The Gaza Strip...Back To Square One?

By George Semaan

This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 27/12/2010

 

In recent years, the Gaza Strip has been – and remains – the most complex issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process. In the summer of 2005, Ariel Sharon decided to unilaterally withdraw from Gaza. The Israelis held that getting rid of the strip would make it easier for them to focus on the problems of the West Bank, and would absolve them of the commitments of the Road Map for Peace, or in other words, would help them emasculate the negotiations. However, facts on the grounds went on to prove the opposite of this. Hardly two years had gone by when Hamas seized control of Gaza, which was followed by the strict blockade on the Strip. And then another two years later, war was waged against the city. Then this year, there was the crime committed by the Israeli navy against the Freedom Flotilla and the Turkish vessel Mavi Marmara.

In truth, the atmosphere surrounding the Gaza Strip these days amid political deadlock in the region, especially the hindrance that U.S. effort to revive the peace process are being subjected to, are reminiscent of the circumstances that led to the Israeli war on Gaza two years ago. Despite the fact that both the Israelis and the Palestinians have shown their keenness before the United Nations on maintaining calm, nothing prevents the possibility that the region is on the verge of a new war in the Gaza Strip. Neither did rocket fire stop, nor have the occupation forces halted their aggression; instead, the air is rife with their bellicose threats.

Throughout the past two years, the front has not been as tense as it is now. Israel is gearing up. It has filed a complaint before the Security Council, in an attempt to put a stance on the record in anticipation of what might happen in the future. Hamas responded by saying that it will lodge a complaint with the UN regarding the Israeli retaliation and threats of further aggression. Egypt, too, has gotten involved, warning of the dangers of the situation, bearing in mind some of the campaigns it has suffered during the previous war on Gaza. The Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor warned Hamas that Israel might be forced to carry out a military operation similar to operation Cast Lead, which Israel launched two years ago against the Gaza Strip, if rockets continue to be launched from the Strip, and threatened to retaliate against any operation. Meridor also held Hamas responsible for any rockets launched, and said that the recent war has achieved the desired deterrence, but that it did not end Hamas’s control of Gaza or secure the release of the captured soldier Gilad Shalit.

But this was not the only failure. The blockade, too, has failed to weaken Hamas’s stranglehold, as did the war on Gaza two years earlier. While it is true that the war has deterred Hamas and forced it to abide by an undeclared truce, it is also true that rocket fire has yet to stop. Some Israeli military leaders have even expressed their fears in the aftermath of the incidents where Cornet type missiles have been fired at an Israeli tank, considering that this type of missiles threatens the balance of power. This is exactly the case with the front in southern Lebanon as well. Whenever the political situation at the level of the negotiations or otherwise falters, some ruckus becomes necessary, and the arming of Hezbollah by Syria and Iran is thus invoked. This is the policy of trying to maintain the required level of deterrence, or to remind everyone of it from time to time.

True, Hamas has renewed its ‘commitment’ along with the Palestinian factions to calm, as expressed by Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar, when he said, “based on the realities of power and the size of the sacrifices we have made, we declare at this stage our commitment to the truce with the occupation”. However, it is also true that the head of Hamas’s Political Bureau has reiterated the necessity of resistance, saying that “the only real option for the Palestinian people is resistance and not negotiations”.

Meshaal’s message is plain and clear. It is first addressed to Abu Mazen, and its bottom line is that the only real alternative to the failed negotiations is a return to resistance. It indeed is the basis and the sine qua non of any reconciliation. No doubt, Hamas is embarrassed by the current phase of ‘no resistance and no peace’, as is the case with Hezbollah. Nevertheless, Hamas is benefitting from the current period of calm to rebuild its arsenal and upgrade it with more advanced rockets and missiles, and also to reorganize its ranks after the blow it suffered two years ago. According to sources within the Israel military, its forces are no longer as weak as they used to be in late 2008. These sources elaborate in detail on Hamas’s efforts to reinforce its arsenal with weapons, which this time are capable of hurting strategic locations in the Jewish state, and which Hamas did not have in its possession two years earlier.

