Monday, November 1, 2010
A Saudi Lesson
By Tariq Alhomayed
This opinion was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 1/11/2010
The ‘The New York Times’ newspaper was not exaggerating when it said that, had it not been for the effort of the Saudi security services, the plot to send terrorist parcels from Yemen to the United States would not have been thwarted. According to the newspaper, the world used to talk about potential terrorists coming from Saudi Arabia, but today it is talking about the excellence of Saudi security, and the importance of it in the battle against international terrorism.
The lesson learned from this Saudi achievement does not concern the discovery of terrorist operations before they occur, but rather the fundamental achievement here was confirmed clearly and unequivocally: [the mentality] of the Saudi security official. He believes in the nobility of his battle, and its justice, and therefore he continues to excel in the most difficult task in the fight against terrorism, namely obtaining information. Those in charge of Saudi security are responsible for this achievement.
One of the most significant problems in confronting terrorism in the Arab and Muslim world is the volume of discontent and systematic skepticism, from religious, political and media circles, regarding the nobility and legitimacy of the fight against terrorism. This leads security authorities in these countries to question the validity of their battle. This is evident in Yemen and Pakistan, and it is a result of the fact that some states have failed to convince their citizens, and security personnel, of the importance and credibility of the fight against terrorism. To combat this scourge is first and foremost in the interest of the homeland, but it also serves to protect religion, and furthermore, one the principle benefits [of combating terrorism internally] is that it prevents foreign forces from interfering, under the pretext of fighting terrorism.
Today we hear the Yemeni officials saying, after the incident involving the terrorist air packages, that they will not allow any foreign interference in their country. The problem that our Yemeni brothers have not understood is that no one craves for such intervention, but countries today, especially in the West, are preoccupied with domestic issues, like their economy, therefore what everybody wants from Yemen is to avoid the ills that originate from their homeland. Especially when it comes to non-complex issues, which brings up the question; how can an individual fool security by sending explosives hidden in computer printers from Sanaa to Chicago?
Therefore we can say that Saudi Arabia has provided a lesson in how to deal with the fight against terrorism. The lesson is that counter-terrorism can be effective when the security personnel believe in the importance and sanctity of their cause. Thus, Saudi security has come to the global forefront in the fight against terrorism, via its excellence in monitoring information. Approximately two weeks ago, France announced that Saudi security had warned their French counterparts of an imminent terrorist threat, and prior to this, the Saudis had already warned two other European countries about a forthcoming terrorist danger. Let us not forget, of course, that the Saudis claimed to have warned Britain [of an imminent threat] before the 7/7 terrorist attacks, and the outcry from the British press when such information was disregarded. However, we saw how the Americans took the Saudi information very seriously a few days ago, and moved quickly, in order to thwart the parcel bomb plot before it could occur. The world soon discovered that the Saudis were responsible for protecting international airports from a major terrorist disaster, which, had it occurred, would have resulted in great chaos, and harmed the international travel and aviation industry.
Therefore, the whole world today thanks the Saudis and their distinguished proficiency in the field of security. Subsequently, Saudi security now becomes a large and continuous challenge, as Saudi Arabia must continue to invest in security, personnel, and technology, to further its recruitment, training and development. Unfortunately for Saudi Arabia and the region, the battle against terrorism is still a long one.
He Is Neither Hostile To Iran Nor Controlled By Tehran
This editorial was published in al-Hayat on 1/11/2010
Let us forget yesterday’s sensitivities and the past few years. Surrendering to them puts policies in small cages, invalidates the present, and booby-traps the future. This applies to relations inside countries with diverse constituents, and to relations among neighboring countries as well. Dialogue inside countries cannot take place on the basis of the victor and the defeated, the strong and the weak, or with the language of provocation, command, or absolute refusal of what has changed, in addition to ignoring the balance of forces and demographic and political realities. However, it also cannot take place through ignoring the legitimate fears of revenge or the wish to marginalize and deal with previous injustice through paving the way for future injustice. The future of countries is not built on power and settlement of accounts or hanging on to formulas that reality does not support, but is rather built with the language of midway and dealing with realism with the variables, and also dealing with national responsibility with the fears caused by the variables. Once again, it can be said that this applies inside countries and among them.
The Iraqi reality is difficult, dangerous, and open to worrisome probabilities. It is not easy for political forces to be unable to form a government even eight months after parliamentary elections that had good results. It is no longer a secret that the issue has to do with a deep crisis among the constituents. It is a crisis of trust that goes beyond the borders of interpreting constitutional texts.
