coast or in the northern part of Libya in order to minimise costs and damage. Those speaking out against the no-fly zone are many, including Syria and Algeria, who voted against it during the Arab League meeting in Cairo.

Russia and China are also critical of the no-fly zone and would probably veto it when the matter is referred to the UN Security Council. Nobody wants to impose a no-fly zone on Libya without clear cover from Nato and the UN, to avoid the controversy that surfaced in 1991 when a similar decision to demilitarise the skies of Iraqi Kurdistan was imposed by the Security Council.

The US, France, UK and Turkey — architects of that no-fly zone — claimed that they had authorisation to do so from UNSCR 688. Boutros Boutros Ghali, then-UN secretary-general, argued that the Resolution contained no such explicit authorisation claiming that a no-fly zone over Iraqi Kurdistan "was illegal".

Military personnel in the US are also worried, given that a new no-fly zone means the air force must strike at the slightest signal originating from any radar on the ground within the designated zone. This runs the risk of Gaddafi placing radars in schools and civilian neighbourhoods in order to accuse the Americans of bombing Libyan civilians. That happened in Iraq after all, forcing France to suspend its participation, precisely because the no-fly zone was leading to civilian deaths.

One question that is currently being debated in world capitals is: how useful would a no-fly zone be in Libya? Would it really deter Gaddafi, who has relied more on artillery and troops — rather than an air force — to crush the rebellion? It would ground his war planes for sure but it certainly would not halt his massive ground assault.

How harmful would outside intervention be, both to the Libyan revolutionaries and other protesters in the streets, for example, in Yemen? An upcoming meeting between US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Libyan interim government will likely only serve as a blessing in disguise for Gaddafi.

The world, however, is also aware that if Gaddafi survives, it would send the wrong message to both Arab masses and leaders: Hosni Mubarak and Zine Al Abidine Bin Ali did it all wrong; had they killed their own people, they would have survived. If a no-fly zone is not implemented and the world does not take immediate action, Gaddafi may survive longer than many might think.

Sami Moubayed is a university professor, political analyst, and editor-in-chief of Forward magazine in Syria.

Europe's Israel Romance Is On The Wane

Europeans are losing their illusions about Israel, our survey shows. Policy is out of step with the public

By Daud Abdullah
This commentary was published in The Guardian on 14/03/2011

In Europe, Israel has historically enjoyed a high level of support, not least because it was perceived as a progressive democracy in a sea of Arab backwardness. At the same time, most Europeans knew very little about the Israel-Palestine conflict: as recently as 2004, the Glasgow University Media Group found that only 9% of British students knew that the Israelis were the illegal occupiers of Palestinian land. Astonishingly, there were actually more people (11%) who believed that the Palestinians were occupying the territories.

However, according to a new poll by ICM for the Middle East Monitor, Europeans' perception of Israel has changed decisively, and their understanding of the Israel-Palestine conflict, while still giving some cause for concern, has improved significantly. The survey of 7,000 people in Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Britain reveals only a small minority (10%) now believe their countries should support Israel rather than the Palestinians, while many more, 39%, think they should not.

This shift in European public opinion may owe something to an improved understanding of the conflict; 49% of respondents were now able to identify Israel as the occupying power. However, 22% still didn't know. This persistence of ignorance about issues that have been long established in international law may reflect media bias, or inadequate coverage of the conflict. It could also be a result of campaigns undertaken by the Israeli public relations machinery in Europe. Whatever the cause, the shift in public opinion is clearly not mainly due to the success of a pro-Palestinian lobby.

This decisive shift appears to be primarily a consequence of Israel's violation of international law, specifically its actions in Gaza, the 2010 attack on the humanitarian flotilla, its settlement expansion programme, and the construction of the separation wall.

There is, across Europe, a growing rejection of Israeli policies. Its blockade of Gaza was said to be illegal by 53% of those polled (16% thought it legal) – an appreciation of the international legal opinion that recognises the siege as a form of collective punishment and a violation of the Geneva conventions.

While it is important to note that those polled saw fault on both sides, 31% considered Palestinians to be the primary victims of the conflict, while only 6% thought Israelis the primary victims. A third of respondents believe Israel is not a democracy, while fewer than half believe it is, and most of those surveyed (65%) agree Israel does not treat all religious groups the same, compared with 13% who believe it does.

European policy on Palestine can no longer be said to reflect the values and aspirations of the people. The survey confirms a disturbing level of disconnect between public opinion and governments' actions. Whereas the EU took a decision in 2003 to place Hamas on its list of terrorist organisations and preclude it from any negotiations, 45% of those polled said it should be included in peace talks, while only 25% said it should be excluded. (A recent survey by the Institute for Jewish Policy research also found that 52% of British Jews support negotiating with Hamas for peace.)

