Palestine Aid Models Must Change

Far from offering sustainable development, the UNRWA's Peace Starts Here aid campaign is simply life-support for Palestine

By Kieron Monks

This comment was published in The Guardian on 19/11/2010

"Peace Starts Here" is the slogan adopted by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to promote its work in the Palestinian territories. But why does peace "start here"? Why not 60 years ago when UNRWA began its work with Palestinian refugees? Or 60 years in the future, when we will still be debating the same problems if the aid models do not change.

The timing of Chris Gunness's recent article about the UN agency's work was unfortunate, coinciding with strikes by UNRWA employees, which have paralysed essential services in the West Bank's 18 refugee camps. The laudable initiatives Gunness mentioned – health centres, schools, food for hardship cases – ground to a halt without his agency's patronage.

That's not sustainable development; it's a permanent life-support system. Neither is it sustainable for UNRWA, which had been forced to slash its services because of budget deficits even before the strikes began.

Palestine is one of the world's largest beneficiaries of foreign aid, receiving over $3bn (£1.9bn) annually (not including the budget of UNRWA itself). Yet a quarter of the West Bank population remains food-insecure and half of all Palestinians live below the poverty line.

If relief work is failing, economic development is even more worrying. Prime minister Salam Fayyad told the Annual Capital Forum that Palestine's GDP grew 9% in the past year, but as a former IMF representative he should know that the gains are hollow. In 2009, over 60% of Palestine's gross national income, and almost 100% of government expenditure, came from aid.

The Palestinian Authority, which receives over $2bn annually, is answerable not to Palestinians, but to its donors. The aid-management structure in Palestine is innately political. At the top level, the ad hoc liaison committee, members include the United States and Israel. The impact of foreign interests can be clearly seen in PA budgets that allocate 10 times more money to security – suppressing resistance to the occupation – than to agriculture, which could be the backbone of the Palestinian economy.

Industries with export potential, agriculture and construction have shrunk to half their 1999 output. Building for future independence has been subordinated to short-term crisis management.

The 2006 elections showed how vulnerable Palestine's economy and development efforts are to foreign interests. Following Hamas's election victory, emergency and development aid were drastically reduced – making a clear statement that foreign aid is contingent on foreign control.

Joseph DeVoir, author of Tracking External Donor Funding, has compiled an extensive study linking aid figures with political changes in the territories. In his words, "when realpolitik shifts, development takes a back seat".

Attempts to make aid work for the population have had little success. Ninety-one countries, including the US, signed up to the 2005 Paris Principles on aid effectiveness, which stipulated: "Developing countries must lead their own development policies." Although the declaration showed widespread acknowledgement of aid's failure to empower Palestinians, it has not been the catalyst for change that was hoped for.

Individual NGOs have attempted to assert their independence from donors. Many reject USAID funding due to its political demands, which preclude assistance for projects that could benefit people with affiliations to undesirable political groups. The Dalia Association has introduced a "Village Decides" scheme, focused on institution building, which empowers local communities to invest funding as they see fit, without conditions.

This commitment to reform is not generally reflective of Palestine's NGO sector, which has become a byword for corruption, incompetence and meaningless job creation. Thousands of NGOs have sprung up, promoting everything from family planning to liberal arts education, bloating the aid industry without delivering long-term benefits.

Naseef Mu'allem, director-general of the Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy, revealed that "JICA – the Japanese government aid mission – invested $5m last year, but practically what they spent is $600,000. The rest is given as salaries, accommodation, hotels, retreatment and transportation for the foreign employees here but not for the Palestinians". Without donors thoroughly checking on their investments, this kind of private profiteering has become normal.

Palestinian perceptions of foreign NGOs are revealing. Bir Zeit University's 2008 survey found just 35% of the West Bank population feel they contribute to the development of Palestinian society; 78% said they played some role in reducing human suffering and 55% felt they contribute to reinforcing the Israeli occupation.

According to DeVoir, the combination of these results seems to reveal a perception that NGOs "do not achieve political goals; they facilitate occupation by making it bearable". Certainly NGOs and international agencies have financial motives for sustaining the occupation, without which they could not obtain the funding to combat its effects.

The foreign money flooding into NGOs has entrenched class divisions in Palestinian society. Employment opportunities within them are typically limited to the educated elite class, narrowed further by routine nepotism. In Ramallah, the difference is most apparent with glitzy nightclubs on the doorsteps of refugee camps – the preserve of foreigners and rich Palestinians who live too comfortably to identify with the struggle for independence. Their money has already immunised them against the worst effects of occupation, working in jobs that allow them to cross borders and checkpoints, lessening their incentive to fight the status quo.