Nonetheless, war in Gaza remains a valid option that may provide a respite for more than one party involved in the conflict. For instance, a war on Gaza would give Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu more time to ward off Washington’s persistent demands regarding the resumption of the peace talks. This is while he is fully aware that the campaign to incite the world for decisive military action against Iran has failed to push Washington into embracing this risky and costly option, which would entail many an adverse impact on the regional level. Everyone is convinced that a diplomatic solution, backed by comprehensive and ever expanding sanctions, is the least costly solution.

In the absence of the war option in the Iranian issue, the option of war in Gaza, under the pretext of the Iranian missiles, and in light of the seizure of arms shipments bound for Hamas from Iran through African states, may deflect some of the criticism against the leader of Likud because of the support afforded to laws and measures that entrench ‘crude racism’ against Arabs and illegal immigrants from Africa. Moreover, if the war achieves its objectives, this may weaken Tehran’s ability to continue its military and financial support for Hamas. But before this and that, a new confrontation might place further hurdles to the Palestinian Authority’s bid to adopt the option of declaring a state: Would it be possible to declare it in the West Bank alone without Gaza?

Meanwhile, such a war would relieve the Palestinian Authority from the burdens of massive U.S. and non-U.S. pressure being put on it to resume negotiations that are not only as futile as they appear now, but which have also damaged Palestinian interests and rights and drained the Palestinian Authority itself. They have also deepened the rift among the Palestinians, as publicly stated by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, who confirmed that the Palestinians have nothing left to concede when he said, “We recognized Israel’s right to exist in the Oslo agreement, and this recognition must be weighed in the gold scale. We have accepted a state on 22 percent of the land, and this is a painful and historical concession. There is nothing else left to concede”.

Intra-Palestinian dispute or conflict requires no evidence of its existence. It is enough to recall that the issues obstructing Palestinian reconciliation are only increasing, both on the political and security levels. While Hamas is holding on to the resistance option, Fayyad’s government asserts that all required institutions are now ready to usher in the promised Palestinian state, including forfeiting foreign financing of the budget in 2013. Fayyad’s government also reaffirms its commitment to fulfill its security obligations stipulated by the Road Map. This is what both Palestinian and Israeli officials boast. The Palestinian Authority does not conceal any complacency regarding arms, whether they belong to Hamas or other factions. This might explain Hamas’s wrath after a number of its members were arrested, and its demands for the Fayyad government to release them and end security cooperation with Tel Aviv.

However, war remains an adventure that is open to all possibilities and endless repercussions, and may not end with the desired results, even if the Israeli army needs to reassert its ability for deterrence and to restore its image that existed prior to the wars in south Lebanon and Gaza. Even the Iron Dome, which Tel Aviv relies upon, is unreliable for the army leaders except in protecting certain strategic positions! The two wars have shown that Israeli military power can no longer provide absolute control over the theater of operations. Despite all the damage it inflicted on the infrastructure, the war on Lebanon in July 2006 did not achieve its goals on the ground, such as the primary target of crushing Hezbollah, and in spite of the political gain Israel achieved through the war, namely, UNSC Resolution 1701. And indeed, it is now known that the resistance in Lebanon has restored its arsenal of rockets and upgraded it with more advanced weaponry, and so is the case in the Gaza Strip. True, the war that took place in late 2008 has caused indiscriminate destruction and death, but it failed to overthrow Hamas and end its control of Gaza, and also to prevent it from rearming.

Beyond this, who can guarantee that the war will remain limited to Gaza? What prevents its spread towards the south of Lebanon, and possibly beyond? If the ‘Defiance Camp’ felt that there is an attempt to strike Hamas out of the regional balance of power, while the Special Tribunal for Lebanon looms over Hezbollah’s shoulders with the aim of striking it out later, then what would prevent a flare-up in the southern Lebanese front? Perhaps this would provide a way out of local Lebanese complications, or would be an attempt to compensate for the damage that an indictment by the tribunal would cause to the party’s image, both at home and abroad. This is not to mention what opening a new front would entail in terms of domestic confusion in Israel.

