Saturday, December 25, 2010
Saudi Liberalism: Is The Problem In The Name?
By Mshari Al-Zaydi
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 25/12/2010
Dr Abdullah al-Ghathami came out to criticize liberalism in Saudi Arabia, during an open lecture he gave at the King Saud University in Riyadh.
I watched this lecture in full, which was available online on the King Saud University's Faculty of Arts website. This recording lasted for around two hours.
For people seeking further information [about this lecture], please refer to the link on this website. As an ordinary observer, I was expecting a calmer approach from the famous Saudi critic, especially as Dr Abdullah al-Ghathami is one of few figures of the Saudi elite who has enriched the scene with his ideas, books, and even his "stories" such as his book detailing the "story of modernity." I was therefore surprised by Dr al-Ghathami’s approach, especially taking into account his distinguished presence and cultural role in Saudi Arabian academia and the marketplace of ideas.
In my opinion, I did not benefit [from this lecture], even though I was genuinely enthusiastic [to listen to it]. What I heard was no different to what I have heard and read before from the opponents of liberalism in Saudi Arabia over the past few years. It was true that Dr al-Ghathami, because he adopts an academic approach, was careful to ensure that he used academic terms, but the latest findings were no different to the "distorted" intellectual depiction of Saudi Arabian liberalism. In his lecture, he referred to a general and distorted perception of liberalism in Saudi Arabia, portraying it as having reached a dead-end. Al-Ghathami’s latest speech about liberalism merely served to underline the negative image of liberalism in the general perception of Saudi society. This is why al-Ghathami’s latest speech targeting and attacking liberalism was welcomed and echoed by the opponents of liberalism throughout Saudi Arabia, the majority of whom are members of the Islamic Awakening movement, or [religious] conservatives.
At this point, it is necessary to stress that the author of this article is in favor of all the cultural, social, and political phenomena in Saudi Arabia being studied, for we are in desperate need of these kinds of studies. Critiquing and indeed dissecting liberalism is not only permissible, but it is one of the most important duties for any scholar or researcher, including Dr al-Ghathami. As Saudi Arabian writer Abdullah al-Qafari put forward in his recent article in the "Riyadh" newspaper, even defining the term "Liberalism" is problematic in Saudi Arabia, as it is many other countries. This term seems to have developed into an object of popular satire, and a controversial social topic, and has therefore even been criticized and lampooned on satirical television programs such as "Tash ma Tash". However we expert more than this from scholars and researchers, as they are expected to investigate beyond the standard and oft-repeated definition, and in a professional and analytical manner, seek to reach an understanding, not support or oppose. This is a question of being devoted to an academic approach, but unfortunately this is something that did not happen in this instance, at least in my opinion.
Liberalism is an issue worthy of study, examination and analysis. It deserves to be placed in its historical, social and political context, and to be understood within the developments that have taken place in the Middle East. Specifically, these range from the dawn of the Al-Nahda [Arab Cultural Renaissance] to the end of the Cold War and the birth of the new world order under President George Bush Senior. We must also consider the rise of religious terrorism, which is something that existed before 9/11, contrary to what the opponents of liberalism tend to espouse in order to associate national reform with US foreign policy [following 9/11].
We can recall the acts of religious terrorism that struck Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as Algeria, not to mention the Al-Ulayya Bombings in Riyadh in 1995. We do not have to go far back in history to recall the Grand Mosque Seizure in 1979 by Juhayman al-Otaibi and his group, or the assassination of [late Egyptian President Anwar] al-Sadat in 1981 at the hands of Egyptian radical extremists.
All these events generated huge questions about the development of religious discourse and its reform in the Arab world. Many Arab intellectuals produced studies, some of them profound and wonderful, on the debates between the state and religion, tradition and modernity, and religious reform in general. This debate developed into a growing trend towards the necessity for political and religious reform. A famous theory soon emerged to the effect that religious intolerance and social rigidity were effects, rather than causes, the results of political despotism and autocracy. Egyptian sociologist and political dissident Saad Eddin Ibrahim was one of the most prominent advocates and defenders of this theory, and he believed that the only solution to this problem was for the immediately implementation of a democratic system, even if this would result in the fundamentalists coming to power. As a side note, we must say that Saad Eddin Ibrahim later distanced himself from this proposal. For his part, we see Dr al-Ghathami categorically putting forward the idea of elections in Saudi Arabia, however these would be elections in social clubs and social clubs alone, even if these elections bring extremists to power [in these social clubs].
The debate surrounding reform and development is an old one in the Muslim world; it almost seems to coincide with the birth of the concept of the Arab nation itself. The questions of freedom, secular and religious reform, and women's social reform, as well as other issues, were the fundamental fabric of the discourse during the Al-Nahda, particularly that by [Syrian Arab nationalist intellectual] Sati al-Husri, his colleagues, and their students.
Likewise in Saudi Arabia, the question of reform is considered an old one, particularly social, religious, and even political reform. Here we can recall the writings of [Saudi intellectual] Mohamed Hassan Awad and Abd al-Karim al-Juhayman.
A confrontation with the conservative and anti-modernist current soon began, particularly on the issue of women and the fight for female education, during the era of King Saud and King Faisal. The debate around social reform has also been well documented in the Saudi press.
Dr al-Ghathami is well aware of all these issues; he has even addressed some of them in his books. Therefore, is there nothing new to be said about the issue of reform in Saudi Arabia, or is the problem merely in the term "liberalism"?
