WikiLeaks Indict And Vindicate US Diplomats

By Ramzy Baroud

This commentary was published in the Jordan Times on 8/12/2010

 

WikiLeaks vs. the US government saga started in July, when 77,000 secret US documents directly relating to Afghanistan were made available to major media organisations. Many of us shook our heads with a mixture of disgust and vindication. We had long been aware of the brutality of the war, and the corruption of its benefactors. Now we finally had written, uncontested proof.

The Afghanistan war logs were revealing and damning. They were filed by soldiers and commanders in the field. Despite their vastness, they constituted a decipherable narrative, a sorry story told and discussed.

The Iraq war diaries also resembled an unmitigated disaster for US war plans; 391,832 classified military documents were published on October 22, revealing the extent of the calamitous invasion, occupation and “state building” under way in Iraq.

The value of these finds - representing the largest leak in history - is unmatched. It effectively brought to an end the illusion that all was well in Mesopotamia. As with the Afghanistan documents, these files constituted a narrative, albeit an extremely long and disturbing one. The fact that 15,000 Iraqi deaths are now officially included in the count is in itself a remarkable achievement.

The leaks regarding Afghanistan and Iraq were related. The much touted “success” of the surge in Iraq under former US president George W. Bush is being repeated in Afghanistan under current President Barack Obama. The same haughtiness, language and even strategies are now being duplicated.

Thanks to the logs and diaries, now we know we are being fed half truths. We can see through the dodgy numbers, the fabricated estimations, the flashy and dishonest language of politicians and leaders. Never again should anyone claim lack of knowledge of civilian casualties, detainee abuse, corruption and very shifty war goals.

On November 28, the State Department was faced with another leak and embarrassment: 250,000 US diplomatic cables were released, divulging everything from the US’ belittling judgments of the supposedly poor fighting abilities of British soldiers in Helmand to the unwelcomed camaraderie between Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, from Qatar’s alleged “[hesitance] to act against known terrorists” to Hizbollah’s alleged attainment of new and sophisticated weapons through Syria.

Much of what has been disclosed was known, expected or realised through a simple exercise of deductive reasoning. In the case of Russia, cables, many of which were disclosed to The New York Times and four other major international news outlets, merely demonstrated the limited access enjoyed by US diplomats in that country. This left them relying mostly on third-party accounts and their personal interpretations.

Their messages, at times, read like unsophisticated blogs, conceited and overly judgemental, if not overly personal.

In the case of Turkey, which seems to be the centre of American diplomacy, 7,981 leaked documents reflected a predictable hatred and paranoia towards a country spreading its wings as a regional power - in a region already claimed by both Israel and the United States. According to reports, the comments were almost all negative. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was reportedly described as an “autocratic Islamist” who surrounds himself by an “iron ring of sycophantic [but contemptuous] advisers”. Ahmet Davutoglu, the foreign minister, is described as “extremely dangerous”, with neo-Ottoman ambitions.

While there were numerous insulting comments about the leaders of almost all the countries discussed in the cables, some revelations were particularly suspicious. For one, it seems strange that Israel, a nuclear power with ongoing military adventures, was spared much of the embarrassment.

Iran’s nuclear programme-related documents are bewildering, as they comprise the only case with a consistent and consequential narrative. This was embraced by the Israeli Jerusalem Post, which described the findings as vindicating Israel (because the leaks alleged that the desire to eliminate Iran’s nuclear programme was also shared by others in the region).

The timing of this revelation seems suspicious, in light of Iran’s scheduled nuclear talks in Geneva, and the increasingly warming of relations between Iran and various Arab countries. It is as if someone, or some entity, wants to enliven the conflict with Iran, and spread it throughout the Middle East.

There was also allegation, made by Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak, that the Palestinian Authority of Mahmoud Abbas was informed in advance of the deadly war unleashed on the impoverished Gaza Strip, which killed and wounded thousands. Even if someone chooses to trust a source like Barak, there are still no surprises here.

Palestinian officials in Ramallah openly coordinate security and other issues with their Israeli counterparts at a time that Gaza continues to face the harshness of siege. The Palestinian Authority’s unflattering conduct requires no leaks.

The Turkish mainstream daily Aksam dubbed the leaks “The September 11 of diplomacy”. And like September 11, the leaks’ impact will likely reverberate on the international stage for years to come. There is no question that the embarrassing disclosures would make every world government thinks twice before sharing any new intelligence with US officials. The US officials will think twice before choosing their words.