Israel is no longer capable of achieving decisive victory in any war. It has fought one of its longest wars four years earlier, and another similar war in Gaza, without achieving its desired objectives. Instead, Israel seems powerless as it faces this new type of wars. It is now the balance of terror that governs the equation between Israel and Lebanon, and perhaps even Gaza, in spite of the calm on both fronts, and despite all that has been said about lessons that Israel has learnt from the last two wars. The rocket arsenal that the resistance possesses in Lebanon and Gaza is a source of great concern for the Jewish state, albeit their threat is not great enough to threaten the fate and future of the state as a whole, even when Iran hints that any new war will push Israel to the sea…So will Netanyahu venture and meet the same fate as Ehud Barak?

Israel, Briefly A Victim Of Fire, Is A Fire-Starter

By Diana Buttu
This commentary was published in The Daily Star on 27/12/2010

With several international aircraft maneuvering the skies above Carmel recently, the scene resembled a synchronized air show with airplanes diving and peaking in perfect tune. 

Bright yellow fire-extinguishing aircraft ascended sharply among the green pine trees spraying bright orange fire retardant and in the distance the yellow and red flames of the Carmel fire danced. Israelis of all walks descended upon Danya – a posh Haifa neighborhood – to witness what many Israeli onlookers called the “rescue operation.” Fathers graciously pointed out to their young children where each of the aircraft originated (France, the US, Sweden, and so on) while others criticized the Israeli government for not having enough materials and equipment to extinguish a fire of this magnitude. “I hope they learn some lessons,” remarked one onlooker, presumably referring to the Israeli government.

But as I watched the fire rage, listened to endless statements of support from the international community, including from US President Barack Obama and the Palestinian Authority, I could not help but think about the world’s many double standards – even as they relate to disasters. Don’t misunderstand me: Haifa is no less dear to me (or to any Palestinian) than any of its current residents. But Gaza is also valuable to me.

Where were the international forces – those belonging to Azerbaijan, the UK, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Italy, Jordan, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and particularly the US – when Israel brutally set Gaza ablaze two years ago this month, killing not 41 but more than 1,400 civilians?

Where were these same countries when Israeli forces, similarly devastated Lebanon four years ago? Where were the beautiful airplanes in the sky maneuvering to try to stop Israel’s man-made disaster? The only airplanes we saw then were the ones that destroyed nearly 60,000 Palestinian homes and factories, completely decimating 3,500 structures; aircraft drones designed to terrorize 1.5 million Palestinians; and aircraft designed to plunge Gaza into perpetual darkness or ensure that thousands are without a clean water supply.

Why then the different treatment? Perhaps the difference is that it is easier and “less controversial” to rush to extinguish fires that threaten trees than fires that threaten people. But if that were the case, where were all of these countries who recently helped extinguish the Carmel fire when Israeli settlers once again set olive groves and other Palestinian trees ablaze? Where was the fire retardant material? The fire-fighters? Where were the Israeli fire rescue teams rushing in support of Palestinians just as Palestinian firefighters rushed in their support?

Lest I appear “ungrateful” I must note that over $5 billion from the international community was pledged to Gaza’s reconstruction to clean up the mess that Israel created (with a parenthetical note that two years later the situation in Gaza is no better, owing to Israel’s continued siege).

Indeed there are many lessons to be learned. Israel has undoubtedly learned it is better at setting other nations on fire than at extinguishing its own fires, and that lighters are more devastating than Qassams and Katyushas. One can dream that Israel will learn those in glass houses should not throw stones. But as is often the case, Israel will simply take away what it needs to boost its rescue services before it sets another country aflame. It is hoped Israel has learned that non-indigenous objects – like pine trees planted in place of ethnically cleansed Palestinian villages such as Al-Tira and Ayn Hawd – do not survive well in the Middle East (though looking at the latest settlement announcements, it is clear that this message about non-indigenous objects has not yet registered).

For Palestinians, there are also lessons. We cannot take comfort in outward statements decrying Israel’s actions, in the face of a history of warm relations. For example, despite Israel’s point-blank killing of Turkish activists aboard the Gaza-bound flotilla in May this year, Turkey cozied up to Israel – just as it did in the aftermath of Israel’s brutal attack on Gaza to purchase Israeli military equipment.