This underplays the issue somewhat, because the problem does not lie in terms and definitions. Perhaps, Dr. al-Ghathami remembers a story that he himself previously mentioned about the problem that Saudi society has in dealing with the term "modernism" due to the criticisms made by key conservative literary figures.
In his book that deals with the story of modernity, Al-Ghathami recalls an occasion when traditionalists, modernists and media representatives participated in the Al-Janadriyah Heritage and Cultural Festival in 1988. At this time, the conservative critic Mohammad al-Malibari had announced his opposition to the term and indeed concept of modernism, saying that if a more appropriate concept was found, then he would not have a problem with the modernists. This prompted journalist Muhammad Sadiq Diyab to propose to rename this concept, and after much discussion he proposed to rename this "imaginary realism." Thus, we saw a new term coined, and an old term rejected, in the hope of ending the problem and stopping the criticism and attacks by the anti-modernists. However, of course, this did not happen, because the issue was not a problem of names and terms. These names were just a terminological construct veiling the real dispute regarding modernization and reform, amongst its supporters and opponents.
Let us discard the term liberalism for example. Let us throw it into the fire and re-define it under a new name: enlightenment, moderation, modernization, national reform, rationalism, or any other term you might choose. After a period of time, you would find that the opponents who distorted the first term will have gone on to distort the next!
Let's save our efforts and confine our discussions to the intellectual and dialectical content of the term, rather than exhausting ourselves in a fruitless struggle over the term itself.
The story is not a tale of names and terms; these issues have been discussed and analyzed in an academic manner. You can examine the validity of the terms with academic discipline, or even discuss them in general, but this must not become a preoccupation.
The story relates to the meaning [of the term], and the differences of opinion, regarding questions of reform and development. This is the core issue.
Lebanon: One Step In Return For Another?
By Walid Choucair
This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 24/12/2010
It is natural for the “great settlement” over the Lebanese crisis, resulting from the dispute over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, to be subject to tension between the parties concerned, whether domestic or foreign. Each side is striving to see that this settlement serves its interest, while everyone is agreed that it will involve compromises by both groups. The outlines of these compromises are gradually beginning to appear, amid strict secrecy about the details of this settlement.
It is natural for the “great settlement” over the Lebanese crisis, resulting from the dispute over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, to be subject to tension between the parties concerned, whether domestic or foreign. Each side is striving to see that this settlement serves its interest, while everyone is agreed that it will involve compromises by both groups. The outlines of these compromises are gradually beginning to appear, amid strict secrecy about the details of this settlement.
This secrecy is allowing the sides, especially local players, to give free rein to their imaginations, as some envision the aspects of this settlement. This is despite the fact that some figures and parties are issuing information about the settlement and discussing its contents; they lack the minimum level of credibility, which would require them to acknowledge that they are unaware of what the settlement contains. Going too far in predicting what it entails will result in disappointment, when this settlement is eventually announced.
However, the discussion of its broad outlines, and denying the rumors of what the settlement contains, is believable, amid the heavy confusion that surrounds the circulation of information about the settlement. The circulation of this information is due more to desires than facts, and attempts to hint at things without speaking candidly.
However, the reliable information about the settlement permits one to say that it has been completed. If the time remaining before the announcement of the settlement is being used to make contacts to fortify the settlement internationally, to allow Syria to obtain guarantees about its relations with western countries, especially the United States, in exchange for its “engagement” in achieving the urgent western demand to preserve stability in Lebanon through the settlement, whose provisions are being prepared with Saudi Arabia, then calling the Saudi-Syrian understanding the “Great Settlement” is something that conforms to the reality.
Leaving behind the narrow Lebanese maneuvering, the news about efforts to secure American guarantees that satisfy Syria impart even more seriousness to this settlement, irrespective of what these efforts lead to in the end. The important thing is to see that Washington’s failure to satisfy Syria with these guarantees does not cause a setback for these efforts, and to see the White House deal realistically with Syria’s desire for these guarantees, in line with the former’s affirmation of intent to preserve stability in Lebanon. This is especially because this settlement will likely be based on separating the track of the STL from that of Lebanese domestic relations, in order to guarantee civil peace, without giving in to the demand by the tribunal’s opponents to abolish it or obstruct its work. This is what concerns the American administration and Western countries.
In the promised settlement, there is enough to create the foundation of a discussion between Syria and the United States. This discussion would tackle the so-called guarantees for Syria, as Damascus fears continued US pressure, or at the least a decision by US President Barack Obama to ignore the policy of engagement with Syria. Meanwhile, Syria would wait for what Washington will offer, due to the Syrian belief that the failure of US policy in the region means Washington should embrace openness with Damascus, with nothing in return.
The Saudi-Syrian settlement offers a window by which Damascus would obtain these guarantees, if the matter is approached with a bit of modesty. If Washington has adopted a rule of exchanging one step for another in its engagement with Syria, which Washington believes to have been a disappointment, some items in the settlement will require seeing what Damascus has done as a step that should generate a step in return by the Americans.
The Saudi-Syrian settlement might refer to setting down a mechanism to treat the decision to remove Palestinian arms outside the camps (even though no one knows how solid the item is in the settlement). If this happens, a policy such as this, in exchange for Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s absorbing the repercussions of the likely indictment by the STL, deserves attention. The seriousness in treating this issue signals an implementation of one of the items in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, which Washington continues to insist on; it appears in the provision related to disarming non-Lebanese militias. Even if Damascus adheres to this item in the settlement without returning to the text of the resolution, and seeks with its Lebanese allies to implement it, then it is an implementation – in such a case, the only pending item will be the disarming of Lebanese militias. This is something that the Lebanese have decided to refer to the National Dialogue sessions among their leaders, and the White House earlier understood this move.
