Sunday, November 28, 2010

Hariri's Prized Gift From Iran

This editorial was published in the Daily Star on 29/11/2010


What with blacked-out Mercedes being the diplomat’s ride of choice, Saad Hariri probably doesn’t have much use for an Iranian-made car. But when the prime minister returns from his first official visit to Tehran he will do so clasping a gift of far greater import.

Hariri brought with him to Iran nothing less than a statesmanlike riposte to suggestions that Turkish (and Sunni) Prime Minister Recip Erdogan’s Beirut visit was devised as an antidote to Iranian (and Shiite) President Mahmood Ahmadinejad’s last month. What he got in return was an unqualified commitment to Lebanon’s wellbeing.

The prime minister has made a habit of not discussing domestic issues during recent diplomatic outings. In Tehran, avoiding a display of Lebanon’s dirty laundry not only demonstrated recognition of what Iranian support in Lebanon has traditionally meant; it also took in to account Iran’s burgeoning regional clout.

The indication that Beirut would welcome Iranian support of Saudi-Syrian efforts to avert a fresh Lebanese crisis is both positive and realistic. Positive, because Iran’s commitment to stability means a lot, given the size of who is committing; realistic, because Hariri knows the sway Tehran exerts on its Lebanese allies.

It’s worth recalling that Rafik Hariri was one of the first Arab prime ministers to undertake a state visit to post-1979 Iran. Both Saad Hariri and Ahmadinejad will recall the historical significance of Lebanese-Iranian contact. The irony that the name of Iranian-backed Hizbullah is now being uttered in the same sentence as Rafik Hariri’s death will not be lost on either party.

Hariri will soon return to Iran to sign trade agreements, taking bilateral relations to another level. On an economic plain, the two countries aspire to bolster mutual interest, irrespective of Lebanese factionalism. The same cooperation should be courted among political climes.


Hariri’s Iranian sojourn should not be viewed as one group’s triumph, just as Ahmadinejad and Erdogan’s visits ought to benefit the entire country. Closely timed trips from Iranian and Turkish premiers demonstrate that regional regimes have far more in common than they do in opposition when it comes to the good of Lebanon.

The hope is that the Iranian government will work toward Lebanon’s best interests, that it won’t seek to differentiate between or prioritize bickering groups. If regional backers recommend reconciliation then resolution ought to follow.

It is, of course, disappointing that Lebanon’s quandary has reached the stage where outside intervention is the sole solution. But if Iran has joined more traditional regional makeweights in wanting to reset Lebanese foundations, the likelihood decreases that warring parties can tear them down.

Abu Dhabi Growth Forges Ahead

By David Rosenberg
This article was published in Gulf Times on 29/11/2010

The world got its first look at Abu Dhabi’s Zayed National Museum this week when backers unveiled architectural renderings of the dramatic 345,000sq ft structure of five soaring pavilions, mimicking the feathers of a falcon’s wing. The project radiates money and prestige.

The internationally-renowned architect Lord Norman Foster is designing the building and the British Museum is lending its expertise. When it opens in 2014 on Saadiyat Island, a sandy patch 500m off the Abu Dhabi coast, it will be only one of several world-class cultural attractions that include branches of the Louvre and Guggenheim Museums.

A prestige golf course, a St Regis Hotel and a host of other high-end attractions are also slated. The tab for building all this? About $27bn.
If the plans for Saadiyat Island ring a familiar bell of over-the-top development, the kind that sent Dubai, Abu Dhabi’s next door emirate soaring and then crashing, economists beg to differ. With substantial oil wealth and the lessons learned from Dubai’s experience, the United Arab Emirate’s rising economic power stands a good chance of steering its way through a breakneck growth agenda dubbed Plan Abu Dhabi 2030.

“After the financial crisis they are shifting from real estate. They know that property development alone is not a sustainable growth model over the next  five to 10 years,” Jean-Paul Pigat, head of Middle East and North Africa analysis at Business Monitor International, told The Media Line. 

Until Dubai World, a quasi-governmental holding company, asked for more time to pay back investors a year ago, Dubai was riding high on luxury real estate development, offices and malls. It is now weighed down by debt that may be as much as $100bn while the property boom has fizzled. Abu Dhabi helped its high-flying brother with a $20bn aid package last year.

Abu Dhabi still has six hotels opening in 2011, and the emirate is home to three PGA-standard golf courses. But the focus of economic development is on less glamorous projects, like a $5.7bn aluminum plant; the development of a healthcare centre with help from Johns Hopkins University; the Cleveland Clinic; and a host of energy projects.
Abu Dhabi’s state-owned Advanced Technology Investment Company has taken a majority stake in the semiconductor maker Globalfoundries, which will build a $6bn plant near Masdar City employing 1,500 people, Ibrahim Ajami, ATI’s chief executive, said in an interview with the UAE’s The National newspaper last week.