If we were to leave aside what is linked to the Kurdish constituent, the current crisis is summarized as follows: what role will be played by the Sunni Arab constituent in the new Iraq? Will this constituent be an effective and real partner or will its participation be linked to form rather than essence? The answer to this question helps understand the coming Iraqi phase regarding the relations among the constituents domestically, and helps understand the nature of the relations that will be established between Baghdad and a number of capitals in the region. Indeed, the answer will point to the extent of direction towards balance domestically and also balance in relations on the regional level.
Yesterday’s lessons are extremely clear. Managing Iraq from outside the language of mutual acknowledgement of the rights and fears turns it into a source of danger on itself and a source of danger on its neighbors. The neighborhood countries have interests in Iraq and fears that the constituents there lack a “road map” that leads to a long-term stability formula. The same lessons point to the fact that the attempt to manage Iraq from the outside is hard and dangerous, and that hunting in the Iraqi turmoil resembles hunting in a minefield. If Iraqi stability requires the mutual acknowledgement of the constituents of the rights and fears, then stability itself requires the mutual acknowledgement of the forces that have an influence in Iraq in terms of interests and fears.
There is no ambiguity regarding the solution: domestically, a democratic Iraq in which the Arab and Kurd constituents coexist based on the Constitution, and an Iraq where an effective partnership between the Sunni and Shiite constituents represents an absolute response to the destructive strife that was caused by the ripping of the Iraqi fabric. The solution on the exterior is an Arab Iraq that is effective in its surroundings and its nation, and that is not neither hostile to Iran nor controlled by Tehran. It is obvious that an Iraq which is hostile to Iran will not know stability. It is also obvious that an Iraq which is controlled by Tehran is an Iraq that won’t know stability. The Iraqis are searching for Iraq to retrieve it from the fangs of strife or interferences. They do not have another homeland. Arabs search for Iraq because its loss is a problem that could turn into a catastrophe. Realism is the key for a successful search inside and outside. With realism comes mutual acknowledgement. In this context, the initiative of King Abdullad bin Abdul Aziz represents an opportunity. The Iraqi forces can benefit from Saudi Arabia’s Arab and Islamic and international weight, and from its king’s credibility. Moreover, the support of the Arab league is also important, especially that its last decision concerns the Iraqis. It is high time to find Iraq. It is a need for its citizens, its nation, and for restoring some balance to its surroundings that are haunted with the memories of empires and the bitterness they left behind.
Let us forget yesterday’s sensitivities and the past few years. Surrendering to them puts policies in small cages, invalidates the present, and booby-traps the future. This applies to relations inside countries with diverse constituents, and to relations among neighboring countries as well. Dialogue inside countries cannot take place on the basis of the victor and the defeated, the strong and the weak, or with the language of provocation, command, or absolute refusal of what has changed, in addition to ignoring the balance of forces and demographic and political realities. However, it also cannot take place through ignoring the legitimate fears of revenge or the wish to marginalize and deal with previous injustice through paving the way for future injustice. The future of countries is not built on power and settlement of accounts or hanging on to formulas that reality does not support, but is rather built with the language of midway and dealing with realism with the variables, and also dealing with national responsibility with the fears caused by the variables. Once again, it can be said that this applies inside countries and among them.
The Iraqi reality is difficult, dangerous, and open to worrisome probabilities. It is not easy for political forces to be unable to form a government even eight months after parliamentary elections that had good results. It is no longer a secret that the issue has to do with a deep crisis among the constituents. It is a crisis of trust that goes beyond the borders of interpreting constitutional texts.
If we were to leave aside what is linked to the Kurdish constituent, the current crisis is summarized as follows: what role will be played by the Sunni Arab constituent in the new Iraq? Will this constituent be an effective and real partner or will its participation be linked to form rather than essence? The answer to this question helps understand the coming Iraqi phase regarding the relations among the constituents domestically, and helps understand the nature of the relations that will be established between Baghdad and a number of capitals in the region. Indeed, the answer will point to the extent of direction towards balance domestically and also balance in relations on the regional level.
Yesterday’s lessons are extremely clear. Managing Iraq from outside the language of mutual acknowledgement of the rights and fears turns it into a source of danger on itself and a source of danger on its neighbors. The neighborhood countries have interests in Iraq and fears that the constituents there lack a “road map” that leads to a long-term stability formula. The same lessons point to the fact that the attempt to manage Iraq from the outside is hard and dangerous, and that hunting in the Iraqi turmoil resembles hunting in a minefield. If Iraqi stability requires the mutual acknowledgement of the constituents of the rights and fears, then stability itself requires the mutual acknowledgement of the forces that have an influence in Iraq in terms of interests and fears.