In the end, it is in Washington’s power to come up with a step that it can take, in return for a step by Damascus to implement an international resolution, as part of the latter’s quest for guarantees…
Thursday, December 23, 2010
Turkey And Israel Are Still Searching For A Magic Formula
By Soli Ozel
This commentary was published in The Daily Star on 24/12/2010
The forest fire recently on Israel’s Mount Carmel presented a timely opportunity for the Turkish and Israeli governments to climb down from crisis mode and look for an opening to start the normalization of relations. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan swiftly decided to send two firefighting aircraft as his “humanitarian and Islamic duty.” Rising to the occasion, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called his Turkish counterpart to show his appreciation, and at the site of the blaze personally thanked Turkish firefighters.
This commentary was published in The Daily Star on 24/12/2010
The forest fire recently on Israel’s Mount Carmel presented a timely opportunity for the Turkish and Israeli governments to climb down from crisis mode and look for an opening to start the normalization of relations. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan swiftly decided to send two firefighting aircraft as his “humanitarian and Islamic duty.” Rising to the occasion, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called his Turkish counterpart to show his appreciation, and at the site of the blaze personally thanked Turkish firefighters.
Palestinian Statehood
By John V. Whitbeck
This commentary was published in The Jordan Times
On December 17, Bolivia extended diplomatic recognition to the state of Palestine within its pre-1967 borders (all of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem). Coming soon after the similar recognitions by Brazil and Argentina, Bolivia’s recognition brought to 106 the number of UN member states recognising the state of Palestine, whose independence was proclaimed on November 15, 1988.
While still under foreign belligerent occupation, the state of Palestine possesses all the customary international law criteria for sovereign statehood. No portion of its territory is recognised by any other country (other than Israel) as any other country’s sovereign territory and, indeed, Israel has only asserted sovereignty over a small portion of its territory, expanded East Jerusalem, leaving sovereignty over the rest both literally and legally uncontested.
In this context, it may be enlightening to consider the quality as well as the quantity of the states extending diplomatic recognition.
Of the world’s nine most populous states, eight (the US does not) recognise the state of Palestine. Of the world’s 20 most populous states, 15 (the US, Japan, Mexico, Germany and Thailand do not) recognise the state of Palestine.
By contrast, the 72 UN member states which currently recognise the Republic of Kosovo as an independent state include only one of the nine most populous states (the United States) and only four of the 20 most populous states (the United States, Japan, Germany and Turkey).
When, in July, the International Court of Justice held that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence did not violate international law because international law is silent on the subject of the legality of declarations of independence (meaning that no declaration of independence violates international law and is “legal”, albeit subject to the political decisions of sovereign states to recognise or not the independence declared), the US responded by calling on all countries that had not already recognised Kosovo to do so promptly. Five months later, only three more have seen fit to do so: Honduras, Kiribati and Tuvalu.
If the Arab League were now to call on the minority of UN member states that have not already recognised Palestine to do so promptly, it is certain that the response would be superior (both in quantity and in quality) to the response to the recent American appeal on behalf of Kosovo. It should do so.
Notwithstanding the fact that (by my rough calculations) states encompassing between 80 per cent and 90 per cent of the world’s population recognise the state of Palestine while states encompassing only between 10 per cent and 20 per cent of the world’s population recognise the Republic of Kosovo, the Western media (and, indeed, much of the non-Western media as well) act as though Kosovo’s independence were an accomplished fact while Palestine’s independence is only an aspiration which can never be realised without Israeli-American consent, and much of international public opinion (including, apparently, the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah) has, at least until recently, permitted itself to be brainwashed into thinking and acting accordingly.
As in most aspects of international relations, it is not the nature of the act (or crime) that matters but, rather, who is doing it to whom. Palestine was conquered and is still occupied, 43 years later, by the military forces of Israel. Most of the world (including the UN and even five EU member states) still regards as Serbian the province of Kosovo, which was conquered and is still occupied, 11 years later, by the military forces of NATO. The American flag is flown there at least as widely as the Kosovo flag, and the capital, Pristina, boasts a Bill Clinton Boulevard and a larger-than-life-size statue of the former American president.
Might makes right, at least in the hearts and minds of the mighty, including most Western decision makers and opinion formers.
Meanwhile, as a perpetual “peace process” appears suddenly threatened by a peaceful recourse to international law and international organisations, the US House of Representatives has adopted by a unanimous voice vote a resolution drafted by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) calling on President Barack Obama not to recognise the state of Palestine and to veto any effort by Palestine to obtain UN membership.
Western politicians and the Western media customarily apply the term “international community” to the US and whatever countries are willing to publicly support it on a given issue, and apply the term “rogue state” to any country which actively resists Israeli-American global domination.
By its slavish subservience to Israel, as reflected yet again both in the absence of a single brave voice raised against this new House resolution and in the Obama administration’s recently rejected offer of a huge military and diplomatic bribe to Israel, as reward for a mere 90-day suspension of its illegal colonisation programme, the US has effectively excluded itself from the true international community (redefined to refer to the great majority of mankind) and became a true rogue state, acting in consistent and flagrant contempt of both international law and fundamental human rights.