But that aside, it must be stated that some US diplomats - unlike the top politicians in Washington - seem to in fact hold themselves accountable for the declared policy of their government. Their repeated emphasis on democracy, corruption and so on in their private messages indicates that they are genuinely focused on these issues, despite the fact that they serve a largely frivolous and propagandist role in the overall policy of the US government.

Finally, one must admit that, unlike the Afghanistan and Iraq leaks, the latest revelations are of hardly any service to the cause of justice and global peace. They simply show the inner workings of US diplomacy, with all its good points, flaws, limitations and shortcomings.

Despite their high number, the documents raise many questions but answer few. They only confirm existing beliefs, ranging from the widespread corruption in Afghanistan to Berlusconi’s “frequent late nights and penchant for partying”. But since more are coming, one can only wait and see.

Fresh Arab Approach Toward Iran, Palestine Needed Now

By Osama Al-Sharif
This commentary was published in Arab News on 7/12/2010

The world is still abuzz over the WikiLeaks diplomatic cables revelations, which have caused both embarrassment and anger in Washington and other major capitals. The press is still sifting through hundreds of thousands of classified US diplomatic cables and every day sheds light on one issue or another.

There are two immediate points which Arab leaders should take note of, regardless of the perceived damage caused by the leaks in some cases. One concerns long-term relations with Iran and the need to chart an independent Arab, particularly GCC, policy toward Tehran. The second is the Palestine Question, which appears to have regressed from being the central cause for the Arabs, at least in the eye of US diplomats in the region, to becoming a marginal or side issue.

The first challenge is enormous and appears to have been underestimated by Arab leaders. Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its attempt to develop fuel enrichment technology away from international supervision is a genuine cause for concern, in the Middle East and elsewhere. But Iran’s diplomatic showdown with the West should not dictate Arab policies. Our relationship with Tehran is much more complex. It involves the long-term security of the Gulf and the region, bilateral relations at different levels, Iran’s involvement in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Palestine and cultural and religious ties. Iran is not an outsider to this region, but a major geopolitical player who is here to stay.

Israel and the West have their own agenda with regard to Iran and its nuclear program. The Arabs should not be followers; they have their own vested interests to protect and safeguard. Their quarrel with Iran centers over specific topics, most of which can be resolved through direct talks and binding assurances.

Certainly the Arabs have no interest in seeing another war conflagrate in the Gulf region. We are yet to see an end to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And if a military confrontation, with incalculable risks and outcome, does break out between Iran and the West, the Arabs should resist being sucked into it.

Instead the Arabs have a strategic role to play, as does Turkey, in calming Tehran’s fears and encouraging it to compromise and open up. On the record, no Arab country is against Iran’s legitimate right to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful means. And if Iran’s latest assurances that it will never attack a Muslim country are to be taken at their face value, then the Arabs should launch a diplomatic drive to hold Tehran to its word.

With a new round of negotiations this week taking place in Geneva between Iran and the 5+1 group of nations over Tehran’s nuclear program, the Arab world should express support and provide ideas to make these talks fruitful. The alternatives are frightening and profound. The repercussions to our region will be disastrous. It is pivotal that key Arab nations debunk the allegations made in WikiLeaks cables and come forward with a gesture of goodwill toward Iran. The GCC summit in Abu Dhabi was expected to cover this matter.

Such move will force Tehran to reciprocate and to provide assurances that its nuclear program is indeed peaceful and threatens no one. If the Iranian leadership fails to make such pledges, then Arab leaderships and public opinion will be united.

In the Manama Dialogue earlier in the week, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki made some positive statements, directed to his country’s neighbors. There is no reason why the Arabs should not respond in kind. Before him President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad discounted the effect of the WikiLeaks revelations and accused the United States of attempting to divide Muslims and stir regional trouble. While Arab and Muslim capitals refuted the veracity of allegations made in the WikiLeaks cables, it is important that they send a positive sign to Tehran.

What is at stake is much more than Iran’s nuclear program, but its relationship with its Arab neighbors. The Arabs need to engage Tehran on many issues such as Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and the security of the Gulf region. It is there that Arab diplomacy should focus.

The Palestine Question has received little coverage in the WikiLeaks documents, so far. This is an issue that raises many questions on the intentions of the whistleblower site. As much as Iran, Iraq and others are important it is difficult to believe that US foreign policy has not given attention to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. For millions of Arabs and Muslims and for many nations around the world Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands and the future of the peace process remain central.