There is no ambiguity regarding the solution: domestically, a democratic Iraq in which the Arab and Kurd constituents coexist based on the Constitution, and an Iraq where an effective partnership between the Sunni and Shiite constituents represents an absolute response to the destructive strife that was caused by the ripping of the Iraqi fabric. The solution on the exterior is an Arab Iraq that is effective in its surroundings and its nation, and that is not neither hostile to Iran nor controlled by Tehran. It is obvious that an Iraq which is hostile to Iran will not know stability. It is also obvious that an Iraq which is controlled by Tehran is an Iraq that won’t know stability. The Iraqis are searching for Iraq to retrieve it from the fangs of strife or interferences. They do not have another homeland. Arabs search for Iraq because its loss is a problem that could turn into a catastrophe. Realism is the key for a successful search inside and outside. With realism comes mutual acknowledgement. In this context, the initiative of King Abdullad bin Abdul Aziz represents an opportunity. The Iraqi forces can benefit from Saudi Arabia’s Arab and Islamic and international weight, and from its king’s credibility. Moreover, the support of the Arab league is also important, especially that its last decision concerns the Iraqis. It is high time to find Iraq. It is a need for its citizens, its nation, and for restoring some balance to its surroundings that are haunted with the memories of empires and the bitterness they left behind.
Sunday, October 31, 2010
Saudi Arabia Holds The Key To Defeating Al-Qaida In Yemen
By Victoria Clark
This comment was published in The Observer on 31/10/2010
The prince had been energetically employing a startling mix of inducements (cars, flats, jobs, wives) and threats to rid Saudi Arabia of an al-Qaida problem made embarrassingly manifest when many of the 9/11 bombers were found to hold the kingdom's passports. One of the "carrots" was inviting a young Saudi member of AQAP who was hiding out in Yemen but claimed to have seen the error of his un-Qu'ranic ways to attend his private Ramadan soiree. He further honoured the young jihadist by transporting him there aboard his private jet.
On arriving at the palace, 23-year-old Abdullah Hassan al-Asiri – his name indicates that he came from a formerly Yemeni province – was duly welcomed by the prince in person. Al-Asiri told him that several other jihadists were keen to follow his lead and throw themselves on his benevolent mercy. However, could the prince reassure them all by speaking to one of them in person, then and there, on al-Asiri's mobile phone? Yes, the gracious prince replied, why not?
That call was the agreed signal for the detonation of a bomb al-Asiri had secreted about his person, probably in his underpants, like the Nigerian but Yemen-trained "underpant bomber" Umar Farook Abdulmutallab, who almost exploded an aeroplane over Chicago last December. The blast blew al-Asiri to smithereens, while fortunately failing seriously to injure the prince. However, it was by far the nearest al-Qaida had ever come to assassinating a member of the kingdom's ruling family. Given the fright of this incident, it is hardly surprising that the Saudis' intelligence effort in Yemen is now fine-tuned and energetic enough to pick up rumours of the threat uncovered on Friday. That success can be construed as a welcome sign to the kingdom's western allies that, opaque and unresponsive as it tends to be, it is taking a useful interest in neighbouring Yemen rather than limiting itself to buying influence among the country's top tribal sheikhs.
It took last December's failed plane bombing to concentrate western minds on Yemen. The poorest country in the Middle East, a terrifyingly dysfunctional state stranded among some of the richest states in the world, including Saudi Arabia, looked ideally suited to providing the world's Islamic jihadists with as welcoming and safe a haven as Pakistan's tribal areas. In January, the then prime minister Gordon Brown hurriedly added a forum to discuss Yemen to the end of a London meeting about Afghanistan. But what, precisely, could be done?
Yemen is home to a whole series of linked crises. The trickle of oil which accounts for 90% of its exports and three-quarters of its revenues will both have run out by 2017, as will the water supply to its capital city, Sana'a. Its 23 million-strong population, two-thirds of whom are under the age of 24, is set to double by 2035. Unemployment is around the 35% mark. At the time of the meeting, the country was also suffering two separatist insurgencies: one in the north near the Saudi border had created a vast refugee problem, and one in the south around Aden which looked capable of splitting the country in half again after only two decades of unity.
Yemen's President Abdullah Salih, at the helm for more than 30 years, thanks to a little oil wealth and a talent for co-opting, flattering, reconciling – a style of rule he describes as "dancing on the heads of the snakes" – presides over what academic Robert Burrowes has dubbed a "kleptocracy, a government of, by and for the thieves".