One might hope that the United States could still pull back from the abyss and recover its own independence, but all signs are pointing in the opposite direction. It is a sad ending for a once admirable country.
The writer, an international lawyer who has advised the Palestinian negotiating team in negotiations with Israel, is author of “The World According to Whitbeck”. He contributed this article to The Jordan Times.
This Week In The Middle East
Charities that fund the settlers; Egypt's vanishing migrants; Christmas extravagance in the Gulf, and an unhappy New Year
This is a frequent complaint when human rights organisations dare to say something critical about Israel, but in the case of Human Rights Watch it's just not true.
The migrants pay $2,000 or more each to be smuggled across the border into Israel but, once they arrive in Sinai, the traffickers suddenly demand more money – as much as $10,000 in some cases – and hold them hostage until their families pay up. It's a horrible racket.
The Egyptian state, despite its enormous security apparatus, doesn't seem very keen to track them down. Why? One reason, no doubt, is that the migrants are from poor African countries and mainly Christian – so their fate is of no great consequence.
Neither the migrants nor the traffickers are regarded as a threat to the regime, but there may also be other reasons for leaving them unmolested. Maintaining security along the border with Israel depends partly on co-operation from the local population – including smugglers. Keeping a lid on arms smuggling may mean letting the smugglers make money in other ways.
No Saudi celebrations: And a miserable New Year to you all. That's the seasonable message from Saudi Arabia's religious police, the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.
The first of January simply marks the start (not very accurately these days) of the new solar year. The Islamic calendar, meanwhile, is based on the lunar year. Both calendars probably owe something to ancient pagan practices of sun and moon worship – though I'm sure the religious police wouldn't want to admit that.
By Brian Whitaker
This commentary was published in The Guardian on 23/12/2010
Human rights 'hypocrisy': There was a predictable response this week from Binyamin Netanyahu when Human Rights Watch issued a report about Israeli discrimination against Palestinians in the West Bank.
Human rights 'hypocrisy': There was a predictable response this week from Binyamin Netanyahu when Human Rights Watch issued a report about Israeli discrimination against Palestinians in the West Bank.
"We must expose the hypocrisy of human rights organisations that turn a blind eye to the most repressive regimes in the world, regimes that stone women and hang gays, and instead target the only liberal democracy in the Middle East," the Israeli prime minister said.
This is a frequent complaint when human rights organisations dare to say something critical about Israel, but in the case of Human Rights Watch it's just not true.
Just four days before the West Bank report appeared, HRW had issued another – very detailed – report on the treatment of gay people in Iran, and a look at the Middle East section of HRW's website shows the wide range of countries and issues that it tackles.
As it turned out, the report on Israel didn't get a lot of media coverage, probably because it only confirmed what most people know already. The US state department, for example, noted: "Many of the issues covered in the HRW report are also covered in great detail in the state department's annual Human Rights Report."
But one important point from HRW's report has been largely ignored. This concerns the way illegal settlement activity is subsidised by American taxpayers through tax-exempt charities. The report urges Congress to investigate and "ensure that tax-exempt status is not granted to organisations that facilitate human rights violations or violations of international humanitarian law".
African hostages: It's now almost two weeks since Khataza Gondwe of Christian Solidarity Worldwide wrote an article here on Comment is free about the suffering of African migrants at the hands of traffickers in Egypt.
The migrants pay $2,000 or more each to be smuggled across the border into Israel but, once they arrive in Sinai, the traffickers suddenly demand more money – as much as $10,000 in some cases – and hold them hostage until their families pay up. It's a horrible racket.
Some have been threatened with death or having their kidneys removed and sold if the money is not forthcoming. Human Rights Watch says:
"In dozens of cases asylum seekers and migrants said that, to coerce relatives to make payments, traffickers would make them call their relatives by mobile phone and then shoot in the air or physically abuse them so the relatives would hear their screams."
"In dozens of cases asylum seekers and migrants said that, to coerce relatives to make payments, traffickers would make them call their relatives by mobile phone and then shoot in the air or physically abuse them so the relatives would hear their screams."
The UN high commissioner for refugees has made representations on the migrants' behalf. So has the pope, along with various NGOs.
Initially, the Egyptian government said it was working "around the clock" to find the hostages and release them. By last week, though, the foreign ministry was beginning to cast doubt on the hostage stories and yesterday, the ministry again said the reports were "baseless".
The Egyptian authorities say none of the organisations complaining about the racket has provided them with information. This is untrue, according to EveryOneGroup, an Italian-based human rights organisation, which says it has given them the approximate location of the hostages and even provided mobile phone numbers for some of the traffickers, plus the names of two of the hostages' guards.
The Egyptian state, despite its enormous security apparatus, doesn't seem very keen to track them down. Why? One reason, no doubt, is that the migrants are from poor African countries and mainly Christian – so their fate is of no great consequence.
Neither the migrants nor the traffickers are regarded as a threat to the regime, but there may also be other reasons for leaving them unmolested. Maintaining security along the border with Israel depends partly on co-operation from the local population – including smugglers. Keeping a lid on arms smuggling may mean letting the smugglers make money in other ways.
Bejewelled tree: The world's most expensively decorated Christmas tree has gone on show at the Emirates Palace hotel in Abu Dhabi, bedecked with $11m-worth of diamonds, pearls, emeralds and rubies, plus some more "mundane" items, such as gold and silver balls.