So why are the major donors happy to keep pouring money into a black hole? What have the US and Europe bought for their tens of billions since 1994? Stability, which could just as easily be called stagnation. Their money is compensation for half a century of political failure.

Last week Hillary Clinton had her picture taken donating an additional $150m to the Palestinian Authority, her first photo opportunity in the region since chairing the failed peace talks. The current systems of aid will never deliver peace, or development, while they serve interests that run counter to Palestinian independence.

Russia And Lebanon: Expanding The Network Of Protection

By Walid Choucair
This comment was published in al-Hayat on 19/11/2010

With the announcement of the Russian military donation to Lebanon, the relations between Beirut and Moscow have likely entered a new phase, one that paves the way for strategic interests between the two countries, and for Russian interests in this small country. One might recall the notion that Lebanon is not as important to the Russian Federation as it is thought by those who are highlighting the military donation, which the Russians announced during the visit by Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri to Moscow. And some might believe that Moscow has decided to grant Lebanon T-72 tanks because it is replacing its armored vehicle arsenal to rely increasingly on newer-generation models, namely the T-90. Nevertheless, the Russian donation deserves some attention.

Russia has never made a donation of this size to a state outside its political and geographical orbit, although the history of international relations shows that it has engaged in debt forgiveness with certain countries. This is sufficient for us to ask about the political meaning behind the move toward Lebanon; it seems to suggest that this superpower wants to enhance its political relations with Lebanon, and that the small country is part of Russia’s concern with developing the current system of regional relations at this stage. The search for Moscow’s objectives in its relationship with Lebanon is taking on added importance, if the economic aspect of bilateral relations can be developed. Those sitting in the Kremlin believe that the economy is the basis of relations between states, and this is especially true if Moscow is concerned with seeing Lebanon avoid becoming an arena of influence for states in the region, both near and far, and does not want to see this influence become an additional reason for undermining stability in the region, along with other well-known reasons. In this regard, Moscow’s eyes are on Iranian influence, which it fears will grow on in the Mediterranean, because it is uncomfortable with Iran’s behavior with regard to the nuclear issue, and with what it sees as the Iranian role in causing the failure of Moscow’s efforts to complete a Palestinian reconciliation. Russia has sought this goal forcefully throughout this year, through efforts to facilitate peace between Palestinians and Israelis. As for Syrian influence, Russia is wagering that its good historical relations with Damascus will let it help push the latter to use this influence for preserving stability in Lebanon.

Moscow is trying to place Lebanon on the map of oil and gas pipelines that pass to and from Russia, to Europe and the Middle East, especially Turkey. It is a map of arteries that form the basis for major political interests and strategic regional projects. During the Lebanese-Russian talks a few days ago, the sides discussed including the possibility of big Russian firms gaining guarantees from the Russian government to build a number of gas-powered electricity plants in Lebanon, with Russian funding, provided that Lebanon purchase this energy from Russian companies for a period of time (30 years, for example), and see Russian gas flow through a Turkish pipeline and then connect it to the Arab pipeline, which has reached the Lebanese-Syrian border. The Russians are headed toward executing a similar project with Turkey; however, it aims at building three nuclear plants to generate electricity on its territory. This electricity will then be sold by Russian firms (which are carrying out the construction process with a guarantee from the Turkish state and the facilities it offers) to Ankara for three decades, with ownership then reverting to Turkey.

Russia’s desire for economic, military and political partnership with Lebanon might help the latter expand the network of external umbrellas that protect its domestic situation from meddling by regional or international powers, and its territory from Israeli adventurism against it. Moreover, it will make Lebanon’s obtaining of additional Russian weapons in the coming stage (negotiations are underway for Lebanon to purchase 46 T-72 tanks at special prices that are very low) possible, if it develops and includes means of protecting its skies from constant Israeli violations.

Russia’s participation in providing elements of force to the Lebanese Army, under no illusions about the balance of power with Israel, constitutes a political-military deterrent to Israeli recklessness, which can be added to Russian economic interests, if bilateral negotiations on agreements covering the electricity sector and oil drilling succeed. All of this opens new horizons that give Lebanon the ability to depend on a wider range of weapons sources, so that the United States alone does not dominate things, and so that protecting Lebanon from Israeli bullying and from regional meddling in domestic conditions becomes a meeting-point for a wider range of states with international influence.