All this is appalling for the vast majority of Yemenis. AQAP, rather than being supported, has ruined tourism in their beautiful country and scuppered all chance of western investment. Southern Yemenis feel warmly towards the west and are unlikely to furnish AQAP with any abiding safe haven in the country. In the last six years of visiting the country regularly, I have learned that Yemenis care much more for land and money than they do for religion or ideology. While a few may be drawn to jihadism, more numb their fear of the future by chewing the leaves of the mildly hallucinogenic qat shrub whose cultivation consumes over a third of the country's agricultural land and a ruinous quantity of water.
AQAP's ability to infiltrate is aided, however, by Yemeni culture. Much of Yemen is run by tribesmen whose sense of self-worth revolves around honouring guests without questions, owning weapons and resisting centralised authority if its dictates impinge on traditionally tribal prerogatives. Small wonder that the influence of the American-educated and English-speaking, internet-savvy Yemeni tribesman and cleric Anwar al-Awlaqi, the man whose teachings may have inspired the bombers, is proving impossible to eliminate, for example. Whatever the pro-or anti- al-Qaida politics of members of the Awlaqi tribe, a large and powerful grouping whose lands are situated east of Aden in the south of the country, they would be dishonouring themselves and their tribe if they handed him over.
Quite correctly, there seems no chance of western armies trying to enforce change on Yemen in the manner they have set out to do in Iraq and Afghanistan. And, in truth, Yemen deserves more pity than bombs. The United States has increased its aid to Yemen – half developmental, half military – to approximately $300m.
We would be well advised to leave the job of arresting Yemen's descent to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf counties which make up the Middle East's equivalent to the European Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). All have substantial Yemeni diaspora and a much better understanding of how the country's internal and tribal affairs work. They also have the funds and, as the attack on Prince Mohammad bin Nayef shows, the immediate and pressing motivation.
This comment was published in The Observer on 31/10/2010
The almost two-year-old merger of Saudi and Yemeni jihadists into a Yemen-based al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) seems to have been a success. Certainly, that is what the suspect packages, including mobile phone technology, on board two cargo planes, suggests. The Saudis have brought funds, the Yemenis manpower. AQAP was described on Thursday by the chief of Britain's Foreign Intelligence Service, Sir John Sawers, as posing a threat comparable to that emanating from Pakistan or Afghanistan.
It's impossible to say whether it was a Saudi or a Yemeni national, or perhaps a Saudi from the disadvantaged southern border region of the country that once belonged to Yemen, who provided the technical know-how, but it is not the first time AQAP has employed mobile phone technology. Barely reported in the west, AQAP road-tested a first mobile phone-enabled bomb in August 2009, at an elegant Ramadan party in Jeddah hosted by Saudi Arabia's chief of counter-terrorism, Prince Mohammad bin Nayef.
The prince had been energetically employing a startling mix of inducements (cars, flats, jobs, wives) and threats to rid Saudi Arabia of an al-Qaida problem made embarrassingly manifest when many of the 9/11 bombers were found to hold the kingdom's passports. One of the "carrots" was inviting a young Saudi member of AQAP who was hiding out in Yemen but claimed to have seen the error of his un-Qu'ranic ways to attend his private Ramadan soiree. He further honoured the young jihadist by transporting him there aboard his private jet.
On arriving at the palace, 23-year-old Abdullah Hassan al-Asiri – his name indicates that he came from a formerly Yemeni province – was duly welcomed by the prince in person. Al-Asiri told him that several other jihadists were keen to follow his lead and throw themselves on his benevolent mercy. However, could the prince reassure them all by speaking to one of them in person, then and there, on al-Asiri's mobile phone? Yes, the gracious prince replied, why not?
That call was the agreed signal for the detonation of a bomb al-Asiri had secreted about his person, probably in his underpants, like the Nigerian but Yemen-trained "underpant bomber" Umar Farook Abdulmutallab, who almost exploded an aeroplane over Chicago last December. The blast blew al-Asiri to smithereens, while fortunately failing seriously to injure the prince. However, it was by far the nearest al-Qaida had ever come to assassinating a member of the kingdom's ruling family. Given the fright of this incident, it is hardly surprising that the Saudis' intelligence effort in Yemen is now fine-tuned and energetic enough to pick up rumours of the threat uncovered on Friday. That success can be construed as a welcome sign to the kingdom's western allies that, opaque and unresponsive as it tends to be, it is taking a useful interest in neighbouring Yemen rather than limiting itself to buying influence among the country's top tribal sheikhs.