No Saudi celebrations: And a miserable New Year to you all. That's the seasonable message from Saudi Arabia's religious police, the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.
Bang on cue, they have warned that anyone caught celebrating New Year in public will be punished – along with any shops selling "items symbolising the occasion".
Now, I know they don't like Valentine's Day or Halloween (though, judging by a recent WikiLeaks document, they have trouble keeping the damper on that), but what exactly is wrong with New Year? Where in the Qur'an does it say you can't have a party at midnight on 31 December?
The objection, I suppose, is that the western (Gregorian) calendar competes with the Islamic calendar, in which New Year falls at a different time. But the fact that the western calendar was introduced by Pope Gregory XIII on 24 February 1582 (or 20 Muharram 990, if you prefer) doesn't give it any religious significance, and it's widely recognised, even by non-Christians, including many Muslims.
The first of January simply marks the start (not very accurately these days) of the new solar year. The Islamic calendar, meanwhile, is based on the lunar year. Both calendars probably owe something to ancient pagan practices of sun and moon worship – though I'm sure the religious police wouldn't want to admit that.
Roadblocks To Mideast Peace
Only the Israelis and Palestinians hold the key to peace in the Middle East, but neither is invested enough in border and security talks to allow them to succeed. Until they do, there's likely to be more wheel spinning than real progress.
By Aaron David Miller
This commentary was published in The Los Angeles Times on 23/2010
Having spent 20 months chasing an elusive Israeli settlement freeze, the Obama administration has now launched a new effort on borders and security whose chances of success are almost as dubious.
Giving up is not an option, but neither is giving in to the illusion that America holds the key to Mideast peace. It doesn't. Only the Israelis and Palestinians do, and right now neither is invested enough in these talks to allow the effort to succeed. Until they are, there's likely to be more wheel-spinning than real progress.
The good news is that the administration has finally focused on the right issue: how to get Israelis and Palestinians to the end game. But that's also the bad news. The gaps on the core issues are wide, and even on the two least hopeless ones — borders and security — there are fundamental divisions.
On paper, the arguments in favor of fast-tracking how to define the borders of a Palestinian state and accompanying security arrangements seem quite compelling. After all, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become a trade-off between land and security. And by defining the borders of a future Palestine, the argument goes, you can get at settlements through the back door, identifying how much West Bank land Israel needs to keep for settlement blocks and the extent of territorial swaps to compensate Palestinians.
In the cruel and unforgiving world of Middle Eastern politics, however, these assumptions don't neatly stand up. First, while borders and security may be the easiest of the final status issues, they are hugely complex. Benjamin Netanyahu isn't Ehud Barak or Ehud Olmert, whose offers of up to 96% of the West Bank to Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, respectively, still weren't completely acceptable to the Palestinians. And it's certain that this Israeli government, or even another, won't improve on that offer.
Then there is the security component, which, over the last 10 years of Palestinian terror, violence and high-trajectory weapons, has become more, not less, complex. It's true that security in the West Bank has improved markedly, but no Israeli government will agree to surrender the vast majority of it to a Palestinian president who doesn't control all of the Palestinian guns and rockets. In short, until the Hamas problem is resolved (and nobody has a clue how to do that), it's hard to imagine how a binding agreement on borders could be reached and approved by Israel's parliament, let alone implemented.
Nor will Israelis and Palestinians give up their leverage by negotiating sequentially. Israel will not part with land it controls without first seeing where Palestinians are on issues like Jerusalem and refugees. And Palestinians will not give up their refugee card or make concessions on security arrangements without seeing first what they can get from the Israelis on Jerusalem and borders.
Netanyahu has also demanded that Palestinians recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, something Abbas will not do easily. If he does agree, it would most likely be at the end of the process and not until the Israelis made some concessions on refugees.
To this list of headaches add the capacity of Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah to undermine the process, the reality that Jerusalem is both an identity and territorial issue, and the pesky problem of continuing Israeli construction in West Bank settlements and in Jerusalem. And given the administration's track record of vacillation, it is not entirely clear that President Obama is prepared to defend his own bridging proposals. Even if he is, what does he do when one or both sides says no?
A breakthrough between Israelis and Palestinians requires them to own and invest in their negotiations in a way they currently don't. Real ownership is usually driven by local factors involving prospects of pain or gain, not by Washington's pleadings or desires.
Today, we have neither enough pain nor enough gain. The status quo, while harsh, particularly for Palestinians, is manageable. Paradoxically, Palestinian state-building efforts, security performance and the absence of terrorism inside Israel have created a tolerable situation for most Israelis. Israel's focus on the Iranian threat has further distracted its attention. And Palestinians seem to be gearing up for their own grand diversion: gaining international recognition for a Palestinian state they don't control.
The status quo could change, of course. But to make the tough decisions required now, leaders are needed who are not only masters of their own politics but who are also prepared to be bold and visionary with one eye on the future.
Neither Abbas nor Netanyahu is that risk-ready. And Obama can't create in Washington the leadership, urgency and partnership needed among Israelis and Palestinians.
What should the administration do? Abandon the field, as some have suggested? Withdrawal isn't in our interest, and in any event, our "If it's broke, we can fix it" mentality makes that all but impossible.
Instead, the administration must walk the fine line between doing too much and not enough. The current approach — supporting state-building from the bottom up and engaging Israelis and Palestinians quietly on all the core issues from the top is worth a try as long as the president doesn't get overly ambitious, as he did on the settlements issue.