But if there is one fundamental lesson all parties have learned it is this: the different treatment between the international “rescue” of an Israeli forest and the lack of similar aid to Palestinians has little to do with trees, nature or the environment. Rather, the international community will always rush to Israel’s side when it is on fire, but will never stop Israel from setting fires elsewhere.

Diana Buttu is a human-rights lawyer and a former legal adviser to the Palestinian negotiating team. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.

New Year Hopes

By Nermeen Murad

This commentary was published in The Jordan Times on 27/12/2010

 

2010 will end in less than a week and I am looking forward to new beginnings in 2011.

Most of my hopes - as many people’s - are personal, related to my and my husband’s personal and professional growth, our children’s health and happiness and our family’s and friends’ continued prosperity and positive well-being.

2010 held many rewards, but also some challenges. Many lessons have been learned. We discovered that good effort is often rewarded but also equally resented. We discovered that democratic expression is only accepted in theory, but in reality is denigrated as “bad marketing”. We discovered that success can be earned, but more often has to be bought and bargained for. We discovered that while individuality is celebrated, human beings prefer to move in packs.

We also discovered that the term “we Arabs” should be removed from our dictionary since Arabs and non-Arabs are all human beings with similar faults, qualities and reactions. We concluded that all religious holidays should be celebrated by followers of all faiths, to showcase the importance of spirituality and moral order, and highlight the futility of exclusionism.

We discovered that peace of mind has more to do with the budget available and the creativity in spending it than with any activity of the mind. We discovered that good health is 20 per cent genetics, another 20 per cent hard labour and 60 per cent abstinence from the joys of life. Short-term fun is sinful and long-term fun is contingent on the denial of short-term fun.

On a personal level, I learned that: giving your children their freedom brings them closer to you; a good husband (spouse) is a gift from God; a good accountant can save your business; and an occasional heart to heart with your best friend can maintain your sanity.

From the world of politics and economics, there were some lessons to be learnt as well. Football is not a sport, but a game to test political belonging; social violence is not a fist fight at the end of a party, but a politically void expression of mass anger; appointment to the head of a Cabinet ministry is a life-long economic perk; elections are a privilege and not a right; a vote of no confidence translates into political suicide; use of the right to free expression is political suicide; multiparty systems is a political theory from a foreign book of paradigms; tomato shortages are a business opportunity; women’s causes are bartered for political gains; the peace process is a pseudo name for an agreement to delay resolution; diplomats stay diplomatic as long as they are getting their way and political opposition is just another way to say political bankruptcy.

Gullible human beings that we are though, we have a list of high expectations for the year 2011. We hope that: those who resent criticism are able to be challenged by it rather than angered by its motives; peace advocates finally drop the process and begin the progress; political order is allowed to replace violent and angry expression; newspapers become a forum for free voices and not propaganda; a smaller number of people ascend to the post of Cabinet minister this coming year; Parliament and government partner in their service of the people; women are reinstated as citizens equal to men; children are taught to dream, aspire and achieve, and that we all learn to criticise less and appreciate more, and before anyone else says it, starting with me.

Happy New Year!

