Analysts: Peace Between Israel And Hizbullah Rests With Stability, UN Forces

Fresh conflict unlikely in 2011 but some at UN see outcome of Special Tribunal vital

By Patrick Galey 
This article was published in The Daily Star on 03/01/2011 

BEIRUT: Israel and Hizbullah are unlikely to seek a fresh conflict in 2011, although much depends on Lebanon’s internal stability and the competence of international peacekeeping forces, military and political analysts told The Daily Star Sunday.

Retired Lebanese Army General and political science lecturer at the American University of Beirut Elias Hanna said that recent intensive military training exercises performed by Israel were a deliberate demonstration that its military was capable of defeating Hizbullah.

 

“The saying is: ‘If you want peace prepare for war.’ [Israel is] implementing the worst case scenario,” Hanna said. “Moreover, it is their message to the US, Iran and Syria that they are ready to go and do it themselves. When they move, Hizbullah have to move.”

It emerged Sunday that Israeli military chief Gabi Ashkenazi had advised US diplomats in late 2009 that he was preparing for a “large-scale” war, according to documents released by WikiLeaks and reported by a Norwegian paper, the Aftenposten.

Hanna said, however, that Israel would think twice before attacking Hizbullah inside Lebanon again. “It was a catastrophe for the Israelis in 2006 and they do not want a repeat of that,” he said.

In addition, Hizbullah – so long as the current security situation in south Lebanon persists – lacks motivation to strike Israel preemptively, according to Hanna. “From time to time we might have some unknown missiles fired into Israel but there will never be a major issue to disturb the status quo, which is based on what Hizbullah wants and what Iran and Syria wants.” 

As well as tough choices for the two principal combatants, the new year brings with it challenges for the 13,000-strong United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), according to former long-term force adviser Timur Goksel.

Last year saw a spate of attacks on French peacekeepers by southerners, something Goksel attributed to miscommunication. He welcomed the announcement that Ireland and Finland will again contribute troops to UNIFIL in 2011.

“Irish and Finns were very popular in the south [during their last deployments] … They are not aggressive types and are good for peacekeeping,” Goksel said.

Goksel added that it would be likely the two nations would share the UNIFIL area south of Tibnin, a sector previously manned by French troops and which saw some altercations between peacekeepers and southerners last year.

“This will mean some redeployment from the French contingent. Either the French will reduce their numbers in UNIFIL or they will give up the idea of deploying in a specific area. Whatever it is, [the French] giving the area up is a good thing for UNIFIL,” he said.

“The French contingent has a different approach to peacekeeping. It’s not easy to be peacekeepers if you trained as a fighting force.”

As for a repeat of 2010’s attacks on the force, Goksel said he didn’t anticipate any major future clashes, although he warned problems were possible if Hizbullah was to be implicated in the UN-backed probe into the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

“What worries most at the UN is the impact of the [Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)], if there was a negative outcome for Hizbullah and what impact that will have on UNIFIL,” he said.

Sahar Attrache, Middle East and North Africa analyst for the International Crisis Group, said it was possible – if unlikely – that attacks on UNIFIL could follow public court indictment announcements.

 

“The situation [with UNIFIL] will depend on the situation with the whole country. I don’t suspect that UNIFIL will be the first target,” she said. “In some way, UNIFIL in the view of Hizbullah represents the international community. The whole situation is so unpredictable but if Hizbullah controls the situation then the predicament of UNIFIL will be very different in 2011.”

She added, however, that: “Hizbullah doesn’t want to confront the international front as well as Israel.”

Hanna argued that since troop contributing countries had voiced their support for the STL, UNIFIL soldiers were in a difficult position concerning Hizbullah.

“[UNIFIL’s] countries are totally supporting the tribunal and their physical presence is within the Hizbullah area,” he said. “The relationship between UNIFIL and the people in the south is dependent on how far the force interferes with Hizbullah’s plans for the south and endangers its strategic military designs on the region.”