Stop The Christian Exodus From Muslim Countries

By Dr Hamad al-Majid
This comment was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 18/11/2010
 
The attack on the Church of Our Lady of Salvation in Iraq not only caused murder and destruction, but it has led to wider religious, humanitarian, and legal turmoil. Among those primarily affected by this reckless Al Qaeda attack have been the advocates of a moderate, tolerant Islam, as was the case in the aftermath of the 9/11 atrocities. After 9/11, calls for moderate Islam declined significantly, and hundreds of Islamic institutions were closed. Furthermore, a large number of preachers lost their funding, and thousands of orphans and widows, who were being supported by such institutions, were displaced.
 
Al Qaeda’s horrific attack against the Church of Our Lady of Salvation in Iraq represents a self-inflicted blow for the organization. The noose around its neck has subsequently tightened in a number of countries, including Saudi Arabia. Even when Al Qaeda focussed its rhetoric on ‘resisting America’ and ‘targeting Americans’, this failed to resonate with a segment of their religiously indoctrinated youth. Nevertheless there was little opposition to this rhetoric from within, with members following the principle of "I do not support this, but it does not affect me."
 
Yet Al Qaeda was soon exposed as merely a brutal force, with a skewed ideology, when it began to target Saudi Arabian economic institutions. The terrorist group launched an attack on the entire Saudi security network, firstly by targeting its head office, and then later attempting to assassinate one of its key figures, Saudi Assistant Interior Minister for Security Affairs, Prince Muhammad bin Naif. Whilst people became aware of Al Qaeda, they soon became disillusioned with its methods, and were not convinced by its ideology, except for fools with questionable intellect.
 
The Iraqi branch of Al Qaeda attempted to justify its attack on the Iraqi Church, by suggesting it was a response to an earlier incident, whereby two [Christian] women, who had reportedly converted to Islam, had subsequently been abducted by a Church [in Egypt]. If we accept such a justification, then hypothetically we must also accept a British right-wing group attacking a mosque in London, causing a massacre, in support of two Muslim women converting to Christianity, and then being detained in an Islamic institution in France. What a nonsensical pretext! What is this twisted logic? This is the shame that Al Qaeda has brought to our religion, and into the minds of its followers.
 
One of the most important duties for our scholars, preachers, and intellectuals, who are interested in Islamic affairs, is to raise their voices to denounce such unprovoked crimes committed by Al Qaeda against Christian churches and Shiites. This should be equivalent to our condemnation of aggressive attacks against mosques and Sunni centres, committed by some Shiite extremists, or radical Christian groups. The language of condemnation should also be strong, clear and unequivocal, because when Al Qaeda commits such crimes, it distorts the image of Islam and Muslims everywhere. We should suffocate them intellectually, and free ourselves from their heinous acts. Silence, or even the mild language that confronted Al Qaeda’s crimes in some Muslim countries in the 1990s, has helped, along with other factors, to prolong the influence of this poisonous ideology. No scholars or preachers have so far been able to stop Al Qaeda intellectually, and systematically isolate them, whether in the official public arena, or in the private domain.
 
In order to confront this radical trend, we can also consider a number of quotes from historical religious figures, whom Al Qaeda has tried to transform into champions of its ideology. One such figure was Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah, who once famously said "the people under our protection come before the people of our own religion". This was in response to the [invading] Tartars, who had captured both Muslims and Christians [in the Mongol invasion of Damascus].
 
Sultan Qalawun brought both sets of prisoners, in order to negotiate with the Sheikh, and offered to release the Muslims, whilst retaining the Christians. However Ibn Taymiyyah responded with his famous retort and this represents an air of wisdom that Al Qaeda's criminals certainly lack.

The Janus-Like Nature Of Arab Elections

By Rami G. Khouri
This comment was published in The Daily Star on 19/11/2010


Three Arab countries that should have very lively political cultures – Jordan, Bahrain and Egypt have either just held parliamentary elections or will do so later this month. Having just witnessed the aftermath of the Jordanian vote in Amman, this strikes me as a timely moment to pause and assess the positive and negative in these exercises.

The good news is that most Arab citizens can organize themselves politically and regularly contest parliamentary seats, nominate themselves as candidates, engage in open public debates about the issues they deem important, and express their grievances and satisfactions with their political systems or leaders. The elected parliaments to a very limited extent can also try to hold the executive branch of government accountable through actions such as voting on national budgets and giving (or denying) cabinet ministers a vote of confidence.

