President Saleh, Stand Aside And Give Yemen A Chance

By clinging to power Saleh is putting the stability and security of the region at risk-and the West must tell him so.

By Khalid al-Hureibi
This commentary was published in The Guardian on 10/03/2011

A demonstration demanding the resignation of the Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. Photograph: Muhammed Muheisen/AP

  

President Ali Abdullah Saleh is rapidly losing control in Yemen. Populist unrest is escalating despite a heavy-handed approach by the government. Last week, in a show of solidarity, the Hashed and the Bakeel – the two largest tribal groups in Yemen, and allies of Saleh over many years – announced their full support for youthful protesters demanding a change of regime.

Saleh has offered unprecedented concessions to the opposition. He retracted his plan for constitutional amendments that would have allowed him to stay in power indefinitely and proposed to form a government of unity. The Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), the largest Yemeni opposition bloc, categorically rejected the offers and asked for his immediate departure. Some sources say Saleh even offered to let the opposition form a government on its own terms.

The president has lost credibility on the street and across the whole Yemeni political spectrum but western countries, led by the US, have not shown they appreciate the risks in retaining the status quo in Yemen. The longer the current situation continues, the more resentment will grow against the regime and the sooner a civil war will become imminent. This will not only affect Yemen but the repercussions would certainly affect the region and the security of the world at large.

In such circumstances, external military intervention would eventually be inevitable. The spectre of such a situation could dwarf current happenings in Afghanistan – not only because of the tribal structure of Yemeni society, but also because of the ready availability of weapons. Yemen is second only to the US in guns per capita (60 guns per 100 people, according to the Small Arms Survey in 2007).

Saleh once infamously described his efforts to rule the tribes of Yemen as like "dancing on the heads of snakes". It seems his days of being a good dancer are over and the snakes have transformed into dragons that will not only devour him but possibly the whole country and the region as well.

Saleh has received more than $300m from the US to fight terrorism but several WikiLeaks cables show the Americans are disappointed with his efforts.

The Yemeni government is directing all its security and military capabilities to control widespread uprisings and this has provided al-Qaida with the unstable environment it craves in order to escalate its activities in the Arabian peninsula. The situation will worsen if a civil war breaks out in Yemen and a power vacuum ensues.

The Houthis – the insurgent Shia group operating in north Yemen – are in total control of two provinces and their power is progressively increasing due to the weak central government. The Houthis will certainly take advantage of any turmoil and Iran would, quite possibly, support them.

The separatists in the south are growing stronger every day. Saleh's regime has denied them basic political rights and treated them as second-class citizens when allocating resources and land. Despite the use of excessive force and killings to crack down on dissent in the south, the numbers of protesters have been increasing. This instability has allowed al-Qaida to place its main strongholds on the Arabian peninsula in the south of Yemen.

Recent events in Egypt and Tunisia have shown it is not in the west's interest to adopt a "wait and see" policy until one side wins and only then lend support. The people in the region resent this opportunism, which severely undermines the credibility of western governments. This approach provides the radical anti-western discourse a golden opportunity to attract followers.

If Yemen descends into chaos, and this is a very real possibility, the anti-west resentment will grow exponentially if external military intervention becomes a necessity.

For any solution to be successful it should consider an honourable exit for Saleh and a smooth transition of power. The west needs to make it clear that Saleh should leave now. Pressure must be applied for a handover of power in a smooth and orderly fashion under international supervision.
Aspects needing urgent attention are:

• Forming a presidential council to rule for an interim transitional period. This council should include representatives from the JMP, the army and the protesters.
• Holding fair and free presidential and parliamentary elections within one year, monitored by regional and international observers.
• Guarantees that Saleh, or any of his family, will not be brought to trial, provided they relinquish all their government posts and return all money or gains made when in power.
• The assets of Saleh and his family inside the country and abroad should be frozen.
• An arms embargo should be enforced.
• The army should commit to a neutral status in any political conflict.