Hanna also ruled out the possibility of Hizbullah commencing hostilities with Israel as a smokescreen to smother indictments. “Would Hizbullah go to war in order to avoid [the STL fallout]? No. Because it is not a local decision, it is a regional one,” he added.

Goksel also pointed out the potential confusion which could result from new troop arrivals. The Finns and Irish will bring the number of contributing countries to 33 for 2011.

“Why bring more and more countries in? This is unheard of in UN history and one of the reasons it hasn’t worked is that there are all these countries,” Goksel said. “It doesn’t make the force better or more professional; it just makes things harder for the troops on the ground. As long as its peaceful it’s fine but if things get serious it can be unmanageable.”

Two southern issues dominated discussions in 2010, both in Beirut and among the international community: the Blue Line demarcation and Ghajar.

In August a dispute which began over maintenance work on a tree close to the Blue Line at Adaysseh village resulted in the death of two Lebanese soldiers and a journalist, as well as a senior Israeli officer in the worst violence seen along the de facto border since August 2006.

The incident prompted calls for a hastening of Blue Line demarcation, which Goksel said would occur this year.

A potential source of friction were the announcements by both Lebanon and Israel that their governments would seek to protect and exploit fossil fuel resources in the east Mediterranean.

Goksel said it was unlikely UNIFIL would be involved in the demarcation of a naval “border,” given the potentially lucrative nature of any separation.

“Demarcating the sea is far more complex than land borders. It is a completely different calculation and UNIFIL will not be capable of doing it themselves. I don’t see the UN, with its limited capacity, getting involved,” he said.

Both Goksel and Hanna gave short shrift to Israel’s announced intention to remove its troops from the northern sector of Ghajar village, in line with international guidelines.

“Ghajar is a minor issue for the future. The rhetoric was high at the beginning and has waned. It was political propaganda and was meant to be believed but the Israelis won’t give something for free,” Hanna said.

Silent Feminist Revolution

By Gema Martin Munoz

This commentary was published in The Jordan Times on 03/01/2011

 

Arab societies often appear rigid and resistant to change to outsiders, because what they see is these countries’ ruling regimes, which mostly do resist development and change. But this image is nearly the opposite of reality in Arab societies, where enormous dynamism is opening doors to many types of change, albeit at different speeds and in complex, contradictory ways - particularly when change from below is held back from above.

Consider Arab women. The predominant image is of a passive, exotic, and veiled victim-woman who reacts to events instead of actively participating in them. She is an impersonal object of communal stereotypes that sustain cultural prejudices.

In fact, Arab societies are engaged in a process of immense and irreversible change in which women are playing a crucial role. During the last half-century, intense urbanisation and feminisation of the workforce in all Arab countries has propelled women into the public arena on a massive scale.

During this period, differences in schooling levels between boys and girls have lessened everywhere - though at different speeds. Indeed, in many Arab countries, more girls than boys are now in secondary and higher education, which shows that parents consider their daughters’ education to be just as important as that of their sons. And all surveys show that young men and women want to study and have a job before they marry. (Moreover, they increasingly want to choose their own partner.)

At the same time, demographic shifts, along with social and economic factors affecting education and work, are forcing profound change on the traditional model of the Arab family. Higher ages for marriage and declining fertility - resulting directly from widening use of artificial contraception - are reducing family size to something much closer to the “nuclear families” of the West. The Maghreb region may lead in this regard, but the phenomenon is observable throughout the Arab world, even in the most rigidly conservative states.

This new family model has gained so much force that it is imposing itself on rural society, too, where the decline of the agrarian economy is accompanied by a strong shift towards smaller families. This change is occurring at slightly different speeds across the Arab world, but often it is occurring simultaneously in town and country.

Not surprisingly, these changes have led to a redistribution of power between old and young - and between men and women. We are now witnessing a progressive weakening of patriarchy, reinforced by the shift from traditional to more nuclear families.

Of course, these changes do not mark a sharp break with the past. All change reflects local compromises with tradition and with patriarchal laws, and different rates of adjustment between old and new ways of life. The changes, however, are notably weaker and more complex in countries like Palestine and Iraq, owing to the grave conflicts they have been undergoing.