The goal is to derive two thirds of its gross domestic product from things other than oil by 2030.

Abu Dhabi also has the added benefit of holding 9% of the world’s proven oil reserves — 98.2mn barrels — and 5% of the world’s natural gas. It also has enough land to develop without reclaiming it from the Gulf, Robin Teh, director of valuation and research at the international property agency Chesterton International, wrote in Gulf Times last week.

“Soon, Dubai is likely to have some competition from its neighbour, Abu Dhabi…. Abu Dhabi is in line to offer a greater variety of retail, leisure and recreational activity than most cities in the (Gulf).”
Giyas Gokkent, head of research at Abu Dhabi National Bank, said he didn’t see competition emerging between the two emirates, however. Much of what Abu Dhabi is developing, such as its airlines and airports and its aluminum industry, is competing with Europe or other non-Gulf economies, not with Dubai, he told The Media Line.

“We’ll have a rapid rail link between the two areas, and if you come back in 15-20 years time you will find a single cosmopolitan area. There will be a merging between Dubai and Abu Dhabi,” he said. “People will fly to Dubai and say, ‘lets go visit the Guggenheim in Abu Dhabi today.’ It will be a single destination. In Yas Island, there will be theme parks – it will be like an Orlando for the region.”

If Abu Dhabi does have any competition, it may be coming from Qatar, said Pigat of Business Monitor International. Qatar aims to boost its LNG export capacity by 12% to 77mn metric tons a year. Eventually, it wants to raise total oil and gas output to 5mn barrels of oil equivalent per day, from 2.8mn last year.

Vast amounts are already being spent on education and sports initiatives, the arts and property development.

“In terms of infrastructure spending and growth, Qatar is star performer in the Gulf,” Pigat said.

Oceans Of Blood And Profits For The Mongers Of War

By Robert Fisk
This comment was published in The Independent on 27/11/2010

Since there are now three conflicts in the greater Middle East; Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel/"Palestine" and maybe another Lebanese war in the offing, it might be a good idea to take a look at the cost of war.

Not the human cost – 80 lives a day in Iraq, unknown numbers in Afghanistan, one a day in Israel/"Palestine" (for now) – but the financial one. I'm still obsessed by the Saudi claim for its money back after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990. Hadn't Saudi Arabia, King Fahd reminded Saddam, financed his eight-year war against Iran to the tune of $25,734,469,885.80? For the custodian of the two holy places, Mecca and Medina, to have shelled out $25bn for Saddam to slaughter his fellow Muslims was pretty generous – although asking for that extra 80 cents was surely a bit greedy.

But then again, talking of rapacity, the Arabs spent $84bn underwriting the Anglo-American operation against Saddam in 1990-91 – three times what Fahd gave to Saddam for the Iran war – and the Saudi share alone came to $27.5bn. In all, the Arabs sustained a loss of $620bn because of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait – almost all of which was paid over to the United States and its allies. Washington was complaining in August 1991 that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait still owed $7.5bn. Western wars in the Middle East, it seemed, could be fought for profit as well as victory. Maybe Iraq could have brought us more treasure if it hadn't ended in disaster. At least it would help to have paid for America's constant infusion of cash to Israel's disastrous wars.

According to Israeli historian Illan PappĂ©, since 1949, the US has passed to Israel more than $100bn in grants and $10bn in special loans – more than Washington hands out to North Africa, South America and the Caribbean. Over the past 20 years, $5.5bn has been given to Israel for military purchases. But for sheer self-abuse, it's necessary to read of the Midas-like losses in the entire Middle East since just 1991 – an estimated $12,000,000,000,000. Yup, that's a cool $12trn and, if you don't believe me, take a look at an unassuming little booklet that the "Strategic Fortnight Group" published not long ago. Its statistic caught a few headlines, but was then largely forgotten, perhaps because it was published in faraway Mumbai rather than by some preposterous American "tink-thank" (as I call them). But it was funded by, among others, the Norwegian and Swiss foreign ministries. And the Indians are pretty smart about money, as we know as we wait in fear of its new super-economy.

So since there may soon be a new Israel-Hizbollah war, let's get an idea of the astronomical costs of all those F-16s, missiles, "bunker-busters", Iranian-made rockets, smashed Lebanese factories, villages, towns, bridges, power stations, oil terminals – we will not soil ourselves with Lebanon's 1,300 pathetic dead or Israel's 130 pathetic dead in the 2006 war for these are mere mortals – not to mention the losses in tourism and trade to both sides. Total losses for Lebanon in 2006 came to an estimated $3.6bn, for Israel $1.6bn – so Israel won hands down in terms of money, even if its rabble of an army screwed everything up on the ground. But among those who paid for this were American taxpayers (funding the Israelis) and European taxpayers, Arab potentates and the crackpot of Iran (funding Lebanon). So the American taxpayer destroys what the European taxpayer rebuilds. It's the same in Gaza; Washington funds the weapons to blow up EU-funded projects and the EU rebuilds them in time for them to be destroyed again. But boy oh boy, in the Lebanese war, US arms manufacturers make a packet – and so, to a lesser extent do the Iranian and Chinese missile dealers.