Without such urgent and proactive action, the situation will descend further into mayhem. The west should realise that Saleh has become so detrimental to the stability and security of the region and his clinging to power will prove to be very costly over the next few weeks.

America Shouldn't Hijack Egypt's Revolution

Obama must resist the urge to help Egyptian democrats -- unless they demand it.

By Steven  A. Cook This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 09/03/2011

Let's face it: Hosni Mubarak was a strategic asset to the United States. He ensured access to the Suez Canal, upheld the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, and kept the Islamists down. He also presided over a foul regime that abused its citizens and violated every principle that Americans hold dear. The fact that the United States supported this now-discredited government for three decades is not lost on Egyptians. And it shouldn't be lost on Washington, either, as it attempts to forge a new relationship with Cairo.

Washington has a long wish list for the new Egypt. Despite its baggage-laden history with the country, the United States wants Egypt to be democratic, economically successful, and a reliable ally. It wants Cairo to regain its luster as a regional leader so that it may bring its considerable diplomatic weight to bear as an interlocutor on Arab-Israeli affairs and a counterweight to Iran's regional ambitions. The United States also wants Egypt to serve as a model for political reform, inspiring countries throughout the Arab world toward a more just political order. This ambitious vision is unlikely to be fully realized, but if Egyptians achieve only a portion of their revolutionary aspirations, the Middle East will be a better place.

Policy analysts and democracy-promotion specialists are already racing to formulate a strategy that matches substantial resources to these lofty aims. They want to provide technical assistance to help Egypt develop political parties, impartial electoral laws, judicial independence, and legislative oversight. They also have plans for economic reform, which include U.S. assistance for debt relief and incentives for foreign investment and increased bilateral trade.

Sounds wonderful -- in theory. But it's time to tap the brakes on these grandiose plans, for there are significant drawbacks to a robust American role in post-Mubarak Egypt. If Washington is to realize its goals, it should approach the country's coming transformation with a lighter touch and a certain amount of humility.

The main reason is that Egyptians remain distrustful of Washington and its intentions. Why shouldn't they be? Successive administrations -- Republican and Democratic alike -- supported and benefited from their close ties to Mubarak. Even George W. Bush, who pressed Mubarak hardest to undertake reforms, never penalized him for his stubborn resistance to change. A high-profile approach to Egypt's transition will consequently raise suspicions about Washington's intentions and goals, complicating efforts to develop the kind of relationship with the new Egypt that President Barack Obama's administration wants.

Happily, anti-Americanism was not the main theme of the millions of Egyptians who took to the streets in late January and early February. But Americans should draw no conclusions from the absence of anger directed toward Washington during the 18 heady days of demonstrations. The political dynamics of the new Egypt will encourage the country's leaders to diverge from Washington, if only to establish their nationalist credentials. Prime Minister Essam Sharaf and Foreign Minister Nabil al-Arabi have already signaled that they will split from their predecessors and the United States on the Israeli blockade of Gaza and on Egypt's relationship with Iran.

Even if Washington pledges its total neutrality in Egyptian politics, a bold and public democracy-promotion effort could quickly lapse into support for one party, group, or movement. U.S. officials will be sorely tempted to gravitate toward liberal elements within the revolutionary movement, such as Ayman Nour's al-Ghad party, the newly licensed al-Wasat party, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mohamed ElBaradei, and a host of independent figures. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that Congress will remain neutral should the Obama administration choose to work with the Nasserists and the Muslim Brotherhood, both of which maintain views on Egyptian foreign policy, especially when it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict, that are inimical to American interests.

Already, a bipartisan group of lawmakers has expressed its concern about the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's largest and best-organized Islamist group. Republican Sen. Mark Kirk released a statement on Feb. 2 cautioning that the United States "must heed growing warnings about the Muslim Brotherhood, their leaders and plans for taking Egypt back to the 13th century." Rep. Howard Berman, the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has also expressed his desire to use U.S. funding to bolster liberal Egyptian political movements, and said that he is "skeptical" about the Muslim Brotherhood's democratic bona fides.