It took last December's failed plane bombing to concentrate western minds on Yemen. The poorest country in the Middle East, a terrifyingly dysfunctional state stranded among some of the richest states in the world, including Saudi Arabia, looked ideally suited to providing the world's Islamic jihadists with as welcoming and safe a haven as Pakistan's tribal areas. In January, the then prime minister Gordon Brown hurriedly added a forum to discuss Yemen to the end of a London meeting about Afghanistan. But what, precisely, could be done?
Yemen is home to a whole series of linked crises. The trickle of oil which accounts for 90% of its exports and three-quarters of its revenues will both have run out by 2017, as will the water supply to its capital city, Sana'a. Its 23 million-strong population, two-thirds of whom are under the age of 24, is set to double by 2035. Unemployment is around the 35% mark. At the time of the meeting, the country was also suffering two separatist insurgencies: one in the north near the Saudi border had created a vast refugee problem, and one in the south around Aden which looked capable of splitting the country in half again after only two decades of unity.
Yemen's President Abdullah Salih, at the helm for more than 30 years, thanks to a little oil wealth and a talent for co-opting, flattering, reconciling – a style of rule he describes as "dancing on the heads of the snakes" – presides over what academic Robert Burrowes has dubbed a "kleptocracy, a government of, by and for the thieves".
All this is appalling for the vast majority of Yemenis. AQAP, rather than being supported, has ruined tourism in their beautiful country and scuppered all chance of western investment. Southern Yemenis feel warmly towards the west and are unlikely to furnish AQAP with any abiding safe haven in the country. In the last six years of visiting the country regularly, I have learned that Yemenis care much more for land and money than they do for religion or ideology. While a few may be drawn to jihadism, more numb their fear of the future by chewing the leaves of the mildly hallucinogenic qat shrub whose cultivation consumes over a third of the country's agricultural land and a ruinous quantity of water.
AQAP's ability to infiltrate is aided, however, by Yemeni culture. Much of Yemen is run by tribesmen whose sense of self-worth revolves around honouring guests without questions, owning weapons and resisting centralised authority if its dictates impinge on traditionally tribal prerogatives. Small wonder that the influence of the American-educated and English-speaking, internet-savvy Yemeni tribesman and cleric Anwar al-Awlaqi, the man whose teachings may have inspired the bombers, is proving impossible to eliminate, for example. Whatever the pro-or anti- al-Qaida politics of members of the Awlaqi tribe, a large and powerful grouping whose lands are situated east of Aden in the south of the country, they would be dishonouring themselves and their tribe if they handed him over.
Quite correctly, there seems no chance of western armies trying to enforce change on Yemen in the manner they have set out to do in Iraq and Afghanistan. And, in truth, Yemen deserves more pity than bombs. The United States has increased its aid to Yemen – half developmental, half military – to approximately $300m.
We would be well advised to leave the job of arresting Yemen's descent to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf counties which make up the Middle East's equivalent to the European Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). All have substantial Yemeni diaspora and a much better understanding of how the country's internal and tribal affairs work. They also have the funds and, as the attack on Prince Mohammad bin Nayef shows, the immediate and pressing motivation.
Hijacking The History
This Editorial was published in Arab News on 1/11/2010
After grabbing the Palestinian land Israel is claiming their heritage too
Athough it won’t say so, the recent decision by UNESCO to define two mosques in the occupied territories as Palestinian is a reply to Israel that earlier this year registered the mosques — the Bilal Ibn Rabah Mosque near Bethlehem, and the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron — as its national heritage sites. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the sites would be renovated “in order to reconnect Israelis to their history” even though the two mosques are located in the heart of Palestinian population centers where no significant Jewish population exists.
The Ibrahimi Mosque is where Baruch Goldstein, the American Jewish terrorist and reserve soldier in the Israeli Army, sprayed Muslim worshipers with a machinegun in 1994, killing at least 29 worshipers and injuring 150 others. Bilal Ibn Rabah Mosque, which is off limits to Muslims and is located at the northern tip of Bethlehem, has been completely annexed to Israel and is separated from the rest of the Arab city by the gigantic barrier Israel has built for the purpose of annexing to Israel large chunks of the West Bank.
When Netanyahu announced the original plan, the two mosques were not included. However, after Jewish settlers and their allies in the government exerted pressure on the premier, he decided to add the two sites to the original plan.
Back then, the UN had censured Israel for including the two mosques in its planned Jewish heritage trail, reminding Israel that the two sites are located in the West Bank. Today, UNESCO went one step further than reminding. The mosques, it determined, are Palestinian.