At a time when the US appears to have failed to convince the Israeli government to accept a three-month freeze on settlement activities, the Arabs should step in and underline the importance of resolving this decades-old conflict. Focus on Iran or Afghanistan should not be at the expense of the Palestine Question, which remains crucial to peoples of the region.

King Abdallah of Jordan, also speaking at the Manama Dialogue, underlined the importance of not missing a last chance to implement the two-state solution. He warned of a regional catastrophe and his words should be heeded.

There is a dire need to re-galvanize Arab strategies and policies in the wake of the disruption that the WikiLeaks cables have caused. The Arabs need to present a new and unwavering stand on priorities and positions in order to deflect any damage that the WikiLeaks cables may have caused. It is imperative that they act now!

Tables Have Turned In Sudan

Northern opposition to separation is far less than media reports suggest, with the South now enjoying the virtue of the victim.

By Nesrine Malik

This commentary was published in The Guardian on 7/12/2010

The referendum clouds are beginning to gather and the mood is tense in Khartoum. As southern Sudan prepares for its vote on secession next month, there is confusion and foreboding. The topic dominates conversations and in local media – despite the long history of conflict – southerners are now portrayed as brethren and unity is predicted as the only viable outcome.

As international media coverage intensifies there are some themes emerging: that secession is unavoidable, that the north will never accept it, and that war is inevitable.

On the ground, the chasm between these reports and the reality is significant. Most of them conflate the northern government with the northern populace and opinion on the street. While northerners (themselves an amalgamation of races, tribes and regions, including Darfur) have historically shown a racist and patronising attitude towards the south, the degree of outright opposition to the secession is less than one would expect.

The overwhelming feeling is of resignation, combined with concern. This is not to be confused with a lack of interest. "There is no such thing as 'no one cares'," in the north, an ex-minister told me. "Sudanese care, they're just not sure what about."


There are broadly two reasons for this. The first is the north's political culture. As in many Arab countries, society is highly politicised with strong opinions voiced, but there is little recourse to effecting change. Decision making has been out of the hands of the populace for so long.


The attitude towards the south has always been dictated from above. Those with longer memories can recall the intense propaganda campaign waged by the north in the 1990s. Southerners were painted as infidels, sub-human Zionist collaborators, while "martyrs" from the north were sanctified.


More recently there has been a sudden volte-face. A fast track to reconciliation over the past few months has seen a celebration of southern culture and music, and the north has been subjected to a public media crash course on all things southern.

Despite this new-found concern, there is already de facto separation from the south – which is the second reason for the detached attitudes in the north. There are few tangible links with the south that would sufficiently exercise northerners regarding loss of property, investments or business revenue. There is also little genuine affection for the people of the south. As a recent report from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies accurately pointed out, "conversations with Sudan's educated classes, usually rich in texture and nuance, start to lose their smooth edges when the subject matter turns southward. Stereotypes, paternalistic attitudes and casual racism often creep into the analysis".

What you do find instead is a nostalgic, misty-eyed attachment to an idea of a Sudan that never really existed: the largest country in Africa, the "land of a million square miles" – a refrain often echoed in nationalistic speeches. The new shape of Sudan on the map after separation – diminished, dismembered, unfamiliar and awkward – perturbs many.

There is also a residual bitterness and dented pride. War has crippled the country for so long only to end in a relinquishment of the regions most wealthy in natural resources. Ironically, there is a view that the National Congress party (NCP), even though it is desperate to avoid secession, made a tactical error in its eagerness to sign the comprehensive peace agreement without establishing a strategic plan to avoid separation. Those in the north who actively support separation – the likes of the Al-Intibaha contingent – get no thanks from southerners for their attitude appears to be one of racist good riddance.

But the overall result is that there is no real current of opinion against separation but bubbling resentment and uncertainty, exacerbated by an administration that seems just as clueless. I cannot help but feel that the tables have turned. The south now enjoys the virtue of the victim.

As a people, the northerners are worried, not about the split but about their own day of reckoning when they will no longer not be able to use the south, the war, or western designs in the region as a pretext.

Al-Qaeda's M&A Strategy

Is franchising a successful way to build a global terror network?

By Daniel Byman

This article was published in Foreign Policy on 7/12/2010 

On Sept. 11, 2006, al Qaeda celebrated the fifth anniversary of its marquee terrorist attack by announcing that it had signed up hundreds of new members -- an impressive growth spurt for an organization whose membership is often estimated by American counterterrorism analysts to be in the low thousands.