An aggressive American effort in Egypt also risks alienating leaders who would otherwise be willing to work with the United States. The perception that certain groups enjoy American largesse could complicate their efforts in a new, more democratic Egypt. The political environment in Cairo will naturally be hostile to anything even remotely connected to the Mubarak era -- including the United States. By taking a high-profile role in Egypt's transition, the United States increases the risk that potentially pro-American political leaders will be tarred with "Mubarakism."

The United States must also understand how this revolution fits into the last century of Egypt's political struggles, which have largely focused on achieving independence from international forces that seemingly conspired to rob Egyptians of control over their own destiny. Egypt's 1919 nationalist revolution aimed to end the British occupation that had compromised the national dignity of its people for 40 years. The 1952 coup that brought Gamal Abdel Nasser to power had many causes, but above all else it was a new phase in the anti-colonial effort to bring an end to Britain's continued influence in Egypt. Mubarak, by continuing his predecessor Anwar Sadat's alignment with Washington, compromised his country's independence in the eyes of many Egyptians. In time, it became conventional wisdom among his opponents that the relationship emasculated Egypt's regional influence while contributing to repression and stagnation at home.

The revolutionaries of Tahrir Square have now managed to alter the history that ostensibly all-powerful internal forces -- with the help of external patrons -- had written for them. As they see it, they brought down their dictator without anyone's help, and believe that they are capable of constructing a decent political system worthy of a great country. This is a source of empowerment for Egyptians, and a point of pride and dignity.

In the current environment, it is best for outsiders -- particularly those with ties to the ancien régime -- to keep a low profile. In practice, this means that Washington's message should focus exclusively on first-order principles: non-violence, tolerance, pluralism, and accountability. It also requires that the United States hew carefully to the needs Egyptians themselves articulate. If Egyptians want American help, then by all means, Washington should give it to them. But the sight of U.S. bureaucrats pushing out comprehensive programs, training, and grants -- along with congressional benchmarks and conditions -- is likely to embitter all parties involved.

Having long sought to manage their own destiny, Egyptians likely will be reluctant to take unsolicited advice from outsiders. Egypt has eminent jurists, learned scholars, and a large number of talented activists who understand what they want and how to get there. They need a lot less help than we think. If the United States wants to achieve its goals in Egypt, it should allow Egyptians the opportunity to triumph or fail on their own.

A Transition For Arab Economies

By David Ignatius

This commentary was published in The Washington Post on 10/03/2011

 

After the radiant sunrise of the Arab spring, here's a somber shadow: Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries making the transition to democracy are likely to face severe economic problems over the next several years - ones that could bring chaos if the Arabs and their friends in the West aren't wise.

 

For the dimensions of this economic transition, think of the Marshall Plan after World War II, but add several complicating factors: The United States and many of the European governments that would fund such a program can't afford it; the new democracies don't have governments yet to manage the assistance and probably won't for months; and the Arab people are likely to be prickly about accepting help, especially if it has U.S. strings attached. 

 

And here's one more post-revolutionary worry: Many of the initiatives that will be popular with the people, such as across-the-board wage increases and subsidies, will be good politics but bad economics. The public sector is already too big in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, and there will be pressure to expand it even more as the economic crisis worsens. 

 

"The challenge that faces Egypt and other Arab countries is how to go on with economic reform without bringing back a big role for the state in managing the economy," says Marwan Muasher, a former Jordanian foreign minister who is vice president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

 

The weeks of protest in Tahrir Square were a heady school for democracy, but they brought economic activity almost to a standstill. Factories were idle; banks were shuttered; financial markets were closed; tourists canceled their trips. The World Bank says it doesn't have reliable forecasts for Egypt yet because officials there haven't been able to finish their assessments. 

