Iran's Supreme Leader Is Destined To Combat The President

By Mehdi Khalaji

This commentary was published in The Daily Star on 22/12/2010

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has never been happy about the status of the Iranian presidency – neither during his own tenure, from 1981-1989, nor during the terms of his three successors.

Tension between the president and the supreme leader is built into the Islamic Republic’s core. The supreme leader has absolute authority and can veto decisions made by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. At the same time, the Iranian president emerges from an electoral process with an agenda and ambitions of his own. During a president’s second term – which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has now begun – the tensions inevitably emerge into public view.

Khamenei has never been willing to tolerate a president with a large independent power base. In the past, he clipped the wings of President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who had strong ties to the merchant class, and of President Mohammad Khatami, a reformer whose support came from Westernized middle-class professionals. Though Ahmadinejad received the supreme leader’s support in the face of large-scale protests against his disputed re-election last year, Khamenei does not appear hesitant about limiting the president’s power.

In fact, it appears that the massive demonstrations against Ahmadinejad only delayed their confrontation, since both the supreme leader and the president rallied publicly to defend the legitimacy of the electoral process. However, Ahmadinejad’s radical Islamist views and his support among religious, lower middle-class Iranians have not protected him from Khamenei.

For the most part, the two men have avoided a head-on confrontation. Their struggle is visible, however, in their maneuvering inside other branches of government. In this arena, Ahmadinejad faces off against Ali Larijani, the speaker of the Parliament, and against his brother, Sadeq Larijani, who is the head of the Iranian judiciary.

The Larijani brothers have been vehement critics of the president, whom they accuse of ignoring legislation and key judicial rulings. Within the Parliament, the conservative bloc is divided between supporters of Ahmadinejad and advocates of more parliamentary oversight of the president.

Recently, Parliament demonstrated its opposition to Ahmadinejad’s economic policies by deciding to remove the president from his traditional post as head of the General Assembly of the Central Bank. This would reduce Ahmadinejad’s ability to intervene in economic policies and it would also keep him from naming the bank’s governor.

But this decision is contingent on the approval of the Council of Guardians, where a group of the president’s supporters have launched a counter-attack. They want the supreme leader to allow the president to issue warnings to both the Parliament and the judiciary if he thinks that they have overstepped their authority, thereby subordinating the Larijani brothers to presidential authority.

Until now, Parliament has been an effective tool for the supreme leader to rein in presidential authority legitimately, and it is difficult to imagine that the Larijani brothers would have mounted such a sharp challenge to Ahmadinejad without Khamenei’s approval. If they carry the day, the president will lose authority over the one area where his power has been greatest, namely the Iranian economy.

 

By contrast, the president has no serious say in the conduct of Iranian foreign policy, which is under the supreme leader’s direct supervision. Khamenei is known to seek advice from various parties, but ultimately he takes his decisions alone. For example, he overruled Iranian nuclear negotiators who offered a compromise during the Geneva negotiations in October 2009.

Khamenei does rely on Ahmadinejad to lead Iran’s public diplomacy. The president travels widely, he speaks frequently, and he mobilizes political support with his anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric. But public diplomacy is not diplomacy per se. It is clear that no one in Ahmadinejad’s inner circle – certainly not the president himself – has gained the supreme leader’s confidence. The nuclear portfolio, for example, remains exclusively under Khamenei’s control.

Within the realm of religious politics, Khamenei has made careful use of Ahmadinejad’s radicalism. It is widely believed that the president would like to reduce the clergy’s influence and increase the power of the Revolutionary Guards, which are his main source of institutional support. Thus, Khamenei can present himself as a defender of the clergy. Given the widespread doubt about his clerical credentials since he took power 21 years ago, such a step would enhance his position.

Clerics know that if Khamenei becomes weaker, Ahmadinejad’s circle would be able to manipulate widespread anti-clerical resentment in Iran and exclude them from power. Moreover, Ahmadinejad knows that, without Khamenei’s restraint, the clerics would use their political networks among conservatives like the Larijani brothers to limit the president further. The mutual hostility existing between Ahmadinejad and the clerical class offers the supreme leader the best of both worlds.