The dynamics of change in Arab societies are rarely accompanied by change in the political system. Most states resist transferring the processes of social transformation into their legal framework. They fear, with reason, that extending freedoms and developing individual autonomy within the family - and so weakening patriarchal authority - could lead to a questioning in the public arena of the ideological basis of state power.

The result is widespread invocation by governments of religious norms, and to a lesser extent references to tradition, in order to legitimise the continuation of patriarchal rule. “State feminism” is generally more a demonstration of rhetoric or political symbolism, concerned primarily with projecting a progressive image internationally, than it is a real motor for change.

Undoubtedly, however, the region’s political authorities, no less than families themselves, will be forced to accept the inconsistencies of the traditional model when it comes to the transformation of the condition of women. This change will affect many others, and it must be analysed from an Arab perspective, as well as from outside that perspective.

This is particularly necessary because the situation of women is one of the main benchmarks that the outside world, and particularly the West, uses to assess the Arab world. And, unfortunately, such assessments tend to focus on the supposed immobilism that derives from Islamic norms, which obscures knowledge of the real changes that are taking place.

Indeed, the predominant view of Arab societies often stifles outsiders’ ability to break free of their belief that Islam confines all Arab women in the same way, when in reality they experience very different conditions. This prevents many from seeing, much less evaluating, the deep changes taking place in Arab societies - and how women are driving those changes forward. The West thus risks depriving itself of an important key to understanding the Arab world today, and as it will be tomorrow.

The writer is director general of Casa Árabe and professor of sociology of the Arab and Islamic World at Madrid’s Autonomous University. ©Project Syndicate, 2010. www.project-syndicate.org

Dead Terrorists Will Go To Hell

By Ahmed AlJarallah
This commentary was published in the Arab Times on 03/01/2011

MAY the curse of Allah, the angels and the entire humankind be unto those who toy with the security of Egypt — the land of peace, safety and security. God Almighty describes Egypt as the land of tranquility. Those who perpetrated the bloodletting of innocent people in the early hours of the New Year inside a church in Alexandria are human devils without religious knowledge and conscience. The dead ones among the perpetrators are burning in hell, while the dead church members are in paradise with the martyrs and the righteous.

The human devils who perpetrated the terrorist activity in the church do not represent Islam or any other religion but themselves. Egypt’s Coptic Christians understand this very well, because they have been part of the society prior to the Islamic conquest. They are intelligent and well-versed enough to realize that the perpetrators are not Egyptians and not by any chance related to Islam or Christianity. They are simply human devils who deserve to be sent to the lowest part of hell.

Those confused minds are determined to toy with security of Egypt, but they cannot succeed in destroying the largest Arab nation whose leadership has been ensuring stability in Arab and Islamic nations, as well as the entire world for several decades. Despite all the incidents the region has gone through, Egypt remains the benchmark based on which the Arab nations repel political illnesses befalling them. Although we know that Egypt — government and citizens — is strong enough to ward off a handful human devils, we still need to ask a question: what do destroyers want from Egypt? What is happening and why now? What do the devils want from the beautiful Cairo and the great Alexandria? What do they want from the safe oasis that enjoys a flow of wealth from all angles? Are they planning to deprive people the blessings of Allah so they can face the wrath of God?

Everybody in that country, especially the Coptic Christians, know that the devils will not escape punishment since security in countries is like health in the body. This action will not go without punishment in a country that has since long realized that religion belongs to God and the country is for all and sundry. The country remains stable even in difficult situations. All Egyptians understand that terrorism is alien to their tolerant culture. Terrorism is heresy from people with bad minds and heresy causes people to stray, while going astray leads to hell. We wish to reiterate that those who committed this heresy are in hell’s fire, while martyrs of the church are in paradise, whether the crazy devils like it or not.