Netanyahu has condemned the UNESCO decision as absurd, an attempt to detach the people of Israel from their heritage. Yet it is Israel, which seeks to consecrate its fait accompli of Palestinian land and history by laying false historical claims. Israelis occupied the land and claimed territorial rights, and now they are hijacking the history and heritage of Palestinians, claiming it is theirs. This is, like Jewish settlement expansion, another land grab that goes against international law and revokes the Palestinians’ right to their cultural identity.
The two mosques have been exclusive Islamic houses of worship for hundreds of years, and in the case of Ibrahimi Mosque, over 1,000 years. Thus, the Israeli claim that they are Jewish sites is beyond the pale. They are located in the West Bank, territory the Palestinians want and need as part of their future state. And international law obliges the occupation authorities not to change the historical heritage of the occupied territories or change the identity of the land or alter its features.
UNESCO, the United Nations cultural watchdog and defender of endangered sites worldwide, is constantly being forced back into the Arab-Israeli conflict because of Israel claiming guardianship of numerous Arab sites in the occupied territories.
UNESCO has once again entered the fray because while it won’t say so, the mosques were being annexed as Israel attempts to establish historical grounds for its existence.
After grabbing the Palestinian land Israel is claiming their heritage too
Athough it won’t say so, the recent decision by UNESCO to define two mosques in the occupied territories as Palestinian is a reply to Israel that earlier this year registered the mosques — the Bilal Ibn Rabah Mosque near Bethlehem, and the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron — as its national heritage sites. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the sites would be renovated “in order to reconnect Israelis to their history” even though the two mosques are located in the heart of Palestinian population centers where no significant Jewish population exists.
The Ibrahimi Mosque is where Baruch Goldstein, the American Jewish terrorist and reserve soldier in the Israeli Army, sprayed Muslim worshipers with a machinegun in 1994, killing at least 29 worshipers and injuring 150 others. Bilal Ibn Rabah Mosque, which is off limits to Muslims and is located at the northern tip of Bethlehem, has been completely annexed to Israel and is separated from the rest of the Arab city by the gigantic barrier Israel has built for the purpose of annexing to Israel large chunks of the West Bank.
When Netanyahu announced the original plan, the two mosques were not included. However, after Jewish settlers and their allies in the government exerted pressure on the premier, he decided to add the two sites to the original plan.
Back then, the UN had censured Israel for including the two mosques in its planned Jewish heritage trail, reminding Israel that the two sites are located in the West Bank. Today, UNESCO went one step further than reminding. The mosques, it determined, are Palestinian.
Netanyahu has condemned the UNESCO decision as absurd, an attempt to detach the people of Israel from their heritage. Yet it is Israel, which seeks to consecrate its fait accompli of Palestinian land and history by laying false historical claims. Israelis occupied the land and claimed territorial rights, and now they are hijacking the history and heritage of Palestinians, claiming it is theirs. This is, like Jewish settlement expansion, another land grab that goes against international law and revokes the Palestinians’ right to their cultural identity.
The two mosques have been exclusive Islamic houses of worship for hundreds of years, and in the case of Ibrahimi Mosque, over 1,000 years. Thus, the Israeli claim that they are Jewish sites is beyond the pale. They are located in the West Bank, territory the Palestinians want and need as part of their future state. And international law obliges the occupation authorities not to change the historical heritage of the occupied territories or change the identity of the land or alter its features.
UNESCO, the United Nations cultural watchdog and defender of endangered sites worldwide, is constantly being forced back into the Arab-Israeli conflict because of Israel claiming guardianship of numerous Arab sites in the occupied territories.
UNESCO has once again entered the fray because while it won’t say so, the mosques were being annexed as Israel attempts to establish historical grounds for its existence.
Rabat, Madrid and Exit Strategies
By Mohammad el-Ashab
This comment was published in al-Hayat on 31/10/2010
In its criticisms of the government of Spanish Prime Minister Luis Zapatero, the only comment that the Spanish People’s Party had regarding the civil unrest that broke out in occupied Melilla, was describing the impoverished suburbs of the city- where Moroccans take refugee- as the most fragile areas in all European cities.
No Spanish voice rose to declare that the excessive force used by the local government- supported by security personnel from Madrid- to disperse demonstrators that were demanding the right to work, has violated the principles of human rights. There is strong evidence that Moroccan residents were rising up against marginalization and selectivity in employment policies, which are restricted to Spanish nationals in occupied Melilla. At the least, this is sufficient justification to continue a type of discrimination in dealing with citizens’ affairs, and there is no difference between residents of occupied Melilla and its Moroccan visitors here. Perhaps the recent crisis that arose between Rabat and Madrid, over the terrible conditions of Moroccan emigrants, was merely a warning cry. In the end, the demonstrations in the streets of Melilla are not isolated from the repercussions of continued Spanish occupation, even if this phenomenon took on the character of a protest for social rights.