The history of the Islamic Republic indicates that the power struggle between the supreme leader and the president never abates. It also suggests that the supreme leader will prove to be stronger.

More importantly for the international community, this internal struggle keeps Iran’s leaders from realistically appraising their foreign and nuclear policies. Consumed with their test of wills, they are unable to make well-informed and nuanced decisions in their dealings with outside countries.

Mehdi Khalaji, who trained as a Shiite cleric in Iran, is a senior fellow at the Washington

Institute for Near East Policy. THE DAILY STAR publishes this commentary in collaboration with Project Syndicate © (www.project-syndicate.org).

The Last Line Of Decency

By Ian Buruma

This commentary was published in Thr Jordan Times on 22/12/2010     

Every Friday afternoon for more than a year, hundreds of Israeli Jews have gathered on a dusty little square in the middle of Arab East Jerusalem. There are some Palestinians there, too, including a couple of boys selling fresh orange juice. The people gather there, in the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood, to protest the eviction of Palestinian families from their homes to make way for Israeli settlers.

These evictions are humiliating, sometimes violent, and frightening to other Palestinian families - who are in danger of losing their homes as well. Israeli students were the first to organise a protest, known as the Sheikh Jarrah Solidarity Movement. They were followed by distinguished professors, famous novelists and a former attorney general, among others.

At first, the Israeli police used force against the protesters, even though such demonstrations are perfectly legal in Israel. This provoked such a bad publicity that the police backed off, while still blocking the road to the new settlements. All the demonstrators can do is hold up signs, bang drums, chant slogans, and show solidarity just by turning up.

The background to the evictions is not exactly straightforward. Some Jews did live in the district before they were kicked out in the 1948 war of Israeli independence. Many more Palestinians were kicked out at the same time from neighbourhoods in West Jerusalem, and found new homes in areas like Sheikh Jarrah, which came under Jordanian jurisdiction until the Israelis took back East Jerusalem in 1967.

These people were largely left in peace until a few years ago, when Jews began to lay claim on properties lost in 1948. Palestinians who might wish to make similar claims on properties in West Jerusalem cannot do so. Because they settled after 1948 in “enemy territories”, such as Jordanian Sheikh Jarrah, they are barred by Israeli law from reclaiming lost property.

Some Arab properties in Jerusalem are purchased by Jewish businessmen or organisations. But some are simply appropriated. Documents, going back to the Ottoman period, are sometimes produced, but their authenticity and provenance are often in doubt. In any case, as is so frequently the case in Israel, the Palestinians are given a raw deal.

Sheikh Jarrah is far from the worst case. Other Palestinian neighbourhoods in Jerusalem are cut off from the rest of the city by Israel’s so-called “security wall”, which means that their inhabitants do not receive proper municipal services, despite being obliged to pay city taxes.

Uncollected garbage piles up in the streets. Water supplies are erratic. Children can no longer go to their schools. People lose their jobs.

Things are even worse in Palestinian towns farther afield, such as Hebron, where Israeli settlers often behave like Wild West gunslingers, flouting the laws of their own country as they drive away Palestinians by cutting down their trees, poisoning their livestock, and subjecting them to other forms of torment, including fatal shootings, which have gone unpunished.

When American diplomats complained about Jewish settlers’ forcible intrusion into Palestinian neighbourhoods, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded that Jerusalem was not a settlement, but the capital of Israel. This implies that Jews can push farther and farther into East Jerusalem, as well as build settlements on Palestinian territories around the city, which Israel now claims to be part of Jerusalem. The ultimate aim, it appears, is to make Jerusalem Jewish, by purchase, by invoking historical claims and, if necessary, by force.

This effort is so systematic, and backed so vigorously by the Israeli government, that there seems to be little prospect of a few hundred protesters, however distinguished, managing to stop it. So is it all a waste of time? Is it just a radical-chic outdoor cocktail party?

At least one Palestinian gentleman thought not. He lives a few streets away from the spot where the protesters gather.

“If it weren’t for you people,” he said with a joyful smile, “we would all be doomed.”