Turkey: The New Indispensable Nation

This article was published in Gulf Times on 27/12/2010

Mavi Marmara ship seen through the Hagia Sophia Museum as it returns to Istanbul yesterday after Israel’s deadly raid on an aid flotilla bound for Gaza Strip on May 31. Turkey has objected to Israel’s aggression in and blockade of Gaza Turkey put its imprint as one of the most influential countries not only on 2010, but on the first decade of the third millennium. At the start of the new decade, too, Turkey’s geopolitical position, rich historical heritage, cultural depth, well-educated young population, ever-strengthening democracy, growing economy, and constructive foreign policy make it an indispensable country in a world transformed by rapid globalisation.  By making use of all of its assets, Turkey is contributing to regional stability and peace and working towards a global order based on justice, equality, and transparency. As an emerging power, Turkey will continue to realise its own potential and simultaneously contribute to global peace. The chaotic conditions of the post-Cold War world have made civil wars, occupations, nuclear armament, and human trafficking chronic problems. While globalisation offers new opportunities, it also causes new global problems and deepens the inequalities embedded in the world order. It is no longer possible to sustain the current world order, which, based as it is on a skewed notion of centre-periphery relations, merely produces injustice and inequality. Turkey seeks to contribute to regional and global peace by facilitating democratic reforms domestically and implementing a principled foreign policy. As a Nato member, Turkey aims to become a full member of the European Union and establish cordial relations with all of its southern and eastern neighbours. Turkey’s posture – looking both East and West – is neither paradoxical nor inconsistent. On the contrary, Turkey’s multidimensional geopolitical position is an asset for the region. There are few countries that can play such a critical role. Turkey constitutes a new synthesis because of its ability to link such diverse qualities and backgrounds. Turkey is thus capable of overcoming the dichotomies of East-West, Europe-Middle East, and North-South. Indeed, this capacity is essential because we need to leave behind the Manichean disagreements, conflicts, and fears of the Cold War era. Those who see the world through those old, fearful lenses have difficulty understanding Turkey’s rising profile and dynamism. But the realities of the twenty-first century necessitate a multi-dimensional and inclusive political perspective. Acting on these principles, Turkey is following a proactive foreign policy stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East and the Caucasus. This geography is Turkey’s natural historical and cultural hinterland. Turkey’s cultural and historical links with the peoples of these regions are deep and conducive to regional peace. Turkey cannot remain indifferent to this geography, for it stands at the center of it. History clearly shows that it is impossible to establish and sustain global peace without ensuring peace and stability in the Balkans and the Middle East. Turkey is following a constructive and inclusive policy for these regions, which are marked by remarkable models of cohabitation, science, arts, culture, and civilization. Due to our recent efforts, the wounds of the Bosnian war are being healed, facilitating peace and stability among Balkan peoples. Turkey’s efforts are also helping to prevent wars in the Middle East, and our intense efforts have helped keep a diplomatic track open on the Iranian nuclear issue. Moreover, we are helping to facilitate political stability in Iraq and helping the Nato mission in Afghanistan. And, of paramount importance, Turkey is making enormous efforts to help establish an independent and sustainable Palestinian state – efforts that are appreciated by Turkey’s Western and Eastern friends alike. Today, Turkey is following a policy that represents a sense of justice in the Middle East, and is working toward the removal of artificial borders and walls among the region’s peoples. We desire to live in a region where the dignity of every person is respected. That is why we have objected to Israel’s aggression in and blockade of Gaza, and will continue to do so. We know that it is not possible to attain global peace unless we establish sustainable peace in the Middle East, which requires resolving the Palestinian question. Therefore, we urge Israel and all other countries involved to follow constructive and peaceful policies. Motivated by these principles, Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and I showed through our “Alliance of Civilizations Initiative” in 2004 that cultural, historic, and religious differences are no reason for conflict. The basis for our approach to humanity is the following principle of the famous Turkish poet Yunus Emre: “We love and respect the created because of the Creator.” As a result, we stand firmly opposed to discrimination against any society, religion, sect, culture, or country. I consider anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and prejudice against Christianity crimes against humanity, whose common values and ethical rules oblige us to confront and reject all forms of discrimination. Besides its cultural, historic, and diplomatic values, Turkey’s vibrant economy has become a source of stability and welfare. When my party took office in 2002, the Turkish economy totaled around $250bn. Today, Turkey’s annual GDP has reached $800bn, making it Europe’s sixth largest economy and the 17th largest in the world. It has also been one of the least impacted by the global economic crisis, with growing foreign trade, a strong banking system, and diverse and prospering small and medium-size enterprises. Thus, the Turkish economy returned to its pre-crisis levels in 2010. All of these qualities have transformed Turkey into an attractive place for business, media, artists, diplomats, students, and non-governmental organisations from around the world. Turkey’s ever-increasing soft power is becoming one of its most significant traits, which we will continue to use to enhance regional and global peace. The impact of globalisation has brought about a rebalancing of power, but the demand for justice, transparency, and legitimacy remains constant. The global problems of our times necessitate co-operation, political will, and sacrifice. That is why we are following a proactive policy in multilateral institutions to facilitate an equitable sharing of our world’s resources. Turkey will continue to work toward a just and equitable global order in 2011 and beyond. This is a responsibility emanating from our history, geography, and the universal values that we hold. — Project Syndicate *** Recep Tayyip Erdogan is Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey.