The issue of the two cities, Ceuta and Melilla, no longer concerns Moroccan-Spanish relations, which have their ebb and flow. Despite all of the crises, the two countries have been able to escape the predicament with the least possible level of losses. Particularly so when Spain’s Socialist government pushes in the direction of understanding and openness, even if it does not submit to Morocco’s conditions of beginning a calm dialogue about this issue. But on the other side of the spectrum, the People’s Party appears more concerned about shutting the door to any Moroccan-Spanish dialogue, as its leader, Mariano Rajoy, visited the two occupied cities twice in a short period of time. This is while Rabat has not forgotten how former Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, a hard-line conservative, was behind the eruption of a crisis over the uninhabited Perejil Island in the spring of 2002; perhaps the confrontation’s move into the two cities themselves represents a new development then.
At a time in which the Spanish authorities believe that the eruption of protests was an extension of the economic crisis, which has hit at the backbone of Spain and other European countries, there are other analyses. These hold that the family ties and intertwined relations of the residents of the two cities and their families in the region adjacent to the two occupied cities had an impact in directing the incidents of popular anger, which were based on political factors.
The outbreak of anger has set the governments of Rabat and Madrid before a difficult test, one that will not take place without repercussions.
The new Spanish foreign minister, Trinidad Jimenez, has begun to face various types of pressure. She stands between the reservations of the opposition and growing Moroccan requests to start a serious dialogue. Her predecessor, Miguel Angel Moratinos, was an adept practitioner of accord, as he could anger opponents in his country and its neighbor at the same time. But when he saw things moving in the direction of an explosion, he always used a special recipe for instituting calm, but this usually left things half resolved. However, Jimenez, who was involved in foreign relations within the Socialist Party, needs more fortitude to contain the repercussions of the crisis, which might spin out of control.
Most likely, her announcement that Rabat will be the first stop on her foreign visits does not only enshrine an inherited tradition in Spanish politics; it also indicates a desire to knock on all doors. The Moroccans also share the following notion with the Spanish: bilateral relations should not become an election issue. If one must submit to the pressure in this regard, then this card should at least become a search for exit strategies for the crises, and not a reason to increase tension.
However, policy is now being made on the ground, and not in air-conditioned rooms. This is a new development that might be contained, if there is more understanding and behavior that is less about escalation and imposing de facto realities.
No Spanish voice rose to declare that the excessive force used by the local government- supported by security personnel from Madrid- to disperse demonstrators that were demanding the right to work, has violated the principles of human rights. There is strong evidence that Moroccan residents were rising up against marginalization and selectivity in employment policies, which are restricted to Spanish nationals in occupied Melilla. At the least, this is sufficient justification to continue a type of discrimination in dealing with citizens’ affairs, and there is no difference between residents of occupied Melilla and its Moroccan visitors here. Perhaps the recent crisis that arose between Rabat and Madrid, over the terrible conditions of Moroccan emigrants, was merely a warning cry. In the end, the demonstrations in the streets of Melilla are not isolated from the repercussions of continued Spanish occupation, even if this phenomenon took on the character of a protest for social rights.
The issue of the two cities, Ceuta and Melilla, no longer concerns Moroccan-Spanish relations, which have their ebb and flow. Despite all of the crises, the two countries have been able to escape the predicament with the least possible level of losses. Particularly so when Spain’s Socialist government pushes in the direction of understanding and openness, even if it does not submit to Morocco’s conditions of beginning a calm dialogue about this issue. But on the other side of the spectrum, the People’s Party appears more concerned about shutting the door to any Moroccan-Spanish dialogue, as its leader, Mariano Rajoy, visited the two occupied cities twice in a short period of time. This is while Rabat has not forgotten how former Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, a hard-line conservative, was behind the eruption of a crisis over the uninhabited Perejil Island in the spring of 2002; perhaps the confrontation’s move into the two cities themselves represents a new development then.
At a time in which the Spanish authorities believe that the eruption of protests was an extension of the economic crisis, which has hit at the backbone of Spain and other European countries, there are other analyses. These hold that the family ties and intertwined relations of the residents of the two cities and their families in the region adjacent to the two occupied cities had an impact in directing the incidents of popular anger, which were based on political factors.
The outbreak of anger has set the governments of Rabat and Madrid before a difficult test, one that will not take place without repercussions.