Let's break down the 2006 Lebanon war figures. Bridges and roads: $450m. Utilities: $419m. Housing: $2bn. But military "institutions": a paltry $16m. Hizbollah apparently spent $300m. Overall, rebuilding came to $319m, infrastructure repairs to $454m, oil spill costs to $175m. Just for sadistic fun, you can add forest fires ($4.6m), displaced civilians ($52m) and Beirut airport ($170m). But the biggest cost of all? Tourism, at $3-4bn. Now Israel. Tourism lost $1.4 bn, "government and emergency services" $460n, businesses $1.4bn, compensation paid out $335.4m, forest fires $18m. What have the Israeli army and Hizbollah got against forests? In all, the Israeli losses amounted to 1.5 per cent of GDP, the Lebanese 8 per cent of GDP.

And just look at the Middle East "arms race" – the jockeys being the arms manufacturers, the punters being the countries of the region and, of course, their "huddled masses". Saudi Arabia, as the Mumbai report said, leaps in a decade between 1996 and 2006 from $18bn to $30bn a year – it's just negotiating a $60bn deal with the US – and Iran from $3bn to $10bn. Israel has gone from $8bn to $12bn. In fact, there's an interesting correlation between Israel's state-of-the-art democratically minded missile-firings between 2000 and 2007 – 34,050 – and Hamas's evil, terrorist-inspired missile firings: a rather piffling 2,333.

There's a host of other goodies in this appalling list of financial and social horrors. On 11 September 2001, just 16 people were on America's "no-fly" list; by December, it was 594. By August 2008, it had reached an astonishing 100,000. At present rate, the US "terrorist watch list" will reach two million souls in two years' time. Since 1974, UN peacekeepers on the Golan Heights have cost $47.86m while the UN has forked out $680.93m for its forces in southern Lebanon since 1978.

So coming soon to a war near you; oceans of blood, bodies torn to shreds, of course. But bring your credit card. Or a cheque book. It's big business. And there may be profits.

Cables Obtained By WikiLeaks Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels

By Scott Shane and Andrew W Lehren
This article was published in the New York Times on 28/11/2010
WASHINGTON — A cache of a quarter-million confidential American diplomatic cables, most of them from the past three years, provides an unprecedented look at backroom bargaining by embassies around the world, brutally candid views of foreign leaders and frank assessments of nuclear and terrorist threats.
Some of the cables, made available to The New York Times and several other news organizations, were written as recently as late February, revealing the Obama administration’s exchanges over crises and conflicts. The material was originally obtained by WikiLeaks, an organization devoted to revealing secret documents. WikiLeaks intends to make the archive public on its Web site in batches, beginning Sunday.
The anticipated disclosure of the cables is already sending shudders through the diplomatic establishment, and could conceivably strain relations with some countries, influencing international affairs in ways that are impossible to predict.
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and American ambassadors around the world have been contacting foreign officials in recent days to alert them to the expected disclosures. A statement from the White House on Sunday said: “We condemn in the strongest terms the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents and sensitive national security information.”
“President Obama supports responsible, accountable, and open government at home and around the world, but this reckless and dangerous action runs counter to that goal,” the statement said. “By releasing stolen and classified documents, WikiLeaks has put at risk not only the cause of human rights but also the lives and work of these individuals.”
The cables, a huge sampling of the daily traffic between the State Department and some 270 embassies and consulates, amount to a secret chronicle of the United States’ relations with the world in an age of war and terrorism. Among their revelations, to be detailed in The Times in coming days:
¶ A dangerous standoff with Pakistan over nuclear fuel: Since 2007, the United States has mounted a highly secret effort, so far unsuccessful, to remove from a Pakistani research reactor highly enriched uranium that American officials fear could be diverted for use in an illicit nuclear device. In May 2009, Ambassador Anne W. Patterson reported that Pakistan was refusing to schedule a visit by American technical experts because, as a Pakistani official said, “if the local media got word of the fuel removal, ‘they certainly would portray it as the United States taking Pakistan’s nuclear weapons,’ he argued.”
¶ Gaming out an eventual collapse of North Korea: American and South Korean officials have discussed the prospects for a unified Korea, should the North’s economic troubles and political transition lead the state to implode. The South Koreans even considered commercial inducements to China, according to the American ambassador to Seoul. She told Washington in February that South Korean officials believe that the right business deals would “help salve” China’s “concerns about living with a reunified Korea” that is in a “benign alliance” with the United States.
¶ Bargaining to empty the Guantánamo Bay prison: When American diplomats pressed other countries to resettle detainees, they became reluctant players in a State Department version of “Let’s Make a Deal.” Slovenia was told to take a prisoner if it wanted to meet with President Obama, while the island nation of Kiribati was offered incentives worth millions of dollars to take in Chinese Muslim detainees, cables from diplomats recounted. The Americans, meanwhile, suggested that accepting more prisoners would be “a low-cost way for Belgium to attain prominence in Europe.”
¶ Suspicions of corruption in the Afghan government: When Afghanistan’s vice president visited the United Arab Emirates last year, local authorities working with the Drug Enforcement Administration discovered that he was carrying $52 million in cash. With wry understatement, a cable from the American Embassy in Kabul called the money “a significant amount” that the official, Ahmed Zia Massoud, “was ultimately allowed to keep without revealing the money’s origin or destination.” (Mr. Massoud denies taking any money out of Afghanistan.)
¶ A global computer hacking effort: China’s Politburo directed the intrusion into Google’s computer systems in that country, a Chinese contact told the American Embassy in Beijing in January, one cable reported. The Google hacking was part of a coordinated campaign of computer sabotage carried out by government operatives, private security experts and Internet outlaws recruited by the Chinese government. They have broken into American government computers and those of Western allies, the Dalai Lama and American businesses since 2002, cables said.
Mixed records against terrorism: Saudi donors remain the chief financiers of Sunni militant groups like Al Qaeda, and the tiny Persian Gulf state of Qatar, a generous host to the American military for years, was the “worst in the region” in counterterrorism efforts, according to a State Department cable last December. Qatar’s security service was “hesitant to act against known terrorists out of concern for appearing to be aligned with the U.S. and provoking reprisals,” the cable said.
 ¶ Mixed records against terrorism: Saudi donors remain the chief financiers of Sunni militant groups like Al Qaeda, and the tiny Persian Gulf state of Qatar, a generous host to the American military for years, was the “worst in the region” in counterterrorism efforts, according to a State Department cable last December. Qatar’s security service was “hesitant to act against known terrorists out of concern for appearing to be aligned with the U.S. and provoking reprisals,” the cable said.
¶ An intriguing alliance: American diplomats in Rome reported in 2009 on what their Italian contacts described as an extraordinarily close relationship between Vladimir V. Putin, the Russian prime minister, and Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian prime minister and business magnate, including “lavish gifts,” lucrative energy contracts and a “shadowy” Russian-speaking Italian go-between. They wrote that Mr. Berlusconi “appears increasingly to be the mouthpiece of Putin” in Europe. The diplomats also noted that while Mr. Putin enjoys supremacy over all other public figures in Russia, he is undermined by an unmanageable bureaucracy that often ignores his edicts.