Holding Out Hope For Sudan

This editorial was published in the Los Angeles Times on 26/12/2010

A scheduled election next month is likely to result in southern Sudan seceding from the north. But the region's problems are so numerous that the likelihood of a happy, prosperous, democratic nation coming into being is low.

Anyone who has travelled to both the desert-like north of Sudan — where the capital city of Khartoum is located — and the flood-prone south cannot help but notice the extraordinary differences between them. The people of the north are mostly lighter-skinned, Muslim Arabs. Those in the south tend to be darker-skinned, Christian and animist rather than Muslim, more recognizably African. The north borders the Arab nations of Egypt and Libya; the south leads to Kenya, Uganda and Congo.

These disparate regions were melded into one country as part of the same blunt imperial exercise that deformed so much of the world: The British, that is, decided it should be so, creating a nearly 1-million-square-mile nation whose linguistic, cultural, racial and historical contradictions were readily apparent long before the country became independent in 1956. As independence neared, the people of the south were increasingly dominated by those in the north, pressured to adopt Arabic as their official language, subjected to increased proselytizing to convert to Islam, and ultimately placed under the political control of the government in Khartoum.

Unsurprisingly, the marriage was an unhappy one from the start, and the result has been a half-century of violence — cross-border raids from the north, kidnappings, slavery, subjugation and war. Before it was settled with a landmark, comprehensive peace agreement in 2005, the south's struggle to free itself from northern rule was the longest-running civil war in Africa, leaving some 2.5 million people dead.

Now, if you believe the optimists, those long-ago wrongs may finally be righted. As a result of the 2005 peace deal, the people of southern Sudan were granted semi-autonomy and are now scheduled to vote in a Jan. 9 referendum on whether to secede entirely and form their own, separate country. The national government in Khartoum has agreed, under some duress, to abide by the results of the referendum. There are some 10 million people in the south, and an overwhelming number of those who vote are expected to opt for secession. If that happens, Africa's first new nation in nearly 20 years — the Republic of Southern Sudan, it may or may not be called — would be established.

But will it really be that easy? We hope so. It is long past time for the people of southern Sudan to undo this ludicrous geopolitical mistake. Still, the problems ahead are numerous. For one thing, there's the question of whether the north will allow the referendum to go forward at all. President Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir — who is famous for his role in the brutal Darfur campaign and who has been charged by the International Criminal Court with war crimes and crimes against humanity — was dead-set against the referendum but caved under pressure to agree. For months, Western observers have been expecting the north to undermine the elections, by postponing them or by using proxy militias and fake dissident groups to stir up trouble and subvert their legitimacy. So far that has not happened, and the vote is now widely expected to take place.

Even if it does, the likelihood of a happy, prosperous, democratic southern Sudan coming into being is low. According to United Nations statistics released in advance of the election, 85% of the people in southern Sudan can't read. There is one teacher for every 1,000 primary school students. Southern Sudan has one of the highest maternity and infant mortality rates in the world. More than 4 million people are on "emergency assistance," meaning that they will need food handouts this year. More than 1.5 million will face "severe food insecurity."

The United States, the United Nations and former South African President Thabo Mbeki have, to their credit, been pushing for a free and fair referendum and feverishly working with both sides to ensure that it goes forward peacefully. Now the world needs to begin to figure out what happens next if it passes. What, for instance, will become of the 2.5 million southern refugees still living in the north and dependent on the northern economy for their livelihoods? Will they be expelled? Will they be automatic citizens of the south or will they be stateless? How are borders to be drawn, and will they be hard borders or soft ones? There is currently a population of several hundred thousand people — many of them pastoralists, herding cattle and other livestock across the land — who move easily on a seasonal basis from north to south, as they have for hundreds of years. Will they require visas and travel papers?