The new Spanish foreign minister, Trinidad Jimenez, has begun to face various types of pressure. She stands between the reservations of the opposition and growing Moroccan requests to start a serious dialogue. Her predecessor, Miguel Angel Moratinos, was an adept practitioner of accord, as he could anger opponents in his country and its neighbor at the same time. But when he saw things moving in the direction of an explosion, he always used a special recipe for instituting calm, but this usually left things half resolved. However, Jimenez, who was involved in foreign relations within the Socialist Party, needs more fortitude to contain the repercussions of the crisis, which might spin out of control.
Most likely, her announcement that Rabat will be the first stop on her foreign visits does not only enshrine an inherited tradition in Spanish politics; it also indicates a desire to knock on all doors. The Moroccans also share the following notion with the Spanish: bilateral relations should not become an election issue. If one must submit to the pressure in this regard, then this card should at least become a search for exit strategies for the crises, and not a reason to increase tension.
However, policy is now being made on the ground, and not in air-conditioned rooms. This is a new development that might be contained, if there is more understanding and behavior that is less about escalation and imposing de facto realities.
Saudi Arabia To Iraq...Through The Door
By Tariq Alhomayed
This opinion was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 31/10/2010
The call issued by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz to all Iraqi parties to meet in Riyadh, under the umbrella of the Arab League, is a good thing not just for Iraq and the people of Iraq, but for the entire region. The importance of this call is that Saudi Arabia has approached Baghdad through the [official] door [i.e. in the right way].
The Saudi Arabian King did not invite one [Iraqi] party at the expense of another, nor did he call for an Arab Summit or regional meeting to take place without the input of those involved in this issue, namely the Iraqis themselves. Rather King Abdullah called on the people of Iraq, and "all parties that participated in the elections, and political actors" to discuss the affairs of their country, and it's future, themselves; especially as the situation in Iraq is in dire need of a proposal to save the country from a dark and indeed terrifying future.
With the decline in the proposal of positive initiatives that deal with all Iraqi [parties] in an equal manner; King Abdullah's initiative comes at an important time in order to contribute to helping Iraq to overcome this ongoing crisis [over the formation of a government], with the Iraqis resolving this with their own hands. By inviting all Iraqi parties to meet in Riyadh, this means that the Iraqi problems will be solved by Iraqi ideas, rather than in foreign capitals, with one party going to Iraq, another to Syria, a third to Egypt, and another to Saudi Arabia. What is most important in the Saudi Arabian initiative is that it calls for all Iraqi parties to meet under one roof, and in a country that was and remains concerned about Iraq and the Iraqi people, namely Saudi Arabia.
This is in complete contrast to what I mentioned in my article yesterday about how the game is being played in Iraq [This is How the Game is Being Played in Iraq], according to a well-informed source. Saudi Arabia has taken the initiative to help Iraq overcome this predicament by inviting the Iraqis to sit at one table, face to face, in Riyadh, rather than proposing detailed solutions from abroad. King Abdullah clearly and explicitly called on the Iraqis to come [to Riyadh] to "consult and decide which noble way you take and which honorable direction you choose." He went on to say that Saudi Arabia "assure[s] you of our full readiness to extend a helping hand and support for all resolutions that you will reach and agree upon in order to restore security and peace to the land of Mesopotamia."
Without a doubt, Saudi Arabia's strength does not lie in militias; for it has nothing of this, but rather in its credibility, which was demonstrated in King Abdullah's historic speech when he said "your unity and solidarity strengthen you and us and are cause enough for reunion, patience and wisdom."
Today, as we mentioned before, Saudi Arabia has approached Baghdad through the door, and King Abdullah has called on the Iraqis to meet in Riyadh without setting any preconditions in order for the Iraqis to provide the solutions for themselves. Therefore, this is a historic opportunity for Iraq and the entire region, and it is up to the Iraqis of all [political and sectarian] inclinations to take advantage of this. In Saudi Arabia there will be no pressure on any one party against another, for Saudi Arabia's obsessions, and that of King Abdullah – which is clear to anybody who listens to him talking on the subject of Iraq – is protecting the unity and independence of Iraq. This was demonstrated in King Abdullah's historic speech when he said "our hands are outstretched to you. Let us work together for the security, integrity and stability of the land and brotherly people of Iraq. O Allah, I worked hard and I now ask righteousness; I prayed and I now beseech your response; and I have informed so that You, the most generous of all, will be my witness."
This is a historic call [by the Saudi King] and an opportunity that the wise and those concerned about Iraq have long dreamed of.
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