These are useful and desirable actions that are the right of any citizen, in any form of governance system. Limited as these powers may be, and constricted as their impact on state policies are in reality, nevertheless these are important foundational elements of accountable and pluralistic governance. The single most important power is the right to freedom of expression. Citizens who can express their concerns, grievances or complaints, and make known what they expect from their government officials, provide the essential starting point and needed checks for good governance. Only by making their views known can citizens hope to hold accountable those who actually make the decisions of state – whether tax and subsidies rules, budgetary allocations, or foreign policy alignments.

The recent elections in Jordan and Bahrain and the upcoming vote in Egypt later this month ultimately affirm the cardinal rule of contemporary Arab political culture: Arab democratic practices and institutions – parliaments, elections, political parties – are alive and kicking, but there continues to be a deep and chronic gap between the phenomenon of citizens who vote, and the policies of governments that seem never to change. The positive aspects of holding elections are offset by the negative fact that election results tend to have no impact on the conduct of government policies, in the domestic or foreign realms. Voting thus becomes a useful exercise in freedom of association and expression, but not an element in the peaceful rotation of power among diverse political groups with different ideological policies they wish to implement.

Many reasons explain why Arab parliaments have so little power, including appointed upper houses that check their influence, gerrymandered electoral districts that guarantee a pro-government conservative majority, government-controlled electoral laws and media systems that limit the eligibility and impact of opposition candidates, and, it is commonly alleged, ballot box stuffing and other vote rigging methods employed by incumbent elites.

Despite these structural biases in favor of pro-government majorities, Islamist, progressive, independent and nationalist opposition groups nevertheless regularly take part in elections. All those who participate in such elections – candidates and voters alike – know that they are players in a drama that operates within fixed boundaries, and they do not exaggerate the real significance and impact of what they are doing.

An interesting issue is always whether the main national opposition group will take part or not. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood fields its candidates as independents or under the guise of other legal parties because it is banned as a political group. In the 2005 voting the Brotherhood still managed to win 20 percent of the seats in Parliament that way. Thousands of its members have been imprisoned, tried, or harassed, and many others are prohibited from standing as candidates, yet it is still contesting the elections again later this month. The main opposition Islamist groups in Jordan and Bahrain, on the other hand, boycotted the elections. In the end, however, it makes little difference if opposition forces play the game or boycott the entire process. The result is always predictable, with opposition groups holding 10-20 percent of seats at the most and having zero impact on the actual formulation of state policies.

So what should we make of Arab parliamentary elections? They seem important for three reasons: they reveal that ruling power elites and their foreign supporters remain hesitant to allow the full force of Arab public opinion to assert itself; they provide useful means of gauging public sentiments on important issues of the day; and, they provide a limited arena in which people learn to contest power peacefully, make deals with other groups, and appeal for the votes of their fellow citizens – techniques that will be useful one day when some Arab country decides to relax, trust its people, and move more credibly into the realm of genuinely accountable and representative governance.

Until then, we will have this intriguing and recurring spectacle of Arab parliamentary elections that generate much commotion and some reshuffling of faces and seats, but that also never really bring on any actual changes in political life or national policies.

Here's why Israel must not attack Iran now

In any attack plan of any country there is a risk that the pilots, and particularly the leaders above them, will become enthralled by the plan, without considering all the implications.

By Amos Harel

This comment was published in Haaretz on 18/11/2010

Dr. Olli Heinonen, former deputy secretary general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, presented a relatively optimistic forecast regarding the Iranian nuclear danger when speaking with Haaretz last month. Iran's centrifuges, he told Yossi Melman, are not working well; some of them are defective. Only about 3,000 are working properly, and Iran will need many more to enrich uranium to a level that will allow it to manufacture a nuclear weapon.

	The reactor building of the Bushehr nuclear power plant is seen, just outside the southern city of Bushehr, Iran, Saturday, Aug. 21, 2010
	Photo by: AP

Intentionally or not, Heinonen provided a significant argument against an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear sites in the near future. Heinonen is talking about a critical period of more than a year, during which diplomatic efforts can still see the program halted. A host of international media reports about computer worms and mysterious explosions of Iranian nuclear sites and missiles, responsibility for which has been attributed to various intelligence agencies in the West, could attest to even more time available before a violent clash becomes inevitable.