Then there's the fact that some 80% of the country's lucrative oil reserves are in the south, and the north, as might be expected, is not eager to give up the revenue they bring in. At the moment, all the oil is exported via pipelines that run through the north, and revenue is split between north and south. It's time to negotiate a post-referendum arrangement that will divide revenue fairly and in a manner that avoids triggering renewed conflict.

There's also the question of how the south will be governed. Though it is culturally and ethnically distinct from the north, southern Sudan is itself a land of dozens of tribes and scores of languages; it has been unified in recent decades only by hatred of the government in Khartoum and the common quest for independence. No one would describe the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement as a particularly democratic organization; it is, rather, a former guerrilla army built on a "big tent" model in which many competing groups, each with its own agenda, came together to fight. When a new government emerges, however, the impoverished people of the new country will begin demanding services, democratic governance and the rule of law — and being "anti-Khartoum" will no longer be sufficient. It is unclear how or whether the SPLM will rise to the occasion.

Finally, there are Sudan's neighbors, which are understandably nervous about the emergence of a weak and fragile new state on their borders; no one wants to live next door to the next Somalia.

 All in all, there's reason for excitement and reason for concern. Six months ago, few would have expected the referendum to be proceeding as smoothly as it is. Then again, although further violence is not a certainty, it is far from unlikely. As exhilarating as election day will be, it is increasingly clear that the hard work will begin Jan. 10.

The Maghreb Project Reasserts Itself

By Mohammad el-Ashab

This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 26/12/2010

It is not true that conditions of stability throughout the Maghreb region vary greatly in intensity. Instead, they are closer to being an contagion that spreads, irrespective of differences between one country and another; thus it seems that Tunisia, which portrays itself as a model of stability upheld by an iron fist, has gotten caught up in the wave of violence, which recently hit the streets of Sidi Bou Zeid.

Prior to this extraordinary explosion, North African countries were understood to be trying to respond more closely to concerns of democracy in a way that would give the people more freedom of movement, of expressing its anger regarding unfair government decisions or socio-economic injustice. However, the experience of Tunisia confirms without a shadow of a doubt that moving away from democracy also moves things closer to antagonized sentiment and further conflicts. Nevertheless, linking the two cases, namely moving closer or further away from embracing modern laws and values, reflects a certain degree of tension that can only be contained through a solution that relies on openness.

Tunisia, which has teetered considerably in the direction of democratic openness, will have to juggle between what it believes to be a viable plan for economic prosperity, if only for a short time, and a political alternative that guarantees an improvement in socioeconomic conditions, based on strengthening the peaceful transfer of power. The winds of anger, when they come out of season, can sweep away everything.

Neighboring Algeria has been more impacted by uncalculated steps toward openness and enshrining political pluralism, on the rubble of the National Liberation Front’s domination of the country’s affairs throughout its modern history. It took years, and a high price was paid, before a ray of hope appeared at the end of the tunnel. Even though the Liberation Front is not the ruling party in Tunisia, as it brought together both civilian and military figures, the two countries share the following: they left behind the model of one ruling party that monopolizes political influence.

In Morocco as well, it took decades to see the features of a new political accord appear, bringing to power the fierce opponents of the regime of the late King Hassan II. However, this did not prevent the resumption of certain manifestations of social chaos. Another state in the Maghreb, the Libyan Jamahiriya, is searching for the features of this path, while the weakest state in the region, Mauritania, has followed the democratic path in its own fashion, allowing opposition voices to become more outspoken.

In a similar fashion to these developments on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, Spain once moved in the right direction. All it did was give the experience of General Franco sufficient time to run its course. Despite all of its political defects, it focused on boosting socio-economic conditions, so that when democratic openness came, Spain had no difficulties in catching the European “train,” at least in terms of absorbing the complex issues of progress, something that was concluded by espousing the democratic option. Spain was helped in this by the fact that Europe was able to absorb the experience of Spain, along with Portugal, as the Europeans were in urgent need of protecting their southern flank by expanding in this direction.