But al Qaeda hadn't so much recruited its new members as acquired them: They were from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC by its French initials), a jihadist group that for years had almost exclusively targeted the ruling regime in Algeria. "The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat has joined the Al Qaeda organization," Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda's No. 2, crowed. "May this be a bone in the throat of American and French crusaders, and their allies, and sow fear in the hearts of French traitors and sons of apostates." A few months later, the GSPC adopted the moniker "al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM). A minor-league guerrilla operation had rebranded itself as a franchise of the biggest name in Islamist terrorism.

AQIM is not alone in going from a local to a global focus. The popular image of al Qaeda is of an organization that draws its membership from disillusioned Muslims who, infuriated by U.S. support for Israel or intervention in the Muslim world -- and beguiled by the idea of a universal caliphate -- go off to join the fight. But in fact, much of al Qaeda's growth in the last decade has been the kind of expansion that any American businessman would recognize: They've systematically tried to absorb regional jihadist start-ups, both venerable and newly created, and convince them that their struggle is a component of al Qaeda's sweeping international agenda -- and vice versa. Zawahiri himself was once head of one such organization, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), which he led from an exclusive focus on toppling the Egyptian regime to an embrace of al Qaeda's anti-American and pan-Islamic agenda. Al Qaeda branches have since popped up in Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, and the organization is making inroads with groups in Pakistan, Somalia, and elsewhere.

 

Consider last year's Christmas Day bombing plot, in which a Nigerian recruit to the Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) almost blew up a passenger airplane landing in Detroit. Yemen has long hosted al Qaeda-linked jihadists, but for most of the last decade they focused on local and regional targets. In 2009, however, jihadists in Yemen and Saudi Arabia announced a merger under the AQAP banner and took on a more global focus: one that included the Detroit plot and this October's plan to blow up two cargo planes as they neared U.S. cities.
The attacks emerging from Yemen have led some U.S. officials to believe al Qaeda's affiliates are more dangerous than the organization's core, isolated as it is in the Pakistani hinterlands. Making sense of this network is key to understanding the threat of terrorism today -- and how best to respond to it.

                                                                     How Do I Sign Up?

Formally joining al Qaeda is a complex process and one that can take years. It is often difficult to tell when a true shift has occurred, in part because al Qaeda does not demand sole allegiance; it supports local struggles even as it pursues its own war against the United States and its allies. So group members can be half-pregnant: both part of al Qaeda's ranks and loyal fighters in their local organization. Zawahiri, for instance, had been part of al Qaeda since its founding in 1988, but for almost a decade he saw EIJ, not al Qaeda, as his primary charge. It took 10 years for Zawahiri to fully sign on to Osama bin Laden's "International Islamic Front for Jihad on the Jews and Crusaders," and three more years for his group to fully integrate with al Qaeda. For Algeria's GSPC, the process took at least four years, and the integration is still incomplete.

During this prolonged courtship, groups often straddle their old and new identities, trying to keep up the fight against the local regime while also attacking more global targets. Often this is a time of infighting, with key leaders pulling the group in different directions. Some seek to stay the course and continue to fight the local regime, while others are attracted by what al Qaeda has to offer. Somalia's al-Shabab, for instance, appears to be in such a phase today. Some parts of the organization cooperate with al Qaeda, with foreign jihadists playing leading roles in tactics and operations. But others within the movement -- probably the majority, in fact -- oppose the foreigners' control, with some even publicly condemning terrorism and even working with international humanitarian relief efforts. Al-Shabab could become "al Qaeda of the Horn of Africa," but this is not yet a done deal. And if it happens, it could split the group.

After a merger happens, command relationships between the affiliate and al Qaeda's central leadership vary. When al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula began attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2003, they were done at the direction of al Qaeda's central leadership, which was eager to strike at the kingdom. But groups like AQIM retain a high degree of independence, working with al Qaeda's core more as partners than as proxies. Many AQIM attacks still target the Algerian regime, particularly its security forces -- an aim more in keeping with the group's past priorities than al Qaeda's.