¶ Arms deliveries to militants: Cables describe the United States’ failing struggle to prevent Syria from supplying arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has amassed a huge stockpile since its 2006 war with Israel. One week after President Bashar al-Assad promised a top State Department official that he would not send “new” arms to Hezbollah, the United States complained that it had information that Syria was providing increasingly sophisticated weapons to the group.
¶ Clashes with Europe over human rights: American officials sharply warned Germany in 2007 not to enforce arrest warrants for Central Intelligence Agency officers involved in a bungled operation in which an innocent German citizen with the same name as a suspected militant was mistakenly kidnapped and held for months in Afghanistan. A senior American diplomat told a German official “that our intention was not to threaten Germany, but rather to urge that the German government weigh carefully at every step of the way the implications for relations with the U.S.”
The 251,287 cables, first acquired by WikiLeaks, were provided to The Times by an intermediary on the condition of anonymity. Many are unclassified, and none are marked “top secret,” the government’s most secure communications status. But some 11,000 are classified “secret,” 9,000 are labeled “noforn,” shorthand for material considered too delicate to be shared with any foreign government, and 4,000 are designated both secret and noforn.
Many more cables name diplomats’ confidential sources, from foreign legislators and military officers to human rights activists and journalists, often with a warning to Washington: “Please protect” or “Strictly protect.”
The Times has withheld from articles and removed from documents it is posting online the names of some people who spoke privately to diplomats and might be at risk if they were publicly identified. The Times is also withholding some passages or entire cables whose disclosure could compromise American intelligence efforts.
Terrorism’s Shadow
The cables show that nearly a decade after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the dark shadow of terrorism still dominates the United States’ relations with the world. They depict the Obama administration struggling to sort out which Pakistanis are trustworthy partners against Al Qaeda, adding Australians who have disappeared in the Middle East to terrorist watch lists, and assessing whether a lurking rickshaw driver in Lahore, Pakistan, was awaiting fares or conducting surveillance of the road to the American Consulate.
They show American officials managing relations with a China on the rise and a Russia retreating from democracy. They document years of painstaking effort to prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon — and of worry about a possible Israeli strike on Iran with the same goal.
Even when they recount events that are already known, the cables offer remarkable details.
For instance, it has been previously reported that the Yemeni government has sought to cover up the American role in missile strikes against the local branch of Al Qaeda. But a cable’s fly-on-the-wall account of a January meeting between the Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and Gen. David H. Petraeus, then the American commander in the Middle East, is nonetheless breathtaking.
“We’ll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours,” Mr. Saleh said, according to the cable sent by the American ambassador, prompting Yemen’s deputy prime minister to “joke that he had just ‘lied’ by telling Parliament” that Yemeni forces had carried out the strikes.
Mr. Saleh, who at other times resisted American counterterrorism requests, was in a lighthearted mood. The authoritarian ruler of a conservative Muslim country, Mr. Saleh complains of smuggling from nearby Djibouti, but tells General Petraeus that his concerns are drugs and weapons, not whiskey, “provided it’s good whiskey.”
Likewise, press reports detailed the unhappiness of the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, when he was not permitted to set up his tent in Manhattan or to visit ground zero during a United Nations session last year.
But the cables add to the tale a touch of scandal and alarm. They describe the volatile Libyan leader as rarely without the companionship of “his senior Ukrainian nurse,” described as “a voluptuous blonde.” They reveal that Colonel Qaddafi was so upset by his reception in New York that he balked at carrying out a promise to return dangerous enriched uranium to Russia. The American ambassador to Libya told Colonel Qaddafi’s son “that the Libyan government had chosen a very dangerous venue to express its pique,” a cable reported to Washington.
The cables also disclose frank comments behind closed doors. Dispatches from early this year, for instance, quote the aging monarch of Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah, as speaking scathingly about the leaders of Iraq and Pakistan.
Speaking to another Iraqi official about Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister, King Abdullah said, “You and Iraq are in my heart, but that man is not.” The king called President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan the greatest obstacle to that country’s progress. “When the head is rotten,” he said, “it affects the whole body.”
The American ambassador to Eritrea reported last year that “Eritrean officials are ignorant or lying” in denying that they were supporting the Shabab, a militant Islamist group in Somalia. The cable then mused about which seemed more likely.
As he left Zimbabwe in 2007 after three years as ambassador, Christopher W. Dell wrote a sardonic account of Robert Mugabe, that country’s aging and erratic leader. The cable called Mr. Mugabe “a brilliant tactician” but mocked “his deep ignorance on economic issues (coupled with the belief that his 18 doctorates give him the authority to suspend the laws of economics).”
The possibility that a large number of diplomatic cables might become public has been discussed in government and media circles since May. That was when, in an online chat, an Army intelligence analyst, Pfc. Bradley Manning, described having downloaded from a military computer system many classified documents, including “260,000 State Department cables from embassies and consulates all over the world.” In an online discussion with Adrian Lamo, a computer hacker, Private Manning said he had delivered the cables and other documents to WikiLeaks.