The Israeli-Palestinian endgame isn't ready for prime time. The U.S. could make the situation a great deal worse by assuming it is. I saw this movie with another risk-ready president in the run-up to Camp David in July 2000. The Israeli and Palestinians weren't ready to make conflict-ending decisions then, and neither were we. And the results were predictable and disastrous.
This time we need to refrain from putting U.S. positions on the table or looking for a moment of truth unless there is a reasonable chance that the gaps can be bridged. And we need to approach this phase without deadlines, big rhetoric or bigger peace plans doomed to fail, and above all, without making promises we can't keep.
It's not pretty or dramatic, but if we're smart and lucky, patient, determined and measured in our approach, we just might help the Israelis and Palestinians get hooked on a process that could work instead of hooking ourselves again on one that won't.
Aaron David Miller, a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, is the author of "The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace."
Islamists Bite The Ballot
Recent elections in Bahrain and Egypt are being criticized for all the usual reasons. Authoritarian regimes -- one a monarchy, the other a quasi-military dictatorship -- cracked down on the media and the small opposition forces that challenged them in the run-up to the polls, eventually holding ballots with little or no monitoring.
But a silver lining can be discerned in the dark cloud. Islamist opposition groups in both countries, instead of interrupting the polls with violence, decided to participate in them. This is in line with a growing tendency among Islamists to embrace democratic politics -- even when they know the process to be skewed against them.
At a time when the decade-old militarist approach to dealing with Islamism has been laid bare as impotent, even counterproductive, governments should view this positive trend as reinforcing a new, more political approach to Islamist militancy.
But the main Shiite opposition Al Wefaq as well as Sunni Islamist groups Al Asalah and Al Menbar participated. All Islamists campaign for socially conservative policies, such as a ban on alcohol and restrictions against women, while calling for political liberalization. Al Wefaq champions better housing and jobs for Shiites and speaks against the large-scale naturalization of Sunnis from other countries, which it views as a move to undermine the Shiite population’s dominance in Bahrain.
Al Wefaq won 18 of the 40 seats, up one seat from the outgoing assembly. The Sunni groups split five seats between them, down from 15 in 2006 when they contested as allies. Analysts said the boycott by other Shiite Islamists helped Al Wefaq. The government did not allow international monitors. Local NGOs that scrutinized the voting said the election was “procedurally acceptable,” although the overall electoral system remains unfair.
Three out of four voters boycotted the election, as did many leading opposition figures, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohamed ElBaradei. The Brotherhood initially appeared to be leaning toward a boycott as well -- for instance, when its members voted out reformists in favor of radicals in internal elections earlier this year. However, the group finally decided to participate, albeit only in the first round.
Its leaders focused on issues such as the need for democratic rights and transparent elections in their campaign. They also spoke against the privatization of public services and the falling standards in the health, education, media, and religious endowment sectors. However, the group lost all its 88 seats in the 518-member assembly.
There were crucial differences in the degree to which the two regimes controlled the polls -- leading to variations in the performance of Islamist and other opposition groups. Bahrain, like Egypt, made the electoral atmosphere difficult for the opposition, but it did not indulge in widespread ballot-stuffing to wipe it out. It doesn’t need to. The appointed upper house of the assembly can block legislations passed by the elected lower house, allowing the monarchy to rule unperturbed.
Egypt had marginally relaxed its political environment five years ago under pressure from the George W. Bush administration’s Middle East democracy drive, allowing the Brotherhood to reap its richest-ever electoral harvest. This time around, there was no U.S. pressure. Also, the stakes were much higher. The new parliament will elect a new president next year, when Mubarak is expected to pass on the reins to son Gamal after 30 years in power. The transition could be tricky, and Mubarak wants his house to be perfectly in order. The parliamentary vote is “a training exercise for the presidential elections in how you mobilize the party, the party machine,” said a senior ruling party official. But in countries where elected assemblies have limited powers anyway, the performance of particular groups in elections is only of partial significance. Participatory trends are more interesting -- and important.
Participating Islamists often leave behind a violent past. The 82-year-old Brotherhood, for instance, is regarded as the precursor of all modern Islamist outfits. It was linked to the Nazis during World War II and blamed for many assassination and coup attempts in Egypt in the following decades. Its most influential ideologue in this period was Sayyid Qutb, whose incendiary writings are treated as gospel by Islamist militants the world over. But the Brotherhood gave up violence in the 1970s and has intermittently dabbled in electoral politics since then.
The leaders of Al Wefaq organized violent unrest that brought Bahrain to the brink of civil war in the 1990s. In this decade, however, they have turned to democratic politics. Islamists in countries such as Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria have made similar transitions from militancy to democracy. Those in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories participate in elections while still maintaining militant wings.
Such a turn indicates both ideological and tactical moderation. Militant Islamists traditionally do not accept the notion of nation-states, emphasizing instead the global Muslim ummah, or community. Many Islamists also consider democracy to be un-Islamic, as it gives precedence to manmade legislations over the divine law, or shari’a. Participating in elections marks a departure from both these hardline stances. Islamists also run the risk of antagonizing their core support, making it a difficult tactical choice. And participating in rigged elections, as Middle Eastern elections generally are, leaves Islamists -- indeed Islam itself -- open to the charge of failure.