He may be expecting too much. But the show of Jewish solidarity no doubt makes some Palestinians feel less alone. Moreover, it is harder for Palestinians to demonstrate themselves, because they risk losing their precious residency permits in Jerusalem.

But the protests are worthwhile for another reason: they are good for Israel. Protests, or civil resistance, in the face of government force, rarely have immediate, tangible results. Under dictatorships, they can even be counterproductive, leading to violent reprisals. This is especially true of violent resistance, which simply invites greater violence.

Israel is not a dictatorship. Despite all the segregation, discrimination and ethnic and religious tensions, Jerusalem is also one of the Middle East’s last truly diverse cities. There are precious few Jews left in Tehran, Damascus or Cairo. By contrast, the Arab population in Jerusalem is 36 per cent, and growing.

Israel must also defend itself against much Arab hostility. But systematic humiliation of Palestinians, by allowing settlers to get away literally with murder, has a corrupting effect on Israeli society. Citizens are coarsened by the casual brutality meted out to a minority, and become inured to it. Even if most Israelis never see a roadblock, the security wall, or forcible evictions, the habit of looking away, not wishing to know, is a form of corruption.

This is why the Friday afternoon protests, however ineffectual in the short run, are essential. The demonstration of solidarity makes Israel a more civilised place. It keeps alive a sense of decency, a hope that a better society is still possible - for Palestinians and Israelis alike.

The writer is professor of democracy and human rights at Bard College. His latest book is “Taming the Gods: Religion and Democracy on Three Continents”. ©Project Syndicate, 2010. www.project-syndicate.org

Big Challenges Ahead For The New Iraqi Government

This article was published in Gulf Times on 22/12/2010

Iraq’s new government, finally approved yesterday after months of factional squabbling, must stabilise fragile security, pass new investment and hydrocarbons laws and rebuild war-shattered infrastructure. High on the priority list for a cabinet headed for a second term by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is Iraq’s ambitious goal to become a top oil producer and exporter by tapping vast oilfields for the money needed to reconstruct a one-time pariah state torn by war before and after Saddam Hussain’s fall. Maliki will rely on former Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani, now elevated to deputy prime minister with responsibility for the entire energy sector, to continue his work with global oil companies to push Iraq’s crude production to world-class levels. What Comes Next? Lawmakers will be pressed to pass a long-awaited hydrocarbons law and new investment laws that carry at least some of the protections foreign investors are looking for before plunging into a nation just emerging from war. After nine months of limbo, the new government must pass a 2011 budget as soon as possible. The initial spending plan before lawmakers, based on oil at $73 a barrel, sees a $12bn deficit. Maliki has not decided on permanent ministers for sensitive security posts - defence, which controls the army; interior, which controls the police; and national security. Officials said Maliki lacked qualified, independent candidates. Progress on services will be an important factor in public acceptance of the new government. Iraqis frequently complain about intermittent electricity, water shortages and insecurity. “The new government will not be allowed the luxury of taking months to form a plan and years to implement it. People want fast solutions for the provision of social services and addressing the challenge of security,” said Eman Ragab, an Iraq expert at Cairo’s al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. Impact On Oil Iraq has signed a series of deals with international oil companies to unlock its vast oil wealth in a bid to boost its output capacity to 12mn barrels per day from 2.5mn bpd now. The deals could catapult Iraq into the top league of oil producers, rivalling Saudi Arabia. Oil companies could be reassured by familiar faces. Maliki returns for a second term; Shahristani, the previous oil minister and architect of the contracts, moves up to deputy prime minister with expanded power over energy; new Oil Minister Abdul Kareem Luaibi is well known to the oil firms and was at the negotiating table during the oilfield auctions. However, Shahristani’s promotion and the emergence of his close ally at the oil ministry leaves unresolved key energy issues: Baghdad’s troubled relationship with the semi-autonomous northern Kurdish region, which halted crude exports last year in a spat with the central government. Shahristani believes contracts which the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has signed with foreign oil companies are illegal and his relations with the region are fraught. Kurdish lawmakers staged a brief parliamentary walkout last week when they learned Baghdad plans to dock the region’s share of federal revenues if it fails to produce oil for export next year. One analyst said Luaibi might be able to ease tensions between Baghdad and Arbil, the Kurdish regional capital. “Luaibi has been the main intermediary when there have been talks between the oil ministry and the KRG,” said Samuel Ciszuk of IHS Energy. “One could see him as someone the Kurds can at least stomach.” Impact On Non-Oil Investment Iraq’s infrastructure has been degraded by decades of war, sanctions and under-investment. The previous government had ambitious plans to ramp up electricity generation, build hundreds of thousands of new homes, expand ports, build railroads and pave roads. The new government may encourage potential infrastructure investors who have been sitting on the sidelines. But they will want clarity from parliament in the form of legal protections for foreign firms looking to invest in a country just emerging from war and from decades of dictatorship with a centrally planned economy. Iraq’s weakened but still lethal insurgency is also a worry for investors. Militants launch daily attacks - many aimed at the Iraqi army, police and government officials. Impact On Security The inclusion of all the factions - majority Shias, minority Sunnis and Kurds - in a power-sharing government could help prevent a slide back into sectarian slaughter. The ability of Iraq’s army and police to fend off a major surge in violence during the nine months it took to form a government could be a positive sign for investors as the US military forges ahead with plans to withdraw by end-2011. Iyad Allawi’s decision to join the government may help ease tensions. The leader of the Sunni-backed Iraqiya bloc, which won the most seats in a March election, Allawi had warned of the danger of marginalising his group. Allawi himself will lead a policy council and Iraqiya was awarded 10 posts in the cabinet. Iraqiya has several powerful positions, including speaker of parliament and finance minister. The open question is whether its share of the government will satisfy Sunnis, who dominated under dictator Saddam Hussein and voted in force for Iraqiya. — Reuters