But even these somewhat independent partners change both their targets and methods as they move closer to joining al Qaeda. On the road to becoming AQIM, for instance, the GSPC expanded its primary focus to include France as well as the Algerian regime. When it took on the al Qaeda label, the group struck U.N. and Israeli targets and went after Algeria's energy infrastructure, none of which were a priority in the past. Suicide bombings, hitherto one of the few horrors the GSPC did not inflict, grew more frequent, along with Iraqi-style car bombs. In Pakistan, where al Qaeda's influence has spread since 9/11, there were two suicide attacks in 2002; by 2009, there were almost 60.

                                                        The Rewards of Association

For al Qaeda's leaders, the appeal of gathering affiliates is manifold. New franchises are both confirmation of the wisdom of their mission -- to throw out the Westerners and establish a true Islamic government throughout the Muslim world -- and a means of extending its influence. Al Qaeda seeks not only to change the Islamic world, but also to shift the orientation of jihad from the local to the global. Historically, most jihadi resistance movements have focused on their own territory. Even Zawahiri, during his EIJ days, once wrote that "the road to Jerusalem goes through Cairo" -- meaning that destroying Israel, ostensibly the ultimate sacred cause for jihadists, must wait until there is an Islamic government at home. If jihadists did have a foreign focus, it was usually on throwing out foreign troops: for example, fighting the Russians in Afghanistan and, later, Chechnya. But bin Laden has successfully convinced groups that striking the United States and its allies is more important to this victory than fighting more proximate enemies.

Affiliates offer al Qaeda many practical rewards: hundreds or even thousands of fighters, donors, smuggling networks, and sympathetic preachers who offer religious legitimacy. Before the creation of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004, bin Laden and his coterie seemed irrelevant to the struggle against the United States there; it was Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi and his supporters in the Monotheism and Jihad Group who garnered recruits, money, and publicity. Al Qaeda affiliates also offer access to immigrant and diaspora communities -- a group like Somalia's al-Shabab, with its connections to the Somali-American population, would be a prize asset. (Mohamed Osman Mohamud, the alleged Portland, Ore. bomb plotter arrested in November, doesn't appear to have any connection to al-Shabab, but demonstrates the potential that such groups see in immigrant communities.)

What do al Qaeda franchises get out of the deal? Most concretely, money -- either directly from al Qaeda or from elsewhere in its network. After all, jihad isn't cheap. Buying explosives, paying salaries, providing stipends for the families of imprisoned fighters, arranging travel, and handing out bribes to local governments -- it all adds up. (In 1999, EIJ was so broke that Zawahiri blasted a cell member for buying a new fax machine without authorization when the organization's staff was on half salary.) Al Qaeda also has web and media specialists who produce recruitment and fundraising videos, recruiters who try to identify potential new members at mosques and other locations, trainers who teach how to use small arms and make improvised explosive devices, and other experts in its global Rolodex, all available to help a new local franchise. For example, Saleh Ali Nabhan, an experienced al Qaeda commander linked to several attacks in Africa, reportedly trained al-Shabab members in Somalia.

An al Qaeda label is also a potential recruiting boon -- it may help a group attract new members who hate the West and the United States but were not motivated by the group's past, more local, rhetoric. Less tangibly, the al Qaeda brand also can give credibility to groups struggling at home. Groups like al-Shabab often have an inchoate ideology; al Qaeda offers them a coherent -- and, to a certain audience, appealing -- alternative.

                                                                       A Risky Play

But the post-merger relationship is not all IEDs and roses. Gaining affiliates may raise al Qaeda's profile and extend its reach, but it also poses risks for the group's core. The biggest is the lack of control. Maintaining effective command from remote parts of Pakistan was always difficult; the U.S. drone campaign has made it even harder. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Iraq. As early as 2005, al Qaeda core leaders tried to push Iraqi fighters waging guerrilla war under the banner of al Qaeda in Iraq not to slaughter Shiite Muslims, and especially not Sunni civilians, but to no avail. As the bloodshed rose, al Qaeda funders and supporters pointed their fingers not only at AQI leaders, but also at al Qaeda's core. This left the top al Qaeda officials in a bind: Should they denounce their most popular affiliate for its excesses, or risk being tarred with its bloody brush? In 2008, years after the merger, Zawahiri was still defending the al Qaeda cause against accusations of brutality and excess. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (known better as Dr. Fadl), a one-time key EIJ ideologue who has since turned against al Qaeda, excoriated the group this year for the "unprecedented atrocities committed ... against the Iraqi people."