In this context, the all-too-familiar news of two more farcical polls in the Middle East takes on a new meaning. Islamists who entered the fray in Bahrain and Egypt did so at considerable risk; the decision of some Bahraini Islamists not to participate and of the Muslim Brotherhood to pull out from the second round of voting in Egypt reinforces the tenuousness of this trend. Indeed, the Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Action Front, the main opposition in Jordan, did not participate in the parliamentary election on November 9, citing unfair election laws.
Also, Islamists aren’t necessarily opportunists who turn to elections only when they think they can win. This was the charge brought against the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria when it was denied certain electoral success in 1992, and against Hamas in 2006, when the international community did not recognize its victory in internationally monitored elections in the Palestinian territories. The participation of Muslim Brotherhood and Al Wefaq in elections skewed against them reflects a commitment to bringing about political change through legitimate means.
But perhaps the most significant question is: what kind of changes would Islamists try to bring about if they do come to power? Would they establish theocratic states, as happened in Iran after the 1979 Islamic revolution? Kurzman and Ijlal’s research suggests otherwise. A number of Islamist groups they studied dropped calls for the implementation of shari’a over successive elections, began offering secular justifications for democratic participation, and embraced global norms of political pluralism and human rights. A prime example is Turkey, which has been adding constitutional safeguards for democratic rule since the Justice and Development Party, which has Islamist roots, came to power in 2002.
To be sure, the recent trend of Islamist participation in elections does not imply that militant Islamism is on the wane. Groups like al-Qaeda appear no closer to renouncing violence than they were on the morning of September 11, 2001 -- despite some al-Qaeda dissidents recently calling for wider consultations with Muslim groups, scholars, and the intelligentsia on issues such as jihad. Terrorist plots continue to be uncovered, and some succeed. The call to violence continues to entrap gullible young Muslims who are disenfranchised by their governments, disenchanted by the economic and cultural strains of globalization, and disillusioned by the apathy of the global superpower.
But there is no one type of Islamist, nor is there a single Islamist agenda. That is precisely why Islamist groups need to be encouraged -- or at least allowed -- to participate in mainstream electoral politics. Opening up the space of legitimate political dissent can help delegitimize violence, draw existing and potential Islamists away from militancy and terrorism, and moderate their world view. After nearly a decade of trying and failing to beat the pulp out of them, this could be the only serious option left. And as the Bahraini and Egyptian elections show, Islamists may be more than willing to explore it.
But a silver lining can be discerned in the dark cloud. Islamist opposition groups in both countries, instead of interrupting the polls with violence, decided to participate in them. This is in line with a growing tendency among Islamists to embrace democratic politics -- even when they know the process to be skewed against them.
At a time when the decade-old militarist approach to dealing with Islamism has been laid bare as impotent, even counterproductive, governments should view this positive trend as reinforcing a new, more political approach to Islamist militancy.
Elections in the Gulf
Bahrain is a Shiite-majority nation ruled by a Sunni monarchy. The election to the lower house of the national assembly, the third since 2002, was held in two rounds on October 23 and October 30. In the weeks preceding the poll, the government arrested several outspoken Shiite clerics, including Abdul Jalil al Singace, a spokesman for the main opposition Haq Movement. Widespread protests and riots followed. The Haq Movement and some other political groups -- Bahrain bans formal political parties -- boycotted the election. Shiite Islamist groups such as the Islamic Action Society and Bahrain Freedom Movement also joined the boycott.But the main Shiite opposition Al Wefaq as well as Sunni Islamist groups Al Asalah and Al Menbar participated. All Islamists campaign for socially conservative policies, such as a ban on alcohol and restrictions against women, while calling for political liberalization. Al Wefaq champions better housing and jobs for Shiites and speaks against the large-scale naturalization of Sunnis from other countries, which it views as a move to undermine the Shiite population’s dominance in Bahrain.
Al Wefaq won 18 of the 40 seats, up one seat from the outgoing assembly. The Sunni groups split five seats between them, down from 15 in 2006 when they contested as allies. Analysts said the boycott by other Shiite Islamists helped Al Wefaq. The government did not allow international monitors. Local NGOs that scrutinized the voting said the election was “procedurally acceptable,” although the overall electoral system remains unfair.
Different Script
The script was slightly different for Islamists in Egypt, which elected its new assembly on November 28 and December 5. President Hosni Mubarak’s government began suppressing the main opposition Muslim Brotherhood almost a year in advance, jailing senior leaders as well as grassroots activists. More recently, it gagged the media and banned overseas and local monitors to hold what may have been “the most fraudulent parliamentary elections in its recent history.”Three out of four voters boycotted the election, as did many leading opposition figures, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohamed ElBaradei. The Brotherhood initially appeared to be leaning toward a boycott as well -- for instance, when its members voted out reformists in favor of radicals in internal elections earlier this year. However, the group finally decided to participate, albeit only in the first round.
Its leaders focused on issues such as the need for democratic rights and transparent elections in their campaign. They also spoke against the privatization of public services and the falling standards in the health, education, media, and religious endowment sectors. However, the group lost all its 88 seats in the 518-member assembly.
There were crucial differences in the degree to which the two regimes controlled the polls -- leading to variations in the performance of Islamist and other opposition groups. Bahrain, like Egypt, made the electoral atmosphere difficult for the opposition, but it did not indulge in widespread ballot-stuffing to wipe it out. It doesn’t need to. The appointed upper house of the assembly can block legislations passed by the elected lower house, allowing the monarchy to rule unperturbed.