Similarly, a clear majority of Europeans (58%) are against changing the law to make it easier for those accused of war crimes to visit Europe – a ringing indictment of governments that have either changed or are attempting to change their laws to protect Israeli war crime suspects. The Conservatives are committed to changing the law, yet only 7% of the 2,000 Britons polled would support such a change – the lowest figure in Europe.

The results of this study coincide with the epic changes engulfing the Middle East. Given the systemic discrimination by Israel against its Arab population, it is only fair to ask what the reaction would be if it was faced with mass civil protests by its Arab citizens demanding equal rights. Europe's romantic view of Israel has long been on the wane. Its 20th-century image as the battling underdog in a hostile neighbourhood has been shattered by its actions. European governments should bring their policies into line with universally accepted human values. Anything less will be a betrayal of the democratic standards Europe claims to uphold.

Gaddafi Has A Long History As A Killer — And Must Be Stopped

By Richard Cohen
This opinion was published in The Washington Post on 14/03/2011

On Dec. 21, 1988, Moammar Gaddafi killed Theodora Cohen. That’s one way of putting it. Cohen was one of 259 passengers and crew on Pan Am Flight 103. I remember her for obvious reasons and also because, to paraphrase the writer Erich Maria Remarque, the death of one woman is a tragedy, the death of millions is a statistic. Gaddafi has his statistics, but it is tragedy we are talking about today. There is much more to come.

Gaddafi’s agents also blew up the La Belle nightclub in what was then West Berlin. It was a hangout for American servicemen. Gaddafi supported other terrorist activities. He praised the killing of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics as well as the assassination of Anwar Sadat. He killed dissidents in Libya and sent agents to kill them overseas, too. If he wins the current civil war, he will kill his enemies. A bloodbath is coming.

How do I know? I don’t. I can only look at the past — at what Gaddafi has done — and conclude that he will do the same in the future. He can be stopped, though. When President Ronald Reagan retaliated for the La Belle attack by bombing Libya, Gaddafi got the message and quieted down. When Gaddafi saw that America went after Saddam Hussein’s (suspected) weapons of mass destruction, he rid himself of his own. He even paid reparations for the Pan Am 103 bombing. Moammar Gaddafi is a madman, but not mad.

In calling for the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya, various American politicians and others have mixed their historical metaphors to make their point. They cite America’s refusal to stop the genocide in Rwanda and our tardy response to the slaughter of civilians in the Balkans. However, Libya is — or has been — different. This is a civil war of some kind — the people vs. the government. No genocide has been ordered and no genocide has yet been carried out. Libya is not Rwanda. Libya is not the Balkans.

But it could be. And to preclude that possibility it would be productive if the Obama administration got its marbles out of its mouth. Its pronouncements thus far have been all over the lot: Gaddafi must go . . . but not if he really doesn’t want to. In a Post interview, Ben Rhodes of the National Security Council propounded what the Wall Street Journal has rightly called “The Obama Doctrine.” It goes like this: You first.

Amazingly, the White House wants to wait on nearly everyone to do almost anything — the United Nations, NATO, “multilateral organizations and bilateral relationships,” in the words of Rhodes. This is a highfalutin way of saying that first we’re gonna have a meeting and then break into committees and then report back here sometime soon . . . the good Lord willin’.

This is very nice — very un-George W. Bush-like, and that is somewhat the point. But Obama has taken prudence to the point of procrastination. The international community can almost never agree on anything. It always looks to U.S. leadership. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France established diplomatic relations with the Libyan rebels, but the world hardly noticed or cared. It’s the United States that matters. We have the bucks. We have the expertise. We have the military. We lead, they follow. This may not be as it ought to be. It is, however, how it is.

Gaddafi is no mere desert provincial. He underwent military training in Britain and Greece. He undoubtedly has taken the measure of Obama and found him a muddled puddle. Gaddafi himself is just the opposite. He is bold. He was just 27 when he took over his country. He is infused with megalomania. Among his many titles is King of Kings of Africa. He wears many crowns. Shakespeare knew the type. Uneasy lies his head.

It is not too late for NATO to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. (Even the Arab League has called for it.) Such a move would not necessarily amount to a slippery slope. No U.S. troops went to Bosnia until a truce was negotiated. It remains urgent to get Gaddafi’s attention and let him know that the United States will not permit him to slaughter his opponents as Hussein did the Shiites and Kurds — to the everlasting shame of the inert George H.W. Bush.

Obama and Gaddafi are a mismatch. The president is a thinker; Gaddafi is a killer. Unless Obama and the West do something, there’s a bloodbath coming. Just ask the Cohens. Gaddafi killed their daughter.

Saudi Arabia Strikes Back

The House of Saud's intervention in Bahrain is a slap in the face of the United States, and a setback for peace on the island.

By Jean-Francois Seznec
This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 14/03/2011

One thousand "lightly armed" Saudi troops and an unspecified number of troops from the United Arab Emirates entered Bahrain on the morning of March 14, in a bid to end the country's monthlong political crisis. They are reportedly heading for the town of Riffa, the stronghold of the ruling Khalifa family. The troops' task, apparently, is to protect the oil installations and basic infrastructure from the demonstrators.