Brazil: A New Face In The Middle East

Brazil's attempt to portray itself as an enabler in the Middle East is a sign of its ambitions in global political and economic affairs

By Nima Khorrami Assl
This commentary was published in The Guardian on 21/12/2010

Luis Inácio Lula da Silva and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Brasilia. Brazil has defended Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy. Photograph: Eraldo Peres/AP

Wooing The Gods Of The Peace Process

Obama is poised to become increasingly entangled in the Arab-Israeli conflict during the next year. Here's how he can avoid his predecessors' mistakes.

By Aaron David Miller

This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 20/12/2010

If the peace process gods have a sense of humor (and history), sometime around next summer -- the 11th anniversary of Bill Clinton's failed Camp David summit -- another Democratic president's peace initiative will be tested.

Right now, the arc of President Barack Obama's peace process efforts (and the other Clinton's, too) is leading inexorably to American "bridging" proposals -- ideas on the core issues meant to literally bridge the gaps between Israeli and Palestinian positions -- if not a U.S. plan to reach a framework accord on all the big issues, which would constitute an extraordinary breakthrough. Currently, neither Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu nor Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas are able to bridge the gaps on Jerusalem, borders, security, and the fate of Palestinian refugees. But with the Obama administration's inability to resist engaging, the president might end up in another make or break summit. 

But Obama shouldn't rush toward another disaster so quickly. A faltering, struggling peace process with some hope is far better than a failed one that leaves everyone hopeless -- and without a fallback option. When the time comes for big American moves (and, sadly, it will come given the Israeli and Palestinian lack of ownership over their own process), Obama should pay careful attention to the lessons and circumstances of the last big American effort to resolve the core issues.

Much has changed in the past decade since Clinton asked Yasir Arafat and Ehud Barak to come to only the second presidential summit at Camp David in 50 years of American involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some of the changes have inspired observers to believe the time is right for a big American move: both Abbas and Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, unlike Arafat, are well-intentioned, practical men with no history of involvement in terrorism and violence; Palestinian security performance is much improved; and the Arabs have put their own 2002 peace initiative on the table. Much good work has indeed been done on the core issues since Camp David in 2000. If the Untied Statesdoesn't act on this progress soon, say some analysts, there will be no two-state solution to negotiate. And those are the optimists talking.