 

The economic impact of turmoil is estimated by George Abed of the Institute of International Finance. He forecasts growth of just 1.5 percent this year in Egypt, and a decline of 1.5 percent in Tunisia and 31 percent in Libya. Egypt's budget deficit will grow to 9.8 percent of gross domestic product this year, compared to 7.9 percent in 2010, and deficits will total 4.5 percent of GDP in Tunisia and 35 percent in Libya, both of which recorded surpluses last year. 

 

How to avoid a post-democratic crackup? What's needed is a multilateral version of the Marshall Plan - that is, a framework of loans and other assistance that can steady the Arab countries as they make their transition to democracy and prosperity. America isn't really an option; we don't have the money, and our politicians wouldn't want to give it to foreigners, anyway. 

 

But I'm happy to report that there's an answer to this Middle East puzzle. The institution that was created 20 years ago to oversee Eastern Europe's transition, known as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), is ready to take on this new mission. I talked Tuesday with Thomas Mirow, its president, who said his organization is ready to act as a "bank for economic and political transition" in Egypt and neighboring countries. 

 

The Europeans have the expertise. As Mirow notes, the new Arab democracies have the same problems that Eastern European countries did: weak private sectors; feeble small andmedium-sized business; and poor infrastructure. The EBRD has the money, too, with about $17 billion in capital and the ability to raise far more from lenders. Mirow foresees providing about $1.4 billion to Egypt over the next several years, and up to twice that amount to neighboring countries. He's already thinking about opening an office in Cairo, so that Arabs will see this "bank for transition" as their own. 

 

White House officials like Mirow's idea for assisting the new democracies of the Middle East. This approach avoids the stigma of assistance from the International Monetary Fund or the basket-case aura of aid from the World Bank. It puts Egypt and its neighbors in the same category as Poland or Bulgaria - countries whose economic and political systems were shattered by authoritarian rulers. Perhaps the European bank could partner with the Inter-American Development Bank, which has expertise in transition from "Peronist," military-led systems. 

 

The young people who gathered in Tahrir Square say they want to be part of the Mediterranean world - civilized countries with prosperous economies and free political systems. This transition will be rocky because the foundations are so weak, but there are creative new ways - that aren't marked "Made in America" - to provide stability along the road to progress.

Oil Prices And OPEC’s Responsibility

By Randa Takieddine

This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 09/03/2011

 

The massacre being committed by Gaddafi against his people and the ongoing war in his country, along with developments in the Arab world, in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Bahrain and Oman, have raised oil prices to unjustifiable levels that have exceeded $110 a barrel.

According to everyone in the oil industry, oil is available in markets. Despite the continuing drop in Libyan production of about 500,000 barrels a day, European refineries are finding all of the oil they need in the markets. Saudi Arabia raised its production to over 9 million barrels a day and the rest of the OPEC countries are producing at their utmost capacity; these countries’ production exceeded by 2.6 million barrels a day the agreed-upon production quota.

Speculation in financial markets, geopolitical events, and people’s fears of shortfalls in energy supplies have enhanced the ability of speculators to invest in oil futures markets. Moreover, investment in stocks has incurred losses, as the dollar’s value continues to drop.

In OPEC, there are responsible countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Gulf countries and others, which believe that convening an extraordinary meeting might be useful, to show that OPEC is acting responsibly, and that it wants to calm oil markets, at least psychologically, because there is no shortfall in oil supplies. However, it might be positive to hold a meeting to let the world know about the additional quantities it wants to pump into markets, to reassure people that there is no cut-off in supplies.