The Arab intervention marks a dramatic escalation of Bahrain's political crisis, which has pitted the country's disgruntled Shiite majority against the Sunni ruling family -- and has also been exacerbated by quarrels between hard-liners and liberals within the Khalifa clan. The clashes between protesters and government forces worsened over the weekend, when the security services beat back demonstrators trying to block the highway to the capital of Manama's Financial Harbor. The protesters' disruption of the harbor, which was reportedly purchased by the conservative Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa for one dinar, was an important symbolic gesture by the opposition.

For the United States, the intervention is a slap in the face. On Saturday, March 12, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Bahrain, where he called for real reforms to the country's political system and criticized "baby steps," which he said would be insufficient to defuse the crisis. The Saudis were called in within a few hours of Gates's departure, however, showing their disdain for his efforts to reach a negotiated solution. By acting so soon after Gates's visit, Saudi Arabia has made the United States look at best irrelevant to events in Bahrain, and from the Shiite opposition's point of view, even complicit in the Saudi military intervention.

The number of foreign troop is so far very small and should not make one iota of difference in Bahrain's balance of power. The Bahraini military already total 30,000 troops, all of whom are Sunnis. They are under control of Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa and supposedly fully faithful to King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa. Bahrain also has a similar number of police and general security forces, mainly mercenaries from Baluchistan, Yemen, and Syria, reputed to be controlled by the prime minister and his followers in the family.

At this time, therefore, the Saudi intervention is largely a symbolic maneuver. It is so far not an effort to quell the unrest, but intended to scare the more extreme Shiite groups into allowing negotiations to go forward. The crown prince recently laid out six main issues to be discussed in talks, including the establishment of an elected parliament empowered to affect government policy, fairly demarcated electoral constituencies, steps to combat financial and administrative corruption, and moves to limit sectarian polarization. He notably failed to mention one of the opposition's primary demands -- the prime minister's resignation.

The Saudi move, however, risks backfiring. It is extremely unlikely that the Saudi troops' presence will entice moderate Shiite and Sunni opposition figures to come to the table -- the intervention will force them to harden their position for fear of being seen as Saudi stooges. The demands of the more extreme groups, such as the Shiite al-Haq party, are also likely to increase prior to negotiations. These elements, having seen job opportunities go to foreign workers and political power dominated by the ruling family for decades, have grown steadily disenchanted with prospects of talks.

The crown prince is well aware that the Saudi intervention only makes a negotiated solution to this crisis more challenging, so it is difficult to imagine that he invited the Saudis into Bahrain. The more liberal Khalifas, such as the crown prince, know very well that the only way out of the crisis is to obtain the resignation of the prime minister and some of the more extreme Sunni ministers.

However, the prime minister -- with whom Gates did not meet with during his weekend visit -- does not appear to have any intention of resigning and is the most likely figure behind the invitation to the Saudis to intervene. Although details are still sketchy, he is likely joining with the Saudi king to pass the message to the United States that he is in charge and no one can tell him what to do. Furthermore, it signals that the Saudis agree with Bahrain's conservatives that the Shiite must be reined in rather than negotiated with, even at the cost of telling the United States to kiss off.

The Saudi intervention may also have been precipitated by the deepening rift between the extreme Sunni elements and the liberal Khalifas. If the Saudis are indeed heading to Riffa, it is possible they are tasked with defending the Khalifa stronghold not so much against the Shiite rabble but against the Bahraini military, which is under the command of the crown prince. The Saudi intervention would therefore be an effort by the prime minister and the Saudis to pressure the crown prince into not giving in to the protesters' demands and to fall in line with their plans to secure Bahrain as the personal fiefdom of the Khalifas and their tribal allies.

Whatever the case, the future appears bleak. The Saudi intervention will no doubt provoke a reaction from Iran, which will argue that their Shiite brothers are being systematically oppressed. Any troubles caused by Bahraini Shiites will only provoke further Saudi intervention. Ultimately, the island risks falling under de facto, if not de jure, Saudi control.

The Saudi intervention, however small, is therefore a major step backward for the region. It represents a major slap in the face to the United States, a defeat for the liberal Shiite and Sunni elements in Bahrain, and ultimately a catastrophe for the entire Khalifa family, both the liberal and conservative wings, who may have just surrendered their power to the giant next door.

Ultimately, this may also be a defeat for Saudi Arabia as well. The Saudis have long tried to avoid overt interventions in their neighbors' affairs. They intervened once during the 1994 upheavals in Bahrain and in the past two years have been active on the Yemeni border -- but under King Abdullah they have tried to arbitrate, rather than dominate, events on the Arabian Peninsula. Their decision to intervene directly in Bahrain's affairs suggests a weakness in the Saudi leadership and Riyadh's surrender to the more conservative elements in the country.

Jean-François Seznec is a visiting associate professor at Georgetown University's Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.