Mr. Lamo reported Private Manning’s disclosures to federal authorities, and Private Manning was arrested. He has been charged with illegally leaking classified information and faces a possible court-martial and, if convicted, a lengthy prison term.
In July and October, The Times, the British newspaper The Guardian and the German magazine Der Spiegel published articles based on documents about Afghanistan and Iraq. Those collections of dispatches were placed online by WikiLeaks, with selective redactions of the Afghan documents and much heavier redactions of the Iraq reports. The group has said it intends to post the documents in the current trove as well, after editing to remove the names of confidential sources and other details.
Fodder for Historians
Traditionally, most diplomatic cables remain secret for decades, providing fodder for historians only when the participants are long retired or dead. The State Department’s unclassified history series, entitled “Foreign Relations of the United States,” has reached only the year 1972.
While an overwhelming majority of the quarter-million cables provided to The Times are from the post-9/11 era, several hundred date from 1966 to the 1990s. Some show diplomats struggling to make sense of major events whose future course they could not guess.
In a 1979 cable to Washington, Bruce Laingen, an American diplomat in Teheran, mused with a knowing tone about the Iranian revolution that had just occurred: “Perhaps the single dominant aspect of the Persian psyche is an overriding egoism,” Mr. Laingen wrote, offering tips on exploiting this psyche in negotiations with the new government. Less than three months later, Mr. Laingen and his colleagues would be taken hostage by radical Iranian students, hurling the Carter administration into crisis and, perhaps, demonstrating the hazards of diplomatic hubris.
In 1989, an American diplomat in Panama City mulled over the options open to Gen. Manuel Noriega, the Panamanian leader, who was facing narcotics charges in the United States and intense domestic and international political pressure to step down. The cable called General Noriega “a master of survival”; its author appeared to have no inkling that one week later, the United States would invade Panama to unseat General Noriega and arrest him.
In 1990, an American diplomat sent an excited dispatch from Cape Town: he had just learned from a lawyer for Nelson Mandela that Mr. Mandela’s 27-year imprisonment was to end. The cable conveys the momentous changes about to begin for South Africa, even as it discusses preparations for an impending visit from the Rev. Jesse L. Jackson.
The voluminous traffic of more recent years — well over half of the quarter-million cables date from 2007 or later — show American officials struggling with events whose outcomes are far from sure. To read through them is to become a global voyeur, immersed in the jawboning, inducements and penalties the United States wields in trying to have its way with a recalcitrant world.
In an era of satellites and fiber-optic links, the diplomatic cable retains the archaic name of an earlier technological era. It has long been the tool for the secretary of state to dispatch orders to the field and for ambassadors and political officers to send their analyses back to Washington.
The cables come with their own lexicon: “codel,” for a visiting Congressional delegation; “visas viper,” for a report on a person considered dangerous; “dĂ©marche,” an official message to a foreign government, often a protest or warning.
Diplomatic Drama
But the drama in the cables often comes from diplomats’ narratives of meetings with foreign figures, games of diplomatic poker in which each side is sizing up the other and neither is showing all its cards.
Among the most fascinating examples recount American officials’ meetings in September 2009 and February 2010 with Ahmed Wali Karzai, the half brother of the Afghan president and a power broker in the Taliban’s home turf of Kandahar.
They describe Mr. Karzai, “dressed in a crisp white shalwar kameez,” the traditional dress of loose tunic and trousers, appearing “nervous, though eager to express his views on the international presence in Kandahar,” and trying to win over the Americans with nostalgic tales about his years running a Chicago restaurant near Wrigley Field.
But in mid-narrative there is a stark alert for anyone reading the cable in Washington: “Note: While we must deal with AWK as the head of the Provincial Council, he is widely understood to be corrupt and a narcotics trafficker.” (Mr. Karzai has repeatedly denied such charges.) And the cables note statements by Mr. Karzai that the Americans, informed by a steady flow of eavesdropping and agents’ reports, believe to be false.
A cable written after the February meeting coolly took note of the deceit on both sides.
Mr. Karzai “demonstrated that he will dissemble when it suits his needs,” the cable said. “He appears not to understand the level of our knowledge of his activities. We will need to monitor his activity closely, and deliver a recurring, transparent message to him” about the limits of American tolerance.
Not all Business
Even in places far from war zones and international crises, where the stakes for the United States are not as high, curious diplomats can turn out to be accomplished reporters, sending vivid dispatches to deepen the government’s understanding of exotic places.
In a 2006 account, a wide-eyed American diplomat describes the lavish wedding of a well-connected couple in Dagestan, in Russia’s Caucasus, where one guest is the strongman who runs the war-ravaged Russian republic of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov.
The diplomat tells of drunken guests throwing $100 bills at child dancers, and nighttime water-scooter jaunts on the Caspian Sea.
“The dancers probably picked upwards of USD 5000 off the cobblestones,” the diplomat wrote. The host later tells him that Ramzan Kadyrov “had brought the happy couple ‘a five-kilo lump of gold’ as his wedding present.”
“After the dancing and a quick tour of the premises, Ramzan and his army drove off back to Chechnya,” the diplomat reported to Washington. “We asked why Ramzan did not spend the night in Makhachkala, and were told, ‘Ramzan never spends the night anywhere.’ ”
Scott Shane reported from Washington, and Andrew W. Lehren from New York. Reporting was contributed by Jo Becker, C. J. Chivers and James Glanz from New York; Eric Lichtblau, Michael R. Gordon, David E. Sanger, Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt and Ginger Thompson from Washington; and Jane Perlez from Islamabad, Pakistan.