The armed forces swore before Egyptian leadership a few days ago that mutual respect among all citizens means loyalty to the nation. It is in this national harmony perspective we look at Egypt. President Hosni Mubarak translated this clearly in his directives to citizens and the security apparatus after the sinful attack. He said, “Every Egyptian, Coptic Christian or Muslim, should stand firm in unison to face the terrorists and those toying with Egyptian security, stability and unity of citizens.” He directed the security apparatus to promptly apprehend the criminals. Let’s commend this wonderful position and heed the call of the leader known for his firm stance against evil perpetrators in the country. He will surely fight the dissidents to a standstill until he gets rid of them from the land of peace...Egypt.

We May Be Witnessing A New Age Of Christian Persecution

By Mark Seddon

This commentary was published in The Independent on 02/02/2011

In villages and monasteries in northern Iraq, and in churches in Baghdad, Irbil and Mosul, it is still possible to hear Assyrian Christians talking and praying in ancient Aramaic, said to be the language of Christ. Fewer in number now, the Assyrians are the direct descendants of the empires of Assyria and Babylonia, the original inhabitants of Mesopotamia. The Church of the East, currently presided over by Archbishop Gewargis Sliwa in Baghdad is the world's oldest Christian church.

Before the toppling of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi Christian population numbered some one and half million. By and large, Saddam's Ba'athist government didn't discriminate against the country's minorities; indeed, Iraq's veteran Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz was the most visible of the country's Christians. Today, barely 400,000 remain, with church leaders claiming that organised ethnic cleansing is taking place, unchallenged. Iraq's Christians have in the past been accused of collaborating with Britain and America, and while both Sunni and Shia political leaders say they want Iraq's Christians to remain, some church leaders are urging their remaining flock to abandon Iraq before it is too late and they are massacred.

If al-Qa'ida has its way, this ancient culture and people will soon be no more. In recent days, grenade and bomb attacks killed two more Christians and injured 18 more in Baghdad. Motorcyclists drove down streets, targeting Christian homes. Back in October, suicide bombers attacked the Church of Our Salvation in Baghdad, killing 58, before – and this was unreported at the time – grotesquely blowing themselves up, along with a child hostage, at the altar. In a statement afterwards, al-Qa'ida said: "Christians are a legitimate target."

Tensions between Muslims and Christians are not confined to Iraq: yesterday morning, at least seven people were killed and 24 injured in an explosion at a Coptic Christian church, possibly in retaliation for the rape of a Muslim girl.

Several years ago, I helped set up Save the Assyrians, to put pressure on Iraq to protect its minorities. The campaign had all-party support in Britain and a role in persuading the European Parliament to work with the Iraqi authorities to acknowledge the rights of Iraq's Christians. Britain has a special responsibility towards the Assyrians, who helped the British to police Iraq in the early years of the last century. Thousands were massacred in 1932 for "collaborating".

Now, Iraq's remaining Christians want an autonomous Christian province in their ancient Ninevah Plains homeland in northern Iraq. While Britain or the US may not help their cause, for obvious reasons, the UN, EU and Commonwealth could add their not inconsiderable weight. President Talabani of Iraq declared in November that he had "no objection to a Christian province in Iraq". One Assyrian exile in Britain, however, told me, "They keep talking, but nothing happens."

There is a widespread view among the Iraqi Christian diaspora that their government is simply allowing what some now see as an inevitable and unstoppable exodus of one of the world's most ancient civilisations.

Al-Qa'ida will have judged that a continuing campaign of terror could send Iraq's remaining Christians fleeing within a decade. The terrible irony is that the fate of Iraq's ancient Christian communities may have been sealed when the avowedly Christian leaders of Britain and America decided to topple Saddam Hussein.

Saudi Arabia, Declassified

By Mohammed Hasan Alwan
This Op-Ed was published in The New York Times on 01/01/2011

Of all the places affected by the WikiLeaks cables, few drew as much attention as Saudi Arabia, thanks to its strategic location, controversial image and global economic position. And this is a country that, according to many outsiders, is about to boil over with fundamentalist, anti-Western rage, and here were documents that showed Riyadh in collusion with Washington.

But that’s not what Saudi society is like at all, and the public and government reaction to the cables proves it.