The irony is that the unity project that North Africans were championing at the end of the 1960s resembled the parallel direction the Europeans took; this began with a European common market, followed by the European Union, and then a unified currency. This did not rule out a comprehensive view of balance in EU membership, as the EU leaned toward attracting new partners, particularly from the former Soviet bloc after the Cold War ended.

However, amid this momentum, there was a setback for efforts for a Maghreb Union, even though these countries had not experienced destructive wars among them, as the Europeans had. In fact, this project had all the elements of success, because there were historical, geographical and spiritual realities that pushed things toward harmony and accord, and also because all of the conditions of economic integration in terms of infrastructures, resources, and human and material wealth strengthened the option of unity.

Today, the Maghreb unity project appears to be reasserting itself. It had failed in the past due to continued political disputes and different views on certain issues, which obstructed the natural path of such a project. However, the socio-economic aspect appears to be the one best poised to be absorbed, at least in terms of formulating the outlines of economic integration, lifting barriers, and benefiting from the region’s potential.

In the absence of political will, it will be difficult to move to the phase of useful action. It is unfair to suppose that things such as unrest and social upheaval might open people’s eyes to the advantages of a Maghreb Union - if not for the sake of launching a large-scale strategic endeavor that re-vitalizes the region, then at the least to do away with the socio-economic difficulties that the region suffers.

Arab Christians: The Escape From Extremism

 By Abdul Rahman al-Rashid
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 26/12/2010
 
Within a few days the southerners in Sudan will probably be voting for secession from the north, and then a state will be established and one of its aspects is that it will be the first Christian country in the region. Bear in mind that the Christians are not the majority of the population of the south, because the majority is a collection of subscribers to other beliefs, but the southern Christians are more numerous than the Muslims, and this makes the south a state of Christian character in its shape, and probably in its government.
 
The independence comes at the same time when some 14 million "Arab" Christians are facing a crisis, which is the most dangerous for their existence in a region in which they are historically the oldest inhabitants. They consider that they face particular discrimination and siege by the ideological and armed Islamist extremist groups. The Christians in Iraq today celebrate Christmas under armed protection that has been imposed on their churches after the latest massacre carried out by Al-Qaeda. The Christian Copts in Egypt recently went through a bloody confrontation, the Christians in Lebanon are in a continuous state of shrinking that increases with the rise in sectarian tension, and in Palestine; the numerical shrinking of the Christians is even more acute.The Christians in Jordan and Syria are less exposed to problems.
 
Despite the fact that the encroachment upon, and in some cases the deliberate terrorism against the Arab Christians is real, it is only a part of the dilemma of the entire region. This is because the Islamist extremism directed against the Muslims themselves is greater and more programmed by these groups. The fact is that the magnitude of the targeting of the Christians, whether in Iraq, Egypt, or Sudan, is limited, whether in the address or in the practice of the extremist groups. Indeed there is a campaign against the Arab Christians, but they certainly are the victims of the comprehensive violence led by the extremists; the campaign targets first and second the other schools of thinking such as the Sunnis and the Shiites, and targets the Muslim majority that disagrees with these groups on everything.
 
The problem of the Arab Christian citizen is the same problem as that of the other citizen in his individual rights and unknown future. This is a general situation, and not one peculiar to a sect or group. The cure for this problem is not through building states or returning to the time of the ghetto. Also it is regrettable that there is a project of semi-collective emigration, which has become the dream of the persecuted Christian, and also the dream of many of the persecuted, poor, and youths among the Arab Muslims, who share the queues for emigration visas every morning in front of foreign consulates hoping to escape to a better world.
 
The Christians are a minority that is getting smaller. They live, the same as the majority, between the jaws of a pincer of oppressive regimes and terrorist organizations. In this general climate the Christians are deprived of the same things of which the rest of the citizens are deprived; it does not seem that in the near future this will be transformed into a world over which the respect of individual rights and constitutionally-protected equal citizenship prevail. This is the crisis of all and not only of the minorities.
 
The talk about singling the Christians out for persecution and terrorism, apart from being not true, includes a spirit of capitulation to and serving of the aims of the extremist groups by getting rid of the Arab Christians, and removing a sector that shares the land, has rights, and is a fundamental constituent of the Arab culture.