But joining up with al Qaeda is even more risky for the affiliates. By taking on new enemies at al Qaeda's behest, a group gets -- well, new enemies. When AQIM declared its intention to take jihad beyond Algeria, the Moroccan government -- long hostile to Algiers -- became much more willing to cooperate with its neighbor, and French counterterrorism support for states in the region also picked up. The United States, of course, is the biggest new enemy. Even short of drone strikes, Washington can offer its allies intelligence, financial support, paramilitary capabilities, and other vital forms of assistance, creating new headaches for groups that have plenty of them already.

When groups embrace al Qaeda's "far enemy" logic, they are also embracing strategic absurdity. Terrorist groups that succeed politically, like Hezbollah and Hamas, are firmly anchored in local realities and politics, and their success comes in part because their ambitions are limited. Not so with al Qaeda. Al Qaeda may preach that the regimes in Riyadh, Cairo, and Algiers are held in place by U.S. troops and influence, but the reality is that these governments have their own ruthless security services and means of buying off rivals that help them ensure their grip on power even if Washington abandons them.

Because of these risks, the decision to join al Qaeda often angers more sensible group members who retain local ambitions. One of Zawahiri's EIJ compatriots declared the merger a "great illusion," and in 2001 another member criticized joining bin Laden as a "dead end," fuming, "Enough pouring musk on barren land!" The dissenting comrade had it right: EIJ's cause is dead in Egypt today, and the decision to go global was the nail in the coffin.

It's not surprising, then, that not everyone in the jihadi camp signs up with al Qaeda. Samir Saleh Abdullah al-Suwailem, a Saudi fighter known as Khattab and for many years the most prominent Arab commander in Chechnya, shared many of al Qaeda's goals but rejected a formal relationship. At the time, he believed that he was close to defeating the Russians in Chechnya, and that taking on the United States or other new foes would be a distraction. Prominent groups in Egypt, Palestine, and elsewhere also have refused to entertain closer ties to al Qaeda, or have even rejected the organization publicly.

                                                                    Handle with Care

All this suggests that for all the danger al Qaeda's growing network of affiliates poses to the West, it also offers opportunities for counterterrorism. Atrocities committed by one branch of al Qaeda can be used to discredit the core, as has happened with AQI. Ties to foreigners can alienate many insurgents, who are often motivated more by nationalism than religion. For example, AQI suffered when it declared its intention to make Iraq an Islamic state: Many of its potential Sunni supporters there came to see AQI as more of a threat to their independence than the United States. Even Somalis -- who would seem immune to atrocity and bloodletting after years of conflict -- were outraged by the spate of suicide bombings in recent years, blaming foreigners for it and thus undermining al-Shabab's legitimacy in the country.

Nor are all jihadi groups necessarily as professional as bin Laden's inner circle. The al Qaeda core represents an unusual set of leaders and operatives: Most are highly skilled, dedicated, well-trained, and meticulous about operational security. Affiliate members, however, are frequently less careful -- their organizations often were born amid civil wars, and accordingly have focused more on maintaining a continued insurgency rather than focusing on pulling off a limited number of high-profile terrorist attacks. Years of fighting in the mountains of Algeria or the wastes of Yemen are not good preparation for infiltrating and attacking targets in the West.

That's the good news. The bad news is that counterterrorism success against locally focused groups can have unforeseen pitfalls. The United States should, of course, want its allies in the Muslim world to triumph over jihadists; even governments like Algeria's, which are hardly close friends, deserve support. But, as was the case for EIJ and GSPC, local failure may prompt some group members to go global, increasing the risk of anti-U.S. terrorism. Counterterrorism is not zero sum, but it would be naive and dangerous to assume that crushing local opponents won't encourage some cells to split off and join al Qaeda.

The most vexing dilemma for U.S. counterterrorism policy, however, concerns groups that may be moving toward al Qaeda but have not yet made the leap. Many al Qaeda affiliates always hated the United States and its allies, but their focus was local for many years. Because the groups had some ties to al Qaeda, George W. Bush's and Barack Obama's administrations began to target them and encourage others to do so. As a result, the groups became more anti-American, creating a vicious circle.

Consider Ethiopia's U.S.-supported 2006 invasion of Somalia, which intended to remove Islamists from power, and in the process splintered them into smaller groups. Al-Shabab emerged from one of the more radical fragments and has since become far more powerful. Angered by U.S. involvement in the invasion and the targeting of al Qaeda-linked individuals in Somalia, the group has become far more anti-American than its Islamist predecessor ever was. In short, U.S. administrations are often damned either way. Ignoring the group allows potential threats to grow worse and risks an attack from out of the blue. But taking them on may mean driving some deeper into al Qaeda's fold -- and making the terrorist threat all the more dangerous.