The documents were certainly revealing. One reported on a Saudi proposal to invade Lebanon and root out Hezbollah; another told of a party where liquor was abundant and some guests were prostitutes.

But generally speaking, all Saudi politics is local — just as it is in the United States. Public debates focus on domestic concerns, not international issues; most Saudis have more to worry about than diplomatic scandals. As Mahmood Sabbagh, a popular newspaper columnist, told me, “People were more joking than concerned about them.”

What’s more, Saudis and their government are generally in agreement on foreign policy: it was heartening for many Saudis to read cables exposing Riyadh’s commitment to preventing Iranian nuclear proliferation.

True, the government was not happy, but it was more concerned about the leaks’ impact on global diplomacy. Prince Turki al-Faisal, who had served as the director general of the Saudi intelligence agency and as the ambassador to the United Kingdom and the United States, called for Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, to be punished for harming countries’ diplomatic integrity.

But that was about it. And instead of using its heavy hand to block access to sites carrying the cables, the government officially remained silent. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented only briefly, using the extremely tranquil language with which Saudi officials often react to negative international news: “WikiLeaks does not concern the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and, therefore, the government is not interested in commenting on it.” This was not the sound of a government worried about an upset public.

It was right. The government judged correctly that most Saudis would decide that the documents were old news: an echo of familiar rhetoric (the foxiness of American foreign policy) or established fact (the government’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions).

Moreover, according to Fouad al-Farhan, a social activist, Riyadh deftly recognized that many of the leaked documents weren’t all that harmful to Saudi Arabia’s image, and the rest did little actual harm.

Saudi society is not without its concerns and tensions. But in this case, the place that many assume to be a boiling pot, with its young population and conservative rules, received the WikiLeaks documents as a cooling liquid rather than fuel for the fire.

MOHAMMED HASAN ALWAN,  is a Saudi novelist.

An Attempt To Assassinate Egypt

By Ghassan Charbel

This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 02/01/2011

Arabs received with fear and horror the news of the terrorist attack on the Coptic church in Alexandria. They saw in it what is more serious than a passing massacre and considered it to be part of the prelude of total darkness that threatens our societies and countries. It was hard for them to separate this new crime from previous ones that fall in the same context: a broad assassination program that targets the idea of coexistence itself. It targets Arabism, which is able to embrace all the constituents of Arab societies despite their religious or sectarian differences. It also targets the tolerance of Islam, which exhorts the provision of safety to those who live in its midst.

It is the right of Arabs to feel terrified. It suffices to follow the news and what they carry about Iraqi Christians fleeing their country, despite the fact that their roots there go a long way back in history. Unfortunately, the program of emptying Iraq from its Christians has undeniably succeeded. This success has extremely grave repercussions on Iraq and Arabs, as it offers tangible evidence on the impossibility of coexistence. This heralds new rounds in Iraq, particularly with the continued attempts of conflict-makers to revive its fire whenever it calms down. It is also certain that the enemy Israel is the primary beneficiary from the announcement of the impossibility of coexistence among Arabs themselves.

It is the right of Arabs to feel terrified. Before the assassination program moved to Alexandria, we witnessed the fragmentation of national unity in Yemen, and the awakening of sectarian demarcation lines in several countries in the region. We also witnessed an unprecedented relapse in Sunni-Shiite relations in Lebanon, which used to present itself as an Arab model of coexistence among religions and sects.

The Alexandria massacre came amidst this dark picture. It is different in its methods and messages from the quasi-ordinary problems of coexistence, which register from time to time tensions between Muslims and Copts in Egypt. What increases the gravity of the incident are the threats made by Al Qaeda in Iraq about the Copts in Egypt and their places of worship. Moreover, the massacre came a mere few days before the poll that will take place in the South of Sudan and that will probably result in the secession with the North. Announcing the divorce in Sudan will be a resounding acknowledgement of the failure of the coexistence experience there. There is no need to recall how special is the Egyptian-Sudanese relation, and the meaning of the establishment of an independent state in Southern Sudan, whether in relation to coexistence or to the Nile river.