But there's plenty of bad news, too. The Palestinian national movement faces its deepest crisis since its inception. It has become a kind of Noah's ark with two of everything: two security services; two different leaderships (Hamas and Abbas's Fatah) controlling two separated populations; two different sets of patrons and funding streams; and, above all, two different visions of Palestine's future. Netanyahu has the power to lead Israel into a deal, but maybe not the incentive; Abbas has the incentive, but not the power. And Iran and those it supports -- Hamas and Hezbollah -- have the capacity to weaken and undermine the efforts of would-be peacemakers.

As Obama weighs his peace process strategy in the new year, he will be told four things by those who are pushing him to be bold and decisive. First, the parties were "this close" to an accord at the last Camp David, they will say, thumb and first finger almost touching. Second, that a tremendous amount of work has been done in the past 10 years by Israelis and Palestinians on the core issues which have brought the parties closer than they've ever been. Third, that everyone knows the broad outlines of an agreement. And, fourth, that trying and failing is better than not having tried at all.

Myth merges uneasily with fact here, and bad analysis and logical lapses seem to rule the day. Let's address these four points, one at a time. First, on no issue were the two sides "this close" or even nearly so at Camp David in 2000. Second, yes, a great deal of fine work has been done on the core issues -- but by negotiators who risked very little either because they knew the hour was late and there was no real chance of success, or because they were unempowered to negotiate. Third, the fact that we have a better idea of what a solution might be in no way makes it easier to get there. And, fourth, as for the old college try, that's no substitute for the foreign policy of the world's greatest power. Failure costs, and sometimes, it makes matters worse.

As Obama weighs his approach to Arab-Israeli negotiations in the new year, he should certainly know that on some issues -- territory and security -- the two sides have moved closer, at least on paper. No doubt he is aware that, even on issues such as Jerusalem, the Israeli and Palestinian publics may be more conditioned to accepting an agreement. How any of this would actually play out in the cruel and unforgiving world of Israeli and Palestinian politics -- where Abbas and Netanyahu actually have to make decisions -- is another matter. Presumably, the goal of the next several months will be to have the quiet diplomacy of envoy George Mitchell and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton test out all this.

But far more important to Obama's calculations should be the two unasked questions of Camp David: questions that Bill Clinton and those who advised him (including myself), never asked critically or comprehensively enough. This is particularly important for Obama who, much like Bill Clinton, believes that through the force of his personality, he can act as a transformative agent in international politics.

First, are the two leaders willing, able, and ready to make the big decisions on the big territorial issues and on the identity issues of Jerusalem and refugees? And, second, is Obama himself willing, able, and ready to do what's necessary to be tough, reassuring, and fair -- using ample amounts of honey and vinegar to try to make the deal?

If the answer to the first question is yes, Obama's in business. If both are yes, he might even -- with the help of the peace process gods -- get an agreement. But he must ask these questions before he commits because, if he doesn't, he will surely fail. And in failing he will be hanging a "closed for the season" sign on American efforts in Arab-Israeli peacemaking. And far from being the architect of a negotiated two-state solution, Obama will end up being the American president whose administration presided over its demise.

The Proof Revealed By WikiLeaks

By Husam Itani

This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 21/12/2010

It is worrying to see the rush to quote WikiLeaks documents and rely on them, as an argument that does not stand up.

It is rare to see an article published in an Arab newspaper that does not refer to WikiLeaks and treat the content as definitive judgments. Some writers take this as far as the ridiculous and the surreal.

In a recent interview on Al Jazeera, Mohammed Hassanein Heikal said he believed that the importance of the documents lies in their drawing a panoramic picture of American policy around the world. If we take into consideration the simple fact that the WikiLeaks website has only published 1,818 out of more than 251,000, or less than ten percent of the total in its possession, we should ask about the “panorama” to which Heikal is referring.

We know that the shock that resulted from the first batches of American diplomatic cables has astonished the world. But it is hard today, before more of these documents are published, to say anything definitive about the nature of America’s “domestic” vision of the world.

The documents’ power to penetrate Arab political and media circles, arriving at culture circles, has been astonishing. Abdel-Wahhab Azzawi cites WikiLeaks to rebut the poet Salim Barakat (and an article of his in the An-Nahar cutural supplement on 19 December 2010, entitled “Re-producing the Culture of Exclusion and Smearing). The topic of the discussion, Arab-Kurdish relations, is a political one. However, the leaked US State Department documents to boost the Arab position on the Kurds and other minorities, is something that should be reconsidered.