There is no one-size-fits-all strategy. U.S. intelligence and other counterterrorism assets should continue to focus on the core of al Qaeda, which -- both alone and in combination with affiliates -- remains highly dangerous. For some affiliates -- AQAP, for instance -- the United States should rely first and foremost on local allies. In other cases, simply cultivating better relations with states at risk -- such as Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and others threatened by AQIM -- is the wisest strategy. In Somalia, the best that can be hoped for may be simply containing the problem. In all these cases, however, the United States should strive to separate the locals from the al Qaeda core. The organization's merger strategy is a double-edged sword: Al Qaeda has gained from its acquisitions, but it can also be hurt by them.

Daniel Byman is a professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. His forthcoming book is A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism.

Abu Dhabi Summit: A Guaranteed Success!

By Tariq Alhomayed
This commentary was published in Asharq on 7/12/2010
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] summit which is taking place today in the UAE capital Abu Dhabi will be different than any previous summit for the people of the region and neighboring countries, and this is before we even look at what is on the summit's agenda or listen to it's closing speech.
 
As I said in my last article, we are living in a post-WikiLeaks world, and the people of the region and our neighboring countries are more reassured today than at any time before that the Gulf leaders are in agreement with regards to their opinions towards the Iranian threat, and particularly the threat represented by Iran's nuclear project.
 
Therefore regardless of the decisions that will be issued by the Gulf leaders - which will no doubt be issued in elegant diplomatic language as usual - what is new today is that observers, including includes everybody in the region, are now aware that their leaders hold similar views with regards to the threats facing Arab Gulf States, with the most dangerous of these threats represented by Iran's nuclear project.
 
The leaked US diplomatic cables revealed to us the Gulf view towards the threat represented by the Iranian nuclear project, in contras to the [official] diplomatic statements that refrained from saying much about the Iranian nuclear project and the threat that this represents. The people of the region are suspicios towards this nculear project, and increasingly concerned about their future, and the future of their children.
 
However today the situation is completely different, and this is the most important reason why this summit was guaranteed to be successful even before it began, for the people of the region know and agree with the viewpoint held by their leaders. The Iranians must also remember that the GCC - which has existed since its establishment [in 1981] despite all of the differences in opinion and viewpoint between its member states – is meeting today to complete yesterday's message, as well as to send a clear and important message informing Iran that we remember why these countries first decided to meet, and we are still together.
 
The GCC remains one of the most important Arab endeavors in the region, thanks to its unity and cohesion. GCC State leaders have expressed their appreciation of the value and importance of this organization, and these leaders are well aware that the GCC is an important umbrella for the region, and there is no need to overstate its decisions or falsify slogans [to prove this].
 
The meeting of the GCC State leaders today in Abu Dhabi sends a message to reassure the people of the region, and it is also a message to Iran and others that the GCC States will not accept any compromise on its security and interests. The leaked diplomatic cables revealed a convergence and clarity with regards to the viewpoint of GCC States towards the threat represented by the Iranian nuclear project on the region as a whole, and this is what guaranteed that this summit would be a success, even before it began.

Erdogan The Fireman

By Elias Harfoush

This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 7/12/2010

Initiatives of a humanitarian type might be quite few, if not non-existent, between Israel and its Arab and non-Arab rivals. What prevails, and is exchanged between the sides, are initiatives of bloodshed and committing massacres, especially by the Israeli side. Therefore it was notable to see the attention given to the initiative by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to send two firefighting aircraft to help put out the huge fire that consumed Mount Carmel near the city of Haifa, killing more than 40 people. The initiative was notable because of the frostiness that the government in Ankara claims exists in its relations with the Israelis, ever since the Israeli navy attacked the Freedom Flotilla in May, killing nine Turks who were headed to the Gaza Strip on a humanitarian mission.

The irony is that Turkey chose to deliver this humanitarian assistance to Israel, even though the criticisms that it made of the Netanyahu government was that it lacked any humanitarian sense when it carried out its attack on the defenseless Turkish fleet, which was carrying food and medical supplies to the besieged strip.