However, countries such as Iran, Venezuela and the Libyan leadership, which continues to control oil production, do not want such a meeting, because they want more money to use in oppressing their people, and not improving the conditions of individual members of society. Iran, which produces more than 3.5 million barrels a day, uses this wealth to stoke strife and destabilize neighboring countries. The Iranian leadership is unconcerned with a deterioration in its economic conditions through any harsh international sanctions, and is content to achieve greater returns. Meanwhile, Gaddafi and his team are holding on, even though the freezing of their assets has encouraged some people to portray a false image of what is taking place in the country. It is said that Gaddafi tasked his oil minister, Shukri Ghanem, with bringing French journalists to Libya to meet with the colonel and relay his statements to the international media. Shukri Ghanem was an employee in the secretariat-general of OPEC in Vienna, where Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, submitted his doctoral thesis, written by Ghanem, on Libya’s economy. This is how Ghanem became prime minister, and then oil minister, as Saif al-Islam garnered the lion’s share - oil contracts would pass through him; a year ago, one of Saif al-Islam’s brothers was angry about this, and Gaddafi sidelined Ghanem for a period of time, on the pretext that he had received Italian citizenship. Ghanem then patched things up with the colonel, thanks to his son, Saif al-Islam. Gaddafi and his tribe continue to behave with Libya’s oil wealth as if it is their private property; they oppress and kill a people in revolt against a regime that has impoverished a state rich in natural resources and capabilities.

The Arab League and Arab countries have been slow to condemn Gaddafi’s massacres against his people, although the stance that had been awaited was finally taken. As for now, convening an OPEC conference will be useful to show the organization as a group of responsible countries that want to affirm that they do not want to destabilize the international economy. Also, they do not want to see an increase of poverty and despair in the world; they are keen to increase their production, so that there is no shortfall in oil.

The current problem is that a state like Iran is chairing OPEC for a one-year period, which makes joint action by the organization to reassure the world a difficult, if not impossible task, since it is headed by an irresponsible state.

The "Street" Remains A Street

By Adel al-Toraifi
This commentary was puiblished in Asharq al-Awsat on 10/03/2011

There is a heated debate taking place in the Middle East regarding the popular uprisings plaguing the region and this is a debate that is only intensifying day by day. This debate can be summarized as follows: Firstly, there are those who are of the view that enough is enough, and that it is now time for the protestors to hand over the reins of power, whether to the transitional government in Tunisia or the supreme military council in Egypt, so that these bodies can do their duty and restore stability and security, and begin the practical arrangements required for the transition of power. As for those who hold the second opinion, they argue that the revolution must continue until it has achieved all its objectives, and this means continuing demonstrations on the streets, and not imposing any ceiling on the protestors demands, so that all the demonstrators demands can be met and the people can seize their rights with their own hands, from the state apparatus which previously mistreated them under the former regime.
 
The Libyan crisis is ongoing, and in recent days it has begun to resemble a civil war, between those who call themselves revolutionaries, and those who continue to support the Gaddafi regime. No one knows what will happen in Libya, but whilst armed conflict is ongoing there, and whilst the death toll continues to rise, the model of taking to the street seems to be far more costly than was originally promised by those who advocated revolution.
 
Needless to say, there is no longer any talk about the return of former regimes, but the debate about what should be done now is still raging. Some wish to continue with this state of revolution regardless of the risk to state institutions and by doing so they are placing the legitimacy of the Arab republics, and their future, at stake. There are genuine fears about the collapse of the Arab republic system, which suffers from fundamental problems in its governing structure, with the existence of racial, regional, ethnic, and sectarian differences which threaten the unity of the Arab state as we know it, and there is significant evidence of this in Yemen, Libya, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, and elsewhere.
 
Politicians in the region are divided between those who believe they are immune to what is happening – and these politicians are deluding themselves – and those who are taking the initiative – often in an improvisational manner – to provide some political or financial concessions in order to rein in the fantasies of the public, which are being greatly influenced by what is happening in the region. But whilst politicians are drowning in their reports and evaluations, the majority of intellectuals and writers, in turn, are split between those who are concerned by this newfound "logic of the street" and those who are taking a gamble to stand side-by-side with the "revolutionary youth", whatever their demands or slogans, on the grounds that you cannot stand against the demands of the youth, as they form the largest demographic in our region.
 