The Middle East's Next Generation Of Politicians

By David Ignatius
This comment was published in The Washington Post on 28/11/2010

Apolitical succession is beginning in the Middle East in which a generation of generally pro-American leaders is giving way to a group whose attitudes and loyalties are less certain. This transition comes at a time when U.S. power in the region is perceived to be weakening.

The process of change can be seen, in different forms, in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iraq - traditionally the three most powerful nations in the Arab world. All three are vexed by the machinations of a revolutionary Iran and by al-Qaeda militants, both of which encourage opposition to the ruling elites.

The first transition has already begun in Saudi Arabia, the wealthiest and historically the most pro-American of the Arab regimes. The headlines last week were about King Abdullah's visit to the United States for treatment of a slipped disc, and the return to Saudi Arabia of Crown Prince Sultan, the defense minister. It was a sign of change that the travels of these aging royals were announced in the normally secretive kingdom.

But the real Saudi news was that Abdullah's son Miteb has been appointed head of the National Guard, one of the country's top military positions. That marked a transfer of power to what's known as the "third generation," the grandsons of the founding King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud. An earlier hint was the appointment of Prince Mansour bin Miteb, the son of the minister of municipalities, to succeed his father.

Saudi analysts say these changes appear to be establishing a pattern for succession: that sons will succeed fathers in the Cabinet positions assigned in a long-ago power-sharing deal. A likely instance would be the appointment of Mohammed bin Nayef, the highly regarded Saudi chief of counterterrorism, to succeed his father, Prince Nayef, as minister of the interior when Nayef moves up to become the next crown prince.
 

This succession scheme provides a measure of order, but it masks the tensions that are present within the royal family over which way the kingdom should lean, in regional and global conflicts.

The succession in Egypt turns on the age and health of President Hosni Mubarak, who has led the country since the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. Mubarak has proved to be a solid bulwark against Muslim fundamentalists - at the cost of Egypt's stillborn democratic reforms. The transition paradigm in this region is exemplified by the expectation that Mubarak will be succeeded by his son Gamal. With tight controls on the opposition, the Mubaraks' National Democratic Party is expected to win easily in the parliamentary elections starting Sunday.

This father-to-son process was also evident in Syria, where President Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father, Hafez. It took the young president several years to consolidate control, but he has done so cleverly and ruthlessly, and he is now one of the stronger Arab leaders of his generation - someone who regularly thumbs his nose at the United States and gets away with it.

A less fortunate son is Lebanon's Prime Minister Saad Hariri, whose father, Rafiq, was assassinated shortly after leaving that job in 2005. The coming month - when a U.N. investigative tribunal is expected to indict members of the powerful Syrian-backed Hezbollah militia for Rafiq's murder - will test whether a son's need for vengeance can surmount regional realpolitik. In this Shakespearean drama, don't bet on Hamlet.

Iraq is also in the midst of a political transition, and that's the hardest to predict. In this case, the ailing parent who's about to depart the scene is not a person but a nation - the United States. Since invading Iraq in 2003 and shattering its old power structure, U.S. forces there have been in loco parentis. But that's ending, with the formation of a coalition government headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Vice President Biden explained to a small group of journalists last week at the White House how he helped midwife the new government. But though it includes all the major political factions, it's as fragile as Iraqi politics itself. And Biden said explicitly, in answer to a question, that if this weak center doesn't hold and the country slips back into civil war, the United States isn't coming to the rescue.

What's ahead? As the coalition deal was being reached, Iranian operatives are said by an Arab intelligence source to have circulated an order to kill former prime minister Ayad Allawi and other members of his Iraqiya Party. But don't expect Uncle Sam to solve the problem. You're on your own, kids.

Morocco and the European Parliament

By Mohammad el-Ashab
This comment was published in al-Hayat on 28/11/2010

There is a crisis between Morocco and the European Parliament, but there is an even sharper one between Rabat and the Spanish People’s opposition Party. While Madrid, led by Socialist Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero, has paved the way for granting Morocco an advantageous position in its negotiations with the European Union, his opponents continue to push in a different direction.

But there is nothing new here. Nearly seven years ago, Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar asked that economic sanctions be imposed against Morocco in the aftermath of the Perejil Island crisis.

At the time, the Europeans did not meet Aznar’s demands. But now, his supporters at the European Parliament, which is dominated by conservatives, have managed to pass a resolution over the recent El-Oyoun incident, holding that the United Nations is the party best suited to carry out an independent international investigation over the incidents. The Moroccans, meanwhile, said that the resolution contains many distortions.

What the People’s Party failed to accomplish at the level of the European Union in what regards the Perejil Island crisis, when the American administration intervened in the crisis to restore calm on the uninhabited island, the People’s Party managed to achieve this time in the European Parliament. This explains the Moroccan anger, to the degree that a mass rally was organized against the Spanish conservatives. With this, perhaps Rabat has chosen to respond in a way the Europeans would understand, namely by protesting this injustice in the street.

The Moroccans have not been very happy with this situation. In the past, they wagered that when Spain and Portugal join the European Common Market, this would open the door wide for their agricultural products. They believed that giving time to the emerging democracy in Spain would help them find a foothold in Europe. The late King Hassan II had assumed that the time will indeed come when his country would become a full member of the European Union, while opposition voices called on him to improve his country’s record in human rights, press freedoms, and the compatibility of Moroccan laws with the European system.

During the rule of his successor, King Mohammed VI, Morocco has taken the correct path. It has opened the prisons and allowed Moroccans and foreigners to access the records of the country’s secret history of serious violations in what regards this complicated issue. Morocco thus seemed to be closer to containing European disgruntlement, were it not for the thorny issue of the Sahara conflict, which has blocked several moves towards rapprochement. To end the conflict, Morocco has called for a democratic approach under the broad title of autonomy. However, this approach has had repercussions. Sometimes this involved violence, such as when Moroccan forces moved to disperse the Saharan demonstrations that were held to raise social demands, but ended up facing knives and swords, and a number of these forces were subsequently ruthlessly butchered.