Does this Turkish initiative mean that Erdogan has chosen to give the Israelis a lesson in proper, civilized relations, rising above rivalry when the matter involves a humanitarian issue? Or did he find it an opportunity to gain Israeli sympathy and repair the two countries’ relations, especially since his request for an apology and compensation for the families of the Freedom Flotilla victims was met with deaf ears by the Israelis?

Certainly, Erdogan calculated things well. Under the current conditions, Netanyahu was not waiting for an initiative of this type to sympathize with the Jews who were burning above Mount Carmel. Thus, the telephone call between the two men, for which the Israeli prime minister took the initiative, represented a breaking of the ice, and perhaps will help overcome the earlier Turkish preconditions for improving relations and turning the page.

With his initiative Erdogan proved once again, for those who still required evidence, that he is a pragmatic Islamist who is completely different from the radical Islamists who fill the Arab world’s satellite stations with shouting and promises of woe to the Zionist movement and the agents of imperialism! Most notably, one can compare what Erdogan did with the statements by Ismail Haniyah of Hamas, who considered the fire a “divine punishment for what the Israelis have done.” Faced with such a “fatwa,” issued by one of Erdogan’s allies, how can one explain the assistance that the Turkish prime minister rushed to offer to the Israelis, to save them from this “punishment”? Moreover, if the Mount Carmel fire was “punishment” for the Israelis for their behavior, how can Haniyah explain the dry weather that has afflicted the entire region, including the Gaza Strip, where Haniyah took part in a prayer for rain, during which he delivered his famous sermon about the “anger” that has befallen the Israelis?

Certainly, the step taken by the Turkish prime minister is different in form and method than what can be offered by the resistance camp of Arabs, who believe Erdogan is with them, and allied with their positions. Could we wait for a humanitarian initiative such as this toward Israel by Hezbollah or Ahmadinejad or their allies in the region, not to mention Hamas? The lesson in all of this is that Erdogan is doing politics, while those Arabs who believe him their allies, are doing speeches and one-upmanship. The difference between the two is that the former takes advantage of opportunities that benefit him and his country, on the basis of “zero conflict” [among neighbors], while the latter waste all opportunities to build something positive for their stances and causes. The first is trying to win, and the others are piling up the losses.

Lebanon: Reform Starts With Politicians

This editorial was published in the Daily Star on 7/12/2010

Politicians and officials in Lebanon gathered Monday for the annual ceremony to mark the opening of the judicial year.

The usual suspects were there: President Michel Sleiman called for a judiciary that is “strong, capable, and modern and a protector of freedoms.”  The other word that is usually heard on such occasions is “independent,” and Sleiman didn’t disappoint here either.

However, he said the responsibility for the independence of the judiciary rests primarily on the judge, who should remain honest and competent.

This exhortation, truth be told, is a bit problematic. It’s like telling drivers that they’re responsible for the soundness of Lebanon’s roads, while ignoring the state of our pavement, the enforcement of vehicle roadworthiness, and the lack of lights at night.

It’s like telling farmers in the Northern Bekaa to be honest, and grow tomatoes, or public employees to be competent and happy, when some have been waiting decades to be considered full-time staff.

It’s not that the particular approach of the president is wrong; most politicians echo this type of rhetoric.

In the first place, they can begin with themselves. If every single politician who talks about reforming the judiciary could just start by never interfering in a given case, it would be a tremendous start.

In the second place, which judges are letting us down? If someone lodges an official complaint about the unethical behavior of a given judge, will the process produce results?

Last year, the justice minister ousted a corrupt judge from his post, for bribery. A number of other magistrates who were investigated during this mini-campaign got off with warnings, were found to have done nothing wrong, or still await a “verdict.”

The point is that few people would believe that there was only a single corrupt judge in Lebanon that year, and none in 2010. In fact, there are many more, and the ones who go before the disciplinary councils are the ones who lack political protection. Who provides this protection? The same politicians who lecture us repeatedly about the need to reform the judiciary.

In order to reform politics, the legal and judicial element is critical. To reform the economy, laws must be changed, and respected. To reform society, the judiciary must offer fairness. To achieve sovereignty, a country’s judiciary must be sovereign, and itself under the law. The country experienced an economic recovery after the Civil War, despite all of the defects. But no one talks about the judicial recovery after the fighting stopped.

Lebanon is currently on edge because of the Special Tribunal, taking place on another continent. It isn’t surprising, since a country whose politicians don’t play by the rules when it comes to their own judiciary will remain immature in the eyes of the world. It will be a country perpetually in need of tutelage. This is why people are reading about The Hague these days.