It is not surprising that writers and intellectuals have rushed to join the list of signatories to [revolutionary] political statements, or are participating enthusiastically on social networking websites, under the pretext of supporting the "legitimate" demands and voice of the youth. However when we examine this further, we find that writers and intellectuals have no option but to side with the youth because the majority of the existing regimes are not worth defending, either because they are undemocratic on the one hand, or because they have failed to achieve – or have corrupted – the mechanisms for political participation, and thus are nothing more than an obstacle to freedom of expression. For such intellectuals, it is not acceptable to stand by the state – or the regime – because the youthful majority is in opposition. Moreover, the youth are prepared to confront political regimes with mass demonstrations, which provide them with legitimacy, and regardless how hard these regime might try, they are unable to break up these demonstrations by use of force – as they were previously able in the past. This is because the outside world is watching what is happening, and any state-sponsored confrontation of the masses would be met with dozens of youths, who support this rumbling revolutionary wave.
 
Here we find ourselves faced with two opposing arguments: there is the logic of the state, whether it is democratic or autocratic, and the logic of the "street". The state was, and still is, the primary custodian of stability and order, and if it is overthrown by revolutionary slogans, or indeed any slogans, then the idea of civil coexistence would find itself overwhelmed by those who want revenge or to settle scores, or who possess ideals regarding a pure utopian state that is free from sin. The problem with the idea of the "street" is that this entity has no face or name, and transferring power to such an entity would be tantamount to taking a shot in the dark, and this explains the current chaos in the region. Intellectuals, or writers, can choose not to support this regime, or that regime, but when they bless the "street" they are presenting it with absolute authority which is no less ethically dangerous than the power wielded by a totalitarian regime or an individual dictator. In addition to this, some intellectuals are seeking to brand any opinion that disagrees with the street as a justification for the tyranny of their rule, and in doing so, these intellectuals themselves are practicing tyranny and rhetorical violence against those who peacefully hold counter viewpoints.
 
There is great danger in justifying the existence of a state of statelessness, or prolonging a state of revolution, as my colleague Mshari Al-Zaydi wrote. He said that in such a state revolutions continue "every day but under a new title, and with new victims falling prey to anger." The Egyptian playwright Ali Salem also warned - in an article for Asharq Al-Awsat - against "the abolition of the state" or even some of its institutes, under the pretext of cleaning up the [political] system. The scenes of chaos which countries such as Egypt witnessed following the handover of power to the military council are unjustifiable and unacceptable. How can state institutions be violated, and government documents be seized by anonymous people, who use the street to impose their will? How can anybody justify the speech given by new Egyptian Prime Minister Essam Sharaf at Tahrir Square, when he said "you have completed your lesser jihad, and now you are facing the greater jihad of restoring Egypt"? What jihad is this prime minister, who was appointed by military decree following the departure of a president and the suspension of the constitution, talking about?

 
The "street" is not a source of legitimacy, because it only represents the wishes of those who participate, whether they are model citizens, or thieves, and also the state, as a civil regime, cannot compete with the noisy street. As for those intellectuals who seek to ride the wave of the revolution by building a rapport with the Arab street or even the "virtual [Arab] street", they must remember that it was the Arab republics that first raised the slogan: "with the blessing of the street". For decades this slogan was a means for authoritarian regimes to enact "populist" policies, and it stood as an obstacle to the achievement of a genuine civil (secular) state, reconciled with itself, and the outside world.
 
There is a big difference between state reform, and resorting to the street. The first seeks to build a state, whilst the second seeks to overcome it. Here we can say: "The revolutionaries do not create the revolution, but rather they search for the rising force on the street, and then they seize upon it".

The U.S. Should Keep Out Of Libya

Gadhafi might survive the current civil war. But the U.S. does not need the burden of another vaguely defined intervention in a country where American interests are less than vital.