What also increases the gravity of the incident is a statement issued by Al Qaeda in Gaza: “We address ourselves to Christians in general and to those who are in Gaza in particular, and tell them that they are no longer in a protection pact with Muslims”. The statement denounced the ruling of a Gaza court to execute a Muslim citizen who killed a Christian citizen. The logic of dealing with part of the citizens as if they were hostages or an extension of the outside because of their religious belonging is dangerous if it is implemented in Palestine or any other Arab land.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the massacre that targeted the Copt worshippers in Alexandria also targeted every Muslim in Egypt. Indeed, the crime is no less than an attempt to assassinate Egypt through the assassination of its national unity and religious diversity. It would also be no exaggeration to say that any success of this assassination attempt breaks the back of the nation and rapidly pushes it to the tunnels of total darkness. Indeed, the nation would not improve for the better if it is ailing or drowning in a sea of hatred and divorce among its constituents.

The attempt to ignite the demarcation lines among the constituents of the Egyptian people is a continuation of the attempt to ignite the demarcation lines among religions and sects on all the Arab territory. Confronting this program needs more than a security confrontation; it needs boldness in intellectual and cultural confrontation as well as serious consideration of the conditions of protecting stability and the related development and politics. It needs a true and comprehensive cooperation among the Arab countries, as danger threatens everyone, and the black storm will not spare anyone if it succeeds in assassinating Egypt.

Sudan And The "Poor" State

By Hussein Shobokshi
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 02/01/2011
 
Sudan is a country that has always been described as a ‘rich’ Arab state, on account of its agricultural capacity, mineral reserves, readily available water supply, fertile geography, and the capabilities of its diverse populace. However, the political disarray in Sudan has meant that this potential is only ‘theoretical’, and just black ink on white paper, providing neither profit nor nourishment.
 
The people of Sudan have endured a diverse political menu of problems. At times, the country championed a right-wing ideology, whilst on other occasions it leaned towards the socialist camp, whereby the public became “the brothers of the struggle”, and the ruling leaders were “the comrades”. Then came the sudden decision to apply Shariaa law. Politicians seized upon young delinquents, and cut off their hands as a punishment for stealing. However, they forgot to apply the same punishments to those [in power] who were “consuming” public money. After this ‘selective’ application of Shariaa was overlooked, an emergency system of governance was installed with its iron fist, prisons and secret police. Then the democratic trend returned, along with political parties, after a coalition government was formed promising civil authority, and parliamentary elections. It was a period of media freedom, bold platforms and an active parliament, yet the ruling government was weak, erratic and fragmented. Most recently, a military coup occurred [in 1989], known ironically by the term “the National Salvation Revolution”, (in a manner similar to the July Revolution in Egypt, which was initiated by a military coup, launched by a handful of officers).
 
The National Salvation Revolution led to the abolition of newspapers, the suspension of parliament, and the imprisonment of opposition members. A military government was installed, with its senior members controlling the country’s resources and companies. Discontent became clear amongst those who felt that their care, attention and development had been neglected. Voices were raised crying out injustice, and subsequently began to call for independence, and a way out of this odious hegemony. All this was happening under the watchful eye of the current Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir.
 
Today, al-Bashir sees the south of his country, and the major source of oil wealth, preparing to secede from the motherland, and thus disprove the pretense that Sudan is a homeland to accommodate all. He must assess his position, even if just a little, and realize that he has now seriously entered a stage of political bankruptcy. Sudan is no longer a low-income country economically, but its poverty has been inflicted by al-Bashir’s politics. This political poverty is characterized by the ‘threat’ that Sudan will implement Shariaa law in the event of a separation between the north and the south!
 
Al-Bashir’s threat to implement Shariaa law comes across as if he is threatening to use a nuclear weapon or oil as a weapon, and to this we say; Brother, adopt Shariaa law or don’t adopt it!

Al-Bashir’s final political playing card is to become the ‘Wali al Faqih’, or the spiritual leader of the National Salvation Revolution. He has already described himself as military, then political, then electoral, then southern, Darfuri, northern, and national, and finally economic. Now he must play the religious role!