Egypt had marginally relaxed its political environment five years ago under pressure from the George W. Bush administration’s Middle East democracy drive, allowing the Brotherhood to reap its richest-ever electoral harvest. This time around, there was no U.S. pressure. Also, the stakes were much higher. The new parliament will elect a new president next year, when Mubarak is expected to pass on the reins to son Gamal after 30 years in power. The transition could be tricky, and Mubarak wants his house to be perfectly in order. The parliamentary vote is “a training exercise for the presidential elections in how you mobilize the party, the party machine,” said a senior ruling party official. But in countries where elected assemblies have limited powers anyway, the performance of particular groups in elections is only of partial significance. Participatory trends are more interesting -- and important.
Participation Gathers Pace
Contrary to common wisdom, Islamist participation in elections is not an exception. Islamist groups in 21 countries have participated in 89 parliamentary elections over the past 40 years, according to a research by Charles Kurzman and Ijlal Naqvi. The trend has gathered pace in recent years, although participation generally hinges upon expectations of free and fair elections.Participating Islamists often leave behind a violent past. The 82-year-old Brotherhood, for instance, is regarded as the precursor of all modern Islamist outfits. It was linked to the Nazis during World War II and blamed for many assassination and coup attempts in Egypt in the following decades. Its most influential ideologue in this period was Sayyid Qutb, whose incendiary writings are treated as gospel by Islamist militants the world over. But the Brotherhood gave up violence in the 1970s and has intermittently dabbled in electoral politics since then.
The leaders of Al Wefaq organized violent unrest that brought Bahrain to the brink of civil war in the 1990s. In this decade, however, they have turned to democratic politics. Islamists in countries such as Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria have made similar transitions from militancy to democracy. Those in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories participate in elections while still maintaining militant wings.
Such a turn indicates both ideological and tactical moderation. Militant Islamists traditionally do not accept the notion of nation-states, emphasizing instead the global Muslim ummah, or community. Many Islamists also consider democracy to be un-Islamic, as it gives precedence to manmade legislations over the divine law, or shari’a. Participating in elections marks a departure from both these hardline stances. Islamists also run the risk of antagonizing their core support, making it a difficult tactical choice. And participating in rigged elections, as Middle Eastern elections generally are, leaves Islamists -- indeed Islam itself -- open to the charge of failure.
In this context, the all-too-familiar news of two more farcical polls in the Middle East takes on a new meaning. Islamists who entered the fray in Bahrain and Egypt did so at considerable risk; the decision of some Bahraini Islamists not to participate and of the Muslim Brotherhood to pull out from the second round of voting in Egypt reinforces the tenuousness of this trend. Indeed, the Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Action Front, the main opposition in Jordan, did not participate in the parliamentary election on November 9, citing unfair election laws.
Defying the Stereotype
Democratic participation is significant because it belies a number of myths about Islamists. It shows that Islamism is not always a mindless call to arms but a more complex phenomenon, comprising parallel, overlapping, and sometimes paradoxical principles. Islamists might originally have been ideologically opposed to the concepts of nation-states and elections, but they are also capable of intellectual evolution and compromise.Also, Islamists aren’t necessarily opportunists who turn to elections only when they think they can win. This was the charge brought against the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria when it was denied certain electoral success in 1992, and against Hamas in 2006, when the international community did not recognize its victory in internationally monitored elections in the Palestinian territories. The participation of Muslim Brotherhood and Al Wefaq in elections skewed against them reflects a commitment to bringing about political change through legitimate means.
But perhaps the most significant question is: what kind of changes would Islamists try to bring about if they do come to power? Would they establish theocratic states, as happened in Iran after the 1979 Islamic revolution? Kurzman and Ijlal’s research suggests otherwise. A number of Islamist groups they studied dropped calls for the implementation of shari’a over successive elections, began offering secular justifications for democratic participation, and embraced global norms of political pluralism and human rights. A prime example is Turkey, which has been adding constitutional safeguards for democratic rule since the Justice and Development Party, which has Islamist roots, came to power in 2002.
From Militancy to Moderation
Democratic politics generally has a liberalizing influence on Islamists. This is to be expected: if the Muslim masses are not militant or radical, as is widely acknowledged, then groups that depend on their votes for survival would naturally have to soften their stances and look for moderate political platforms that are acceptable to the majority.To be sure, the recent trend of Islamist participation in elections does not imply that militant Islamism is on the wane. Groups like al-Qaeda appear no closer to renouncing violence than they were on the morning of September 11, 2001 -- despite some al-Qaeda dissidents recently calling for wider consultations with Muslim groups, scholars, and the intelligentsia on issues such as jihad. Terrorist plots continue to be uncovered, and some succeed. The call to violence continues to entrap gullible young Muslims who are disenfranchised by their governments, disenchanted by the economic and cultural strains of globalization, and disillusioned by the apathy of the global superpower.
But there is no one type of Islamist, nor is there a single Islamist agenda. That is precisely why Islamist groups need to be encouraged -- or at least allowed -- to participate in mainstream electoral politics. Opening up the space of legitimate political dissent can help delegitimize violence, draw existing and potential Islamists away from militancy and terrorism, and moderate their world view. After nearly a decade of trying and failing to beat the pulp out of them, this could be the only serious option left. And as the Bahraini and Egyptian elections show, Islamists may be more than willing to explore it.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)