By Richard N. Haas
This commentary was published in The Wall Street Journal on 08/03/2011

A good many people across the political spectrum—including some members of the Obama administration—are pressuring the president to intervene militarily in Libya. Much of the commentary has focused on establishing a no-fly zone, but there have been calls as well for enforcing a no-drive zone, or for arming or otherwise assisting regime opponents.

Those making this case appeal to a mixture of morality and realpolitik. They argue that by intervening we will prevent the slaughter of innocents and at the same time demonstrate our willingness to make good on expressions of support for freedom and security.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has taken the opposite position. Testifying before Congress last week, Mr. Gates pointed out that the first step in establishing a no-fly zone that would ground Libyan aircraft and helicopters would be to suppress Libyan air defenses that could threaten U.S. or allied aircraft. This would entail attacking selected targets. In other words, to establish a no-fly zone would be to go to war.

Mr. Gates was and is correct in reminding people of what implementing a no-fly zone would actually mean. But the reasons for questioning the wisdom of establishing such a zone, or taking other military action, go well beyond his warnings.

To begin with, there is no reason to believe a no-fly zone would be decisive. In fact, we have every reason to believe it would not be, given that aircraft and helicopters are not central to the regime's military advantages. The regime could defeat the opposition without resorting to attack planes and helicopter gunships simply by exploiting its advantages in terms of foot soldiers and light arms.

What about other military steps outsiders could take? To impose a no-drive zone—which would aim to limit the government's ability to use tanks and armored personnel carriers—would require far more extensive military force than a no-fly zone. And even if it were implemented, no number of Western aircraft on patrol could stop the movement of every military vehicle. The only way to level the battlefield would be to put trainers, advisers and special forces on the ground.

There are political reasons to question the wisdom of the U.S. becoming a protagonist in Libya's civil war. It is one thing to acknowledge Moammar Gadhafi as a ruthless despot, which he has demonstrated himself to be. But doing so does not establish the democratic bona fides of those who oppose him. And even if some of those opposing him are genuine democrats, there is no reason to assume that helping to remove the regime would result in the ascendancy of such people.

To the contrary. Removing Gadhafi and those around him could easily set in motion a chain of events in which a different strongman, with the backing of a different tribe, took over. Or it could create a situation in which radical Islamists gain the upper hand. Either way, significant areas of the country would be beyond any government control, creating vacuums exploitable by al Qaeda and similar groups.

The wisdom of arming regime opponents is questionable for the same reason. Pre-9/11 Afghanistan offers something of an object lesson here, as the U.S. armed individuals and groups to defeat the regime backed by the Soviet Union. This policy worked in realizing its immediate goal, but in the years that followed it empowered individuals and groups who carried out an agenda hostile to U.S. interests. Arms transferred become arms over which control is forfeited.

There are many reasons to avoid making Libya the center of U.S. concerns in the region. Libya is far from the most important country in the Middle East—both in terms of political influence and its impact on the oil market. American policy makers would be wiser to focus on what they can do to see that Egypt's transition proceeds smoothly, that Saudi Arabia remains stable, and that Iran does not.

Intervening militarily in Libya would be a potentially costly distraction for the U.S. military. It is already overextended in Iraq and Afghanistan. The last thing it needs is another vaguely defined intervention in a place where U.S. interests are less than vital.

To say that U.S. interests in Libya are less than vital is not to argue for doing nothing, but rather for making sure that the actions we take are commensurate with the stakes. In the case of Libya, asset freezes, arms embargoes, threatened prosecutions for war crimes, and the creation of humanitarian safe harbors inside the country or just across its borders would be appropriate.

Under this set of policies, Gadhafi could well survive the current challenge—regimes that are willing and able to attack domestic opponents often do. But, over time, such policies would weaken the regime while strengthening the opposition.