The scenario presented by Jeffrey Goldberg in The Atlantic, depicting in detail a possible Israeli attack, naturally made waves worldwide and in Israel. But along with the limited progress of the Iranian nuclear program, other considerations must be taken into account. The main one involves the implications of an Israeli military move. The immediate outcome of such a move would be a missile war with Iran and its proxies in the region, Hezbollah and Hamas, into which Syria might be swept.

A plan that might seem impressive on a screen before the seven senior cabinet members who meet might deliver much less than promised in practice. The danger is that Israel will obtain only a short-term delay of the Iranian bomb, but will get involved in a prolonged war.

Another important consideration involves the response of the United States. Relations between U.S. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are terrible. Just awful. Obama is angry at Netanyahu because the latter did not accede in time to his pressure and agree to another construction freeze (a gesture he might agree to now ), and because of the actions of Netanyahu's supporters in Washington that helped Obama's opponents in Congress.

After the mid-term elections, the time will come to settle the score. It seems that Netanyahu's hard-line supporters forget Israel's great dependence on the United States.

What is true in ordinary times is even more true in wartime. Israel needs the Americans: for an "air corridor" for an attack, for surveillance and missile defense, for diplomatic support and an airlift of weapons and spare parts.

It is not surprising that the administration last week rejected Netanyahu's demand that the Americans highlight the military option against Iran. Obama's predecessor George W. Bush wrote in his memoir that he turned down Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's request that the United States and not Israel attack the Syrian nuclear facility in 2007. At this time it is hard to imagine that a hypothetical Israeli notice of a planned attack on Iran would get even a yellow light from Obama.
The security establishment has probably invested a fortune and a huge number of man-hours over the Iranian threat. The army must plan for the worst-case scenario, lest it come about. The extensive coverage worldwide of the preparations for a possible attack help deter Iran. In any attack plan of any country there is a risk that the pilots, and particularly the leaders above them, will become enthralled by the plan, without considering all the implications. A wise man once described the overemphasis on the Iranian issue as "idolatry."

The Netanyahu government is at a diplomatic dead end; partly by its own fault and partly by the fault of its neighbors. Syria did not meet Israel's expectation that a diplomatic agreement would include a break between it and Iran and that Damascus would cease stirring the pot in Lebanon.

The Palestinian Authority leadership now has more sympathy and understanding than does the Israeli government in the capitals of Europe and the United States. That is trouble that Israel must find a way to get out of, but not by pressing the accelerator toward Iran.

Research Shows Stuxnet Worm Aimed At Iran

By Josh Halliday This article was published in The Gulf Times on 19/11/2010 Two new independent examinations of the Stuxnet computer worm, thought to be the work of a national government agency, show that it was definitely built to target technology used at Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant. Described as one of the “most refined pieces of malware ever discovered,” Stuxnet took direct aim at industrial systems based in Iran, whose first nuclear power station recently began operations. Speaking to the Guardian in September, security experts said the attack was likely a state-sponsored case of “modern espionage”. Now new research by cyber security firm Symantec shows definitively that Stuxnet was built to target uranium enrichment equipment used to fuel Tehran’s controversial nuclear programme. Eric Chien, a researcher at Symantec, said the company had “connected a critical piece of the puzzle” with the finding. Stuxnet works by sabotaging frequency converter drives used to alter the speed of motors in factory machinery, the study shows. The worm only attacks drives that run at a higher speed - between 807 Hertz (Hz) and 1210 Hz. When Stuxnet finds drives running at those speeds, it begins changing their revolution speed dramatically - “to 1410Hz and then to 2Hz and then to 1064Hz,” Symantec says. That could make a system tear itself apart due to inertial effects, and would certainly prevent it functioning properly. “Modification of the output frequency essentially sabotages the automation system [preventing it] from operating properly,” Chien said. That Iran is the target emerges from the second part of the discovery, Symantec’s team explains: “we can now confirm that Stuxnet requires the industrial control system to have frequency converter drives from at least one of two specific vendors, one headquartered in Finland and the other in Tehran, Iran. This is in addition to the previous requirements we discussed of a S7-300 CPU and a CP-342-5 Profibus communications module.” They note that “while frequency converter drives are used in many industrial control applications, these speeds are used only in a limited number of applications.” Specifically, “efficient low-harmonic frequency converter drives that output over 600Hz are regulated for export in the United States by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as they can be used for uranium enrichment. We would be interested in hearing what other applications use frequency converter drives at these frequencies.” The worm was identified by a Belarusian security firm working for an Iranian client earlier this year, after finding that some technology in the Tehran plant wasn’t working properly. Experts said the worm must have been well-funded and that the team which wrote it probably comprised between five and 10 people, and would have taken around six months to ready for deployment. Ivanka Barzashka, a research associate at the Federation of American Scientists, told Reuters: “If Symantec’s analysis is true, then Stuxnet likely aimed to destroy Iran’s gas centrifuges, which could produce enriched uranium for both nuclear fuel and nuclear bombs.” Another computer security firm, Langner Communications of Germany, also independently found that the worm was designed to target systems used in power plants, such as those at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Alan Bentley, senior international vice president at security firm Lumension, said Stuxnet is “the most refined piece of malware ever discovered,” and that the worm was significant because “mischief or financial reward wasn’t its purpose, it was aimed right at the heart of a critical infrastructure.” Graham Cluley, a senior consultant with the online security firm Sophos, told the Guardian that the attack heralded the “third age” of cyber crime, where “there are political, economic and military ways in which the internet can be exploited - and malware can be used - to gain advantage by foreign states.” “I think we will see more and more attacks which will be blamed on state-sponsored cyber attacks. There have been numerous attacks in the past which could be said to have possible military, political or economic motives, but it is very difficult to prove that a hack was ordered by Mossad or instead dreamt up by a Macclesfield student.”