However, this did not prevent criticisms from being made by the European Parliament.

There were several political, cultural and ideological reasons that led to the resolution: The conservative right-wing influence in the European Parliament was too great that it stifled the cries of the Moroccan security personnel as they were slaughtered. It seems that the muddled account of what happened dominated all other aspects of the situation. Human rights, and not national commitments, are what triumphed.

It does not matter that some groups in the European Parliament were deceived. More importantly, human rights, which are an indivisible issue, require an encouraging climate, one that involves an understanding of rights, and their connection to duties.

Morocco’s problem in the Sahara therefore, is not a debate over the degree to which commitments related to these values have been respected. Instead, it involves the degree to which the Sahara is viable as a model in this regard. Who can convince thousands of Saharans returning from the Tindouf camps that their return does not necessarily mean that there will be a welfare state that will meet all of these demands, such as for housing and employment? Who can cement the values of respect for human rights over the rubble of a regional struggle whose repercussions continue to animate various political developments?

In simple terms, the issue requires adopting an objective vision with regard to what happened in the past, and what is taking place today. It was striking to see a demonstration of hundreds of thousands of Moroccans, to protest the resolution by the European Parliament and the Spanish People’s Party, led by activists and MPs of Saharan origin.

The Ferocious Conflict In Saudi Arabia


By Tariq Alhomayed
This comment was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 28/11/2010
 
The Saudi Arabian Interior Ministry revealed that 19 terrorist cells were planning to carry out operations against institutions, foreign nationals, security figures, and even media figures within Saudi Arabia [before they were arrested by the security apparatus over the past 8 months]. This in an indication that the conflict that is taking place between the terrorists and the Saudi security forces is becoming more ferocious. The statement issued by the Saudi Arabian Interior Ministry revealed that Al Qaeda is trying to undermine the security achievements made by Saudi Arabia by targeting easy or open targets, such as media figures and foreign nationals who – of course – do not receive special individual security protection, as this would be impossible.
 
Al Qaeda wants to achieve two goals; firstly, intimidating those who criticize it, namely the media, and secondly undermining the image of the security services and the successes it has achieved both domestically and externally. This is what is making this battle so difficult and ferocious. The problem in Saudi Arabia today is not in the security effort or its citizens' cooperation with the security apparatus but rather in the ideological division that exists, and the implementation of laws that aim to dismantle the smaller parts of terrorism that contribute to the construction of the grand machinery of terrorism which Al Qaeda utilizes to polarize society, motivate and incite people, and raise funds.
 
What we mean here is the extent that we tolerate the assault on the dignity of the State which the terrorists are seeking to undermine. Since the establishment of the Al Qaeda organization we have – from time to time – seen how easily fatwas that takfir [denounce as infidel] others, transgress the bounds, and strengthen division, are issued in Saudi Arabia. This is despite the issuance of a Royal decree banning fatwa issuance outside of the framework of the Saudi Arabian Council of Senior Scholars. This is because there are those who transgress the limits, issuing fatwas that accuse others of treason; those who do this should be tried and punished for their only aim is to inflame the situation.
 
There is also another problem, and that is fatwas being issued on topics that have nothing do with religion, such as the surprising fatwa that was issued about women's employment. One mistake gave rise to another with regards to this fatwa, and a media campaigns were launched [denouncing this fatwa] causing problems in the Saudi press and inflaming the situation for no reason. This was not useful dialogue, but discord and division being sowed between the two parties, and the victims of this – as always – are the moderates and the State. We all know, and this is a historical imperative, that only one decision is issued from above to decide and settle such issues, whether this is the issue of women's education, or others.
 
The infringement of the State's authority does not end here, but in fact this is something that has reached minor regulatory decisions such as the Saudization of jobs in Quran schools, where we have witnessed dangerous incitement. There is a huge difference between incitement and objection; there are those who incite in the name of religion but who are not in a position of power, or a position of possessing the requisite knowledge [to make such decisions], exploiting controversies over small regulatory decisions in order to incite and radicalize the youth. The State says that it is the system, whilst the instigators say that it is sedition and takfir and unfortunately they are stoking the fire of this incitement and escaping without behind held to account or punished [for their actions].
 
The process of attracting young people to terrorism also means that a defect remains in the education process, in the widest definition of the term, from the family to school. This means that Saudi Arabia is in urgent need of reviewing and evaluating special educational programs for young people, from those teaching this to its syllabus, as well means of occupying the time of young people and benefiting from their energy. This is not through civil action in what is essentially a conservative Muslim society, but through activating the creative energies of young people, filling their leisure time, expanding their horizons, and teaching them that we do not live in a Dar al-Harb [abode of war: territory that is not governed by Islam], but rather we are facing a battle for survival that calls for the protection of every single drop of blood.