Such an approach will not be enough for some. But it does have the advantage of being consistent with the scale of U.S. interests in Libya and what can realistically be done to promote them

Mr. Haass is president of the Council on Foreign Relations.

The Arab World Isn't Clamouring For Our Help

By Anne Applebaum
This commentary was published in The Washington Post on 08/03/2011

 

I'm listening hard, but I just can't hear the "voices around the world" that my colleague Charles Krauthammer said last week are "calling for U.S. intervention to help bring down Moammar Gaddafi." It's true that John Bolton, former U.N. ambassador and present Fox News employee, has declared that "strong American words (and actions) were amply warranted" in Libya. It's also true that a clutch of American politicians and writers have come out in favor of a similarly muscular response as well. 

 

But outside America's borders, all is silent. Certainly nobody in the Arab world is clamoring for American military intervention, or indeed any American intervention: Egyptian democrats are even wary of taking our development money. ("Help from America can be misunderstood," one would-be Egyptian politician delicately explained to The Post a few days ago.) 

 

Nobody in Asia and nobody in Europe is calling for the Marines to be sent back to the shores of Tripoli either. The French, feeling guilty for having failed to support (or even foresee) the revolution in Tunisia, have sent humanitarian aid to Benghazi - but have simultaneously argued against military involvement. The British have already bungled their first solo attempt to see what could be done. On Saturday, a British special forces team and an MI6 intelligence officer touched down near Benghazi, intending simply to make contact with the rebels. They were promptly arrested, handcuffed, interrogated and sent out of the country. The last thing the rebels want, apparently, is the stigma of contact with foreigners. 

 

Why the Arab anxiety about American and Western help? Why the reluctance among our allies? The answer can be summed up in a single word: Iraq. Far from setting "an example for the entire region," as Krauthammer put it, Iraq serves as a dire warning: Beware, for this could be the fate of your country. When the U.S. Army entered Iraq, we knew nothing about the Iraqi opposition, except what we'd heard from a couple of exiles. Our soldiers didn't speak Arabic and hadn't been told what to do once they got to Baghdad. Chaos followed incompetence, which begat violence: Tens of thousands of people died in an eight-year civil war. Although a fragile democracy has emerged, this isn't an example anyone, anywhere, wants to follow. 

 

It's not hard to understand why Libyans and others might fear a repeat performance. In truth, the time to contact the Libyan opposition was a year ago - or five years ago - back when Tony Blair was shaking hands with Moammar Gaddafi inside desert tents and Western oil companies were going in to do business. But the British didn't. We didn't either. Now we don't even know who they are. Various colonels have emerged as "spokesmen" for the rebels - but for all of the rebels? Or just some of the rebels? News reports cite "secondhand reports through rebel networks" as sources; in other words, somebody told somebody else what's going on. As the failed British escapade shows, the spies don't know any better. 

 

We should enforce sanctions in Libya, offer humanitarian aid and put in place a no-fly zone, to be activated if the rebels really begin to lose. But at the moment, even if our military had unlimited funding - which it doesn't - the Pentagon is not equipped to launch democracy in Libya. That is a job for our underfunded international radio networks, especially the ones that broadcast in Arabic; for independent institutions like the National Endowment for Democracy; for groups that train judges and journalists. Unfortunately, we don't have the contacts such groups need. We should start making them now. 

 

It's nice to be on the right side of history, and I'm not surprised that George W. Bush's remaining supporters now feel good about the "freedom agenda" he sometimes advocated and sometimes forgot while in office. But being right, even morally right, isn't everything. It is also important to be competent, to be consistent, and to be knowledgeable. It's important for your soldiers and diplomats to speak the language of the people you want to influence. It's important to understand the ethnic and tribal divisions of the place you hope to assist. Let's not repeat past mistakes: Before sending in the 101st Airborne, we should find out what people on the ground want and need. Because right now, I don't hear them clamoring for us to come. They are afraid of what American "assistance" might do to their country.