Sudan: The No-Win Situation

A vote for independence could lead Sudan back to war. But if there's no result it might be even worse.

By Ros Wynne-Jones

This comment was published in the Guardian on 18/11/2010 

As millions of Sudanese people begin registering to vote this week, their hopes will be tinged with deep anxiety. The laminated voter cards represent the final steps towards self-determination, bringing independence for the south of the country within touching distance.

There have long been fears that a majority vote for secession from Sudan could reignite the civil war that has so far claimed over two million lives. But a new possibility is emerging that could set back the fight for independence by decades.

Charities working in the region are beginning to predict that the most dangerous outcome may be no result at all. The voting process is already behind schedule and may well not meet the legal criteria laid out in advance, meaning there will be no credible outcome.

In this scenario, southern leaders will be tempted to make a unilateral declaration of independence. But to do so would risk everything, and cut the new state off from IMF and World Bank loans. Not only would this be a gift to south Sudan's enemies, it could also plunge the region back into war.

Sudan has lived with a fragile peace now for nearly six years – just tantalisingly long enough to understand what the absence of war means. War in Sudan has been particularly brutal, a conflict of child soldiers and rape, slavery and man-made famine. The country's president, Omar al-Bashir, has faced arrest warrants for war crimes and genocide.

Sudan also continues to suffer deeply due to the conflicts of its neighbours. Even as the Sudanese nation grapples with its own destiny, the advance of the sectarian Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda also threatens lives and stability.

In 1999, I interviewed the survivors of a human bonfire where almost 100 men, women and children had been covered in petrol by LRA soldiers and set on fire. A decade later and that army is still a murderous wildcard within Sudan's borders.

Britain's coalition government has shown it is taking the referendum seriously by prioritising Sudan during the UK's presidency of the UN security council this month; but it should now show it has a plan for the "no result" scenario.

Britain – once the colonial power in Sudan and one of the key architects of the 2005 peace deal – must reassure southern leaders that a second referendum can deliver a result. Meanwhile, the United Nations Mission in Sudan must be prepared to defend civilian lives to ensure a genocide does not take place on its watch.

Humanitarian planning should begin immediately to take in the possibility of a refugee exodus, as well as millions of potential internally displaced Sudanese. In the past, NGO and emergency relief access inside Sudan has been restricted, with catastrophic results; now both sides must make clear, public statements that they will honour human rights. This should go not just for official armies, but also proxy forces such as the Janjaweed who have caused so much bloodshed in Darfur.

War in Sudan is not inevitable, and optimism is wired into Sudanese DNA. Deep in the southern rainforest, I was once shown the ruins of a former palace where the British Major-General Charles Gordon – Gordon of Khartoum – was said to have been laid up with malaria for many months when he took on the south Sudanese in the late 19th-century. One of our guides took pleasure in showing us the remains of Gordon's toilet. "Our enemies come and our enemies go," he said, urinating into the hole overgrown with weeds. "But still we remain."