In the search for pretexts and excuses in the fragments of US diplomatic correspondence, the methods signal several things. Irrespective of the selectivity and arbitrariness in relying on the documents (neglecting those connected with corruption in one of the “defiant” Arab states and the focus on the stance of some “moderate” Arabs, as only example), the heavy reliance by Arab writers and politicians on the information contained in WikiLeaks is selective and lacking, and indicates profoundly the rejection of the panoramic vision that Heikal spoke of. The question here arises about the supporting proof on which Arab writers would rely to support what they say, if WikiLeaks does not publish what it did.

Meanwhile, this quickness to rely on American documents indicates that the space for circulating credible and sensitive political information is very narrow in the Arab world. If the internet has slightly improved things in terms of spread of access, Arab users of the net have drowned themselves in a sea of conspiracy theories or similar silliness. Instead of seeing the internet as a tool of knowledge and scientific thought, in addition to its entertainment aspects, the web has become a mirror of the Arab situation, in all of its disadvantages.

It was not strange, in such a situation, for the WikiLeaks documents to enter the bazaar of ready-made accusations, and for the State Department leaks to cause confusion and vagueness in the minds of Arabs who are already confused to begin with, as they are unable to come to admit the truths of the real world and live with them, and create their own truths and reality. The disaster was that these documents came to the Arabs as a safe haven for their digital superstitions.

Will Al-Salehi Repair Relations?

By Abdul Rahman al-Rahid
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 21/12/2010
 
It was notable that the first statement issued by the new Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, focussed on the need to improve his country's relations with two of its neighbours: Saudi Arabia and Turkey. At a time when relations with Turkey are considered to be at their best for 30 years, relations with Saudi Arabia have reached a new low, and are likely to deteriorate further. Ousted minister Manouchehr Mottaki was not the cause of such deterioration, and thus it would be wrong to think that his dismissal would remove the obstacles between the two countries.
 
Two issues are behind this silent crisis: Firstly, there is rising Iranian influence in the Arab region. Hezbollah is besieging the Lebanese government and crippling the country, whilst in Gaza, Hamas is acting contrary to the interests of the Palestinian Authority. In Iraq, the winners of the recent government election have been marginalized by a coalition which Iran has imposed upon all Iraqis. Bahrain is suffering a state of disorder at the hands of groups affiliated to Iran, and the Iranians have also supported the Houthis in Yemen, who launched attacks against Saudi Arabia. All these incidents form a large map of Iranian activity in the Middle East, which is hostile towards Saudi Arabia. Secondly, there is the issue of the Iranian nuclear file, a subject in which Minister al-Salehi specializes. Iran’s nuclear capabilities are considered the primary threat to Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region.
 
Can the new minister do something about this mountain of complex problems between the two countries?

 
Certainly, Iran is the only party capable of ending the causes of tension between the two countries, or indeed with all countries in the region. Saudi Arabia has nothing more to offer. The Kingdom took the initiative in terms of reconciliation 10 years ago, when it changed its policy and restored relations with the governments of [Akbar Hashemi] Rafsanjani, and then [Mohammad] Khatami. Saudi Arabia also opened its airspace for flights between the two countries and hosted Iranian trade missions, contrary to American advice, which sought to tighten the grip on the Iranian government, and suspend its nuclear program. Unfortunately however, Tehran seemed to misinterpret these Saudi concessions. Subsequently, Iran turned into a savage monster in the Arab region, sheltering al-Qaeda leaders, and intensifying its development of nuclear weapons.

 
During the era of Minister Mottaki, relations did indeed deteriorate, but the minister himself was not responsible. Rather it was the policy of Ahmadinejad, who has persisted with his political manoeuvres, in a manner not witnessed in the Arab world since the 1960s.

 
Is it possible after all this to repair the broken relations? The matter has now gone beyond the capabilities of the new Iranian Foreign Minister, and has reached a stage where the intentions of the leadership in Tehran must change.